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ABSTRACT 
Sedat LACINER King's College 
University of London 
This thesis argues that Turkish foreign policy has not demonstrated an unbroken 
continuity and that drastic changes in Turkish foreign policy positions cannot be 
explained simply by looking to the Kemalist model. Rather, this study argues that there 
have been at least seven different schools of thought relating to foreign policy in the 
seventy-five years of the Turkish Republic. These range from Kemalist isolationism to 
Özalist neo-Ottomanism. 
It further claims that even the Kemalist foreign policy approach can be divided into 
several (often contradictory) branches ranging from Inönism to Ecevit's leftist- 
Kemalism. As such, this dissertation attempts to set out and analyse the evolution of the 
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Aims and Objectives 
The main subject of this thesis is Turkish foreign policy and its ideological evolution. 
There are two basic reasons to make this thesis: The situation in the Turkish foreign 
policy literature and the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy which could not be 
explained fully by using solely the variables other than ideology and domestic 
developments. 
First this study assumes that ideology's and domestic factors' role is an understudied 
subject. Since the end of the Ottoman Empire `change' has been the key note of Turkish 
domestic policies. ' First the country changed its political regime from monarchy to one- 
party-republican system, and then to a multi-party democracy. In the republican period, 
Turkey has seen three military coups (27 May 1960,12 March 1971 and 12 September 
1980 Coup), 2 social and political turmoil and violence (like the clashes between the 
radical leftist and the rightist political groups in the 1970s), 3 economic depressions as 
witnessed in the 1930s, 1970s and 1980s, many ethnic (Kurdish), sectarian (Alevi- 
Sunni) and religious conflicts and uprisings especially in the 1920s, 1930s, 1970s and in 
1 Oya Akgönenc, A Study of Political Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy with Particular Reference 
to New Trends in Turco-Arab Relations, 1960-1975, unpublished PhD thesis, The American 
University, 1975, p. 1. 
2 Works on the Turkish military coups in the republican years include: George S. Harris, `The Role of the 
Military in Turkish Politics I-II', Middle East Journal, Vol. 19, Spring and Winter 1965; William Hale, 
Turkish Politics and the Military, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); Mehmet Ali Birand, The 
Generals' Coup in Turkey, An Inside Story of 12 September 1980, (trans.: M. A. Dikerdem), 
(London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987); James Brown, `Military and Politics in Turkey', Armed 
Forces and Society, Vol. 13, No. 2, Winter 1987; Kenneth Fidel, Social Structure and Military 
Intervention: The 1960 Turkish Revolution, unpublished PhD thesis, Washington University, 1969; 
Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds. ), State, Democracy and the Military, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1988); Türkkaya Ataöv, `The 27th of May Revolution and Its Aftermath', Turkish Yearbook of 
International Relations, 1960-1961, pp. 13-22. 
3 For the political violence and radical movements (leftist or rightist) there are lots of standard works. 
Some of them are: Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974); 
Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975, (London: Hurst, 1977); Serif 
Mardin, `Youth and Violence in Turkey', International Social Science Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2,1977, pp. 
229-254; D. Orlow, `Political Violence in Pre-Coup Turkey', Terrorism, An International Journal, 
1982, Vol. 6, No. 1; Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism, From Irredentism to Cooperation, (London: 
Hurst&Company, 1995); Ihsan Bal, Prevention of Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case Study 
of Turkey, PhD thesis, the University of Leicester, 1999; I. P. Lipovsky, The Socialist Movement in 
Turkey, 1960-1980, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992). 
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the 1980s. 4 Relatively undeveloped economy, poor democratisation and poor human 
rights records have always been serious problems for the Turkish people and these 
problems prevented a stable political life as the political, social and economic stability 
has always been a desired aim for Turkey. 6 
In these years apart from the unstable picture of the Turkish social, political and the 
economic structures, the international system has also dramatically changed; the 19th 
century's economic and political world order collapsed and many empires, like the 
Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and the Austria-Hungarian Empire, were 
disintegrated, two devastating world wars changed the world map, and the world 
politics once more changed under the bipolar Cold War tension, and finally the world 
saw the disintegration of the communist block and the Soviet Union at the end of the 
1980s. Turkey, thanks to its location, has been very close to all these changes, and 
because it lies directly at the centre of an area of great conflicts, 7 both actual and 
potential, Turkey has been exposed to the bad effects of the changes in the international 
arena. However, despite the radical changes in the domestic politics and the 
international relations, it is frequently argued by the Turkish policy-makers8 and by 
4 For the ethnic uprisings see: Bal, Prevention...; Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Sheikh and State: The 
Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, (London: Zed Press, 1992); Gerard Chaliand, Kurdish 
Tragedy, (London: Zed Books, 1994); Michael M. Günter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, 
(London: Macmillan, 1997); David McDowell, A Modern History of the Kurds, (London: I. B. Tauris, 
1996); Kemal Kiri§ci and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, An Example of a 
Trans-state Ethnic Conflict, (London: Frank Cass, 1997). 
5 Human Rights in Turkey's Transition to Democracy, (New York: Helsinki Watch Committee, 
1983); Vojtech Mastny and R Craig Nation (eds. ), Turkey Between east and West, New Challenges 
for a Rising Regional Power, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. xi. 
6 For comprehensive analysis of Turkish domestic politics in the republican period, in addition to the 
studies mentioned above, also see: C. H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, (Huntingdon: The 
Eothen Press, 1990); Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996); William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey, (New 
York: St. Martin Press, 1981); George S. Harris, Turkey: Coping with Crisis, (Boulder, Col.: Westview 
Press, 1985); Metin Heper, State Tradition in Turkey, (Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1985); Kemal H. 
Karpat, Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1973); Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey, A Modern History, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Bernard Lewis, The 
Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London: I. B. Tauris&Co. Ltd., 1968); Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural 
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II, (Cambridge and London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 340-437. 
' Like Arab-Israeli Wars, the sectarian conflicts in Lebanon, the Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union, Iraq Iran Wars, Azerbaijan-Armenia Conflicts and the other ethnic and religious conflicts 
in the Middle East, Caucasia and the Balkans, 
8 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for instance describes Turkish foreign policy as a set of Kemalist 
ideas which has not changed since 1923: `The Goals and Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy', via 
internet, www: //mfa. gov. tr. Similarly the Turkish foreign ministers and the prime ministers, except 
Turgut (zal, argued that the main character of Turkish foreign policy has been its continuity: For the 
examples see Ercüment Yavuzalp, Liderlerimiz ve Dil Politika, Bir Diplomat Gözüyle, (Our Leaders 
and Foreign Policy, From Diplomat's Perspective), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1996), pp. 74,88,144,191, 
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many respected Turkish foreign policy scholars9 that Turkish foreign policy has shown 
a remarkable continuity. Andrew Mango for example, claims `The political crisis had 
little effect on foreign policy until the July 1996 advent to power of a coalition with the 
Islamist Refah Party (... )' 10 Dankwart Rustow similarly defends that traditional policies 
(Kemalist policies) have been carried out without interruption, and continuity has been 
the most significant feature of Turkish foreign policy, " and it with this feature is 
distinguished from many other countries, including some of the Western democracies: 
`In contrast to the frequent internal changes on the Turkish domestic scene, Ankara's 
foreign policy has displayed remarkable continuity. Indeed, Turkey's external relations 
have been marked by a long-term perspective, by a sense of responsibility, and by 
realism that is found in few developing countries and is far from universal even among 
the democracies of the West. ' 12 
Saban calm's argument in a more recent study is not so different: 
`Turkish foreign policy displays an unbroken continuity in its conventional 
understanding which has been developed and applied since the establishment of the 
196 and 244. 
9 Though these scholars' ideas will be detailed below, some of them who defends a continuity in Turkish 
foreign policy can be summarised as follow: Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, The 
Foreign Policy of Turkey, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 68; Altemur Kd1q, 
Turkey and the World, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 205-206; Oral Sander, `Turkish 
Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and of Change', Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Vol. 7, No. 34, 
Winter 1993, pp. 31-46; Oral Sander, `Tiirk Did Politikasmda Sürekliligin Nedenleri', AÜSBF Dergisi, 
September-December 1982, Vol. 37, Nos. 3-4, pp. 105-106; James Brown, Delicately Poised Allies, 
Greece and Turkey, (London: Brassey's, 1991), p. 61-61; Nuri Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow, 
(New York: 1963), pp. 244-250; Nuri Eren, `The Foreign Policy of Turkey', in Joseph E. Black and 
Kenneth W. Thompson (eds. ), Foreign Policies in a World of Change, (New York: 1963), p. 310; 
Dankwart A. Rustow, `Transitions to Democracy: Turkey's Experience in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective', in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds. ), State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 
1980s, (Berlin: 1988), pp. 239-248, p. 247; Yasemin celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999).; Mustafa Aydin, `Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing 
Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, January 2000, 
pp. 103-105; Mustafa Aydin, `determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and 
Traditional Inputs', in Sylvia Kedourie (ed. ), Seventy-Five Years of Turkish Republic, (London: Frank 
Cass, 2000), pp. 152-186; Saban tali§, The Role of Identity in the Making of Modern Turkish 
Foreign Policy, unpublished PhD thesis, the University of Nottingham, 1996; Mahmut B. Aykan, 
Ideology and National Interest in Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Muslim World: 1960-1987, 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Virginia, Virginia, 1988; Selim Deringil, `Aspects and Continuity 
in Turkish Foreign Policy Abdulhamid 11 and Ismet Inönü', International Journal of Turkish Studies, 
Vol. 4, Nol. 1,1987; Gencer Üzcan, `Turk Did Politikasmda Sureklilik ve De&im: Balkanlar Ürnegi', 
(The Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Balkan Case), in Kemali Saybgli and 
Gencer Chcan (eds. ), Yeni Balkanlar, Eski Sorunlar (The New Balkans, The Old Problems), (Istanbul: 
Baglam Yayuicihk, 1997). 
l0 Andrew Mango, `Reflections on the Atatürkist Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy and Domestic 
Linkages', in Makovsky and Sayari, Turkey's..., p. 9. 
11 Dankwart A. Rustow, `Transitions to Democracy: Turkey's Experience in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective', in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds. ), State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 
1980s, (Berlin: 1988), pp. 239-248, p. 247. 
'2 Dankwart A. Rustow, Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
1987), p. 84 cited in Brown, Delicately..., p. 61. 
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Turkish Republic 7.13 
Cali*, in his thesis, recognises that there are other foreign policy approaches apart from 
the Kemalist one, yet he argues that their effect on foreign policy issues has been very 
limited, and `traditional Kemalist foreign policy' as the dominant approach has been 
unchallenged and this has served to the continuity in Turkish foreign policy since 
1923.14 Mahmut Aykan, a Turkish scholar who focuses on Turkey's role in the Middle 
East, also claims that `Turkish foreign policy has exhibited a remarkable continuity 
during the Republican era, despite the radical changes in the global context', such as the 
First and the Second World Wars and the Cold War. 15 Aykan does not give the `secret' 
of this continuity in his thesis, yet his study implies that that all Turkish governments 
adopted Kemalist ideas and never challenged to the main tenets of Turkish foreign 
policy set by Mustafa Kemal. 16 Yasemin celik, in one of the most recent studies 
published in 1999, argues that even the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of 
the communist block could not shift Turkey's foreign policy aims, and continuity 
maintained in the post-Cold War era. 17 celik, similar to the previous scholars, further 
assumes that there have no major alterations in Turkey's foreign policy orientation in 
the eight decades. 18 
Meanwhile some scholars defends that there have been attempts to change some of the 
main tenets of Turkish foreign policy, yet they argue that most of these attempts had 
failed or had been ineffective on the overall direction of policies. For instance, William 
Hale claims that despite some critics, there was no serious challenge to the Kemalist 
foreign policy in the Atatürk and Inönü periods, and he further continues `Kemal 
Atatürk enjoyed a virtually unchangeable national authority, and took a direct and 
crucial interest in shaping Turkey's foreign policy' and `his policies were effectively 
continued by Ismet Inönü'. 19 For Hale, even after the accession of Adnan Menderes's 
Democrat Party, `there was no change in foreign policies', and in the 1970s Ecevit and 
13 calm, The Role of..., p. 418. 
14 cahý, The Role of..., pp. 418-419. 
's Aykan, Ideology..., p. iv. 
16 Aykan, Ideology..., p. iv. 
" celik, Contemporary..., pp. 1-10. 
'g celik, Contemporary..., pp. 1-24 and Conclusion section. 
19 William Hale, `Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics', in David Shankland (ed. ), The Turkish 
Republic at Seventy-Five Years, Progress-Development-Change, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 
1999), p. 93. 
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Demirel co-alition governments's `more multi-faceted foreign policies in practice had 
relatively little effect on the overall direction of policies'20 Likewise, the leftist scholar 
Haluk Gerger in his Turk Di Politikacsinm Ekonomi Politigi claims that there have been 
serious challenges to the traditional foreign policy understanding represented by the 
Kemalists. 2' Gerger focuses on the socialist and the leftist alternatives in particular, 
however he says that even the leftists in government could not challenge the American 
hegemony and had to rely on the Western security system, and as a result of this the 
main direction of Turkish foreign policy could not be shifted. 22 According to David 
Kushner, the most important indication of the continuity since the Atatürk period has 
been Turkey's Westernism and `it was left to Atatürk's successors to take the further 
step of making Turkey an actual ally of the West', and this process was not broken until 
the 1960s. 23 According to Kushner, the leftist and the Islamist political groups seriously 
challenged the traditional policies in the 1960s and 1970s by calling for a radical 
revision of Turkish foreign policy, yet they could not shift the main direction and 
traditional foreign policy understanding was maintained. 24 In summary, despite a few 
exceptional works, 25 it is generally accepted that there have been a remarkable 
uninterrupted ideological continuity in Turkish foreign policy since Atatürk to Özal. 
In the light of this information the first task of this thesis is to examine this continuity 
legacy in Turkish foreign policy. In another words the study attempts to answer whether 
there has been a serious continuity, and if there has been continuity what are the reasons 
behind it. 
Secondly, the study focuses on the ideology's, ideas' and domestic politics' impact on 
Turkish foreign policy, because it assumes that those, who claims continuity in Turkish 
foreign policy, underestimated ideology's and ideas' role in the policies, or mainly 
focuses on the other variables of Turkish foreign policy, such as Turkey's location, 
history, Turkey's economic and political capabilities etc.; George S. Harris, 26 Richard 
20 Hale, `Foreign... ', p. 94. 
21 Haluk Gerger, Tiirk Dij Politikasinin Ekonomi Politigi, (The Political Economy of Turkish Foreign 
Policy), (Istanbul: Beige Yayinlan, 1998). 
22 Gerger, Tiirk..., pp. 93-148. 
23 David Kushner, `Atatürk's Legacy: Westernism in Contemporary Turkey', in Jacob M. Landau (ed). 
Atatiirk and the Modernization of Turkey, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), p. 234. 
24 Kushner, `Atatürk's... ', pp. 234-235. 
25 These exceptional works will be further detailed below. 
26 For Harris Turkey's location, natural-resource deficit and the Turkish straits imposed Turkey certain 
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D. Robinson27, Oral Sandei-28 and John Robertson, 29 for instance see Turkey's unique 
location as the main reason for continuity. As a matter of fact that, Turkey's location 
has always been considered as an important variable of Turkish foreign policy, and this 
study also accepts its crucial role in making of Turkish foreign policy, 30 the listed 
authors however saw it as the main motive behind the continuity by claiming the 
geopolitical realities imposed some unchangeable policies to the policy-makers. 31 
Meanwhile, some of the scholars, 32 who consider Turkey as a small country, argue that 
the international events, like the Second World War and the Cold War, with Turkey's 
location have imposed certain policies to Turkey, which could not be easily changed by 
the domestic actors, like the political parties, governments, parliament etc. Makovsky 
and Sayari for instance argue that `the Cold War imposed a certain amount of order, 
regularity, and predictability 733 and the Soviet Union's unfriendly attitude towards 
Turkey made Westernism as a permanent feature of Turkish foreign policy. 34 Finally it 
is frequently claimed that most of the Turkish policies has rooted in the past, and 
Turkish policy - makers had little manoeuvre room on many foreign policy issues like 
Turkish - Russian and Turkish-Greek problematic relations. For instance G. L. Lewis 
argued that no Turkish politician can restore Turkish - Russian relations, because the 
problem has not been ideology but history. 35 He further literately claims; 
policies and Turkey has not been able to change these determinants: George S. Harris, Turkey, Coping 
with Crisis, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1985), pp. 175-176. 
27 Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, A Case Study in National Development, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 164-168. 
28 Sander, `Turkish... ', pp. 38-42; Sander, Türk... ', 111-118. 
29 John Robertson, Turkey and Allied Strategy, 1941-1945, (New York and London: Garland 
Publishing, 1986), p. xiv. 
30 Geographical foundations of Turkish foreign policy with the historical ones are discussed in the 
Chapter I of this thesis. For the role of the geographical factors also see: Vali, Bridge..., pp. 43-48; 
Patricia Carley, `Turkey's Place in the World', in Henri J. Barkey (ed. ), Reluctant Neigbor, Turkey's 
Role in the Middle East, (Washington D. C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996); Oral Sander, Türk 
Did Politikasi (Turkish Foreign Policy), (Ankara: tinge, 1998); Sander, `Turk... ', pp. 111-117; Mahmut 
N. Latin, The Importance of the Straits in the Foreign Relations of Turkish Republic, PhD thesis, 
University of Southern California, 1948; Harry N. Howard, Turkey, the Straits and US Policy, 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974). 
31 For an example see Sander, `Turkish... ', pp. 38-42. 
32 Some of them include: Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State 
Diplomacy and Great Power Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Alan Makovsky 
and Sabri Sayari (eds. ), Turkey's New World, Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy. 
(Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), esp. pp. 1-8 (Introduction section); 
Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacyin World War II, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1959); Robertson, Turkey... 
33 Makovsky and Sayari (eds. ), Turkey's..., p. 1. 
34 Makovsky and Sayari (eds. ), Turkey's..., p. 1. For a similar view see Aydin, `Determinants of... ', pp. 
103-109. 
35G. L. Lewis, Turkey, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1955), p. 146. 
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`Turkey's ancient enemy is Russia, not communism, and so it is likely to remain until 
some cosmic upheaval alters the configuration of the earth. 
As mentioned ideology's and domestic factors' role are mostly neglected or 
underestimated because it is frequently assumed that the main structural determinants of 
Turkish foreign policy (geography, history, international developments, Turkey's 
economic and military capabilities etc. )37 left little room to the ideological elements to 
change the main tenets of Turkish foreign policy. It is also accepted that, thanks to its 
special location, past and Kemalism's respected position as a state ideology, Turkish 
foreign policy has been one of the most immune area to non-Kemalist currents and 
changes, as a result of this, Kemalism has dominated Turkish foreign policy since 
Atatürk until the present. 38 In this framework Lewis saw ideology's role in Turkish 
foreign policy as `a secondary importance', 39 while Mango vividly claimed ideology 
and domestic political crisis had little effect on foreign policy, except Kemalism's 
dominant role. 40 According to Ferenc A. Vali's Bridge Across Bosphorus, The Foreign 
Policy of Turkey, which is one of the exceptional books that devoted a huge section to 
ideology's effect of Turkish foreign policy, 41 Mustafa Kemal's ideas have guided 
Turkish foreign policy without any break, and Kemalism is not only the ideology of the 
state but `the state philosophy of the Turkish Republic'. 42 Vali implies that Kemalist 
foreign policy has not been challenged and his set of ideas have been adopted by all the 
Turkish governments: 
36 Lewis, Turkey, p. 146. 
3' For the term of `structural determinants' see Aydin, `Determinants of... ', p. 133. 
38 Rustow, `Transitions... ', p. 247; Vali, Bridge..., pp. 54-63; Sander, `Turk.. ', pp. 106-111; Mehmet 
Gönlübol and Cem Sar, Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dij Politikasi (Ataturk and Turkey's Foreign Policy), 
(Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basunevi, 1963); A. L. Karaosmanoglu, `Turkey's Security and the Middle East', 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1, Fall 1983, pp. 157-175; George Harris, Turkey: Coping with Crisis, 
(London: Groom Helm, 1985), pp. 180-203; Mustafa Yi maz and others, Atatürk ve Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti Tarihi, (Atatürk and the History of Turkish Republic), (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1998), p. 
245, and Foreign Policy section, (pp. 244-280). 
39 Lewis, Turkey, p. 146. 
40 Mango, `Reflections... ', p. 9. 
41 The works which focused on the ideological elements of Turkish foreign policy include: Eric Rouleau, 
Turkey: Beyond Atatürk, (New York: 1997); Mustafa Aydin, Foreign Policy Formation and the 
Interaction Between Domestic and International Environments: A Study of Change in Turkish 
Foreign Policy, 1980-1991, PhD thesis, Lancaster University, 1994; Hakan M. Yavuz, `Turkish Identity 
and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism', Critique, Spring 1998, pp. 19-41; Duygu 
Bazoglu Sezer, `Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region', in 
Vojtech Mastny and R Craig Nation (eds. ), Turkey Between East and West, New Challenges for a 
Rising Regional Power, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 78-81 (Ideological Considerations 
section); Hale, `Foreign... '; Cabs, The Role...; Saban cah5, `The Turkish State's Identity and Desicion 
Making Process', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 6, no. 2, Spring 1995; Aykan, Ideology...; Gerger, 
Turk... 
42 Vali, Bridge..., p. 54. 
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Me fundamental goals of national policy, as determined under Atatürk, have not 
changed, although they have become better defined and updated to meet the more 
exacting requirements of the world today. '43 
Similarly Richard Robinson argues that ideology's impact on foreign policy can be 
ignored and further continues: 
`... Relative immunity to emotion and ideology in setting foreign policy has given Turkish leaders enviable latitude. Public opinion... is not nearly as involved in formulating foreign policy in Turkey, as involved in the United States. Indeed, the very 
absence of an ideological basis in Turkish society has made it possible for the leadership 
to shape policies to meet specific situations. " 
This study of course does not claim that there is no critique of Kemalism in genera145 or 
Kemalist foreign policy in particular. On the contrary, particularly the leftist and 
socialist authors provide a wide-range of critics of traditional Kemalist foreign policy 
perspective. ' However even the leftist and other critiques of Kemalism do accept that 
Kemalism has dominated Turkish foreign policy and the other political groups have had 
little effect on Turkey's external relations . 
47 Similarly even though the Islamists, 
another opposition group, have heavily criticised the Kemalist foreign policy 
understanding even they claim that all republican foreign policies have been Kemalist 
and no other group could shake the Kemalist hegemony on the foreign policy issues 
43 Vali, Bridge..., p. 68. 
Robinson, The First..., pp. 162-163. 
as Criticisms about Kemalism and Kenialist policies mainly focuse on the social and economic issue and 
Kemalism has heavily been critises by the leftist, Islamist and the liberal authors on these issues. Though 
it is impossible to list all these studies here because of the scope and the size limitations of this thesis, 
some of them can be given as an example: Taha Parla, Türkiye'de Siyasal Kiiltürün Kaynaklari, 
Atatürk'ün Nutku, (The Sources of the Political Culture in Turkey), (Istanbul: Iletiýim Yayinlan, 1991); 
Yalcin Kücük, Türkiye Üzerine Tezler, 1908-1978, (The Thesis on Turkey, 1908-1978), (Istanbul: Tekin 
Yayinlan, 1989); caglar Keyder, Türkiye'de Deviet ve Smiflar, (The State and the Classes in Turkey), 
(Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1989); Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin 
Kurulmasi, 1923-1931, (The Establishment of the One Party Regime in Turkish Republic), (Ankara: 
Yurt Yayinlari, 1981); Gencay Saylan, `Ordu ve Siyaset: Bonapartizmin Siyasal Kültürü', (The Army and 
Politics: The Political Culture of Bonapartism), in Sadun Aren'e Armagan, (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler 
Birligi Yayinlari, 1989). For an Islamist critiq see Abdurrahman Dilipak, Bir Baska Acidan Atatürk, 
(Atatürk, From a Different Perspective), (Istanbul: Beyan Yayinlari, 1991). 
46These work include: Türkkaya Ataöv, Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye, (America, NATO and Turkey), 
(Ankara: Aydinlik Yayinevi, 1969); Mehmet Ali Aybar, Bagimsizlik, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm, 
(Independence, Democracy, Socialism), (Istanbul: Gercek, 1968); Dogan Avcioglu, Türkiye'nin Düzeni, 
(Turkey's Order), (Ankara: Bilgi, 1969); Gerger, Turk..; Kücük, Türkiye... 
47 For example Gerger argue that leftist Inönü and Ecevit's policies cannot be considered as deviation 
from the traditional foreign policy. He even claims that Ozalist approach in general is an extension of `the 
traditional capitalist understanding', not a challenge to the official policies: Gerger, Turk..., pp. 24-64. 
103-121 and 161-229. 
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claiming the reason for the `failure of Turkish foreign policy' is this Kemalist 
continuity. 48 
Furthermore it must be noted that of course there are some exceptional studies which 
argue that there have been some serious deviations from the traditional Turkish foreign 
policy, and ideology with other domestic factors have played an important role in 
shaping Turkey's foreign relations. Selim Deringil for instance does not see an 
unbroken ideological continuity in Turkish foreign policy: Deringil considers Kemalism 
as a part of the Ottoman tradition, and underscores contiunity in the Ottoman and 
republican politics, either domestic or foreign, 49 yet, by seeing Kemalism as an 
extention of the Ottoman traditions, Deringil implies that the old competition between 
the ideological groups continued in the republican years, and though Kemalism 
dominated the Turkish politics for a long time, Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism and 
their branches emerged in politics in time, and this naturally reflected on foreign policy 
area. For example Deringil considers Özalist policies as a deviation from the traditional 
policies, and says that `since 1983 Turgut Özal and the Motherland Party increasingly 
diverged from the traditional non-adventurist line of Turkish foreign policy'. 50 He 
further argues that the increasing identity crisis in Turkish foreign policy after the Inönü 
period have been one of the important determinants. 51 Similar to Deringil, Bülent 
Gokay shows that there were some other important political groups even in the early 
period of the 1920s, who represented alternative approaches in Turkish foreign and 
domestic politics. 52 Apart from these studies, another scholar, Eric Zürcher provides the 
background of the close ideological connection between the Ottoman ideological 
currents and the Kemalist understanding, and he further emphasises the competition 
between the Kemalist and the other ideological groups in domestic and foreign 
48 Kadir Misiroglu, Musul Meselesi ve Irak Türkleri, (The Musul Dispute and the Iraqi Turks), 
(Istanbul: Sebil Yayinevi, 1976), p. 145; Kadir Misiroglu, Lozan, Zafer mi Hezimet mi?, (Lausanne: 
Victory or Crushing Defeat? ), (Istanbul: 1992), esp. Introduction section of the book, Dilipak, Bir 
Baske... 
49 Sehm Deringil, `Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatiirk', in Clement H. Dodd (ed. ), Turkish Foreign 
Policy, New Prospects, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), p. 1; also see Selim Deringil, `Aspects 
and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdulhamid II and Ismet Inönü', International Journal of 
Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1,1987; Selim Deringil, `Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: From 
Namik Kemal to Mustafa Kemal', European History Quarterly, Vol. 23,1993. 
50 Deringil, `Turkish... ', p. 5. 
s' Deringil, `Turkish... ', p. 7. 
52 Bülent G6kay, `Historiography of the Post-War Turkish Settlement', New Perspectives on Turkey, 
Fall 1992, No. 8, pp. 27-48. 
22 
policies. 53 In addition to the historians, Hakan Yavuz, is one of the exceptional scholars 
who directly and fully focused on the ideological competition on Turkish foreign policy 
issues. Yavuz perceived the changes in the Özal era as a clash of Kemalism and neo- 
Ottomanism and argued that Turkey's new identity produced a new foreign policy 
understanding whic is different from the previous understandings. 54 Cengiz candar, 
who is one of the representatives of the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy approach, also 
argue that Özal represented a clear deviation from the Kemalist understanding in 
domestic and foreign policies, though he is reluctant to accept that there was some more 
deviations from the traditional policies before Özal. 55 Despite all these exceptional 
studies, 56 still it can be argued that the ideological competion on implementation of 
Turkish foreign policy has remained relatively an understudied area. 
In this framework one of the main aim of this study is to examine whether Kemalist 
foreign policy has dominated the official Turkish foreign policy since the foundation of 
the republic without any break, and whether Kemalism can be a foreign policy ideology 
for such a long time. The thesis, without denying Atatürk's towering role, assumes that 
no foreign policy ideology can survive for almost eight decades in a changing world 
without any change or evolution, and it seems impossible to persist in the same policies 
while the world and society are changing without a pause. Moreover the thesis accepts 
53 There is no doubt that Zürcher's studies have been very useful for this thesis, and some of them are 
heavily used in this study, yet these studies mainly focus on the last days of the Ottoman Empire and the 
early years of the republican history, rather than modem Turkish foreign policy. Zürcher in his Turkey, A 
Modern History book, in particular pointed out the challenge of the other ideological groups to the 
Kemalist orthodoxy, yet this book is mainly on the social, political and the economic changes in modern 
Turkey rather than Turkish foreign policy: Zürcher, Turkey... For the Ottoman roots of Kemalism and the 
modern Turkish political ideologies and the competition between the Kemalist groups and the opposition 
see also the same authors' following studies: Erik J. Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, The Role of the 
Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926, (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1984); Erik J. Zürcher, Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive 
Republican Party, 1924-1925, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991); Zürcher, Erik Jan, `Young Turks, Ottoman 
Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics, 1908-1938', in Karpat, Kemal H. (ed. ), Ottoman 
Past and Today's Turkey, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 150-173. 
54 Hakan Yavuz, `DegiFn Turk Kimligi ve Did Politika: Neo-Osmanhcingln Yüksehi i', Liberal 
Dü ünce, Vol. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 25-38. 
55 Candar in Sever, Metin and Cem Dizdar, 2. Cumhuriyet Tartilmalan (Second Republic Debates), 
(Ankara: Ba§ak, 1993), pp. 62-73 and personel interview with candar, 20 August 1999, Istanbul, Turkey. 
Also see Nevin Ater, `Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dis Politikasi ve Hükümet Programlan', Iktisat 
Dergisi, No. 537, May-June 1996, pp. 71-86; Sever, 2. Cumhuriyet...; also partly Mustafa Aydin, 
`Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures During the Cold War', 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, January 2000, pp. 103-139. It is certain that in addition to the 
studies mentioned above there are more exceptional studies, which question the Kemalist contiunity in 
Turkish politics, especially in the sociology and history disciplines. However it is hardly possible to list 
all these studies in this thesis because of the scope and page limitations. As a result of these limitations 
the thesis has to focus on the Turkish foreign policy literature. 
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that `a common policy can only be produced on the basis of an ideological consensus', 57 
and in the light of this assumption it argues that a stable foreign policy or continuity is 
hardly possible in such a politically instable country and in Turkey's geopgraphic 
location which is surrounded by the most volitile and unstable regions, like the Balkans, 
the Middle East and the Caucasus. The differences between Atatürk's, Menderes' and 
Özal's Middle East policies or differences between Inönü's, Ecevit's and Demirel's 
Soviet Union policies also causes some doubts about the continuity and the claim of that 
Turkish foreign policy has been solely a set of Kemal's ideas. In this context, this thesis 
primarily will focus upon ideological evolution of Turkish foreign and will try to find 
the answer of whether there has been an ideological continuity since 1923 to the end of 
the Özal period. 
As mentioned, the second reason to study this subject is the recent debates on Turkish 
policies in the post Cold War era. Foreign observers who have commented on the recent 
policies of the Turkish government after the end of the Cold war have raised the point 
as whether Turkish foreign policy was changing its orientation and its traditional pacific 
and peacefull policies. 58 Even some foreign observers perceived these policies as an 
indication of resurrection of the Ottoman Empire. 59 In this context this study argues that 
the international changes and Turkey's reactions to them in the recent years in particular 
has increased the necessity to focus on ideology and domestic developments as 
determinants of Turkish foreign policy, and the thesis also aims to make contribution to 
understand whether there has been a serious deviation from the previous policies. 
In summary the main focus of this thesis is the ideological evolution of Turkish foreign 
policy and it endeavoures to find the answers of whether there has been an uninterrupted 
ideological continuity in Turkish foreign policy and whether Kemalism has dominated 
57 Gabriel A. Almond, `The Elites and Foreign Policy', in James Barber and Michael Smith (eds. ), The 
Nature of Foreign Policy, (Edinburg: The Open University Press, 1974), p. 245. 
58 Graham E. Fuller, `Turkey's New Eastern Orientation', in Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, 
Turkey's New Geopolitics, From the Balkans to Western China, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1993), 
pp. 37-97; N. A. Stavrau, `The Dismantling of the Balkan Security System: Consequences for Greece, 
Europe and NATO', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 1995; Yavuz, `Turkish... ', pp. 19- 
41; Sezer, `Turkey in... ', pp. 72-83; Heath Lowry, `Challenges to Turkish Democracy in the Decades of 
the Nineties', Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. V, Fall 1996, pp. 89-111, p. 
104. 
s9 Stephanos Constantinides, `Turkey: Emergence of a New Foreign Policy the Neo-Ottoman Imperial 
Model', Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 24,1996, pp. 323-334; O. Tunander, `A New 
Ottoman Empire - The Chooice for Turkey-Euro-Asian vs. National Fortress, Security Dialogue, Vol. 
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Turkish foreign policy without serious challenge. The thesis' main aims are to make 
humble contribution to understand the reasons behind the great changes in Turkish 
foreign policy in the republican history, and to the existing literature on ideological and 
domestic elements' role in Turkish foreign policy. 
Limitations 
In order to examine the above questions, this study will discuss a relatively long 
historical period from Atatürk to Özal. Yet, since it is not a chronological history of 
Turkish foreign policy, it will not detail all the developments in this period but will 
rather focus on the developments most pertinent to its thesis. As said this study does not 
claim to explain all events and / or developments during these years. 
Another problem lies with the delimitation of the time-frame to the last year of Özal, 
1993. Of course evolution of Turkish foreign policy did not stop in 1993. On the 
contrary, between 1993 and 1999 the debates on identity crisis of Turkish foreign policy 
reached a peak, and at the present time a suitable ideological framework is still foremost 
problem for Turkish foreign policy. However, despite the importance of this period, two 
factors hinder its examination: First, there is not enough source-material to explore the 
current evolution. Most of the works written on this era are popular books. Moreover, 
newspaper and magazine articles are not enough for such a research. Unfortunately, 
with a few exceptions, Turkish political leaders do not write their memoirs and the 
archives are not open to researchers. Secondly, in the period of 1993-1999 no new 
school of thought appeared. The competition was between the old schools of thought; 
Erbakan's Islamism; Demirel's, Yilmaz's and tiller's Democratic approach; Türke§'s 
Turkism; Ecevit's and RPP's Kemalism, and Özalist Ottomanism. 
Third, this thesis is a case study of foreign policy, more than a study on international 
relations or foreign policy theories. Hence, it discusses mainly the special circumstances 
peculiar to Turkish foreign policy, avoiding general theoretical debates; and 
concentrating instead on the historical and ideological background of Turkish foreign 
policy. 
26, No. 4,1995, pp. 413-426; Stavrau, `The Dismantling... '. 
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A fourth limitation is that, as will be seen, the Republican era has witnessed many 
different foreign policy currents, with different concepts and theories. For example there 
are huge differences between Kemalist nationalism (ulusculuk) and Islamist nationalism 
(milliyetcilik-ümmetcilik). There are about seven different ideologies, which the thesis 
deals with. To give definitions to all the concepts according to each of the ideologies is 
a formidable task. Hence, the study seeks to provide the meanings of the main concepts 
in each political school focusing on the transformation of the general concepts in 
Turkish political life, such as secularism's changing role in Turkish political thought. 
Another problem is that of objectivity. Because each of the ideologies claims to be right 
and the others to be wrong, ideological sources were not very reliable. From Kemalism 
to socialism each of the currents has blamed the others of being a `liar' or false. Apart 
from this general problem, the exploration of ideologies and ideas in Turkey is much 
more difficult than in many other countries. Because, in the Turkish case Kemalist 
ideology has no guiding book and orderly laid-down principles, many different groups 
have claimed to be the real Kemalists. Hence, this study, to clearly distinguish between 
the ideologies, is exercising caution in the use of ideological sources, such as memoirs 
and party programs. 
Sources 
The sources used in this thesis can be separated into five different categories: a) archival 
studies; b) primary documents, such as memoirs and collections of speeches, texts of 
agreements etc; c) interviews; d) books and e) periodicals. 
Archival Studies: There is no doubt that the most useful archive for a study like this 
would be those of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, they are not open 
to researchers and the public. Despite this, I have benefited extensively from the 
Ministry's publications and leaked archive materials. Particularly useful were the 
memoirs of the former diplomats who have reached the Ministry documents. Also the 
Ministry's Bulletin was one of the important sources for this thesis, as was TBMM 
Kütüphanesi ve Dökümantasyon Merkezi (The TGNA Library and Documentation 
Centre) in Ankara. Particularly, parliamentary debates were very helpful in examining 
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domestic debates on foreign policy issues. Also the TGNA's publications, like Tutanak 
Dergisi (The Journal of Proceedings) are among the primary sources of this study. 
Another archive used was Baabakanlik Devlet Ar#vleri (Archives of Turkish Prime 
Ministry). For the Ottoman period the Istanbul branch of this archive was used while its 
Ankara branch helped with the Republican period. 
Other Primary Documents (Speeches, Memoirs, and Agreements): Certainly for this 
kind of study the memoirs and speeches of key figures, like Atatürk and Inönü, are 
highly important. Many of these documents can be found at the Atatürk Library and the 
Inönü Foundation in Ankara. Also Turkish National Library's Ankara and Izmir 
branches have good collections on this subject, as does the Middle East Technical 
University's Atatürk Library. Özal's speeches were found in Turkish newspaper 
archives, like Milliyet, Cumhuriyet and Zaman, and interviews. On the other hand, 
because most Turkish diplomats wrote their memoirs it was easy to trace their ideas and 
observations on foreign policy. The most useful publications to find the official 
agreements are the TGNA's publications. Moreover some ideological books and articles 
can also be considered as primary source because they set the main principles of a 
political current. In this context I made efforts to reach the primary books and journals 
of the ideological groups, like Yon, Akis and Forum collections. 
Interviews: These were used particularly for the Ozal period because there is no 
sufficient study of the Özal period and the archives are still closed. 
Books: The books used in this study have been written mainly by Turkish, British and 
American authors. These were mainly found in the Turkish National Library (Ankara 
and Izmir), Ankara University SBF Library, METU and Bilkent libraries (Ankara), 
Marmara Documentation Centre and Library (Istanbul) in Turkey; and King's College 
London Library, Library of School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London 
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Library, RUSI Library, British 
Library and the Library of Senate House of London University in Britain. 
Articles: Newspaper and journal articles are among the most important sources for this 
study because the newspaper collections clearly show the evolution in Turkish foreign 
policy. Many articles can qualify as primary source since the newspapers and some 
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magazines have been the base of the ideologies and political currents, like Cumhuriyet, 
Milliyet, Zaman, Akis, Forum and Yön. Particularly Milliyet collections (Ankara and 
Istanbul), Cumhuriyet collections (Istanbul) and Zaman collection (Ankara) provided 
most useful articles. To reach the older papers I benefited from the Turkish National 
Library (Ankara), Ankara Adnan Otüken Provincial Library, Ankara University SBF 
Library, Istanbul Beyazid Library and some private collections. For the British and 
American newspaper collections I used the British Library and London University 
libraries and American Culture Library, Ankara. In addition, I also benefited from the 
internet pages of Turkish and British newspapers. 
Structure and Plan 
Mainly, an historical - analytical approach has been used throughout this thesis. As 
noted above, it had to describe ideological-historical background and the practices in 
order to place the changes in Turkish foreign policy in their wider context. Therefore 
each chapter discusses the historical and ideological sources before focusing on the 
course and changes in policy. 
Apart from Introduction and Conclusion, the study is divided into ten chapters. The 
thesis begins with the geographical and historical background of Turkish foreign policy. 
After discussing the geographical determinants, Chapter I argues that the Ottoman 
years are crucial in exploring modern Turkey's foreign policy because modern schools 
of thought are rooted in the Ottoman period. Almost all schools, like Islamism, 
Ottomanism and Turkism were established by the Ottomans and they can be regarded as 
the preludes of the modern successors. Moreover, Kemalism is also rooted in the 
Ottoman past. Particularly the Young Turks and their secular Westernism and 
nationalism provided an ideological ground for Kemalism. Furthermore, the Ottoman 
tradition continued to affect the Republican era, and since the 1950s the old Ottoman 
currents have reappeared under different names. 
Five chapters (II, III, IV, V, VI) are devoted to the Atatürk and the Inönü periods, 
because Kemalism is considered to be the most influential school of the republican era. 
It can be said that none of the republican decades can be understood without referring to 
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Atatürk. In this context, this study also aims at providing the ideological and historical 
background to Kemalism. It also attempts to find the answer to whether there is a 
Kemalist foreign policy, or if it is just a fiction. In this framework, Chapter II provides 
the impact of the War of Independence on Kemalism, and the republican foreign policy 
understanding. It particularly focuses on the Sevres and Lausanne Agreements. 
Chapter III deals with the rise of Kemalism as the regime of the new Turkey. The 
internal reforms are also discussed from the foreign policy perspective. Chapter IV 
looks at the ideological background of Kemalist foreign policy and explores its foreign 
policy principles and aims, notably Westernism, nationalism and scepticism, before 
discussing the methodological principles of this policy. Having provided the historical 
and ideological backgrounds, the study applies the Kemalist understanding to its 
implementation. In this context, Chapter V looks at the Kemalist policies carried out by 
Atatürk himself. With Chapter VI, the thesis moves to the post-Atatürk era, and first of 
all, looks at the Inönü years. Although Inönü is generally considered as one of the 
leading Kemalists, Chapter VI takes issue with this opinion and claims that in the 
Inönü years the Kemalist policies were transformed and became more isolationist. 
Chapter VI further argues that while Atatürk was a pragmatic leader and avoided from 
institutionalising his principles, in the Inönü era the Kemalist class created a new kind 
of Kemalism, which was more sceptical and isolationist. 
Chapter VII, VIII, IX and Chapter X are devoted to the Cold War and the Özal years 
(1950-1993). In this period of the republican history, Kemalism faced serious 
challenges from the right, left and Islamism. Particularly the right-wing democrats 
posed the greatest challenge to Kemalism and became a serious alternative in foreign 
policy. Chapter VII focuses on the Menderes years and claims that the Menderes 
government followed a very different foreign policy from Atatürk and Inönü. In his 
policies two factors were vital, namely the Cold War as the ideology of Turkish foreign 
policy and Menderes' liberal-conservative worldview. Therefore the chapter tries to 
trace the connection between the Democratic policies and these two sources of the 
ideology, concentrating on Menderes' Middle Eastern and US policies to prove the 
change in foreign policy. 
Chapter VIII looks at the post - Democratic Party years, namely the 1960s. In this 
decade Turkish foreign policy confronted enormous challenges and dramatic ideological 
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changes were witnessed, particularly in the Kemalist and leftist schools. Kemalism 
became leftist - Kemalism and Kemalist foreign policy orientation was radically 
transformed by the new elements. Similarly the neo - Democrats (Justice Party and the 
others) made efforts to find a new way in foreign policy, and Demirel suggested a 
multi-dimensional foreign policy orientation. Chapter VIII explores all these changes 
and examines the role of these ideas in Turkish foreign policy. 
Chapter IX focuses on the 1970s and the dramatic changes in Turkish foreign policy of 
that era. Particularly Ecevit's foreign policy shows a clear deviation from Atatürk's 
pragmatism and Westernism. Chapter IX looks at the reasons behind Ecevit's 
ideology-oriented Third Worldist foreign policy approach, and also deals with the return 
of the old Ottoman schools of Ottomanism and Islamism. The study also explores the 
Cyprus Crisis and the anti-Turkish Western policies because of their effects on Turkish 
foreign policy making. Also Turkey's policies toward the West in these years shows the 
certain deviation from the tradition. 
Finally, Chapter X looks at the Özal years. There is no doubt that Özalism is a turning- 
point for Turkish foreign policy because with Özal's neo-Ottomanism the challenge 
against Kemalism became more clear than ever. The chapter looks at the preludes of 
Özalism and the ideological foundations of its foreign policy orientation. 
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CHAPTER I 
Geographical and Historical Foundations of Turkish Foreign 
Policy and the Ottoman Legacy 
`If the English entered Egypt, they did so to pre-empt the French who had 
occupied Tunisia. England did not have to do so; yet it granted new freedoms 
to our Egyptian Muslim brothers. There is abundant evidence that England is a 
friend of Turkey and the Muslims... Under these circumstances, the best thing 
to do is to invite the English to Anatolia and re-organise our country according 
to English recommendations. We have no alternative but this. As they 
reformed Egypt, they can improve our country as well. " 
Jöntürk Hoca Mehmet Kadri Nash's solution to the decline of the Empire 
`We were such an ignorant people. We saw the English as a protector and 
defender of freedoms. For us, the English give the nations their independence, 
freedom and oppress and annihilate the cruel dictators, like the Hamid. ' 2 
Riza Nur 
Geo2raahv and History 
As noted by Carley, few countries occupy Turkey's exceptional position, 3 it is between 
the three most volatile regions of the world: the Balkans, the Middle East and the 
Caucasus. It also bridges two continents, Europe and Asia, and three seas the 
Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Aegean. Moreover, Anatolia and Thrace, which 
have been the heart of the Turkish states throughout history, have been the centre of the 
greatest civilisations, including the ancient Greek civilisation, the Roman, Hittite, 
Urartu, Byzantine and Ottoman. Similarly, the neighbouring regions are also the 
inheritors of the greatest civilisations, notably Egyptian, Persian and Mesopotamian. 
Furthermore, the region where Turkey is located is home to all three monotheistic 
religions, namely Judaism Christianity and Islam. These civilisations and religions have 
inevitably left their marks on how people look, think and define their feelings about the 
past and future. 4 When the Turks came to the region from the Central Asia, unlike the 
Mongols, they did not destroy or reject the existing cultures, but blended them with 
their own, which was already a mixture of Turkish, Islamic, Persian, Chinese and Indian 
cultures. Turks were Muslim, but not Arab or Middle Eastern. Their language, race, 
1 Mehmet Kadri Nash, Serayih, (Paris: 1912), cited in Ali Birinci, Hnrriyet ve ihtilaf Firkasi, (Istanbul: 
1990), p. 59. 
2 Riza Nur, Hayat ve Habratim (My Life and Memoirs), (Istanbul: Altlndak Yayinevi, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 
100. 
3 Patricia Carley, `Turkey's Place in the World', in Henri J. Barkey (ed. ), Reluctant Neigbor, Turkey's 
Role in the Middle East, (Washington D. C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 3. 
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historical-cultural background were completely different. Although they mixed with the 
Greeks and other Balkan and Caucasian ethnic groups they were not Christian. In other 
words, Turkey is at a religious and cultural crossroads, blending Christian, Muslim and 
Jewish populations at the border of the Judeo-Christian West and the Muslim East. As S 
a result of these, Turkey's location and past have left it with something like an identity 
crisis, or at least an identity dilemma, which continues to mark not only its national 
character but also how it views itself and its place in the world. 6 This disadvantage (or 
advantage) has determined the Ottoman and modern Turkey's foreign polices, although 
their ideologies and aims have been almost diametrically opposed. 
Secondly, Turkey's topography and location have generated some unalterable foreign 
policy behavioural patterns. Though Anatolia has natural boundaries and a fortress-like 
interior - it is surrounded by the Black, Aegean and Mediterranean Seas and by high 
mountains - it has some vulnerabilities. Located on several international highways, a 
state based on Anatolia and Eastern Thrace was seen as incapable of defending itself 
without friends on the European and Asian sides or without control of the main 
entrances to these territories, namely the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the 
neighbouring islands (such as Cyprus and the Aegean) and the Straits. Therefore, when 
the Ottomans aimed to establish a powerful state, as Byzantium had done before, they 
first tried to unite the Anatolian and Thrace territories and to control the Straits. The 
next step in maintaining the Empire's security was to control the islands surrounding 
Anatolia and to create barriers between the Empire and the neighbouring powers like 
Persia, Russia and Austria-Hungary. 
The Straits figured prominently in Turkey's security and foreign policy. ' Thanks to the 
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, Turkey can control the naval traffic between the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as they constitute the only outlet for many Black Sea 
countries, like Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldavia. This is also the most 
vital seaway for Russia's economy and security. However, these advantages have 
triggered many foreign attacks on Turkish territories. For Russia, for example, control 
of the Straits came to mean more than a secure outlet to the Mediterranean and a 
4 Yüksel Söylemez, `Turkey: Western or Muslim? ', Turkish Review, Autumn 1992, pp. 45-46, p. 46. 
5 Arthur Cyr, `Turkey and the West', Perceptions, September-November 1996, pp. 108-119. p. 109. 
6 Cyr, `Turkey... ', P. 109. 
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forward defensive position against an attack along its southern flank. By controlling the 
Straits and the commercial centre of Istanbul, Russia would enhance its prestige and 
secure the geopolitical domination of the Middle East. 8 Hence, it is arguable that a state 
in Anatolia and Thrace must control the passes from these straits, lest otherwise its 
security be in danger by losing the most strategic lands in the region. 
The Aegean islands have a similar role in Turkey's security. They not only control the 
sea routes between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean but also provide excellent 
bases for an attack on the Anatolian mainland. Therefore, it can be argued that an 
Anatolian power has to control these islands or at least ensure that they be disarmed and 
friendly towards Turkey. 
Indeed, past experience has proved that the loss of control of any of these regions and 
seas is detrimental for a state located in Asia Minor. As a result, location determined the 
friends and enemies of the people inhabiting these territories. Geography, together with 
history has thus given Turkey permanent problems and rivals. For example, the Turks 
always have kept one eye on their northern neighbour. The Ottoman Empire and Russia, 
from the I6th century to the end of the Ottoman Empire, engaged in 29 great wars over 
the region. 9 This rivalry continued after the Second World War, when Stalin demanded 
some Turkish territories; indeed the Soviet threat lasted until the end of the Cold War. 
In another word, with history, `geography has predisposed Russia and Turkey to a 
history of conflict. Their cooperation was never free from suspicion. ' 10 
Likewise, the rivalry between the Greeks and the Turks is also a direct result of 
geography and history. As witnessed throughout their history, when one side was 
weaker, the stronger one attempted to dominate the other. For instance during the last 
years of the Byzantine Empire, the Turks expanded at the declining Empire's expense. 
In the same way, Greece grew four-fold by taking over Turkish territory, and finally 
' Vali, Bridge..., pp. 44-45. 
8 Harry N. Howard, `The Straits After World War II: Problems and Prospects', Balkan Studies, 11, No. 
1,1970,38 and David Alvarez, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and 
Turkey, 1943-1946, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies-190,1980), p. 32. 
9 Alvarez, p. 34; Sander, Tiirkiye'nin..., p. 130 
10 Bülent G6kay and Richard Langhorne, Turkey and the New States of the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, (London: HMSO, Wilton Park, 1996), p. 24. 
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occupying Western Anatolia in order to create its new Byzantium Empire ideal. " 
Similar to the Russian case, the antagonism and scepticism between these two nations, 
still continue. Even now many Greeks fear a possible Turkish occupation, and for Greek 
nationalism Anatolia still is the home of the great Greek civilisation and they hope will 
become a part of Greece some day. As a result, the Turkish-Greek rivalry is still one of 
the most important determinants of these countries' foreign polices. 
Turkey's relations with other neighbours are also shadowed or determined by territorial 
needs and a common past. For example, Arabs largely hold the Turks responsible for 
their economic, military and political backwardness. 12 As Graham Fuller put it, the Arab 
sense of `victimisation' in history played a crucial role in Turkish-Arab relations and 
created structural problems in the relationship 13. Despite these negative examples, the 
common past also produced natural friends, like the Albanians, Bosnians, Azerbaijanis 
and so on. 
In short, `foreign policy does not spring spontaneously from the minds of decision 
makers. Rather, it is a product of the past experiences of a nation and the specific 
political beliefs and ideologies that have come to be accepted over the years. ' 14 Turkey 
is no exception. Despite all the Kemalist efforts, the Ottoman years deeply affected the 
Republican foreign policy understandings. These years even can be considered as the 
prelude to Kemalist ideology. In the words of Kazancigil `Kemalism built on the reform 
movements which started at the beginning of the 19th century 7.15 In this framework, the 
next section traces the Ottoman years and the impact of the Ottoman experience in 
shaping the Kemalist approach. 
11 $iikrü Sina (hirel, `Turkey and Greece: Difficult Aegean Relationship', in C. Balkir and A. M. 
Williams (eds. ), Turkey and Europe, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1996), pp. 161-188, p. 161. 
12 Norman Itzkowitz, `The Problem of Perceptions', in L. Carl Brown (ed. ), Imperial Legacy, The 
Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 
p. 35. 
13 Graham E. Fuller, `Turkey's New Eastern Orientation' in G. E. Fuller and 1.0. Lesser, Turkey's New 
Geopolitics, From the Balkans to Western China, p. 49. 
14 Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, (Engelewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 71. 
's All Kazancigil, `The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism', in All Kazancigil and Ergün Özbudun 
(eds. ), Atatlirk, Founder of a Modern State, (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1997), p. 37. For another useful 
analysis of the connection between Kemalism and the Ottoman reform currents see: Erik Jan Zürcher, 
`Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics, 1908-1938', in Kemal H. 
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The Ottoman Legacy 
Ideological and Practical Foundations of the Empire 
The Ottoman Empire was one of the greatest powers in history. When it was established 
in 1299, nobody could guess that it would defeat the Byzantine Empire and conquer 
almost a third of the European continent. The Ottomans, for centuries, dominated the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea rims. When compared with their European and Asian 
counterparts, the Ottoman armies were better organised, the imperial political and 
economic systems were more centralised and relatively stronger. The main reason of 
this success was its unique combination of economic, social, political and military 
elements. 
Islam as the Legitimising Ideology: First of all, the Ottoman Empire was a leader of 
the Islamic world. Having taken the caliphate during Selim's reign, there was no rival 
for the leadership of the Islamic world. This provided an ideological framework for 
Ottoman foreign relations, whereby the non-Muslim territories were dar-ul-harb, land 
of war, while the Muslim territories were dar-ul-Islam, land of peace. As Robins 
pointed out: 
`The Ottoman Empire was not typical of the European Empires of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, whose underlying characteristic was that of a distinct people of the 
metropolitan core, motivated by a nationalist ideology, seeking the subjugation of 
peoples in a geographical periphery.... The Ottoman Empire, by contrast, was not a 
Turkish Empire in which the ideological motivation was Turkish nationalism. In many 
respects rural Anatolia was as much a domain of the empire as parts of the Balkans or 
the Middle East. The chief motivating ideology of the empire was Islam, especially as 
the profile of the empire in Christian Europe receded... The Ottoman elite was an 
evolving one based on a culture of empire, rather than on a narrow and exclusive notion 
of ethnicity or race. '16 
The Ottoman-Islamic Synthesis: While Islam determined the ideology of the state, '7 
Ottoman political social structure was a blend of Iranian, Byzantium, Arab and the 
Turkish traditions. The members of the ruling class were `the slaves' of the 
sultan/caliph whose position was unassailable. The devjinne (collection) was the prime 
source of administrative and military recruits. According to this system, children, 
mainly Christians, were taken by the Ottomans, converted to Islam and educated as 
Karpat (ed. ), Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 150-173. 
16 Robins, Turkey..., pp. 17-18 
17 For Islam's role in the Ottoman state system and society see: Norman Ilzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and 
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member of the ruling class. '8 Devvinne provided probably the most loyal bureaucrats 
for the Ottoman state. 
The Millet System: The third secret of Ottoman power was the millet system. 19 
Religious tolerance both practical and a legal necessity. 20 According to this system, each 
main religious group (or millet) enjoyed generous autonomy in many fields, including 
education, welfare, and the personal law of its members. The millet leaders represented 
the interests of their people at the palace. Over time, more religious sects were officially 
recognised as separate millets, such as the Greek Catholics and Bulgarian Orthodox. 
That is to say, contrary to the European experience there was no Ottoman national 
identity shared by all the millets. Diversity was the hidden power of the Ottoman 
Empire, however as will be discussed this power would turn a weakness in the 19th 
century. 21 
Military's State, State's Military: Another characteristic feature of the Ottoman 
Empire was the role of the military in the state structure. In the words of Hale `no 
distinction was drawn between the civilian and military arms of the state, since both 
functions were frequently combined in the duties of a single individual. '22 Conquests in 
terms of economy were important sources for the Empire which owed its dominance to 
its `invincible' armies. The military was `the God's army' spreading `the true religion', 
Islam. Therefore the army and the security apparatus had privileges over the civilian 
institutions. In the words of the historian Lybyer, `The Ottoman government had been 
an army before it was anything else'. 23 That is to say the most powerful institution in the 
Ottoman State was the army. Even, during the era of decline the army had power to 
change the sultans. As a result, the army saw itself as the protector of the state. 
Islamic Tradition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972). 
Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, An Introduction History to 1923, (London: Longman, 1997), 
55. 
19 For a survey of the millet system see: Looty Levonian, `The Millet System in the Middle East', The 
Muslim World, April 1952; B. Brade and B. Lewis (eds. ), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman 
Empire, (New York: Helmes and Meier, 1982). 
20 McCarthy, The Ottoman..., p. 55. 
21 For the role of the nations in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire see Clement H. Dodd, Nations 
in the Ottoman Empire: A Case Study in Devolution, Hull Papers in Politics, University of Hull, No. 
18, April 1980 
22 Hale, Turkish..., p. 2. 
23 Cited in Hale, Turkish..., p. 2. 
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`Father State' Understanding: The Ottoman State machine had a `holy aim': cihat, to 
spread the `true religion. ' The source of the power of the state and the executives was 
not the people but the religion. According to Islam, so long as the sultan is fair and 
Muslim, the people cannot oppose his acts but have rather to obey the emirul-muminin, 
who in turn looks after the people in the name of God. The second reason for the 
emergence of the `father state' understanding was the circumstances in which the 
Ottoman Empire was established. After the disintegration of the Selcuk Empire, the 
Turkish tribes suffered from lack of unity. Therefore, as successors to the Selcuks, the 
Ottomans viewed the unity of the state as the most important issue; otherwise, intensive 
strife between the tribes and the sects would be inevitable. As a result, despite the 
autonomy of the main religions, the Ottoman subjects were not able to join the political 
process. They were free as long as they did not threaten the unity of the state. There was 
only one way for ordinary people to participate political life: to become a kul (literally, 
servant) of the Sultan, in other words to become a bureaucrat. Therefore the bureaucrats 
identified themselves with the state. After the modernisation of the Ottoman 
bureaucracy, the bureaucrats, like the army, came to see themselves as the protectors of 
the state, its unity and ideology. 
External Factors: In addition to these internal factors the international balance of 
power favoured the Ottoman Empire. First the Ottomans controlled the international 
trade routes during the centuries. Thus, together with military conquests, international 
trade was one of the main economic sources of the Empire. Also, during the classical 
era, the Ottomans had no serious rivals, as Russia and many other European countries 
were still principalities. The Black Sea was an Ottoman lake, and the Mediterranean 
was under its control. This provided relative security and immunity. Therefore, for a 
long time, the Ottoman Sultans did not recognise their European counterparts as heads 
of state and did not send permanent ambassadors to the European countries until the 1 St' 
century. 
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Decline and Idea of Reform24 
In the 18th and 19th centuries this picture dramatically changed. International trade had 
shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. The Western powers were sharing the 
entire world among themselves, while the Ottomans were trying to hold onto their 
existing territories. In addition, the economic and cultural transformation of European 
society created a gap between the Ottomans and the Western powers. This resulted in 
great technological advancements in Europe, which in turn changed the international 
political balance. Some historians, like Arnold Toynbee, consider the Russian-Turkish 
Treaty of Kücuk Kaynarca (1774) as the beginning of Ottoman decline. 25 Others put it a 
century earlier at the Russian-Ottoman Treaty of Carlowitz (1699). The truth, however, 
is that it is virtually impossible to determine the exact date of the beginning of the 
decline of Ottoman power, because even after the disastrous wars against the western 
coalitions the Ottoman Empire remained a formidable power in south-eastern Europe, 
the Black Sea, the Middle East and North Africa. 26 However, the rise of the Western 
powers was palpable and the Ottoman Empire could hardly resist them. Moreover, the 
emergence of Russia as the main power in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus caused a 
major shift in the balance of power against the Ottomans. Yet the most deadly stroke for 
the Ottomans was the emergence of nationalism. It can be argued the French Revolution 
constituted one of the starting dates of the Ottoman decline. 27 In a nation-states-age, 
almost all the advantages the Ottomans had, such as the millets, devsirme or the unique 
Ottoman bureaucratic systems became a liability. As a result, the Ottoman governments 
could not halt the disintegration of the empire. 28 The Ottoman government was in fact 
24 For the decline process in the Ottoman Empire see D. C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in 
the Ottoman Empire, (New York: 1929); Halil, Inalcilk, `The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman 
Empire', in P. M. Holt and others (eds. ), The Cambridge History of Islam, I, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), pp. 324-353; C. Issawi, The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914, 
(London and Chicago: 1980); V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds. ), War, Technology and Society in the 
Middle East, (London: 1975); 
25 Also the British historian Anderson starts its book with Kücük Kaynarca Treaty: Mathew S. Anderson, 
The Eastern Question 1774-1923, A Study in International Relations, (London: Macmillan, 1972). 
26 Vah, Bridge..., pp. 7-8. 
27 The French Revolution was not only one of the greatest forces of disintegration but also as will be seen 
in the next sections a strong inspiration source for the Ottoman reformists who would affect Kemalism. 
For the details of the effects of the revolution in the Ottoman Empire see: Bernard Lewis, `Impact of the 
French Revolution on Turkey', Journal of World History, July 1953; Halil Inalcik, `Tanzimat ve 
Türkiye', (Tanzimat and Turkey), Tarih Vesikalan, II, 8 August 1942. 
28 For a general discussion of the disintegration process and the role of the Christian minorities and the 
Western powers in the decline see: Mathew Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in 
International Relations, (London: 1972). 
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aware of all these changes. 29 They knew that the Empire had to change, but did not 
know `how'. Of course, some military reforms were made during the Selim III reign, 
but these were not comprehensive social, political and economic reforms. The first 
efforts to restore Ottoman power were superficial and based on the copying of Western 
institutions and the importation of Western technology, notably military technology. In 
a short time, it was understood that the problem was structural and that Ottoman 
economic and political systems were need to be restructured. 
Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism 
To stop the decline, three main political approaches were articulated during the 19t' 
century: Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism. They would deeply affect and shape the 
Republican era. There were of course other political groups, and the debates were multi- 
faceted. Socialism, for instance, appeared as an alternative approach in the late 190' 
century yet it was relatively weak despite its influence among the Christian and the 
Jewish minorities. 30 However, this categorisation helps us to understand the roots of 
Republican external and internal politics. As will be shown later, these movements 
formed three different schools of thought in foreign policy. Indeed, foreign policy 
issues became at times more distinctive features of these groups than internal matters. 
While almost all political groups saw westernisation and modernisation as an instrument 
to halt the collapse, their perceptions of modernisation and methodologies were 
different. The Turkish intelligentsia was torn between Ottomanist liberalism, Turkish 
nationalism and Islamism, and the Kemalist turning point was a result of this dilemma. 
New Bureaucrats and the Emergence of Westernist, Secular Nationalists 
As a traditional empire the most urgent problem for the Ottoman Empire in 
implementing the reforms was the question of manpower. Almost all of the bureaucrats 
had been trained in the old system, and most of them had no idea about the reforms 
needed to turn the Empire into a modern state. The number of people with adequate 
29 Kemal Melek, Dogu Sorunu ve Milli Mücadele'nin Di Politikase, (The Eastern Question and 
Foreign Policy of the National Struggle), (Istanbul: Bogazici Universitesi Yayuu, 1978), p. 7. 
30 See Mete Tuncay and Erik J. Zürcher (eds. ), Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 
1876-1923, (London: British Academic Press, 1994); Mete Tuncay, Tiirkiye'de Sol Akimlar, 1908-1925 
(The Left Currents in Turkey); A. Sayilgan, `Ti rkiye'de Sol Akimlar, 1908-1925', (The Left Currents in 
Turkey), in P. Dumont and G. Haupt (eds. ), Osmanh Imparatorlugu'nda Sosyalist Hareketler, (The 
Socialist Currents in the Ottoman Empire), (Istanbul: 1977). 
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knowledge of new military and political techniques could be counted in hundreds, even 
as late as 1850.31 The Foreign Ministry played a vital role in solving this problem. 
As noted earlier, the Ottomans had not send permanent ambassadors to the European 
countries which they had considered inferior. When diplomacy became one of the main 
tools of the Ottoman westernisation effort, they needed a comprehensive diplomatic 
core and a foreign ministry. The first permanent ambassador was sent to London in 
1793, during Selim HI's reign, 32 though no further diplomatic appointments were made 
until the 1830s. After the Greek revolution made Greek interpreters unreliable for the 
Ottoman State, a new office, Bab-i Ali Tercüme Odasi (Translation Room) was 
established. This was not just a Foreign Ministry department, but also a school for 
statesmen and diplomats. Those, who worked there were able to follow European 
developments and could easily see the weakness of their own Empire. In the words of 
McCarthy: `language became a door opening onto European culture for Ottoman 
bureaucrats and high officials, and graduates of the Translation Office soon became the 
leading executives of the state. '33 Thus the importance of the Translation Room 
dramatically increased, and in the following years the Foreign Ministry became one of 
the sources of the Ottoman reforms. In addition to its nominal duties it handled a 
number of matters that would have normally been left to other ministries, including 
internal reform legislation, the status and regulation of foreign subjects and non- 
Muslims in the Empire, and foreign commercial as well as political relations. 34 
Especially during the Tanzimat, Reform Era (1839-1876), the power of the Foreign 
Ministry peaked. The main reason for this was the diplomatic balance in the European 
political system after the rise of the Russian power. The Russians were driving the 
Ottomans out of the northern and western coasts of the Black Sea both by encouraging 
the Orthodox minorities in the Balkans and by defeating the Ottoman armies. This in 
turn brought the Ottomans the support of Britain, anxious for its Indian possession. Both 
British leaders Palmerston and Disraeli committed Britain to a policy of containing 
Russia. In this strategy the survival of the Ottoman Empire had a vital role. Thus Britain 
did not threaten to take large stretches of the Turkish territory as did Russia, Austria and 
31 Zürcher, Turkey..., p. 47. 
32 Carter V. Findley, (Trans. Latif Boyaci, Izzet Akyol), Osmanli Devletinde Bürokratik Reform, 
Babiali (1789-1922) (The Bureaucratic Reforms in the Ottoman State), (Istanbul: Iz Yayincilik, 1994), p. 
108-109. 
33 McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, (New York: Longman, 1997), p. 295. 
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even France'35 and gave conditional support to the Ottomans by pursuing the territorial 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire as an important part of their strategy. Moreover, the 
European powers' interests were incompatible and the appearance of German and even 
Italian interest in the area by the end of the century made any partition impossible. 37 
In addition to this political support, it can be argued that the British believed that the 
only way to save the Ottoman Empire against the Russians was its modernisation 
because with its traditional structure the Empire could not defend itself against the 
Russian attacks, 38 and as a result the Ottoman weakness might collapse the British 
Russia policy. Under these circumstances, the new Ottoman bureaucrats were seen as 
the only people capable of achieving this goal. As will be seen, these people were very 
vulnerable vis-a-vis the Palace since they did not enjoy public support, and hence 
warmly welcomed the British support for their policies. In time the French and the 
Russians also established very close relations with the Ottoman bureaucracy. 
This is not to say that the bureaucrats were acting as foreign agents. On the contrary, 
they were patriots who sincerely believed that the only way to save the Empire was to 
get the Western powers' support in the Empire's modernisation. However, their 
occasional misperception of international relations tended to badly affect their ideas. 
The well-known Jöntürk Hoca Mehmet Kadri Nash's ideas about the British occupation 
of Egypt offered an excellent example of this: 
`If the English entered Egypt, they did so to pre-empt the French who had occupied 
Tunisia. England did not have to do so, yet it granted new freedoms to our Egyptian 
Muslim brothers. There is abundant evidence that England is a friend of Turkey and the 
Muslims- Under these circumstances, the best thing to do is to invite the English to 
Anatolia to re-organise our country according to English recommendations. We have no 
alternative but this. As they reformed Egypt, they can improve our country as well. '39 
34 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 72. 
35 C. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, (London: University of London Press, 1971), p. 15- 
16 and 35. 
36 Omer Kürkcüoglu, `Turco - British Relations since the 1920s', in William Hale and Ali thsan BaN 
(eds. ), Four Centuries of Turco - British Relations, (Beverley, North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 
1984), p. 80. 
37 For the Europeans the future of the Ottoman problem was `Eastern question' and thanks to the 
divergence among the great European powers, the problem remained unsolved until the end of the 
Ottoman Empire, 1923. For the Eastern question in addition to Anderson, The Eastern... also see John A. 
R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1917); 
38 In the words of Clayton, `the Britain became pro-Turk in order to be anti-Russian': Clayton, Britain..., 
36. 
Mehmet Kadri Nash, Serayih, (Paris: 1912), cited in Birinci, Hürriyet..., p. 59. Also for this 
perspective: Ali Birinci, `Turk Siyasi Dü üncesinde Ingilizperestlik', (English Admirers in Turkish 
41 
The bureaucrats were also mainly inspired by secular ideas more than religious ones. 
They were also westernised themselves and thus did not have the support of the 
Ottoman public. Besides, since they defended the European political and social systems 
they could not get the support of the Palace, which needed their skills but was opposed 
to their political ideas. So, they had to create coalitions to protect themselves and to 
constantly preserve the balance between the political actors. A unique symbiosis thus 
evolved between the bureaucrats and the Europeans, with each party manipulating the 
other. In the end, the Europeans turned out to be right, progressively weakening 
Ottoman power and increasing their dominance over the Empire. The rivalry among the 
Western powers and Russia thus saved the Ottoman political entity, but not its military 
or economic power. As will be seen later, Europe's attitude towards the reforms was 
one of the main handicaps of Ottoman reformers, which resulted in the evolution of 
Ottoman political ideologies. In this environment, the role of Ottoman diplomats and 
the Foreign Ministry was vital. They were the only ones who knew Western methods, 
languages, and ways of life. Also, the Foreign Ministry handled all foreign loans, so 
critical for boosting the ailing Ottoman economy and f nances. 40 Finally, many 
bureaucrats, ministers and Grand Viziers were educated in this office, 41 such as Mustafa 
Reid Pasha (1800-1858), Ali Pasha (1815-1871) and Fuat Pasha (1815-1869) and these 
people increased the Ministry's power vis-a-vis other ministries. 42 
The new bureaucracy's perception of Ottomanism was highly pragmatic. That is why it 
was dramatically transformed in a very short period. The main trend was westernisation 
as the new bureaucrats copied the western way of life in education, military, industry, 
transportation and so on. However they still hoped to be able to prevent the Empire's 
collapse without cultural westernisation. Some of them, like Namik Kemal were 
Thought), Yeni Tiirkiye, 3, March-April 1995,1,3, p. 558-564. 
40 This financial relations resulted in the bankruptcy of the Empire in 1879, and following the bankruptcy, 
the creditors succeeded in reorganising the country's finances and some of the Ottoman revenue- 
producing areas of the economy through the medium of the medium of the Ottoman Public Dept, set up in 
1881. (Kent, The Great..., p. 2). 
41 Erik Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the 
Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), p. 3. 
42 The relations with some of the ministries were among the tasks of the Foreign Ministry. Even 
translation of the books and articles in the European languages was its duty during the first years. As a 
direct result of these translations, the Foreign Ministry became a school for many Ottoman novelists, 
journalists and poets. 
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defending Islamist ideas in practice. 43 They were no doubt modernists but also eastern 
and Ottoman, believing in Ottoman ability to modernise and westernise while retaining 
their identity and culture. As the 19th century came to an end, and Ottoman decline 
gained momentum, the reformists were divided into three main schools: those who 
identified themselves with religious and other local concepts; seculars, purely 
Westernist Ottomanists (then Turkists); and those who sought a synthesis of western 
technology and science with Islamic and Ottoman values. During the Hamidian era, in 
particular, this division became deeper. 
Abdülhamid II and `Pan-Islamist Foreign Policy' 
For the traditionalists, Islam was the best prescription to slow down Ottoman decline. In 
this view, the Empire was collapsing because of its deviance from Islamic policies. Yet 
while the traditional Islamists totally refuted Western ideas, many reformist and 
modernist Islamists/Ottomanists viewed Islam as a cultural value and a legitimising 
ideology for the unity of the Empire. 44Their Islamism was pragmatic and inspired by 
local problems more than universal issues, and it is difficult to be certain whether they 
used Islam to realise their Ottomanist ideas or were sincere about the Islamic aims. As 
Jacob Landau put it, Pan-Islamism was a response to the clash between the new and the 
old, and the foreign attacks. 45 
Abdulhamid's reign was a turning point for Islamist policies and this dramatically 
affected the Ottoman foreign policy. The Hamidian era also included many important 
changes in comparison with previous eras. 46 The first change was institutional, notably 
a dramatic decline in the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hariciye Nezareti) and 
its substitution by the Sultan and his advisers who became the main pillar of Ottoman 
foreign policy. The reason behind this was the Sultan's distrust towards the 
43 Mümtaz'er Türkdne, Siyasi Ideoloji Olarak Islamcih in Dogu u, (The Emerge of the Islamism as a 
Political Idea) (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1991); Ismail Kara, Islamcdann Siyasi Görü§leri, (The 
Political Ideas of the Islamists), (Istanbul: Iz Yayincibk, 1994). 
44 For example Namik Kemal, in his `Ittihad-z Islam' (Islamic Unity) argued that only a union of all the 
Muslims, led by the Ottomans, could save the Empire. Also see Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young 
Ottoman Thought, (Princeton, NJ: 1962), p. 60 and Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam, 
Ideology and Organization, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 3; 
45 Landau, The Politics..., p. 9. 
' M. Sdkrü Hanioglu, `J6n Türkler ve Osmanli'da 19 - Did Politika Baglantisi' (Jon Turks and the 
Connection Between the Foreign and Domestic Politics in the Ottomans), in Faruk Sonmezoglu (ed), 
Türk Did PolitikasinHn Analizi (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), (Istanbul: Der Yaymlan, 
1994), pp. 333-355, p. 333. Rifk1 Salim Burgale, Tnrk - Ingiliz Münasebetleri, 1791-1941, (Turkish - 
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bureaucracy. Secondly, there was a theoretical and ideological shift in Ottoman foreign 
policy. During the Hamidian era, state policies were oriented toward the Muslims. 
Abdülhamid explained the reason for this new policy in his memoirs; 
`in new order of things that is, in a state based upon the individual- the government 
must abide by the cultural tendencies of the majority of its subjects. The Ottoman State is being made up mostly of Muslims, its government should abide Islam, very much as 
the French government abided by the Catholic culture. '47 
Like the Ottomanist prescription, there were pragmatic reasons behind `Islamist foreign 
policy'. During the first years of Abduihamid's rule, the Empire had lost its best 
provinces and much of the army. Having lost its most Christian populated provinces the 
Empire became predominantly Muslim. Secondly, in addition to the military defeats, 
Abdulhamid II inherited a heavy foreign debt and in 1882 had to accept the authority of 
the Foreign Debt Administration set up by the European debtor countries to collect their 
loans. Thirdly, the sultan thought that he had only one tool to prevent what he 
considered the British plans to put an end to the Ottoman Empire: Islam. For 
Abdulhamid II the Muslims under British rule would change the British mind about 
Ottoman survival. That is to say, the Empire had lost almost all its foreign policy 
instruments, except Islam as a foreign policy ideology. 48 
Furthermore, the Russian Empire dominated the Black Sea rim by capturing huge 
Ottoman territories. The Russians were militarily stronger and also enjoyed the support 
of the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. Abdulhamid II, who understood that 
it would be very difficult to defeat the Russians in combat, thought that the same 
strategy the Russians had used could be used against them. Hence he viewed the 
Muslims under Russian rule as a useful card. Finally, it was understood that 
international law or agreements could not prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
For example, despite the 1856 Paris Agreement, which guaranteed the Ottoman State's 
territorial unity, the European powers, de facto or de jure, undermined Ottoman rule and 
then occupied their territories step by step. This in turn led to a more active Ottoman 
English Relations, 1791-1941), (Istanbul: 1946). 
47 Kemal H. Karpat, `The Ottoman Rule in Europe From the Perspective of 1994', in Vojtech Mastny and 
R. Craig Nation (eds. ), Turkey Between East and West, (Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), pp. 1-44. 
48 Although some thought that pan-Turkism could be the most effective solution to the collapse, the 
Sultan did not favour such an alternative. Yusuf Akcaraoglu, Türkcülük ve Di Türkler, (Turkism and 
the Turkish Abroad), (Istanbul: Toker Yaymlan, 1990), pp. 96-109 (the section of `Abdi lhamid 
Döneminde Türkcülüge KMi Ahnan Tavirlar' - The Policies Against Turkism During The Hamidian 
Period). 
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foreign policy based on the Pan-Islamist approach. As a result, as leaders of all 
Muslims, the Ottomans gained four practical benefits. 49 the halting of possible Muslim 
riots in Ottoman territories; getting a new and strong card against the European powers 
and Russia all of which had millions of Muslims in their colonies; maintaining political, 
strategic and economic support of the overseas Muslims in some issues; responding to 
Christian propaganda. 
Though Islam was seen as the best, indeed the only tool in foreign policy by 
Abdulhamid II, as noted earlier, his Islamist policies did not mean that Abdulhamid was 
a traditionalist sultan. On the contrary he was one of the most enthusiastic sultans for 
reforms and modernisation, 5° keen on Western culture, art (especially opera and theatre) 
and literature. His main aim was not to build a purely Islamic and traditional society, 
but rather a modern, Westernised Islamic country. 5' That is to say, on the one hand he 
carried out Islamist foreign policy and used Islam to legitimise his policies, while on the 
other he continued to carry out the reforms and westernisation process. 
In addition, Abdulhamid's Islamist policies also focused on Muslims who lived outside 
Ottoman rule. He sent emissaries to overseas, such as Japan, China and Indonesia52 
however a special emphasis was placed on British India and Russian Central Asia. 53 
Newspapers and leaflets were published in Urdu (e. g. Peyk-i Islam), Arabic and Persian 
(like El Gayret) languages54; the number of the Ottoman counsellors in India was 
increased and meetings were organised to unite the Indian Muslims. As a result, the 
British, French and Russian governments were always careful to treat the sultan-caliph 
49 Abdulhamid II, in his memoirs, accepts only two of these reasons: to forge the Islamic unity and to 
respond the Christian propaganda. Abdulhamid II, Sultan, Siyasi Hatiratim (My Political Memoirs) 
(Istanbul: 1974); Ismet Bozdag (ed. ), Abdülhamid'in Hatira Defteri, Belgeler ve Resimler 
(Abdillhamid's Memoirs Notebook the Documents and the Pictures), (Istanbul: 1975). 
50 Lewis, The Emergence. - 51 Contrary to the general opinion Abdulhamid was not very strict on the Islamic rules even in everyday 
life of his subjects. Mayokan observed that most of the staff in Yildiz Palace was not fasting in Ramadan 
period. I. M. Mayokan, Yddhzda Neler G6rdüm (What I Saw in Yzldiz), (Istanbul: 1940), pp. 22-25. 
2 Abdulhamid II even sent permanent diplomatic representatives to some small African countries and the 
Far Eastern countries like Philippines. For the some examples of the appointment documents: Istanbul 
Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry, No. 21/33 (4351)/22126. B. 1328/1 (on the appointment of the 
$ehbender (Consular) Necib Haci Efendi); Istanbul Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry, No: 
2634 (4372)/16/29. S(h). 1328/1, Hariciye iradeleri Katalogu (on the appointment of $ehbender 
(Consular) Ohannes Efendi to Africa Consulate. 
53 Anthony Hyman, `Turkestan and Pan-Turkism Revisited', Central Asian Survey, Vol 16, No. 3,1997, 
FF. 341-342. 
Ilber Ortayh, '19. Yüzyilda Panislamizm ve Osmanli Hilafeti' (Pan Islamism in 19. Century and the 
Ottoman Caliphate), Türkiye Gnnlügü, No. 31, November-December 1994, pp. 25-31. 
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in such a way as to avoid mass protest among the millions of Muslims in their 
empires. 55 Some of the Ottoman counsellors were declared persona non grata, like 
Hüseyin Kamil Bey, counsellor for Karachi, India. 56 Yet despite these European 
apprehension, Abdulhamid never sought disturbances or jihad in these territories. His 
aim was simply to save the Empire by holding the Islam card against the British and 
Russians. 57 Moreover, despite its Islamic characteristics, Hamidian foreign policy was 
not aggressive. Nor could it escape historical Ottoman attitudes. Similar to the earlier 
19th century Ottoman diplomacy, it aimed at exploiting the competition among the great 
powers. Since the British and French were obviously against his Islamist policies, 
Abdulhamid saw the Germans as a balancing power, since his Islamist policies perfectly 
matched Kaiser Wilhelm H's Weltpolitik (the Kaiser visited Istanbul three times, a 
record for any European monarch). 58 The co-operation with the Germans was based on 
mutual interests. The Kaiser hoped to use the sultan/caliph's influence among Muslims 
against his European rivals. Also the Ottoman territories could be used as a source of 
raw materials for a growing German industry. For the Sultan the anticipated gains were 
clear: to put an end to Ottoman isolation in Europe; to defend the Empire's territorial 
integrity with German support; to counter balance Russian and British power and 
influence; and to speed up the economic and technological development with German 
training and technological aid. Thus while Germany was defending the Ottoman 
interests in the region and Europe, the Ottoman Empire gave German companies in its 
territories preferential treatment. 59 As a result, the Turkish-German friendship that was 
started by Abdul Hamid and the Kaiser, was to continue for a century, through the 
Young Turks, Mustafa Kemal, Inönü and the DP periods. 
ss Roderic H. Davison, `Ottoman Diplomacy and Its Legacy', in L. Carl Brown (ed), Imperial Legacy, 
The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), p. 190. 
56 Azmi Ozcan, Panislamizm, Osmanli Devleti, Hindistan Mäslämanlarl ve Ingiltere, 1877-1914 
(Pan Islamism, Ottoman State, Indian Muslims and Britain), (Istanbul: 1992). 
57 Interestingly, most of the Western academics considered Pan-Islamism as a plan to collapse the British 
Empire. Most of the Turkish academics, on the other hand, like fiber Ortayh and Azmi Ozcan, perceive 
Pan-Islamism as an extension of the internal balance and the weakness of the Empire. 
58 Landau, The Politics..., p. 46. 
59 One of the best examples for the German-Ottoman co-operation is the Anatolia-Baghdad Railway 
Project. This project increased the co-operation between these countries while Britain and France opposed 
it. Murat Ozyüksel, Osmanh - Alman 
Iti4kilerinin Gei im Sürecinde Anadolu ve Bagdat 
Demiryollari, (Anatolia and Baghdad Railways in the Development of the Ottoman-German Relations), 
(Istanbul: 1988). 
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In brief, Abdulhamid's Islamism can be considered an ideology of self-defence rather 
than of aggression aimed at preserving the integrity and the unity of the Empire. His 
diplomacy relied on the balance of forces between the great powers of Europe, seeking 
to avoid new wars and to recover lost territories. German support was supposed to close 
the gap between the West and the Empire in military and economy term. When he 
understood that the Empire could not cope with British superiority, Abdulhamid used 
the religious and ethnic cards against the British Empire. However he never publicly 
attacked British or French interests as the Young Turks would do in future. 
Another method used by Abdulhamid II in his foreign policy was to support 
international law, 6° which at times proved more effective than the Ottoman army. In fact 
before the Hamidian era Ottoman diplomats had frequently referred to international law. 
For example, Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha, in condemnation of actions by Greece 
during a period of tension wrote that `No country is allowed to make its own laws 
superior to what is called the law of nations'. 61 The ultimate aim was to become an 
equal part of the European state system and to guarantee the Empire's territorial 
integrity by using international law and Abdulhamid 11 continued this policy. 
Though they failed to prevent Ottoman collapse, and were discarded by his successors, 
`the domestic and foreign policies of the reign of Abduihamid II (1878-1909) have left a 
permanent remark on Turkish society and the Muslim world as a whole. '62 Even 
Atatürk, in spite of the fundamental difference between his and Hamidian ideologies, 
used similar foreign and domestic policies. 
Abdülhamid II and the Rise of the Secularist - Positivist Philosophy 
One of the significant effects of the Hamidian era was the creation of a modern 
education system and the attendant development of a secularist-positivist philosophy 
among Ottoman civil-military officers. This development left its mark permanently on 
Ottoman institutions and political life. Secular westernst political groups were a direct 
result of this development and the army and the foreign ministry were shaped by the 
impact of this ideology. 
60 Bozdag, Abdülhamid'in..., pp. 72-105. 
61 Davison, `Ottoman... ', p. 185. 
62 Karpat, `The Ottoman... ', p. 26. 
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Almost all Ottoman political groups had accepted the need for Westernisation, but 
secular Westernism was not a result of necessity but a product of a secularist-positivist 
education system. Although most of them were traditional observant Muslims, the 
Ottoman Sultans had no alternative, but to use Western education methods, because the 
Islamic/Ottoman medrese system was corrupt and bankrupt. Even the most religious 
sultans, like Abdulhamid II, encouraged Western-style schools. As Göcek pointed out, 
Western -style education was introduced to unite and modernise society, yet it instead 
deepened the existing gaps between segments into chasms. 63 These schools, for instance 
imported a secularist philosophy, and trained the Ottoman pupils as ideologically 
fanatic Westernists: 
`The secularist-positivist philosophy embodied in the Ottoman reform movement found 
itself in direct opposition to the religious spirit of the traditional school system. The 
"modem" school system that emerged after 1839 was the antithesis of the old Ottoman 
system and gradually undermined and replaced it, a process that culminated in the 
Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu (Law for the Unification of Education) in the Republic. '" 
The secularist education system was supported by the European powers, and was at 
times imposed upon the Ottoman State. For example, during the Abdülaziz reign France 
sent a diplomatic note to reform the education system according to the European 
system. 65 The languages of learning in these modern schools were French and Turkish. 
Most teachers and academics were educated in the French, German or Italian 
missionary schools or in one of these countries, and were fanatically Westernist and 
secularist; some were atheist in a country which was the political leader of the Muslim 
world. As witnessed during the Second Merutiyet events, the teachers in the 
universities served to politicise the students against the Palace. 
66 For example, in the 
Military Medicine School the veteran students were telling new students that `this 
school is a home of freedom. Here you must study for science and to protect the country 
from "esaret" (Abdýlhamid regime)... The hocas (teachers) are "hürriyetperver" (lover 
of freedom / anti Hamidian regime). They are like us. '67 
63 Fatma Müge Göcek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), p. 140. 
64 Kemal H. Karpat, `Reinterpreting Ottoman History: A Note on the Condition of Education in 1874' 
International Journal of Turkish Studies, Winter 1981-82, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 93-100, p. 95. 
65 yücel Aktar, Ikinci Me4rutiyet Dönemi Ogrenci Olaylan (1908-1918) (The Student Movements in 
the Second Mesrutiyet Era), (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1990), p. 17. 
66 Ajdarý Ikinci..., p. 27. 
67 Nur, Hayat..., p. 100. 
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Institutional Impact of the Western-Styled Education and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
With the decline of the old system, these newly established schools began to feed vital 
official institutions. Most of the Foreign Ministry officials for example, originally came 
from either the Mekteb-i Mülkiye (The School of Political Science) or foreign schools. 
Galatasaray Lisesi - Secondary and High School (French - medium), Saint Joseph 
College (French), Robert College (English), Italian Boy-Girl Schools (Italian), Tarsus 
American (English) were the most successful schools in the Empire and all carried out a 
foreign curriculum in foreign languages. 68 Similarly, Ottoman military officers were 
educated in the Narb 'rye (The Military High School) or in foreign states, notably 
Germany. Other significant `modern' schools were the Law and the Medicine faculties 
of the Darunun (University). These schools would play a similar role in the Republic, 
by continuing to educate its civil servants. 69 Thus the army and the Foreign Ministry 
became largely pro-Western, though their Westernism was extremely naive and saw the 
European powers as a panacea. As Dr. Riza Nur, one of the important westernst 
Ottomans admitted, 
68 Many teachers in these schools were foreigners, and the difference between the Turkish and the 
foreigners was limited Tevfik Fikret, one of the most famous Ottoman poem and the director of the 
French-medium Galatasaray High School, whose students have dominated the Foreign Ministry entrance 
examinations since the 19th century, is a very good example to explain the ideological situation in these 
schools and how the future-Ottoman officers were educated Fikret in his `Haluk'un Amentiisü' expressed 
his secularist positivist understanding: 
There is neither Satan, nor angel, 
We are the Satan, we are the gin, 
I believe in, 
Only the man will change the world into paradise 
I believe in 
One day science will make the soil gold, I believe in 
Everything will be possible with the power of intelligence 
I believe in... ' 
When Fikret sent his son Haluk to Royal Technical College in Scotland he advised: ` Go and bring some 
light to our country. ' For Fikret civilisation was in the West, not in his country. Naturally he also advised 
his students and the Ottoman nation to do the same thing as Haluk did. Haluk, having graduated from the 
American Robert College, Royal Technical College and the Michigan University converted to 
Christianity. For the most comprehensive study on the Tevfik Fikret and the Haluk cases see Cüneyd 
Okay's article in Toplumsal Tarih, no. 30, June 1996. 
69 This similarity confirms the continuity of the Ottoman modernisation process in the Republican era. 
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`We were such a ignorant people. We saw the English as a protector and defender of 
freedoms. For us, the English give the nations their independence, freedom and oppress 
and annihilate the cruel dictators, like the Hamid. '7° 
The impact of foreign education on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was even more 
alarming. Most officials in this ministry graduated from the Christian missionary 
primary and secondary schools in the Empire or from European schools. Most of them 
also continued their education in a European college, university or Western-styled 
Mekteb-i Mülkiye in Istanbul. Almost all of them came from wealthy Ottoman families, 
and had visited the European capitals before taking their post in the ministry. Therefore 
they were admirers of the West, which represented in their eyes an advance 
civilisational system, whereas the Ottoman Empire, without any doubt, was an 
undeveloped state. Their civilisational perception naturally determined their position on 
foreign policy issues, yet they also came from the Ottoman state tradition and respected 
the hierarchy of that state. As a result, they served the system while trying to manipulate 
it wherever they could. However, since the regime was aware of this tendency, it sought 
to bypass the Foreign Ministry and take direct control over foreign affairs. This applied 
not only to Abdulhamid but also to secularist Westernist political groups, like the CUP 
and the Kemalists. 
Despite the `soft resistance' of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Palace, the main 
impact of Western education came to be exerted through the army. The secular- 
positivist philosophy had dominated the military schools and most of the officers were 
anti-religious and anti-Palace. They were better organised and more confident than other 
opposition groups. Therefore, unlike the Foreign Ministry, when they felt strong enough 
they attempted to seize power. 
Ottomanists 
This group's ideology was based on creating an Ottoman nation and it identified 
nationalism mainly with religion and a shared past. They believed that the Ottoman 
State would survive by unifying the peoples who lived or had lived in the classic 
Ottoman territories, namely Anatolia, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and 
North Africa. They thought that to unite these greatly diverse peoples the State had to 
70 Nur, Hayat... 
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find a new citizenship concept which relied on mutual responsibilities and rights 
between the Sultan/State and his subjects. They also suggested the adoption of Western 
democratic institutions, a parliament and a written constitution. Therefore, it can be said 
that the new Ottomanism was more liberal and democratic than Palace Ottomanism had 
been. At the beginning of the 20th century, in particular they represented the liberal wing 
of Ottoman politics. While in domestic politics they defended decentralisation, ethnic 
autonomy, a free market economy and a democratic system, 71 their foreign policy was 
very similar to Hamidian foreign policy. They knew the Empire's weakness and sought 
to avoid any involvement in war or conflict, arguing that its only chance of survival lay 
with the exploitation of competition between the great powers. These `liberal 
Ottomanists' were supported by the ethnic and religious minorities and from time to 
time by the Palace. However, they could not meet the demands of the middle class and 
the bureaucracy, and thus could not become a major power in Ottoman politics. Yet 
they affected all political groups in one form or another and sometimes these groups 
carried out Ottomanist policies. Therefore it is difficult to classify certain policies and 
the politicians as Islamist, Westernist or Ottomanist. For example most Hamidian 
policies were Ottomanist rather than Islamist. The liberal Ottomanists failed in the 
Imperial time, but, as will be shown later in the Republic Turkish conservatism and 
liberalism would rise out of the ashes of this liberal Ottomanism. 
Secular Westernists 
Finally, the most radical school of thought was the secular westernist nationalists. They 
were very active during the Hamidian era, blaming the Sultan's Islamist policies for the 
Empire's economic and military failures. 72 A predominant role was played by the Jon 
Turks (Young Turks)73 to organise a secret organisation Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the 
Committee of Union and Progress-CUP). 74 Its primary preoccupation was similar to the 
71 Feroz Ahmad, Ittihatciliktan Kemalizm'e, (From Ittihatcilik to Kemalism), Second Edition, (Istanbul: 
Kaynak Yayinlan, 1986), p. 13. 
72 M. Sukru Hanioklu, The Young Turks in Opposition, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995); Zürcher, `Young Turks... ', p. 151. 
73 The Young Turks and their role in Turkish politics are discussed in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: 
The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, (Oxford: 1969); Ahmed 
Bedevi Kuran, Osmanh Imparatorlugu'nda Inkilap Hareketleri ve Milli Mücadele, (The 
Revolutionary Movements in the Ottoman Empire and the National Struggle), (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 
1956). 
74 During the first years the organisation was a base for the opposition against the authoritarian Hamidian 
regime (istibdat), even some Islamists were the members of the organisation, like Bediuzzaman Said-i 
Nursi. Ismail Kara, Islamcilar'in Siyasi Görälleri, (The Ideas of the Islamists), (Istanbul: iz Yayulcilik, 
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earlier schools of thought: how to save the Ottoman Empire and what political system 
should be adopted to modernise the country. 75 However, contrary to these schools of 
thought, the CUP, which came to dominate Ottoman politics after the 1908 `revolution', 
viewed technological and scientific developments as insufficient for saving the Empire, 
and instead insisted on cultural reforms as well. They identified nationalism with such 
secular concepts as race and culture, and especially during the Mesrutryet 
(constitutional) era, became the most enthusiastic westerners and modernisers. Their 
understanding was that Europe should serve as a model for development in every aspect 
of Ottoman life. 76 The journalist Abdullah Cevdet described the essence of this ideology 
in one sentence in 1913: 
`There is no second civilization; civilization means European civilization, and it must 
be imported with both its roses and its thorns. '" 
According to this outlook the Ottoman Empire had to change its civilisational track. As 
will be seen, at the end of the 19th century this woridview was the most popular 
ideological movement among military students and officers. The Westernist and 
civilisational perceptions of the party inevitably affected its internal and foreign policy. 
Another significant feature of the CUP was the army's role in the policy-making 
process. There had been no clear distinction between the civilian and military arms of 
the state and military matters had always had a priority. When the Empire entered the 
era of decline, military reform was more acceptable than reform in any other aspect of 
national life, since the need to defend the empire was universally accepted. Therefore, 
the reconstruction of the Empire's military machine nearly came to the fore in the minds 
of the reformers. 78 In spite of resistance from the traditional units the nature of the army 
helped the success of the reforms. During the first years European arms and techniques 
were transferred to the Ottoman army. Then, the Palace confronted the same problem it 
had faced in the reform of the civil bureaucracy: shortage of manpower. As a result new 
1994), p. 127. However, later it evolved to a purely secular-Westernist political party. 
75 Tank Z. Tunaya, `Türlsiye'nin Siyasi Geliýme Seyri Icinde Jön Turk Hareketinin Fikri Esaslan', (The 
Foundations of the Jon Turk Movement in Turkey's Political Development) in Prof. Dr. Tahrir Taner'e 
Armagan, (Istanbul: IÜFFD, 1956); Muammer Görmen, isvicre'de Jöntürk Baum ve Türk Siyasal 
Hayathna Etkileri, 1889-1902, (The Jon Turk Press in Switzerland and Its Impact on Turkish Political 
Life, 1889-1902), (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1995), p. 23. 
"6 Abdullah al-Ahsan, Ummah or Nation? Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society, 
(Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1992), p. 33. 
" Quoted in Dankwart A. Rustow, Turkey, America's Forgotten Ally, (New York: Council of Foreign 
Relations, p. 14. 
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military schools were established, and became `a way to acquire a modern education 
and open doors to upward mobility in a society which had become highly stratified with 
limited opportunities for Muslims'. 79 As a result, these schools inculcated Western ideas 
into the Ottoman military. The foremost books military students were reading were 
French, and the dominant ideologies in the schools were positivism, secularism and the 
French revolution's Jacobin understanding. 80 As noted above, the leaders of the 
Ottoman army had power over civilian matters and they always saw themselves as 
guardians of the state. When this tradition was blended with French revolutionary 
ideology, the military schools and the military itself became the bases for the reforms 
and opposition to the Palace. Although the army, for a while, did not engage in political 
matters, many young officers dreamt of establishing a secular-positivist-European 
country instead of the traditional Ottoman Empire. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 
the most influential leaders of the 1908 movement were officers, like Mustafa Kemal. 
As a result the army became deeply involved in Ottoman internal and foreign affairs. 
The third feature of the CUP period is the Jacobin co-operation between civil and 
military bureaucrats against the liberals, Palace, religious institutions and the people. 
For the Young Turks, these groups had been used by external forces to destroy the 
Empire. 8' The Young Turks believed their ideas about reform, secularisation and 
modernisation to be absolute, unconditional truths for the salvation of the Empire, and, 
from this perspective the policies could not be debated and tested before their 
implementation. They did not have public support, and alienated the Europeans through 
their aggressive policies. The only support for their policy thus came from the 
bureaucracy. Thus the CUP lost an important tool in diplomacy: public support and 
flexibility. As a result, the CUP found it difficult to change its policies when it was 
necessary. Worst of all, Ottoman foreign policy lost its pragmatism and framework, and 
the party ideology came to supersede external relations. 
78 Hale, Turkish..., p. 13. 
79 Ahmad, The Making..., p. 104. 
80 Officer Rahmi Apak claims that there was no moral education in War Academy, and the students were 
thought with a different belief system that the ordinary people have. See Rahmi Apak, Yetmillik Bir 
Subayin Hatiralan, (The Memories of a Seventy-Years-Old Of cer), (Ankara: TTK Yayinlan, 1988), p. 
13-14. 
81 Sina Aksin, Jön Tiirkler ve Ittihak ve Terakki, (Jon Turks and Ittihak and Terakki), (Istanbul: Ger9ek 
Yayin an, 1980), p. 111. 
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Another characteristic of CUP policies was its Turkism, then pan-Turkism. Obviously, 
without a nation it was difficult to create a European nation-state. Hence, the main aim 
of the CUP was to create a nation. According to their view, Islam and Ottomanism had 
failed to unite the Ottoman peoples, and the only way to save the Empire was to create a 
Turkish-led Empire. As a matter of fact, `Turk' since the beginning of the Ottoman 
Empire, had meant `rude, common villager' and the Palace never defined itself as 
Turkish. Even among commoners, `Turk' was used as an insult. 82 For many Ottomans, 
the term `Turk' had a somewhat derogatory connotation even at the end of the 19th 
century. 83 
Hence seeking to create a `Turkish nation' was contrary to the popular mood. This 
nourished the Young Turks' belief in a Jacobean approach and made them more radical. 
For them, Turkification and modernisation had to descend from the top to down. They 
did not see the people as a source of power since for them the people's values were 
responsible for the backwardness of the Empire. Thus, although they had accused 
Abdulhamid II for being authoritarian they followed his footsteps. Yet though the CUP 
was Turkist, there was no consensus on a possible Turkish empire. The nationalists split 
into three different groups: Pan-Turanists, Pan-Turkists, and Turkists. The first group 
sought unification of all `Turanic races' which includes the Magyars and Finns as well 
as the Turks. Pan-Turkism, in contrast aimed at the unification of all the Turkic peoples 
(Turkish race) namely the Turks of Central Asia, China, what is now the Russian 
Federation, Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijans (Iran and Azerbaijan), Bulgaria, Crimea, 
Moldavia, Western Thrace, Cyprus. Turkism was the most moderate of these and 
advocated a cultural nationalism rather than a racial one. It was not irredentist and was 
not very enthusiastic about the unification of the Turkish peoples. 
" As the Empire 
suffered territorial losses, the radical-romantic nationalists, like Enver, gained more 
power in the CUP and eventually in government. As a result, the Empire came to pursue 
foreign policy goals that were beyond its power. 
The Young Turks in Foreign Policy and the Emergence of the Contra- 
82 The ottomans depicted the Turks as etrak-i idrak (One does not use his brain) while the Arabs were 
called as kavm-i necib (noble race). Ortayli, p. 54. 
83 Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism, From Irredentism to Cooperation, (London: Hurst & Company, 
1995), p. 29. 
84 Ayse Neviye Caglar, `The Greywolves as Metaphor', in Andrew Finkel and Nukhet Sirman (eds. ), 
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Nationalisms 
Despite their enormously different political aims and principles, being continuously 
engaged in war or suppression of rebellion, the Young Turks had little time for internal 
reforms. Likewise, even in foreign policy they had few options and were forced to toe 
the Ottomanist policies of their predecessors. 85 Ironically, the Young Turks continued to 
use Islam as a foreign policy tool and German influence became much deeper. For 
example, the army founded by Enver Pasha to rescue the Caucasus, was called the 
`Islamic Army'. Pan-Islam's expansionist character suited the Young Turks' aims and 
mood. Also the `outside Turks' were also Muslim and most of them were not aware of 
their nationality, therefore the only common unifying subject to unite the Turks was 
Islam. Similarly the Young Turks saw Germany as the only country supporting the 
restoration of Ottoman loses. However, the Young Turks were not well-equipped to 
continue the Hamidian policies. They were not Islamists - some of their leaders were 
atheists who regarded Islam as a reactionary factor - and consequently did not grasp the 
core values of such an ideology. 86 
Hence, when their brief flirtation with Islam soured, the Young Turks looked to the 
Turkic world as their source of power and a way to end isolation. But there was no such 
Turkic world out there: only Turkish tribe which could help the Ottomans was 
themselves when they need help. Still, the Turkists could not see that, because their 
policy was a prisoner of their ideology. Enver Pasha, the most influential CUP leader, 
was a perfect example of the failure of the Young Turks' adventurist policies bringing 
the Empire into the First World War and eventually leading to the imperial collapse. 87 
This failure cannot be explained by only Enver's inexperience or incompetence, because 
Turkish State, Turkish Society, (London: Routledge 1990), pp. 79-101, p. 81 
85 David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, (London: Frank Cass, 1977), p. 101. 
86 Harry Luke, The Old and the New Turkey: From Byzantium to Ankara (London: 1955), p. 143; 
Landau, The Politics, p. 87; Kemal H. Karpat, `The Turkic Nationalities: Turlish-Soviet and Turkish- 
Chinese Relations', in W. O. McCagg and B. D. Silver (eds. ), Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers (New 
York: 1979), p. 124. 
87 When the outside Turks did not rescue the Ottomans, Enver decided to free them from the `Russian 
yoke'. Ironically to reach his Pan-Turkist ideal Enver and Talat Pasha carried out a Pan-Islamist 
campaign in the Caucasus. They were not Islamist and their aim was to Turkify the Caucasus. Baran 
Dural, Milliyetgilige Farkh Bir Bakal ve Turan Idealinin Dogu*u (A Different Perspective to 
Nationalism and the Emerge of the Turan Ideal), (Istanbul: Kamer Yayinlari, 1992), p. 116; Serif Bey's 
newly published memoirs clearly shows that Turkish armies had no chance to win the war: Kurmay 
Yarbay Köprülülü Serif Bey, Sankauu*, An, (Sarikanus, Memoirs), (Ankara: Türkiye I* Bankasi Kültür 
Yaynilan, 1999); also see Sevket Süreyya Aydemir, Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Pap, 1914- 
1922 (Enver Pasha, from Macedonia to Central Asia), (Istanbul: Remzi, 1972). 
55 
he was one of the Empire's most capable leaders. But he did not give up his ideological 
precepts until the final territory of the Empire was lost. 
This experience was one of the most instructive lessons for Kemal and his Republican 
friends. That is to say, not only the CUP's ideology, but its actual failures formed 
Kemalist ideology. The first effect of this failure on Kemalist Turkey was pragmatism 
and realism. Another effect was a more moderate nationalist approach, namely Ziya 
Gökalp's nationalism. For Gökalp, before conquering other territories, all Ottomans 
must be Turkified. His prescription was based on a secular, Westernist and Muslim 
Ottoman nation-state. 88 Kemal understood that the first priority was not to create a 
Turkish Empire, but rather a homogeneous Turkish nation. For Kemal, Turkey needed 
stability not war. Hence it had to sacrifice some territories to establish a healthy nation- 
state. Already at the time when the Turkists were defending a Turkish empire, Kemal 
argued that the Empire had to leave some of the territories in the Balkans: 
`Rumeli (the Balkans) cannot be defended now. If we do not want a disaster we must 
make peace with Greece. Let give up all our rights over the Crete, and let give our 
Aegean islands give the Greeks except the closest ones... '89 
Nor could the Young Turks use the German factor as efficiently as had Abdulhamid 
since they did not know their enemies and friends well, and had no control over their 
relations with these powers. Their romantic Turkism led to an aggressive foreign policy 
orientation and mistrust of the European powers. 90 As a result, CUP's foreign policy 
exhibited a marked hostility towards Britain and France, 91 and was heavily dependant 
on one power: Germany. Again, Kemal was against the CUP's Germany-based foreign 
policy: 
`We should not sacrifice any of our soldiers for a foreign country's interests. Turks 
should not be used in the German military plans... We should not trust the Germans for 
88 Gdkalp's Türkcülügün Esaslan book provides all the differences between the adventurist Turkism 
and Gökalp's nationalism. As a sociologist he saw the Western-type nation-state as the solution while the 
pan-Turkists did not mind so much the political system the Turkish state had 
89 Ahmed Emin Yalman, Yakin Tarihte C irdiiklerim ve Gecirdiklerim, 1888-1918, (My Memoirs for 
the Near Past, 1888-1918), (Istanbul: n. d), p. 184. 
90 Abdulhamid II also did not trust any European powers, yet, as Ünal pointed out, Abdülhamid's anti 
Europeanism and his fundamental mistrust of all the Powers were rooted in a sense of his own Empire's 
weakness. In contrast, in the words of Ünal, `the anti Europeanism of the CUP was rooted in an 
aggrieved and assertive nationalism some of whose implications in international affairs were potentially 
revolutionary. ' Hasan Ünal, `Young Turk Assessments of International Politics, 1906-9', in Sylvia 
Kedourie (ed. ), Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics, (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 36. 
91 ibid., p. 31-32. 
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the thousands of Turks. We should not give the Genpans the opportunity to colonise our 
country. 92 
Thus, the lessons from the failure of the CUP's German policy would become the 
essence of Atatürk's non-alignment policy in the Republican era. 
Conclusion 
Despite the autocratic structure of the Empire, its foreign policy making was a 
pluralistic process. There were many orientations, and decision-makers were open to 
suggestions. Almost all foreign policy schools in these years were influenced by the 
decline of the Empire. The Empire was declining and the question preoccupying all 
political groups was what were the causes of this decline and why were the Ottomans 
relatively underdeveloped in comparison with the West? The first attempts were 
institutional more than structural, yet resulted in a modernist elite. Thus by the mid- 
nineteenth century some Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals started to distinguish 
themselves as a group of dissidents; Young Turks. 93 The first Young Turks were also 
modernist and westernist, yet their modernism was moderate, looking for religious 
grounds for the adoption of western institutions. 94 Yet these attempts failed to explain 
the cause of backwardness and military defeats. Therefore the Ottoman intellectuals 
began to question the role of religion and tradition in this backwardness. Thus, 
westernism split into different schools of thought while the religious groups were 
evolving into political Islamism, traditionalism etc. The new westernists viewed Islam 
and tradition as responsible for the Empire's decline. Ottomanism had evolved to 
moderate westernism, and now it was evolving to a positivist, secularist westernism, 
which perceived religion as a `primitive mode of thought. '95 This misperception was 
nourished by the Ottoman intellectuals, bureaucrats and army officers who began to see 
their society as uncivilised and underdeveloped. For them, modernisation, 
westernisation and secularisation were identical concepts. After the 1908 revolution 
they dominated Ottoman political life until the collapse of the Empire. These political 
changes inevitably reflected on the Empire's foreign policy. 
92 Yalman, Yakin..., pp. 291-292. 
93 Mert, `Children', pp. 70-71. 
94 Tiirk6ne, Siyasi... 
95 Nuray Mert, The Early Republican's Secularism, A Theoretical Approach, unpublished PhD thesis, 
the University of Bosphorus, Istanbul, 1992. 
57 
The second point is that Ottoman foreign policy turned from an offensive to a defensive 
policy. Internally the Empire made efforts to modernise its army, state institutions and 
education system. During these years the main aims of foreign policy were to gain time 
for internal reforms; regain the territories that had been lost; protect the remaining 
territories; creating a new link between subjects and the state by keeping different ethnic 
and religious groups, who shared similar aims; and to prevent nationalist movements 
and revolts. Almost all schools of thought sought to save the Empire, yet had different 
prescriptions to this end, like secularism, authoritarian westernisation, liberal 
westernisation, Islamisation, Islamic modernisation, Turkism, pan-Turkism, pan- 
Turanism etc. The attempts to create an Ottoman nation failed, and the Empire lost most 
of its non-Muslim subjects by the end of the 19th century. Although Abdulhamid's 
Islamist policies slowed down the decline the Ottoman anachronistic state system was 
decaying. Hamidian foreign policies aims were similar to the previous ones. Despite the 
significant role of ideology, it was not a determining factor but one of the tools of 
foreign policy. Abdulhamid was autocratic in foreign policy making and 
implementation, yet pragmatic in its goals. Like his predecessors, he used the 
competition between the great powers to the Empire's advantage. 
After the 1908 revolution, the in-experienced Young Turks dominated Ottoman foreign 
policy. Their radical policies made foreign policy more ideological and accelerated the 
Empire's decline. In other words, foreign policy goals were sacrificed to ideology. The 
Empire lost vast territories in a short time and eventually disappeared after the First 
World War. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, Kemalism and its foreign policy orientation were 
products of the Ottoman years. Even Göcek argues that the Turkish nation -state was 
created by the labours of the Ottoman bureaucratic bourgeoisie under the guidance of 
Kemal. 96 Although, Kemalists, like Taner Timur97, argue that the Kemalist movement 
was largely independent of previous Westernisation attempts, it is arguable that 
Kemalist foreign policy was a correction or a continuation of these policies. Mustafa 
I Görek, Rise of the..., p. 139. 
97 Taner Timur, `The Ottoman Heritage', in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (eds. ), Turkey in 
Transition, New Perspectives, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 17. 
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Kemal witnessed the agonies of a crippling Empire and saw the failure of all these 
approaches. Although he shared similar ideas with the CUP, Kemal realised the limits 
of Turkey and its international circumstances. In this framework, these three 
approaches, notably the secularist westernist nationalists, and the lessons from Ottoman 
collapse can be seen as a prelude to Kemalist foreign policy. As a former Ittihatcr, 
Kemal had dreams of a secular, modern, positivist, European, Turkish state, yet as an 
eyewitness to the failure of the CUP he also grasped the logic of the Hamidian foreign 
policy. In addition to the ideological and historical lessons, Mustafa Kemal observed the 
attitudes of Europeans and other ethnic and religious groups towards the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire. For him culpability for this failure lay with the old Ottoman political- 
cultural system, European hostility towards the Turks and the betrayal of the Ottoman 




The War of Independence and 
Imperial Foreign Policy vs. Kemalist Foreign Policy 
`This agreement (the Lausanne Agreement) confirms that we left 
Egypt, Sudan, Cyprus, the Aegean Islands and other territories. You, 
friends, have struggled very hard to defend these territories. But our 
loses were not only the territories. This agreement declares the end of 
a magnificent Empire. This agreement declares that we gave 
Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Arabistan. l 
Niyazi Bey (Mersin MP) 
It can be argued that the War of Independence is the most important development in 
contemporary Turkish history. It marked the end of the Empire and the emergence of a 
nation-state. It not only shaped the future of Turkey but also the 20th century Turkish 
mind. The solidarity in the war and the foreign attacks determined internal and external 
Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, the war was the environment in which Kemalist 
ideology was shaped. This chapter, in this framework, focuses on the significant 
developments which deeply affected Turkish foreign policy in Atatürk period and the 
following years, however it must be noted that the details of the period and many 
important events during these years fall into the scope and limits of this study. That is to 
say the main aim of this chapter is not to provide the details of one of the well-known 
periods of Turkish history, or just summarise the events of the period but to show the 
impact of the Independence War on Kemalism and Turkey's foreign policy and to 
examine the differences between Kemal and the Ottomanists' foreign policy by 
discussing the most significant developments in these years, like the Lausanne 
Agreement. 2 
' Niyazi Bey's speech, T. B. M. M. Zabit Ceridesi, Cilt: I, 8.205-217. 
2 For the detailed history of the War of Independence period see: Malimut Gologlu, Milli Mücadele 
Taribi, (The History of the National Struggle), five volumes, (Ankara: 1969); Kazim Ölalp, Milli 
Milcadele, 1919-1922, (The National Struggle), two volumes, (Ankara: 1971,1972); Enver Ziya Karal, 
Türkiye Cumburiyeti Tarihi: 1918-1960, (History of the Republic of Turkey, 1918-1960), (Istanbul: 
Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1963); $evket Sdreyya Aydemir, Tek Adam, Mustafa Kemal, 1919-1922, (One 
Man: Mustafa Kemal), (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1969); Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, A Speech Delivered 
by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, (Ankara: Bgbakanhk Basunevi, 1981); Bilal N. Simsir, Sakarya'dan 
izmir'e, Ingiliz Belgeleriyle (From Sakarya to Izmir, with the British Documents), (Istanbul: Milliyet 
Yayinlan, 1972); Laurance Evanse, Türkiye'nin Paylaplmasi, 1914-1924 (Sharing Turkey), (trn.: 
Tevfik Alanay), (Istanbul: MilJiyet Yayinlan, 1972); Paul Dumont, Mustafa Kemal, (trn: Zeki Celikkol), 
(Ankara: Kültür Bakanhgi, 1999) 
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At the time of the Armistice of Mudros, 1918, the Ottoman Empire was utterly 
destroyed and its territories had been occupied: The French troops landed to occupy the 
Clicia region (south and south-eastern Turkey) including Adana, Mersin, Tarsus and the 
neighbouring region. The French were in co-operation with the Armenians to fully 
complete the occupation. 3 The British, thanks to the secret agreements, which had been 
signed during the First World War took the oil-region, namely Musul, today's Northern 
Iraq. In the north-eastern Black Sea costs the Greeks' plan was to establish a Greek 
state, Pontus, while the Armenians dreamed of a greater Armenia from the south-eastern 
Turkish - Kurdish provinces to the eastern borders of Turkey, and they had the Allies 
support in their plans. 4 In the Southwest there was a disagreement between the Italians 
and Greeks; both claimed that these Turkish territories were historically their right. 
While Italians occupied the Antalya, Burdur, Konya and the Western coasts of Mugla, 
the Greeks would occupy the biggest city in the region, Izmir (Symra). Finally, on 13 
November Istanbul was occupied by the Allies, mainly by the British and the French 
troops and the war-ships. Moreover, `the minorities intended to use the Allied 
occupation for their own benefit'5, as witnessed in the Greek, Armenian and the Arab 
cases. Under these circumstances the sultan's government was not free in its foreign and 
internal relations and many politicians saw co-operation with the Allies as the only 
solution. 
The government's indifferent policy to the Allied occupation and the intentions to 
divide Turkey into many small states evoked a wide range reactions within Muslim the 
society, especially among the Turk and the Kurds. When they realised that the country 
is under occupation and the government was unable to change the situation, the leading 
members of the Young Turks and other nationalists sought an alternative to Istanbul 
government in order to create a resistance against the foreign occupiers. As a result of 
these efforts Societies for the Defence of the National Rights were founded in many 
different provinces with co-operation between the former CUP and the esraf (local 
3 For the French - Armenian co-operation in the occupation see Yahya Akynz, Türk Kurtuiul Savqi ve 
Fransiz Kamuoyu, 1919-1922 (The French Public Opinion and the Turkish Independence War), 
(Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlan, XVI Series, 1975), pp. 122-123. 
4 Six provinces had been mentioned in the Mondros Armistice and as will be seen the Sevres Agreement 
would allocate the region to the Armenians. Also see Mim Kemal 
Öke, The Armenian Question, 1914 - 
1923, (London: K. Rustem & Brother, 1988). 
5 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 329. 
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elite). 6 Societies' main aim was to organise local and regional congresses and many just 
focused on the regional liberation movements, instead of a national resistance 
movement. For instance the Erzurum Congress's official main aim was liberate and 
protect the Eastern provinces against the Russians and Armenians7 while the congresses 
in the West concentrated on the Greek occupation. After the Erzurum, the Sivas 
Congress (September 1919) is considered one of the most important ones since for 
Mustafa Kemal it was the most important step towards the national independence war 
and finally the proclamation of the republic. Kemal was not the only leader who 
organise congresses and meetings and in fact before his departure from Istanbul to 
Anatolia many local congress had been hold, however Kemal and his friends increased 
the national character of the resistance. Mustafa Kemal, who was one of the greatest 
Ottoman war heroes at that time, landed Samsun in May 1919, and then he actively 
joined or organised the resistance meetings, including the Havza, Erzurum and the 
Sivas. As an influential leader he in a short time became one of the most powerful 
leaders of the movement by getting the support of the potential leaders like Ali Fuat 
Cebesoy and Kazim Karabekir. Kemal as discussed and as will be seen in the next 
chapters was a secular, Westernst and a Turkish nationalist. However in order to attract 
the other groups and the ordinary people and as a result of this to organise a strong 
national resistance movement he had to unite use a different rhetoric than his own ideas. 
So, Kemal and his friends like the others declared the aims of the movement as to 
liberate the nation", territory, caliphate and sultanate. 9 Actually we understand that 
Mustafa Kemal did not share the aim of liberation of sultanate and caliphate, instead of 
that he saw both as responsible for the invasion as he clearly declared his real intentions 
after the proclamation of the republic: 
'The enemy powers were openly attacking the Ottoman Empire and the country itself 
morally and materially. They were determined to dismember and annihilate both. The 
6 Erik Jan Zürcher, `Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: identity Politics, 1908- 
1938', in Kemal H. Karpat (ed. ), Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 161; 
Zekai Güner, Milli Mücadele Ballarken Tilrk Kamuoyu, Basin, Siyasi Partiler, Cemiyetler, (Ankara: 
Kültür Bakanhgi, 1999). 
For the Erzurum Congress see Cevat Dursunoglu, Mill Mücadelede Erzurum (Erzurum in the National 
Struggle), (Ankara: 1946); Baykal Bekir Sitki, Erzurum Kongresi he ilgili Belgeler (The Documents on 
Erzurum Congress), (Ankara: 1955); Dursun Ali Akbulut (ed. ), Erzurum Kongresi Hakkinda Belgeler, 
(The Documents About the Erzurum Congress), (Erzurum: Erzurum Valiligi, 1989); Mahmut Gologlu, 
Erzurum Kongresi, (The Erzurum Congress), (Ankara: Nüve Matbaast, 1968); Bülent Tanör, 
Türkiye'de Yerel Kongre Iktidarlari (1918-1920), (The Local Congress Powers in Turkey), (Istanbul: 
1992), pp. 20-35. 
8 `Nation' (millet) meant Muslim peoples of the Empire, mainly Turks and Kurds. Du snnoglu, Milli..., p. 
151. 
9 Zürcher, `Young... ', p. 164-165. 
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Padisah (sultan) - Caliph had one sole anxiety, namely to save his own life and to 
secure tranquillity for himself and government. ' 10 
Also the Amasya Protocol, which was prepared by Kemal and his friends on 19 June 
1919, implied the essence of Kemal's understanding: 
` 1. The unity of the Fatherland and national independence are in danger. 2. The Istanbul 
government is unable to carry out its responsibilities. 3. It is only through the nation's 
effort and determination that national independence will be won... " 
Despite the divergence between Kemal and the other groups, Mustafa Kemal in these 
years only underlined independence principle to unite the different political groups 
against the foreign occupiers. The Greek invasion campaign helped Kemal and his 
friends by stimulating the national resistance, particularly in the Western parts of the 
Empire. The invasion of Izmir by the Greek troops with the help of the local Greek 
minorities and the support of the British, French and the Americans12 in particular and 
the general slaughter of the Turkish population in the following days13 in the region 
caused a great reaction in Anatolia. The Sivas Congress took place under these 
circumstances on 4-12 September 1919. Before the Congress the Istanbul government 
and the Allied occupation forces realised Kemal's resistance plans and as a result Kemal 
resigned from the army. Now he was a civilian leader. In the Sivas the resolutions of the 
Erzurum Congress were accepted and accepted more radical resolutions. Kemal and his 
friends' influence was clear over the congress; The congress conducted its works under 
the chairmanship of Mustafa Kemal. In the Sivas all Defence and Rights Societies of 
Anatolia and Rumelia (Thrace) were united and became one body, and a Representative 
Committee (Heyeti-i Temsiliye), which would be act as the headquarter of the resistance 
movement until the formation of the Grand National Assembly in April 1920, was 
formed to implement the decisions taken by the congress. 14 Representative Committee's 
foreign policy, as Sonyel pointed out, was in its primary stages, and based on getting 
external (from the Muslim world, Soviet Union etc. ) and people's support. 
" 
10 Atatürk in M. Emin Hekimgil, Mustafa Kemal Atatärk, (Ankara: Ministry of Culture, 1998), p. 2. 
" Kili, Kemalism, p. 11-12. 
12 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 342. 
13 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 342. 
14 Kili, Kemalism, p. 14; 
's Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923, Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National 
Movement, (London: SAGE, 1975), p. 21. 
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The Istanbul government considering the developments in Anatolia took initiative at the 
end of 1919 and held the national elections opening the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul 
while Mustafa Kemal moved his headquarters from Sivas to Ankara. The competition 
was clear, both Kemal and Istanbul were making efforts to take the people's support to 
legitimate their power. The last Ottoman parliament (Meths-i Mebusan) after the 
elections met on 12 January 1920, however, the nationalists dominated it. As a matter of 
fact that Kemal did not expect a radical decisions from this parliaments since Istanbul 
was under the control of the Allies. That's why he stayed in Ankara and waited the 
result. When the last parliament with the efforts of the nationalists accepted Misak-a 
Milli (National Pact)16, which declared that Anatolia (article 1), Thrace (article 3), the 
Aegean Sea, the Northern Iraq were part of the Ottoman state (article 1,4 and 5), and 
suggested a referendum in the rest of the Ottoman territories, like Western Thrace and 
some Arab territories (article 3 and 5). The Pact was also rejecting the foreign control 
over the Turkish territories and demanded fully independence: 
`It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every 
country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the 
means of our development, in order that our national and economic development may 
so be rendered possible, and that it should be possible to conduct our affairs in the form 
of a more modem and regular administration (article 6). For this reason we are opposed 
to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial, and other 
fields. ' 17 
As a result, the Allied forces dissolved the Parliament, and many parliamentarians were 
sent to prison or to exile (mostly to Malta). The Allies hoped to destroy the nationalist 
movement with this, however the dissolution of the parliament increased the importance 
of Kemal as the leader of the movement and many more people, including influential 
soldiers, joined the Ankara movement. Also the dissolution of the Istanbul Parliament 
led to the establishment of a new parliament in Ankara by the `rebel' Mustafa Kemal 
and his friends, who considered the Pact the essence of its ultimate aims and its foreign 
policy. '8 Henceforth the National Pact became the Magna Carta of the nationalists. 
16 Kili claims that the National pact was based on the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses' resolutions: Kili, 
Kemalism, p. 17. 
17 For the English text of the National Pact see: Nuri Eren, `The Foreign Policy of Turkey', in Joseph E. 
Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds. ), Foreign Policy in a World of Change, (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1963). 
18 It is not clear that Kemal accepted the Pacts territorial aim including the islands, some Arab territories, 
and Western Thrace. We have no evidence whether Mustafa Kemal shared this view of point or not 
although Kemal publicly defend the Pact. However, it is certain that Kemal strictly defended the national 
sovereignty and independence principles of the Pact: `We regard those who accept the National pact in 
the material and moral field who approve of our complete independence at once as friends. We recognise 
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Now there were two governments in Turkey claiming to represent the people: Ankara 
and Istanbul. Hence the nationalist Ankara government strove to remove this 
competition and to gain domestic and international recognition, and this became one of 
the aims of the foreign policy of the nationalists. To this end, however, it needed 
financial support to get arms and other necessities. Thus defence matters and financial 
help became the most important priorities of Turkish foreign policy. In this framework 
the most important objectives can be summarised as: 
a. implementation of the National Pact, 
b. recognition of the Ankara Parliament as the legal representative of the Turkish 
nation, 
c. to establish alliances in order to get military, financial, diplomatic and moral 
support. 
The First Parliament and Kemalist Strategy 
Before discussing the war, we must look at the main characteristics of the first Ankara 
Parliament, because its unique features determined the success in the war and then the 
nature of the Kemalist revolution. 
The Ankara parliament opened on 20 May 1920 and Kemal was elected the first 
president of the parliament on 24 April. No single group dominated the Ankara 
Parliament, that is Mustafa Kemal and his adherents were far from controlling the first 
parliament. As a matter of fact, the Kemalists were in a minority in the Assembly when 
they began the political struggle. The leadership of Kemal and the prestige he enjoyed 
as the hero of the war of liberation gave the Kemalists a great advantage. '9 But that is 
all. There was a pluralistic and democratic environment in the parliament. In addition to 
the secular Westernists, the Islamists and the Ottomanists were also strong. 20 There was 
no political party but groups, namely Birinci and Ikinci Grup (First and Second groups). 
the right proposed in the international relations of settled and civilised societies, namely, "Every nation 
should have control over its own destiny" as the quintessence of the most sublime and noble ideals and 
ideas for the community of all nations. We demand the unconditional recognition of this right for 
ourselves. ' Atatiirk in M. Emin Hekimgil, Mustafa Kemal Atatfirk, (Ankara: Ministry of Culture, 
1998), p. 7. 
9 Ahmad, The Making..., p. 53. 
20 Ihsan GiineS, Birinci T. B. M. M. 'nin Dälünce Yapisi, 1920-1923, (The Thinking Style of the First 
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The First Group came from the Young Turk's tradition and was secularist Westernst, 
while the Second Group was a wider coalition of Islamists, Ottomanists, traditionalists 
and the liberals. The First Group was revolutionary, the Second evolutionary. The First 
Group was autocratic looking to the French revolution as an example, but the Second 
was more liberal. All Sükrii Bey, Second Group, MP for Trabzon, summarised their 
liberalism: 
`If a nation cannot insist on its due, if that nation cannot maintain and preserve its 
freedom that nation would be a slave. We must give the people personality and self- 
respect. If the people know that they are free, they would have the ability to do more 
things... '21 
The only common denominator between these groups was their aim for full- 
independence and hostility towards the occupying powers. Therefore both were 
concerned by each other and made efforts to preserve the coalition until independence 
day. Especially, Kemal knew that he could not create a secular nation-state with this 
Parliament. For him, such a revolution needed an autocratic powerful government, but 
the First Parliament's governing body was a parliamentary government. The Parliament 
had all means of control over the government, and was so zealous in defending its rights 
and responsibilities, particularly external affairs. Therefore until the end of the War 
Kemal did not attempt any reform but manipulated the groups in the Parliament by 
using his heroic charisma in order to get absolute power in the post-war era. 22 As 
Mango pointed out 
`his formulas could be interpreted to give satisfaction to both conservatives and 
radicals... Through the Grand National Assembly he mobilized all Muslims willing to 
resist. As long as the war lasted he refused to discuss permanent constitutional 
arrangements. Against supporters of the Istanbul government, he used irregulars, then 
threw his new army against them. He even organised his own tame Bolshevik Party to 
stop genuine Bolshevik infiltration. ' 23 
The Parliament had been created in order to put an end to the occupation of Turkey. 
Therefore Turkey's foreign relations were its reason d'etat. As a natural extension of 
that, the Parliament had absolute power in its legislation and execution of foreign policy 
matters. Because the first priority was to win independence and end the occupation, 
therefore as discussed above, the differences in the Parliament did not appear for a 
Turkish Parliament), (Ankara: Türkiye Iý Bankasi Kültür Yayinlan, 1997), p. 381-389. 
21 Ali $ükrü Bey (Second Group, MP for Trabzon), cited in Ihsan Gunq, p. 185. 
22 Similar to Kemal, the Second Group also delayed its ultimate aims, and waited until the end of the war. 
Hirseyin Avni Bey (MP for Erzurum), Tevhid i Eckar (daily), 29 April 1339, p. 3. 
23 Andrew Mango, Turkey, (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1968), pp. 46-47. 
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while. However the real picture was different than the appearance since liberating the 
nation and the fatherland was not the only aims of the parliament: 
`To liberate the caliphate and the sultanate, the fatherland and the nation, within the 
framework of the principle of national sovereignty... '24 
In fact, the was these sometimes contradictory aims which united people and the 
different political groups against the foreign occupation. Even Mustafa Kemal 
pretended to accept liberating suntan and caliphate as an ultimate aim of the national 
resistance although it would be understand after the war he was a sincere republican and 
against monarchy and the Islamic state. Therefore it can be argued that in the first 
Ankara Parliament there were at least two different foreign policy understanding: 
republican and imperial. As will be seen in the Lausanne agreement, both had different 
inspirations, considerations and ultimate aims. While the imperial approach saw 
territory and population as a sign of the power of the state, republicans' priority was a 
homogenous population with a defendable and limited territory. However, as 
mentioned, these differences did not cause formidable troubles as the urgent problem 
was to stop the aliens from the country. Yet immediately after the military victory, the 
divergence would appear over the Lausanne negotiations. 
During these years the foreign policy bureaucracy under the strict control of the 
parliament was not so effective: it included just three persons when the Ministry was 
established. 25 The Ministry was not perceived as an actor in the decision-making 
process, because the Parliament viewed itself as the only foreign policy maker and did 
not want to share its extraordinary power with any other organ. Moreover the Ministry 
had not been designed for such a task. Anyone who knew French or any other foreign 
language could easily become a diplomat in the Ministry. 26 The most important duty of 
the Ministry was to translate speeches and documents. 
24 Elaine Diana Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the 
Grand National Assembly, 1919-1923, (Washington, D. C.: 1959), p. 44. 
25 Kemal Girgin, Osmanli ve Cumhuriyet D5nemleri Hariciye Tarihimiz, Te7kilat ve Protokol (The 
Foreign Ministry History in the Ottoman and Republican Periods), (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu 
Basirnevi, 1994), p. 118. 
26 Girgin, Osmanli..., p. 119. 
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The War of Independence 27 and the Sevres S ndrome 
The nationalist movement was direct threat not only for the Allied occupiers but also for 
the Sultanate because the nationalists for the first time claimed the only source of the 
sovereignty was the people and they had sole right to rule the Turkish people and the 
sultan was asked to recognise the parliament's authority's: 
`Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation. The Grand National Assembly is 
the true and sole representative of the nation. Legislative authority and executive power 
are manifested and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly. '29 
On the other hand the Istanbul was making efforts to undermine the Ankara parliament 
by declaring Kemal and his friends `rebel, traitor' and even 'infidel' . 
30 The Istanbul's 
efforts gave its fruits as a civil war and the nationalists had to deal with supporters of 
the Sultan (Green Army etc. ) while it was in a severe conflict against the Greeks in the 
West, Armenians in the East and the French in the southern fronts. 31 
During these days the voluntary Turkish forces were fighting against the Greeks in the 
Aegean and Thrace provinces while the Kurdish and Turkish were in conflict against 
the French occupation forces in the south-eastern Turkey. Thanks to the voluntary 
armed forces attacks, the French was in a serious trouble in the region. For instance, the 
French forces were driven out of Urfa by the nationalists. The military victory and 
heavy loses forced the French to negotiate with the Ankara movement and an armistice 
for 20 days was signed on 30 May 1920. The Ankara parliament was against such an 
armistice, but Kemal persuaded the members by arguing that an armistice would not 
only provide the time necessary for the re-organisation of the Turkish forces in the 
region, but would also bring some more political advantages. 32 Although no Allied 
27 As mentioned for the chapter in general, it must be noted that the aim of this section is not explaining 
the events before Sevres Agreement or the details of the agreement, but to examine its impact on Turkish 
foreign policy in future years. The section particularly looks at the Kemal and his friend's reaction to the 
agreement and its effects on shaping Turkish scepticism about the West and the outer world in general. 
For the details of the agreement, in addition to the general sources mentioned above for the 1919-1923 
period, also see Paul Heimreich, From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace 
Conference of 1919-1920, (Columbia, Ohio: 1974). 
28 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 349. 
29 Atatork in Lewis, Turkey, p. 61. 
30 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 349. 
31 Atatürk, Speech..., pp. 400-404. 
32 Kemal's plan was to create disagreement between the British and the French with such an armistice: 
Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy..,, p. 75. In a short time Kemal's plans worked and the Turkish-French 
armistice annoyed the British and damaged the Allies' prestige in controlling Anatolia as it was 
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states officially recognised Ankara government, with this armistice France de facto 
recognised the Ankara as the representative of the Turkish nation by disregarding the 
Istanbul government. 33 After the armistice the conflicts between the Turks and the 
French were stopped for a while34 and some of the Turkish nationalists found an 
opportunity to move some troops to the West. 35 
In contrast to the successes on the eastern fronts, the situation in the west was not 
bright. In the spring of 1920, the French had occupied Zonguldak province and on 16 
March 1920 Istanbul had officially been occupied by the allied forces as a punishment 
for the nationalist activities in Cilicia. 36This followed the Greek advance in most of 
Western Anatolia. The Greeks had landed Izmir with the approval of the Allies and 
under British, French and US naval protection on 15 May 1919, and they were 
advancing in the region since that date. 37 
Sevres and the Nationalists' Strategy 
Under these circumstances, the aim of the Allied occupiers was to force the Turks to 
sign a peace agreement like all other defeated countries. 38 On 18 June 1920 the Ankara 
Parliament declared that it would abide by the National Pact and would not accept any 
occupation. However on 10 August 1920, the Istanbul government signed the Sevres 
Agreement, which stipulated the occupation of Turkey by the French, British, Russian, 
Greek and Italian forces. The agreement suggested an independent state for the 
Armenians in Eastern Turkey and an autonomous administration for the Kurds in south- 
eastern Turkey. Western Turkey, Izmir and many Aegean islands would be annexed to 
the Greek mainland, while Turkish majority-territories would be shared between the 
other allied forces. The Turks would have no control of the straits zone, including 
considered as a first step to a final peace agreement between France and Turkey. 
33 Bayur, Türk..., pp. 90-94; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy..., p. 75. 
34 Except Antep and some parts of the Adana province. 
35 On 28 May 1920 Kemal immediately issued a withdrawal command to the Turkish forces: Mustafa 
Kemal's Command Telegram, 28 May 1920, Ankara, Document No. 873, Atatürk'ün Kurtuhq Savai 
Yazi$malan (4tatürk's Writings in the War of Independence), Volume II, (Ankara: Muir Bakanligi, 
1995), pp. 145-147. 
36 As a matter of fact that Istanbul was practically under the control of the Allied forces. On 16 March 
1920 this control turned to an official occupation. Robinson, The First..., p. 286; Sonyel, Turkish..., p. 
28. 
37 Robinson, First..., p. 283-284. 
38 For the official text see Reha Parla (ed. ), Belgelerle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Uluslararasi 
Temelleri, (The International Foundations of the Republic of Turkey With the Documents), (Lefkoýe, 
TRNC: 1985), pp. 297-324. 
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Istanbul. The Capitulations and other privileges for Western companies and citizens 
would be restored. In practice, the agreement meant not only the end of the Ottoman 
Empire but also destruction of any Turkish political existence. Interestingly, although 
other defeated countries preserved their independence and much of their territorial 
integrity, like Germany and Bulgaria, there was a visible wish among the British-led 
alliance to erase the Turks from history. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary 
made no secret of his feelings about the Turks: 
`... where they had been for centuries as a source of distraction, intrigue and corruption 
of unmitigated evil to everybody concerned. ' 39 
In the Turkish view, therefore, the Sevres agreement confirmed the Western intention to 
put an end to the Turkish state. Even the United States was against a strong Turkey, 
supporting many mini-states in Anatolia instead of a strong Turkish state. Worst of all, 
the `loyal' Ottoman minorities were helping the allied forces against the Muslim 
population of Anatolia. Even the Muslim Arabs were in co-operation with the British 
against the Turks in the Arabic speaking territories. The Armenians sought an 
independent state in eastern Turkey the Greeks in the Western Anatolia and the Black 
Sea regions were planning to set up a Greek Anatolian state, to be annexed to mainland 
Greece. 
These anti-Turkish agendas in the Sevres nourished Turkish scepticism of the West, 
minority groups and democratisation. For Necati Bey, deputy for Erzurum province, the 
Sevres was `the ugly and satanic face of Europe', while Nebil Efendi, deputy for 
Karahisarisahip, sarcastically commented on the agreement: `They have taken too much 
trouble. It would have been better had they said that Turkey existed no more'. 41 All 
these experiences left permanent marks on the Turkish public and on the minds of 
Turkish decision-makers in the Republican era. Hereafter Turks were obsessed with the 
idea that the Turks were isolated, and had no friends; the West and most of the 
foreigners were viewed as involved in a conspiracy to weaken and divide Turkey and 
eventually destroy the Turks as a nation. These fears were not new; even in the Ottoman 
Empire the Turkish people and elite were suspicious about the West's reliability. 
39 Lord Kinross, The Rebirth of a Nation, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 139. 
40 For Akyüz the Armenians were supported and encouraged by the French. In the Turkish territories 
occupied by French where the Turks were majority Armenyfication was started by the French occupation 
forces: Akyiiz, Türk...,, pp. 122-123. 
41 Both cited in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy..., p. 79. 
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However, with the Sevres Agreement and the Western aggressive and `partial' attitude 
in the War of Independence these fears became a paranoia which can be called the 
`Sevres paranoia' or the `Sevres phobia'. Not only in Atatürk's times but also in later 
years this paranoia was to re-appear from time to time. 
Kemal and his followers vehemently rejected the Sevres Agreement and the Ankara 
Parliament immediately declared all those who signed the Sevres, including the 
Ottoman Prime Minister, to be traitors. 42 However the struggle against the Istanbul and 
the Allies would not be easy: As Atatürk later described `the Army existed in name 
only'. 4' The army was effectively disbanded and the economy collapsed. 44 the economy 
had collapsed. After the war, most CUP politicians and military officers had been taken 
prisoner and the people were fed up with the war. The occupiers were organised 
military forces while the Turkish voluntary groups and bands lacked of sufficient gun 
and financial support. As witnessed in the Sevres agreement the great powers were 
planning to divide Turkish territories to many small countries. The United States for 
instance de facto recognised the Armenian Republic and gave a clear support for a 
greater Armenia including the Eastern Turkey. 45 
Under these circumstances, the nationalist movement first of all tried to strengthen the 
army, on the other it looked for aid and support against the occupation. For external 
support there were only two potential allies: the United States and Soviet Union. 
Though US President Woodrow Wilson had supported an independent Armenian state 
in Turkey, `6 Kemal implied to General Harbord, the American representative, that the 
nationalist movement could accept an American mandate. 
47 
Relations with the Soviet Union: ` Apart from the Muslim countries, `the major 
international support for the Turkish national struggle came from the Soviet Union. 
A9 
42 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 356. 
43 Hekimgil, Mustafa...., p. 3. 
44 Kruger,, Kemalist..., p. 23. 
45 Robinson, The First..., p. 286. 
46 With the Monroe Doctrine an isolationist foreign policy started to dominate the US foreign policy. 
Thus Wilson's suggestions could not be carried out. 
47 Although Atatürk clearly stated his intention for an American mandate Kemalist academics claim that 
this was a strategy, he was using the US against the allied states. 
48 For Turkish - Soviet relations during the War of Turkish Independence see 
Bi lent Gökay, A Clash of 
Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918-1923, (London: 
Tauris, 1997); Halil Ibrahim Karal, Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia During the National 
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the nationalists perceived that the only country from which the nationalists could get 
support was the Soviet Union. Both faced a common threat: the allied forces. (Like 
Turkey, some Soviet territories were under the allied forces occupation and the Soviet 
government faced external and internal threats). Also, the Turkish straits, a historically 
crucial zone for Russian security, were now under the control of the allied states. Thus, 
the Soviet Union saw the nationalist Turks as a `natural ally' against the British and 
other Western powers. In the words of Gökay, `British sponsorship of the Greek army 
in Anatolia and the Allied support of the anti-Bolshevik Russian armies in Russia drove 
the Turkish nationalists and the Bolsheviks into each other's arms ., 
50 The Soviet 
Politburo publicly stressed that the government was ready to assist the Turks in their 
struggle against the Allies. 51 Likewise, the Ankara parliament attached a great 
importance to Soviet friendship realising that its goal could be achieved only if the 
Bolsheviks and the British were balanced against each other. 52 As a result Ankara sent a 
delegation, headed by the newly elected Turkish Foreign Minister Bekir Sami Bey, to 
Moscow on 11 May 1920. Kemal stated his desire for close co-operation between the 
two countries against `imperialist countries' threatening both of them in his letter53 to 
the Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin, in 26 April 1920. He hoped that an official 
agreement with the Soviets would provide Ankara much needed help and financial 
support. 54 In response Chicherin expressed his country's support for the Turkish 
National Pact and its readiness for diplomatic relations. 55 
In the summer of 1920, both the Greeks from the West and the Armenians from the East 
attacked the Turkish forces while the negotiations with Moscow deadlocked because of 
Liberation War of Turkey, 1918-1922, A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution, PhD 
thesis, University of California, 1967; Suat Bilge, Tnrkiye Sovyetler Birligi h4kileri, 1920-1964, Gäc 
Kom#uluk, (Turkey-Soviet Union Relations, 1920-1964, The Difficult Neighbourhood), (Ankara: 
Türkiye Iý Bankase Küitür Yayinlan, 1992), pp. 25-60; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy..., pp. 39-65; Haluk 
F. Gürsel, Tarih Boyunca 'Dirk - Rus 
J]i kileri, Bir Siyasi Tarih Incelemesi, (The Turkish Russian 
Relations in History, A Political History), (Istanbul: Buha Matbaasi, 1968), pp. 181-192. 
49 Bülent Gdkay, `The Turkish Communist Party: The Fate of the Founders', Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 29, No. 2, April 1993, p. 222. 
50 okay, A Clash-., p 2. For a similar view see Gürsel, Tarih..., p. 182. 
51 Gökay, A Clash..., p. 81. 
52 Gökay, A Clash..., p. 168; Taner Timur, Türk Devrimi ve Sonrasi, (The Turkish Revolution and 
Aftermath), (Ankara: tinge Kitabevi, 1997), p. 23. 
5 For Kemal's letter see: Bilge, Gäc..., pp. 34-35. 
sa okay, A Clash..., p. 102. 
ss For Chicherin's letter see: Kazim Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz, (Our War oflndependence), (Istanbul: 
1960), pp. 784-785. 
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Armenia and the Soviets' wait-and-see Turkey policy. 56 The Turks realised that to break 
the deadlock a military operation was inevitable. In fact the developments in the 
Caucasus were of interest to the nationalist Turks because Turkish troops had captured 
many places in the region during the First World War, and General Karabekir with his 
relatively strong troops gave a clear support to Mustafa Kemal. The most important 
factor helped the Turks was the fact that the Russians were beset by the internal 
problems and the Soviet Union was unable to follow an active policy beyond its 
frontiers at least for a while. 57 Thanks to this suitable environment, in the autumn, the 
Turkish nationalists moved onto the offensive to secure the Eastern border and to 
persuade the Russians. In September the Turkish forces under General Kazim 
Karabekir's command began an attack from Erzurum province on 28 September 1920. 
Turkish forces on 2 November took Kars and as a result of the operations the Turkish 
nationalists totally defeated the Armenians. On 3 December 1920 a Soviet government 
was established at Erivan, capital of Armenia and on 2-3 December the Gümrü 
(Alexandropol) Peace Agreement, Ankara's first international treaty, was agreed by two 
sides - the first official agreement signed by Ankara. 58 Thus Armenia and Turkey 
declared the Sevres Agreement invalid (article 10). The agreement also saved the future 
Turkish governments from a potential problem, namely the greater Armenia issue as the 
Armenian government accepted that there was no Armenian majority in any Turkish 
provinces (article 3). The agreement, moreover, increased the prestige of the Ankara 
parliament. Another importance of the agreement was that it allowed Kemal to 
concentrate on the conflicts in the Western front. 
Several months later, after the problems were solved in the Armenian front, on 16 
March 1921, The Turco - Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood Agreement was 
signed. As mentioned, both sides were aware that their ultimate aims were different. 
The French scholar Paul Dumont names Turkish-Russian co-operation as a `friendship 
based on interest'. 59 For example, the Chair of the Baku Congress stated: `We do not 
forget that the Mustafa Kemal government is not communist. Yet we are ready to help a 
56 For the Turkish-Soviet negotiations in Moscow see G6kay, A Clash...; Bilge, Türkiye..., pp. 60-78; I. 
Karal, Turkish Relations with Soviet Union during Liberation War of Turkey, 1918-1922, 
(California: 1967). 
57 Elaine Diana Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the 
Grand National Assembly, 1919-1923, (Washington, D. C.: 1959), p. 108. 
58 For the agreement see GKB, Türk Istikial Harbi, (Turkish Independence War), Volume III, (Ankara: 
1965), pp. 308-311. 
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revolution movement against the British. '60 Similarly Kemal sought to exploit the 
situation in Russia and the antagonism between Russia and the Allied states to his 
advantage. The agreement removed Russian demands for Turkish territories and 
guaranteed the eastern Turkish borders giving Kars and Ardahan to Turkey. The Soviets 
accepted the abolition of the capitulations and officially recognised the Ankara 
government. 6' The treaty also eased Turkey's difficulties and gave it a free hand toward 
the West. Furthermore, as Shaws pointed out the Turkish-Soviet Treaty provided a legal 
justification for Mustafa Kemal to suppress the Turkish communists in Turkey, 62 as 
`both parties promised to refrain from supporting "seditious groups and activities on the 
other's territory". 63 Moreover, the Soviet Union, although it was not mentioned in the 
text, sent military and economic aid to Ankara. The amount of the aid is still not clear. 
The Soviets' main aim was to strengthen the Turks against the Western powers, in 
particular to protect the Turkish straits since the Russians saw the straits as the most 
strategic location for the Soviet national security. Despite the agreement, however, the 
Ankara government still remained very suspicious of Soviet sincerity. For example, 
Bekir Sami Bey, head of the delegation to Moscow, had doubts about the Soviet aims 
regarding Turkey and favoured immediate peace with the Western countries. " 
Relations with the Muslim World: As discussed and as will be detailed in the next 
two chapters of this thesis Kemal and his circle were secular, and their aim in the War 
of Independence was not to save the caliph or sultan, although they never declared their 
sincere aims until they assured the full support of the other political groups. Also they 
saw the other Muslim countries as a source of financial, diplomatic and moral support 
against the Allies. Kemal even gave religious speeches to gain support of the Muslims 
in Anatolia and the Muslims under the British rule. In another words Kemal and the 
Ankara government attached great importance to these societies during the 
Independence War, hoping to reap two benefits: influence over the British Empire and 
the other powers which had Muslim colonies; and financial support from other Muslim 
communities. Ankara's `Islamic foreign policy' worked and in India in particular the 
59 Dumont, Mustafa..., pp. 109-115. 
60 Gönlübol and others, Olaylarla..., p. 27. 
61 Gökay, A Clash of..., p. 109. 
62 When Kemal gained the benefits he expected from the Soviets, he would suppressed the communists. 
For Kemal's attitude towards the Turkish communists see Gökay, The Turkish... ', pp. 220-235. 
63 Shaw and Shaw, History of...., p. 359. 
1 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 31. 
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Muslims protested to the British government over its Turkey policy. 65 Also India's 
Muslim financial support for Turkish Independence War was significant. 66 
In addition, the Ankara parliament's first official international treaty was with a Muslim 
country, Afghanistan. 67 When the Turkish delegate was in Moscow for a possible peace 
treaty negotiations they found a fully authorised Afghan mission ready to negotiate a 
treaty. 68 After the negotiations the Turco-Afghan Treaty was signed on 1 March 1921. 
In fact, according to the text, the treaty was a defence and co-operation agreement. With 
the treaty Turkey and Afghanistan recognised each other as an independent state, and 
the Turks promised to help some of the social problems of Afghanistan. 69 
To summarise, Turkey manipulated the friendly solidarity feelings in the East towards 
the Turkish resistance movement to get material and diplomatic support. However, as 
will be seen in the next chapter this policy would radically change after the military 
victory. 70 
The Greek - Turkish War: The Turkish-Soviet agreement and the subsequent victories 
against the Greek forces convinced the allies of the Ankara's power. Also, there was a 
serious divergence among the Allies on Turkish territories. France, for instance 
perceived the British as the main beneficiary of the Sevres Agreement although French 
loses were relatively higher than the British's. 71 With all these factor, Turkish victories 
65 M. Lütfullah Karaman, `Kurtuiuý Savaýi ve Ihr Politika Baglanunda Din Ögesi ve Hindistan 
Müslümanlan', (The Religious Factor and the Indian Muslims from the Perspective of the Independence 
War and Foreign Policy), in Sonmezoglu (ed. ), Türk p. 234. As Sonyel put it, the British thought that the 
Turkish nationalists might set up `a great Muslim Republic' : Sonyel, Turkish..., p. 31. 
66Although there is no consensus on amount of the Indian aid to Turkey it is clear that the aid was very 
important for Ankara. For Kinross and Dumont the aid was about £125,000: Lord Kinross, Atatürk: 
Rebirth of a Nation (London: Weidenfeld, 1964), p. 298; Dumont, Mustafa..., p. 115. For 
Söylemezoglu, who was a diplomat during these years, £50,000 was sent by the Indian Muslims just in 
1922: G. Kemali Söylemezoglu, Hariciye Hizmetinde 30 Sene, 1892-1922, (30 Years in the Service of 
Foreign Office), (Istanbul: Maarif Kitabevi, 1955), p. 89. For other guesses see Karaman, pp. 231-241. 
67 Ismail Soysal, Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaýmalari, (Turkey's Political Agreements), I. Volume (1920- 
1945), (Ankara: TTK, 1989), p. 25. 
68 The Afghan delegation was also seeking the Soviet support in Moscow for the newly independent 
Afghan state: Sonyel, Turkish..., p. 66; Dilan, Türkiye'nin..., p. 73. 
1 Soysal, Türkiye'nin..., p. 25. 
70 Turkey maintained friendly relations with Afghanistan after the proclamation of the republic, yet the 
relations with any Muslim country would not be based on religious solidarity and Turkey would refuse to 
join any religious meeting in the Atatürk era. For the details see Chapter IV of this study. 
71 Toktanuý Ater, `Ulusal Kurtulq Sava§i'nda Türk Did Politikasi', in Ater and others, Türk Dil 
Politikasinda Soruniar, (Istanbul: Der Yaymevi, 1989), p. 5. 
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in the battles against the Greeks increased Turkish government's prestige in the eyes of 
the Allies. 
As mentioned the Greeks had occupied the Western Aegean provinces and the Eastern 
Thrace. They were moreover planning to advance into the inner Anatolia. For the 
Greeks the Turkish territories were historically Greek and the end of this operation had 
to be all of the Anatolian territories (Megali Idea). 72 The first Turkish nationalist 
resistance groups and the local bands, like Gerkes Ethem and his followers, slowed 
down the Greek advance yet to completely stop the invasion Ankara realised the 
necessity of organised military forces. For a long time the problems in the eastern and 
southern fronts with the lack of financial source, manpower and equipment had 
hindered an effective nationalist resistance, and as a result of these problems in the 
winter of 1919 Ankara forces had withdrawn near to Ankara. The Greek in this period 
continued their occupation with the British support73 until very near to the Ankara 
Parliament. This advance made panicked the Turks and even the members of the 
parliament debated moving the parliament from Ankara to a more eastern province, 
namely Sivas. Under this tensioned environment Chief of the General Ismet (Inönü) was 
put in charge of the Western front and this changed the picture in favour of the Turks. 
On the other hand Kemal made efforts to eliminate the potential leader candidates, like 
Gerkes Ethem and other religious, separatist and liberal opposing leaders, without 
damaging the harmony against the foreign occupiers. The Green Army, which was 
formed by some religious and religious-communist opposing groups with the help of the 
foreign elements, was also another trouble; when Gerkes Ethem joined the organisation, 
the Green Army became a serious threat to Kemal and his friends and wasted the energy 
of nationalist forces. 74 As a result of the First Inönü Battle the Greeks retreated toward 
Bursa on 10 January 1921. 
Thanks to the successful Turkish resistance, the attacks in the Inönü and finally the 
Turkish nationalists' good relations with the Soviets and the French, the Ankara 
72 For the Greek irredentism see: Michael L. Smith, Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922, 
(London: Allen Lane, 1973). 
73 Sükrü Sina Gurel, Tarihsel Boyut Icinde Turk Yunan Ili*kileri, 1821-1923, (Turkish Greek 
Relations in a Historical Dimension, 1821-1923), (Ankara: 
Omit Yayincihk, 1993), p. 33-34; Shaw and 
Shaw, History of..., pp. 357-358. 
74 Gökay, `The Turkish... ', p. 222. Kemal in his Speech argued that Gerkes Ethem's troops with Tevfik 
Bey practically formed the nucleus of the Green Army: Atatürk, 
Speech..., p. 403. 
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government was invited to the London Peace Conference to discuss possible 
amendments to the Sevres Agreement on 6 January 1921. The Conference failed and no 
agreement was reached because the Allied forces did not accept Turkey's demands, and 
in its wake the Greek forces attacked once more, yet these new attacks also failed. In 
light of these setbacks the Italians withdrew their forces from Southern Anatolia and 
looked for an agreement with Ankara when they realised their Anatolia adventure would 
end up with heavy loses. Similarly the French were also seeking to stop the conflict in 
southern Turkey because their casualties and the cost of the war reached its peak and 
they had serious problems in Syria and the Greeks and the British could not end the 
Turkish resistance in the West. 75 First the French hoped to obtain some capitulatory 
privileges for France in exchange for the withdrawal of the troops. The negotiations 
between Franklin-Bouillon of France and Bekir Sami Bey of Turkey had been 
concluded on this base during the London Conference. However neither the Ankara 
parliament nor Kemal approved it because it ignored the national sovereignty principle. 
Thanks to the influence of the Sakarya Battle (13 September 1921), France would be 
convinced in a later date and on 20 October 1921 the Ankara Agreement (Itilafname) or 
Bouillon Agreement would be signed between France and Turkey with this treaty ended 
the state of war between these two countries (article 1), and France became the first 
Western power which concluded a treaty with the Turks. With the agreement the 
southern borders of Turkey were also guaranteed (article 10), and the Anglo-French 
alliance was broken. 76 France with the agreement accepted the National Pact instead of 
the Sevres. Furthermore the Ankara Agreement enabled some Turkish troops to move 
the Western front against the Greeks while the French in turn moved their forces into 
Syria. Consequently, the only countries at war with the Ankara movement remained 
Great Britain and Greece. 
In the summer of 1921, the Greeks and Kemal had political difficulties at home, 
therefore they had to prove their power in a short time. In Greece the romantic and 
reactionary Royalists were now in charge while the religious people, liberals, 
" For the other reasons of the changes in the French Turkish policy see Ismail Soysal, `Turk - Fransiz 
Iliileri, 1919-1984', (Turkish - French Relations, 1919-1984), Siyasal Bilimler Faküitesi Dergisi, Vol. 
2. No. 2,1984, pp. 230-321. 
76 For the full text of the agreement: League of Nations Treaty Series, No. 1284 (1926-27), Vol. 54, pp. 
178-193 and for the Turkish version see GKB, Türk Istiklal Harbi, Doju Cephesi 1919-1921 (Turkish 
Independence War, The Eastern Front), Vol. 111, (Ankara: Genelkurmay, Turkish Head of the General 
Staff, Department of the War History, 1965), p. 250-252; Parla (ed. ), Belgelerle..., pp. 139-146. 
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Ottomanists and leftists in Ankara Parliament were blaming Kemal for the difficulties in 
the war and other aspects of the political life. As discussed in the first section of this 
chapter, Kemal and his friend had no absolute control over the parliament: Some groups 
in the parliament had no patient for victory and they could not understand Kemal's 
flexible policies. On the other hand the Islamists and Ottomanists had doubts about 
Kemal's ultimate aim, because they perceived the main aim of the War of Independence 
as to save Sultan, caliphate and finally the Turkish people and territories while as would 
be seen after the war, Kemal was a secular republican. Furthermore, Kemal had some 
personal enemies in the parliament. '? The opposition in particular pressed Kemal in his 
re-appointment as the Commander-in-Chief and in each of the renewals of the related 
act. In the third renewal, after a long debate the necessary majority to renew the act was 
not obtained. This greatly annoyed Kemal and next day in a secret session he severely 
challenged the opposition: 
`I am not superfluous office or a superfluous authority, and still less of an Act that 
would give full powers to an authority without responsibility. (... ) Salih Efendi, deputy 
for Erzurum, has said that I desired to usurp the rights of the Assembly and that I had 
done so, and he shouted out: We shall not abandon our good rights. (... ) I entirely 
rejected Saliä Efendi's remark about my alleged usurpation of the full powers of the 
Assembly. (... ) The army has no commander-in-chief at the present moment. If I 
continue to carry on my command I shall be doing so illegally. According to the opinion 
expressed by the assembly I ought to have already laid down my command. I had 
previously told the Government that my authority as chief-in-command had expired. I 
felt, however, obliged not to admit that an irreparable disaster could happen. Our army 
at the front could not be left without a commander. Consequently, I did not leave, and 
refused to; I shall never leave it in this way. 78 
In the secret sessions violent discussions took place and the opposition forced Kemal to 
resign yet could not success, and three months later the Act relating to the chief 
command was approved. Kemal's the most important advantage was the foreign 
occupation, and he largely used this card as seen in these debates: 
`... Our real task and our main objective does not concern politics. Our only duty, and 
that of the whole country and the whole nation, is to drive the enemy out of the country 
by the force of our bayonets. Until we have done that, politics is an empty word. '79 
Under these circumstances the Greek advance began on 13 August 1921 toward the 
Sakarya river, near Ankara. This attack once more panicked the Ankara parliament 
" Günes, Birinci..., p. 380. 
78 Atatürk, A Speech..., pp. 551-556. 
79 Atatürk, A Speech..., pp. 552-553. 
78 
because the thunder of the battle was plainly heard in Ankara. 80 After a preparation 
period, however, the picture was completely changed by the Turkish counter attacks in 
August 1922, and the Turks in these conflicts eventually won the war. The Greek forces 
broke and fled to the Aegean Sea while theirs' commanding general was captured. 
Ankara recaptured the territories under the Greek occupation and the entrance of the 
Turkish forces into Izmir marked the Turkish final victory on 9 September 1922. 
Shortly afterwards, on 11 October 1922, the Mudanya Armistice between Turkey and 
Britain ended the war. The Ankara government had achieved its military aims. 
Furthermore, the Turkish victory made Mustafa Kemal a national hero in the people's 
eyes. In the words of Ward, `he was now in the prime of life' . 
82 
The Lausanne Agreement: Founding Agreement of Turkish Foreign Policy 
After the War of Independence, Ankara was ready to change the Sevres Agreement. As 
a matter of fact that Mustafa Kemal sought close relations with the Allies after the 
war. 83 However, although the nationalists had won the War of Independence, the 
Western strategy still recognised both the Istanbul and the Ankara governments. To put 
an end this, the Ankara Parliament abolished the sultanate on 1 November 1922, and in 
so doing it became the only representative of the Turkish people. Sultan Vahdettin 
escaped from Turkey on 17 November 1922. Turkey did not, nevertheless, abolish the 
caliphate and Abdülmecid, Vahdettin's cousin, became caliph by a vote of the Grand 
National Assembly. As leader of the Islamic world community, the Caliph and by 
extension, Turkey enjoyed Muslim political and financial support. Indeed, as will be 
shown later Mustafa Kemal used Islam as a foreign policy tool. 
Having eliminated the Istanbul government, the nationalists selected their 
representatives to the Lausanne Conference: Ismet Inönü and Riza Nur. Kemal had 
personally selected Inönü though he was not a diplomat, and was partly deaf. This in 
turn caused a stir in the Parliament, but Kemal would not budge. 
84 Despite all these 
things, Inönü was his confidant. In the words of Riza Nur, `Inönü could not even go to 
80 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 36. 
81 Ates, `Ulusal... ', pp. 9-14; Davison, Turkey..., p. 124; Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 360. 
82 Ward, Turkey..., p. 51. 
83 For Kemal's efforts see Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy..., pp. 122-159. 
84 Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy..., p. 187. 
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toilet without asking Mustafa Kemal. '85 For another thing, Kemal did not share 
Parliament's expectations of Lausanne. The latter dreamt of establishing a new Ottoman 
Empire on a vast territory. For most parliamentarians, Turkey had won the war and 
could now get the maximum territories lost before the world war. Certainly that 
approach reflected an imperial foreign policy understanding. Yet Kemal's plans were 
totally different. He sought to set up a nation-state, and hence did not need any more 
territory but rather a homogeneous population, a strong and independent economy and 
Western support for his new regime. Although he did not mention this idea too often 
Kemal favoured a minimal territory which could be protected by the existing Turkish 
forces. It will be recalled that Kemal had suggested the same prescription for the 
Ottoman Empire earlier. 86 In other words, despite the Grand National Parliament's 
(GNP) imperial perspective, Kemal's aims were Republican and the best person to 
defend these aims in Lausanne was Ismet Inönü. Inönü assured the GNP members that 
he would take his inspiration from the National Pact, 87 yet he and Kemal were ready to 
sacrifice any territory to maintain the Republican aims. Kemal knew that winning a war 
was not enough to be recognised as an independent political entity. Turkey had to 
persuade the Western powers of this point, notably Great Britain. 
The conference opened on 21 November 1922, however as a result of the Turkish insist 
on an absolute national sovereignty over the political and economic matters of Turkey 
and the Allies' unacceptable demands the conference broke off on 4 February 1923. It 
reopened in two months. The Turkish delegate made many territorial concessions 
including the Musul oil region. The aim was simply to get Western support for future 
years. As a result, the Lausanne Agreement was signed on 24 July 1923, and is 
considered the most important agreement in Turkish foreign policy. In the following 
years, Turkish policy-makers made efforts to either amend some of its articles or to 
protect some of them. The agreement also provided a suitable environment for Kemalist 
policies both inside and outside. It confirmed the Turkish victory and recognised Turkey 
as an independent state by the allied powers. 88 Despite some compromises, the 
85 Nur, Hayat... 
86 For Mustafa Kemal's minimised territorial aims see Yalman's memoirs: Yalman, Yalun..., p. 184. 
87 Ismet Inönü's speech, TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, V. 24.3 November 1922,330-376. 
88 For full text of the agreement see Lozan Sulh Muahedenamesi, Mukavelat ve Senedati Saire, 24 
Temmuz 1923-1339, (The Lausanne Peace Agreement), (Ankara: Turk ye B. M. M. Hariciye Vekaleti, 
The GNP Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1923); Seha Meray, Lozan Bari] Konferansi (Lausanne Peace 
Agreement), Vol. II, (Ankara: Ankara University SBF Yaymlan, 1973) and for the English version: 
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sovereignty of the Turkish government over Anatolia and Eastern Thrace was accepted 
and the economic capitulations were abolished (Article 28). 89 To achieve this, Turkey 
gave up some of the aims of the National Pact. The Aegean Islands, Western Thrace, 
Hatay and Northern Iraq remained outside of Turkish borders (Article 13). Although 
Turkey insisted on keeping Northern Iraq because of its oil reserves90 and its Turkish - 
Kurdish majority, Britain, with the internal revolt, prevented any unification between 
Turkey and Northern Iraq. Turkey also recognised the British annexation of Cyprus 
(Article 21) and gave up all its rights in Libya (Article 22). Turkey did try in the 
conference, to obtain recognition of its unlimited rights of ownership over the Turkish 
Straits, but the joint Anglo-French-Italian point of view prevailed though the Soviet 
Union supported the Turkish side, 91 and Turkey had to accept restrictions on its 
sovereignty rights to the straits. The straits area was demilitarised and an international 
commission was entrusted with supervision of the navigation. On the other hand, 
passage of warships, both in time of peace and war was restricted. 92 Until the 1936 
Montreux Convention the status of the Straits remained as stipulated in Lausanne. 
Atatürk and Inönü were satisfied with the agreement because they had got what they 
had wanted. Atatürk had hoped to gain a fully independent homogeneous state and to 
end the wars and the antagonism between Turkey and the West. 93 With the Lausanne 
agreement, the world recognised a fully independent Turkey, put an end to the war 
between Turkey and the European powers, and abolished the economic capitulations. 
Moreover, for Atatürk and Inönü, Lausanne put an end to the antagonism between 
Turkey and the West. In other words, the Lausanne Agreement laid the suitable ground 
for co-operation with the West. Now Turkey was ready to join the European family. 
Therefore, the Kemalists put the agreement at the heart of Kenialist foreign policy, 
viewing any criticism as an attack on Kemalism. 
League of Nations Treaty Series, XXVIII (1924). 
89 In fact the Ottoman government had annulled the capitulations on 1 October 1914, however that 
decision was not recognised by the other sides, even by the Germans, Turk's ally. The Lausanne 
agreement was the first international agreement confirming the abolition of the capitulations. 
90 Kemal Melek, `Turk - Ingiliz Iliskileri (1890-1926) ve Musul Petrolleri', (Turkish - British Relations 
and the Musul Oil), in East cam (eds. ), Tiirk Dij Politikasinda Sorunlar (The Issues in Turkish Foreign 
Policy), (Istanbul: Der Yayinevi, 1989), p. 36. 
91 Gdrsel, Tarih..., pp. 192-193. 
92 Eren, `The Foreign', p. 292-293. 
93 Cheer Kiirkciioglu, `An Analysis of Atatürk's Foreign Policy, 1919-1938', The Turkish Yearbook of 
International Relations, Vol. 20,1980-1981. pp. 157-160. 
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For Ismet Inönü, as head of the Turkish delegation, the agreement was a personal and 
national victory. He described what he had won for Turkey at Lausanne: 
`A homogenous, unified homeland; within it, freedom from the obligations imposed by 
foreigners and from privileges of a nature creating a state within a state; freedom from 
imposed financial obligations; a free, rich homeland with a recognised absolute right of 
self-defence. 94 
Riza Nur, the second Turkish delegate in Lausanne, wrote in his memoirs that he had 
made efforts to Turkify all the peoples living in Turkey through the Lausanne 
agreement: The most important thing to do is to clear from our country the other races, 
other languages and other religions. 95 Inönü accepted that he had to make certain 
territorial concessions, such as Musul, Aegean Islands and Hatay (Alexandretta) but for 
him these concessions were for peace and stability: `Our only consolation over the loss 
of certain territories is that with the Lausanne Treaty we have gained a long-standing 
peace'. 
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For his part, Mustafa described the Lausanne agreement as `the greatest diplomatic 
victory in history'. For most of the Kemalist authors, like Mehmet Cemil Bilsel97, All 
Naci Karacan98 and Toktami§ Atee9 also, the Lausanne is a great victory while some 
others claim that it was a disaster because Turkey lost many Turkish territories 
mentioned in the National Pact. 10° Ambassador Abdülahat Ak§in argued that Turkey 
had to compromise in order to avoid war with the allied powers. For Ak§in, Turkey was 
not ready for such war and desperately needed time for westernising reforms. lol 
Similarly, Nevin Ate§ has argued that Turkey made serious concessions to Britain about 
the status of the Turkish Straits. For Ate*, the reason for compromise was Turkey's 
desire to gain British support against the French and Russians. 102 Likewise, Inman and 
94 Cited in Salahi R Sonyel, Atatürk - The Founder of Modern Turkey, (Ankara: Turkish Historical 
Society Printing House, 1989), p. 100. 
95 Nur, Hayat..., Vol. III, p. 252. 
96 Abdülahat Aksin, Atatürk'iin Dij Politika ilkeleri ve Diplomasisi, (Atatürk's Foreign Policy 
Principles and Diplomacy), Volume II, (Istanbul: Inkilap ve Aka, 1966), p. 3. 
9' Mehmet Cemil Bilsel, Lozan, (Lausanne), (Istanbul: A. Ihsan Tokgöz Matbaasi, 1933). 
98 Ali Naci Karacan, Lozan (Lausanne), second edition, (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlan, 1971). 
99 Ater, `Ulusai... ', esp. pp. 18-24. 
1 00 The authors, who claim that the agreement was a disaster, are mainly Islamist, such as Abdurrahman 
Dilipak and Kadir Misirhoolu. Misirlioglu argues that the Lausanne was a complete failure (hezimet) 
instead of a victory: Kadir Misirhoglu, Lozan, Zafer mi, Hezimet mi? (Lausanne, Victory or 
Disaster? ), (Istanbul: Sebil Yayinlan, 1971). 
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Foreign Policy and the Government Programs), iktisat Dergisi, May-June 1996, pp. 71-86, p. 72. 
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Sander say that Turkey made concessions in solving the Musul problem though this 
territory was a part of the National pact. 103 
After the conference the GNP heavily criticised the agreement and the Turkish 
delegation. For parliamentarians like Sim Bey (Izmir) and All Sükrü Bey (Trabzon), the 
Inönü delegation had sacrificed the National Pact and therefore the agreement was 
unacceptable. As noted earlier they sought to restore imperial Ottoman glory while 
Kemal and his followers attempted to create a modern nation-state. Hence what Kemal 
considered a victory was a disaster for the Ottomanists and the Islamists. As Niyazi Bey 
(Mersin MP) stated, Lausanne had put an official end to the Ottoman Empire: 
`This agreement confirms that we left Egypt, Sudan, Cyprus, the Aegean Islands and 
other territories. You, friends, have struggled very hard to defend these territories. But 
our loses were not only the territories. This agreement declares the end of a magnificent Empire. This agreement declares that we gave Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Arabistan. '104 
For Niyazi Bey the end of the Empire was a disaster, for Kemal it was a victory. Still, 
Kemal needed the GNP's ratification of the agreement. Reza Nur and Misiroglu claim 
that the leading opponent, Ali Sükrü Bey, was murdered in order to `persuade the other 
parliamentarians to approve the Lausanne Agreement'. '°5 It was also implied that the 
Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu which had been passed for internal reasons, could be used 
against the opponents of Lausanne. Moreover, as noted by many observers, Kemal went 
to elections to renew the `reluctant parliament on Lausanne. 106 It seems that the 
Kemalist regime had made Lausanne its own, and its opponents traitors to the regime 
and the nation. With this agreement Kemal had gained Western support for his regime 
and precious time for his reforms. That was all he had wanted and hereafter the 
Lausanne became one of the Kemalist taboos. 107 
103 A. Haluk Ülman and Oral Sander, `Turk Dir Politikasina Yön Veren Etkenler, 1923-1968, II', (The 
Factors Determining Affecting Turkish Foreign Policy), A. Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 
27, No. 1, March 1972, p. 3. 
104 Niyazi Bey's speech, T. B. M. M. Zabit Ceridesi, Cilt: I, 8.205-217. 
°5 Mlsirhoglu, Lozan...., p. 346. 
106 Murat Quicu, Hilafetin Kaldinimasi Sürecinde Cumhuriyetin ilani ve Lutfi Fikri Davasi (The 
Declaration ofRepublic and Luttfi Fikri Case in the Process ofAbolition of Caliphate), (Istanbul: Kestas, 
1992), p. 281; Mete Tuncay, T. C. 'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulmasi, 1923-1931, (One-Party 
Regime in Turkey), (Ankara: Yurt Yaylnlan, 1981), p. 50; Kemal Zeki Gecosman, Devieti Kuran Meclis 
(Parliament which Established the State), (Istanbul: HUr Yaymn, 1981), p. 59; TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, 
Vol. 28, p. 29. 
107 The Lausanne can be considered as a triumph for Turkey in international arena, because Turkey was 
the only defeated of the First World War, which secured peace and stability by negotiations instead of a 
dictated peace. All other countries, notably Germany, would have to use military tools to take their lost in 
the future years. Thus Turkey guaranteed stability and gained time for the internal reforms by signing the 
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After the Lausanne, the last Allied forces completely left the Turkish territories, 
including Istanbul, and the Turkish troops re-captured all these provinces. The approval 
of the Treaty by the Ankara officially closed the Ottoman era, and when the Turkish 
Parliament made Ankara the new capital of the new Turkish state, it underlined the shift 
from empire to republic. '°8 
Conclusion 
During the Independence War years no single ideology dominated Turkish political life. 
All Muslim groups (Turkish and Kurdish) were united against the occupiers. The 
priority was to gain independence. Foreign policy therefore was designed to reach that 
aim. The agreements signed during this period, Sevres and Lausanne, can be considered 
the most important effects of the War years for future Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, 
Sevres certainly showed the close collaboration between the Ottoman minorities 
(Armenians, Ottoman Greeks etc. ) and the European powers to destroy the Empire. 
Islamists, Ottomanists or Turkists, all understood that only the Turkish and the Kurdish 
subjects of the Empire could be seen as loyal to the Empire. 109 Many thousands of 
Turks were killed or wounded by their neighbours. The effect of that was long-lasting 
and traumatic. The Allied forces could not carry out the Sevres agreement, and the 
French, Greek, Italian, British and Russian armies could not continue their occupation 
of Turkish territories. However, the effect of their policies would last for decades. The 
lesson was that the Turks had no friend but the Turks. As a result, suspicion of 
foreigners and the ethnic-religious minorities became the salient characteristic of 
Turkish foreign policy. No less important, as the founding agreement of contemporary 
Turkey, Lausanne marked Turkish victory over Western anti-Turkish policies, 
guaranteeing Turkish borders and economic and political independence. Turkish policy 
in Lausanne was formed by the Kemalists, hence it can provide a clue for Kemalist 
Lausanne agreement. In the words of Zürcher `Turkey emerged from Lausanne as a nation whose national 
aspirations generally speaking, had been satisfied. This allowed Turkey to concentrate on domestic 
problems. ' Zürcher, `Young... ', p. 119. However, it cannot be the greatest victory in Turkish history as 
the Kemalists argue. Yet it was one of the greatest victories for the Kemalist regime. 
108 G. L. Lewis, Turkey, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1957), p. 76; Smith, Turkey..., p. 57. 
109 In addition to the Turkish and the Kurdish people, the Jewish Ottomans were also loyal to the Empire, 
and most of them refused to play any role in separation of the country. However, the Jewish population 
most of time did not claim a separate identity, instead of that they supported the liberal, Ottomanist or 
Turkist political groups. 
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foreign policy and the main differences between this policy and other foreign policy 
understandings in Turkey. Atatürk's ultimate aim was to join European society, 
therefore he and his friends sacrificed imperial aims in Lausanne without hesitation. 
They sought to establish an independent, sovereign, secular, Western state on a 
relatively small territory and end the historical antagonism between Turks and 
Europeans. Atatürk knew that if the Turks did not give up the idea of an empire, the 
Europeans would not allow them to establish a developed stable state. On the other 
hand, the Ottomanists and the Islamists tried to maintain Turkey's imperial character. 
During the 20th century, therefore, Turkish foreign policy would shift between the desire 
to protect the Lausanne legacy or to change it. Lausanne would remain at the heart of 
Turkish foreign policy. 
85 
CHAPTER III 
Rise of Kemalism 
The Young Turks had not trusted the people, but the coalition behind their power was 
wider than Kenialist regime. Though based on a Westernist, modernist, secularist core 
ideology, the Young Turks current was a composition of many diverse ideologies and 
economic and political groups, including a pan-Islamic one. In contrast, the Kemalist 
regime was ideologically monolithic. Some of its opponents had been killed in the 
continues wars, whereas the Independence War enabled Kemal to subdue the 
opposition. When the opposition in the Parliament rejected his position as Head of the 
Turkish Army, for example, he threatened that `I think, it is very likely that some heads 
will be cut off. ' Despite this famous incident, the Kenialist revolution lacked systematic 
and widespread violence, characterising the French and the Russian revolution. Instead, 
Kemal followed a pragmatic way clearing the obstacles step by step. Because his 
secular and Westernist revolution lacked popular support, ' Kemal had to create a new 
class, namely the Kenialist class, to maintain the future of the regime. This process, 
inevitably, determined the main characters of the regime and the decision-making 
process. 
Kemalist Reforms2 
Immediately after the War of Independence, Kemal annulled the wide coalition, set 
against the occupiers, and wiped out the opposition by force, by law or by sending them 
into exile. The first Parliament was relatively pluralistic and democratically elected, 
therefore they were able to challenge Kemal's policies. The conservatives and the 
liberals derived their legitimacy and power from parliament. Therefore, Kemal 
immediately after the military victory made enormous efforts to prevent the opposition 
(mainly the Second Group) winning the elections for the second parliament held in 
' Baskin Oran, Atatürk Milliyetciligi, (Atatiirk Nationalism), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1990), pp. 66-75; 
Frank Tachau, `The Political Culture of Kemalist Turkey', in Jacob M. Landau, Atatürk and the 
Modernization of Turkey, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, Westview Press, p. 66). 
2 For the Kemalist reforms see Taner Timur, Türk Devrimi ve Sonrasi, 1919-1946, (Turkish Revolution 
and Its Aftermath), (Ankara: Dokan Yaytnevi, 1971); Sami N. 
Özerdim, Atatlirk Devrimi Kronolojisi 
(The Chronology of the Atatürk Revolution), (Ankara: Halkevleri, 1974); Suna Kill, Türk Devrim 
Tarihi, (Turkish Revolution History), (Istanbul: Bogazici Yayunlan, 1980); Arture Ünsal, `Atatürk's 
Reforms: realization of an Utopia by a Realist', Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. 
XXIII, 1979, pp. 27-57. 
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August 1923, and with this operation he successfully eliminated most of the 
representatives of the Islamists, Ottomanists and the liberals. ' In addition, the Caliphate 
constituted another focal point of opposition. Even after the proclamation of the 
republic, the conservatives did not abandon the struggle against the Kemalists, using the 
Caliphate as a symbol of both the country's and the anti-Kemalist opposition. 
Moreover, despite he was elected and appointed by the Turkish Parliament, the Caliph 
had a power which exceeded the Turkish borders being the head of all Muslims, 
including Mustafa Kemal. Apart from the Parliament and the Caliphate, another 
opposition focal point was the liberal Istanbul intelligentsia and bourgeoisie (tradesmen, 
businessmen etc. ). The Istanbul bourgeoisie, as the beneficiary of the old order, did not 
sanction the radical transformation of the political and especially the economic state 
structures. The intelligentsia, which consisted of liberal Turkists, Ottomanists and the 
minorities, like Jews and Greeks, also resisted Kemalist autocratic methods. Another 
serious opposition came from the Kurds, but the character of this resistance was 
different in essence. The Kurdish claim was partly ethnic, partly Islamic. However, the 
Kurdish rebellions were ill-equipped compared with the other oppositions groups, and 
were not able to found an independent Kurdish state or to endanger the Ankara 
government because there was no united Kurdish political movement. The only tools 
available to the Kurdish opposition and the separatist groups were religion and foreign 
support. 4 Finally, the Soviet Union and Marxist groups were dangerous focal points 
against the Kemalists. Thanks to the internal problems in the Soviet Union, Kemal was 
not so alarmed by the Marxists at the time, he had even allowed the Marxists to 
establish their own party to get the Soviet support during the War of Independence, -15 but 
when he had suppressed other opposition groups, he wiped out the Marxists as well. 
Mustafa Kemal knew that if he could obviate all these sources of opposition there 
would be no obstacles to his reforms. In this way he demolished them in a salami 
3 Sabahattin Selek, Anadolu ihtilali, (Anatolian Revolution), (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaasi, 1968), pp. 
601-602. 
'For more see: Erol Kuruba§, Kürt Sorununun Uluslararasi Boy Ilan (The International 
Dimension of 
the Kurdish Problem), (Ankara; Omit, 1997). 
Even some Turkish socialists claim Mustafa Kemal was socialist, but they have no proof for this 
argument. Feridun Kandemir, Atatürk'ün Kurdugu Türkiye Komünist 
Partisi ve Sonrasi, (The 
Communist Party Atatürk Founded and Aftermath), (Istanbul: Yakin Tarihimiz Yayinlan, 1965). For 
Kemal's sceptical attitude towards the Turkish communist during the War of Independence see 
Gökay, 
`The Turkish... ', pp. 220-235. 
87 
tactic. 6 The first move was to change the country's capital from Istanbul to Ankara to 
underscore the essence of the change from the old regime to a new state and 
understanding. Then, on 29 October 1923 a republican regime was declared when most 
of the influential liberal and conservative members of Parliament, like Hüseyin Rauf, 
Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), Adnan (Adivar), Refet (Bele) and Kazim (Karabekir), were out of 
the capital. They reacted angrily, underlining the fact that the Republic did not itself 
bring freedom, and that despotism was still possible under a republic as it was under a 
monarchy. 7 They were right. Kemal's aim, at least for the moment, was not more 
freedom or democracy' but rather to clear the way for his reforms and to clean up the 
debris of the Ottoman order. After the declaration of the republic, anti-Kemalist feelings 
grew in Istanbul. When Lütfi Fikri's, the president of the Istanbul bar association, 
suggestion for a more influential position for Caliph was published, tension between 
Ankara and Istanbul increased dramatically. The most formidable public critics came 
from Kemal's military rivals. Hence the first thing Kemal had to do was to cut the 
connection with the army, and to neutralise them. On 19 December 1923 a law was 
passed obliging military officers who wanted to be in politics to resign their 
commissions. Some generals left parliament and returned to their military posts, while 
others resigned their army commissions. In both cases Kemal's opponents were 
neutralised. A more drastic measure was the abolition of the Caliphate. In the first 
sessions of Parliament the Caliphate was abolished and all members of the Ottoman 
house were sent into exile immediately after the decision, a new constitution, 1924 
Anayasasi, replaced the 1876 Ottoman Constitution. 9 
With these Kemalist moves and the opposition's reaction, led by Hüseyin Rauf, the 
tension reached its high point. Rauf and 31 deputies left the Republican People's Party, 
(RPP - Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) and founded the Progressive Republican Party, PRP - 
Terakkiperver Cumhurryet Fzrkasz) on 17 November 1924. The PRP programme was 
based on Western European liberalism and was far way from the French revolutionary 
tradition. It was Westernist, secularist and modernist, but against Kemalist radicalism 
6 The strategy of taking very thin slices from something (opposition, enemy etc. ) or dividing it to many 
thin slices before a complete confrontation. The analogy is often used in international politics. 
Zürcher, Turkey..., p. 174. 
8 Atatürk explained his excuse as: No country is free unless it is democratic. (... ) but democracy does not 
ripen overnight. ' Atatürk, quoted in Emil Langyel, Turkey, (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 142. 
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and authoritarianism. Similar to the liberal Ottomanists of the late Ottoman period, it 
advocated decentralisation, separation of powers and an evolutionary political 
development rather than a revolutionary one. The new party was warmly welcomed in 
Istanbul, Izmir and the conservative parts of the country. This alarmed the Kemalists. 
Discipline was tightened in RPP and in the Parliament, and Kemal even replaced the 
moderate cabinet members with radical ones, like Recep (Peker). 10 Finally the rebellion 
in the Kurdish region (, eyh Sait Isyani) provided a great opportunity to the radical 
Kemalists to destroy this new party and the Kurdish resistance. il In March 1925 Kemal 
gave clear support to the hawks in the Party. PM Fethi was forced to resign, and Ismet 
Inönü took his place. The first act of the new Prime Minister was to have Parliament 
pass an extraordinary law - Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu). 
The law empowered the government for two years to ban any organisation or 
publication, which might disturb public order. This legitimated the military operations 
in the suppression of the Kurdish rebellion-12 However, as expected, the law was not 
only used against the Kurds but also against the liberals, the Marxists and the 
conservatives. Many important newspapers were closed down in Istanbul and Anatolia. 
All the leading liberals were arrested and the PRP was closed down. Contrary to 
Ottoman authoritarianism, the new regime could not endure any opposition, or any 
dissenting voice. 
Kemalist Reforms and the Establishment of the Kemalist State Machinery 
Once Kemalist domination over political life was ensured, Kemal embarked on an 
extensive reform programme. Now he had the power to re-create the state machinery 
and society. There was no opposition, and all institutions declared their loyalty to him. 
All religious institutions, türbes, tekkes, medreses were closed down. All religious 
symbols, like the fez, 13 cüppe and so on were banned. Under the Law on the 
Maintenance of Order, about 7,500 people were arrested and 660 were executed by the 
9 Before the 1924 Constitution there was a de facto constitution, the Law on Fundamental Organisation 
(Tq/dlat-i Esasiye Kanunu); Düstur, Vol. 1, Ucuncii Tertib, p. 196; Kanun No. 85, TBMM Zabit 
Ceridesi, Vol. 1, pp. 214-223. 
10 E. J. Zürcher, Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican 
Party, 1924-1925, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991). 
11 Ismail, G6lda4, Takrir-i Sükun C irüumeleri (Takrrr-i Sükun Negotiations), (Istanbul: Beige 
Yayinlan, 1997). 
12 Bettet Cemal, $eyh Sait Isyam, ('eyh Sait Revolt), (Istanbul: 1955), pp. 55-60. 
13 In fact, fez is not a religious symbol, but Sultan Mahmut II had replaced the traditional basliks (hat) 
with fez, as a symbol of the modern wear. Kemalists banned fez, because it was the symbol of the 
Ottoman past. 
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Istiklal Mahkemeleri (The Independence Tribunals) for opposing these reforms. 14 In 
1926, the European calendar was adopted. The Swiss civil code and Mussolini's Italian 
penal code were adopted. The family law, trade law and other codes were secularised 
and westernised. All these reforms were considered by the Kemalist administration as 
the steps to make the society more westernised or, from the Kemalist perspective more 
civilised. 
A last-ditch attempt to obstruct the reforms failed miserably. The security forces 
arrested alleged conspirators planning to assassinate Kemal. The Islamists and some of 
the liberals claimed that there was no assassination attempt, but that there was a 
Kemalist conspiracy to blame the opposition. Be that as it may, Kemal used this attempt 
to suppress the surviving opposition. Almost all Unionists, PRP members - except for 
Hüseyin Rauf (Orbay) and Adnan (Adivar) - were arrested. Most of them were charged 
of having planned a coup d'etat, and sixteen were sentenced to death. Although the 
leading military heroes Kazuo Karabekir, All Fuat (Cebesoy), Cafer Tayyar (Egilmez) 
and Refet (Bele) were pardoned under the pressure of public opinion, they no longer 
could pose a challenge to Kemal. 
The Kemalist reforms continued in the 1930s, almost unchallenged. In this period 
Kemal stiffened the solidarity among the Kemalist groups, namely the Party (RPP), the 
army, the bureaucracy and the intellectuals. He also tried to set the main tenets of his 
ideology, Atatürkcülük or Kemalizm - not as a detailed and elaborate ideology 
but rather 
as an indication of the spirit behind his ideals. The basic principles of Atatürkcülük 
were laid down in the RPP programme of 1931: Republicanism (cumhuriyetcilik), 
secularism (laiklik), nationalism (milliyetcilik), populism (halkciltk), revolutionism 
(devrimcilik) and etatism (devletcilik). The basic tenets of Kenialist ideology will be 
discussed later. At this stage we will look at the institutional framework of the reforms. 
Emergence of the Kemalist Grou 
With the growing Kemalist domination over political life, the Republican 
People's 
Party, the state and Kemalism became identical. Any attack on any of them was seen as 
14 Zürcher, Turkey..., p. 181. 
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a betrayal of the country. The state, party and the official press (the only legal press) and 
the schools started a campaign to make the entire Turkish nation Kemalist. In this 
campaign, not only Kemalist ideas but also Kemal's heroic image were used. The 
Atatürkcületirme (to make the people Kemalist) campaign was even carried out in 
elementary schools. This campaign was a part of Kemal's new Turkish, Westernist 
nation building project. As he saw it, he was re-creating his nation, as a religious - free, 
positivist and nationalist people. Under heavy political propaganda, a new generation 
was growing, which would be the future elite of the country. Journalist Selahaddin 
Güngör's memoirs dramatically show how the Kemalist propaganda had affected the 
Turkish people: 
`It was night time, and I was sleeping. I woke up when my older brother started to 
shake. He was shouting `Wake up... Hurry. I will take you to Atatürk. ' I thought I was 
in a dream: `Atatürk? You are kidding me. Can Atatürk be seen by eyes? ' I asked my 
parents, `Atatürk is God? Does he eat? Does he drink like us? '... ''s 
Thanks to this propaganda Kemal created a Kemalist generation who believed in 
Kemalist values. This newly emerging group, together with veteran Kemalists 
composed a new group in Turkish society, namely the Kemalists. For the Kemalists the 
state was everything. Their attachment was not only on ideological grounds. They were 
fed by the state funds. Not only was the State the biggest employer, but it provided 
members of this class with the opportunity for self-enrichment. In a short time, the 
Republican People Party became the best place to become rich. The state funds were 
controlled through Party, and poured into the Party members. Apart from these 
economic gains, the new class also needed the Kemalist state machine to sustain its 
social position and its way of life as the ruling class. 
The ideological and economic differences between the `lower classes' (villagers, 
workers, kücük esnaf etc. ) and the Kemalist elite alienated them from each other. For 
example, while the Kemalist class saw alcohol drinking, dancing, and dating as symbols 
of modernity, the conservatives saw all of these as shameful conduct. The Kemalists 
feared that if they were to lose power they would not be able to enjoy any of these 
`modern' things. In time the Kemalist class came to consider itself the guardian of the 
State, viewing itself, the party and the State as identical. For his part Atatürk saw this 
class as the core and the guarantor of the reforms while perceiving the other social 
15 Selahaddin Güngör, Cumhuriyet (daily, Istanbul), 15 November 1938. 
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classes as ignorant people who needed to be led for their own good. In one of his 
speeches he summarised the Kemalist elite's role as follows: 
`The duty of these citizens [intellectuals and the Kemalist elite] is to mix the best path 
to follow in order to ensure their progress and their renaissance. That is how I see our 
people. The interests of different groups can be reconciled perfectly and there are no 
means of dividing them into classes. All our citizens enter into the group, which we call 
the People. Thus the People's Party will be the school of education in citizenship for all 
our people. ' 16 
In other words there was only one people, but it was divided into two. those who needed 
to be educated by the Kemalists Party, and those who were to implement this 
educational process. This elitist approach17 left no room for alternative ideas in politics 
and provided the legitimating base for the monopoly of the Kemalists and the Kemalist 
ideology over the power. 
The Republican People's Party 
In this framework, the Republican People's Party (RPP) was the most important organ 
of state machinery. As stated by Atatürk, it was the school to educate the people. '8 But 
it was much more than that, it was an intimate part of the administration of the 
Republic. 19 With Atatürk, the party was one of the producers and practitioners of the 
State ideology and policies, setting the aims for the Republic in its congress and 
meetings. An indication of the Party's amalgamation with the State administration can 
be provided by the fact that the provincial presidents of the party were also governors of 
their provinces. Above all, the party's president was also the President of the State. In 
1937 this practice was written into the constitution as were the party's main principles. 
In addition to its administrative functions, the party also strengthened the Kemalist class 
through educational and financial tools. In this task, Halkevleri (People's Houses) and 
schools were very important. Thanks to this Kemalist web, the ideological propaganda 
was strictly sustained. Although Atatürk saw the Party and the Kemalist elite as tools to 
westernise the country, this group was loathe to lose its privileges and strove to 
maintain permanent power over the country. This intention to stay in power was already 
16 Mustafa Kemal quoted in John Parker and Charles Smith, Modern Turkey, (London: Routledge, 
1940), p. 72. 
17 For the Kemalist elitist populism also see Chapter IV of this study. 
18 Fahir Giritlioglu, Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumburiyet Halk Partisi'nin Mevld, (The RPP's Place in 
Turkish Political Life), Vol. 1, (Ankara: Ayyilchz Matbaasi, 1965), p. 125. 
'9 Parker and Smith, Modern..., p. 69. 
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written into the 193 5 RPP Programme and implied in the 1927 programme. 20 Moreover, 
party members made efforts to make Kemalism a frozen ideology, which cannot be 
debated or changed, to protect the party. 2' Hence, any talk about Kemalism as an 
ideology does not justly refer to Kemal's ideas but also to the interests of the group 
Kemal had created because they owed their power and privileges to Kemalism. 
In foreign policy, however, the Party's impact was limited: not because of its weakness 
but due to its lack of interest. The party members mainly concentrated on the domestic 
politics and notably the economic issues. 22 However, the Party's strict monopoly over 
political life prevented alternative foreign policy courses. Any deviation from the 
Kemalist perspective was perceived as betrayal and punished by the party and the state 
machinery. `As ... 
his presidency was confirmed for life, Atatürk became increasingly 
autocratic, treating even minor instances of opposition as rebellion and sending into 
exile some of his oldest associates, including Rauf Orbay, halide Edip, and Adnan 
Adivar, for criticising some of his policies. '23 In this environment it could nor be 
expected a pluralism in neither domestic nor foreign policies. 
The Presidential Palace ((7ankaya Köökü) 
According to law, the President of the State was elected by the National Assembly. Yet, 
despite the written rules, Atatürk, as the party leader had a vital role in election of the 
parliamentarians and as a result of this there was a hierarchical relationship between 
Parliament, the Party and the President. As noted earlier, the president of the Party was 
at the same time the State President; thus Atatürk held the highest position from the 
foundation of the Republic until his death in 193 8. In foreign policy in particular, 
Atatürk was an autocratic leader and his foreign policy making and implementation can 
be likened to Abdulhamid II's. Atatürk was aware of the success and effectiveness of 
the authoritarian Hamidian policies in protecting the empire's unity and stability. As a 
20 `Giri§ Kismi' (introduction section), in CHP 1935 Programs, (RPP 1935 Programme), (Ankara: 
1935); Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi Nizamnamesi, (The RPP Programme), (Ankara: Zellic Biraderler 
Matbaasi, 1927). 
21 For these efforts see $eref Aykut, Kemalizm: Cumburiyet Halk Partisi Programinin Izahi, 
(Kemalism: Republican People's Party Programme's Explanation), (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halst 
Kitabevi, 1936). 
22 Oguz Ünal, Tnrkiye'de Demokrasinin Dogusu, Tek Parti Ybnetiminden cok Partili Rejime Gesij 
Süreci, (The Emergence of Democracy in Turkey, The Process of Transformation from a One-Party 
Regime to a Multi Party System), (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayin AS., 1994), esp. sections 2 and 3. 
23 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 395. For the detailed examples see 
Ünal, Türkiye'de.... 
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result he followed a Hamidian-like strategy. In the words of Sugar `From 1808 until 
1938 Turks lived under absolute masters, Abdulhamid and Mustafa Kemal. '24 Despite 
the similarity, Kemal had more freedom than Abdulhamid. First, he was a national hero 
and a charismatic leader and therefore did not confront any serious challenge. Second, 
opposition to Kemal had a cost and almost nobody dared to take this risk. Third, by 
leaving foreign policy issues to Kemal, the RPP gave him an unbridled freedom on 
foreign policy issues. Thus he became the final and only decision-maker. 25 
Civil Bureaucracy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The role of the civil bureaucracy in the policy-making process was determined by the 
Kemalist dilemma. On the one hand, the Ottoman bureaucracy, was the most 
Westernised and pro-secular group in the country. In this framework, there was no 
challenge to Kemal as there had been Jacobean co-operation between the civil-military 
bureaucracy and the intellectuals since the Tanzimat. Moreover, since the bureaucracy 
owed its existence and privileges to the Kenialist revolution, it had shared aims and 
ideology with the leadership. Foreign policy bureaucracy was no exception. As noted 
earlier, the Foreign Office had been the leading institution in the westernisation process 
since the nineteenth century and this role remained intact in the Republican era despite 
the radical changes and crises. From Ismet Inönü to Tevfik Rüýtü Aras, foreign 
ministers were changed yet the bureaucrats remained the same. 26As noted by Rustow, 
93 % of the Ottoman staff officers and 85 % of the civil servants had remained in their 
posts after the demise of the Empire, 27 giving the Foreign Ministry a much-needed 
stability. Moreover, Turkish diplomats viewed Atatürk as a hero who had saved and 
`civilised' Turkey; 28 as a result the Foreign Ministry carried on without questioning his 
policies. 
24 Sugar, cited in Bal, Preventing..., p. 152. 
25 William Hale, `Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics', in David Shankland (ed. ), The Turkish 
Republic at Seventy-Five Years, Progress-Development-Change, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 
1999), p. 92. 
26 The foreign ministries were also relatively less frequently changed in this era as seen in the Aras case. 
Rtýtü Aras remained in that position for 13 years (1925-1938). 
27 Dankwart A. Rustow, `The Military', in Robert T. Ward and Dankwart A Rustow (eds. ) Political 
Modernization in Japan and Turkey, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 387. 
28 Feridun Cemil Erkin, Diji#lerinde 34 Yil, Anilar - Yorumlar, 1. Lilt, (34 Years in Foreign Ministry, 
Memories - Comments, Vol. 1), (Ankara: 
Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1980). 
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Despite his ideological affinities with the civil bureaucracy, Atatürk's attitude was also 
shaped by his unhappy personal experience with the civil bureaucracy prior to and 
during the War of Independence. He viewed bureaucratic inefficiency as one of the 
main reasons of Ottoman decline. Although most bureaucrats were nationalists and 
Westernists, they did not lead the nationalist resistance when the country was under 
occupation and did not use their power to change the political system. Therefore Kemal 
was suspicious about the civil bureaucracy and thought that he could not trust them in 
the implementation of his reforms. 29 It can be said that he saw the bureaucracy as a 
body, which had no head and needed to be led. On the other hand he realised the 
importance of the bureaucracy in the implementation of the reforms, especially in 
manipulating and educating the masses. But before doing that, they had to be controlled 
and educated themselves. The Party provided this function by creating a Kemalist 
bureaucracy; still, Atatürk felt that he had to rely upon his military and administrative 
representatives and the governors rather than on the bureaucracy as a whole, because of 
his scepticism regarding the bureaucracy. " 
According to the Kemalist perspective, Kemalist bureaucrats' mission was to retain 
political, economic and social control over society. 31 The Kemalist bureaucracy's 
approach to administration was regulative, rather than representational or 
mobilisational. They were responsible for the good of the whole people because they 
represented the State, which was the holiest concept in the Kenialist thinking. In the 
words of Turan, `the ruled were seen not as citizens but as subjects whose prime duty 
was obedience to their benevolent rulers. '32 This kind of a bureaucratic machine was a 
perfect tool to introduce the reforms from above. The alienation of the bureaucrats was 
high in Ottoman days, yet the cultural gap was not as wide as in the Republican era. As 
a result the civil bureaucracy did not consider the people's preferences in domestic and 
foreign policy. There was no competition in the policy-making process yet Mustafa 
Kemal's suspicious attitude minimised the bureaucracy's role in decision-making. In 
29 Metin Heiler, `Ataturk and the Civil Bureaucracy' and titer Turan, `Continuity and Change in Turkish 
Bureaucracy: The Kemalist Period and After', both are in Jacob M. Landau, Ataturk and 
Modernization of Turkey, (Leiden: Westview Press, 1984). 
30 Heper, `Atateirk.... ', pp. 90-91. 
31 Turan claims that Ottoman and Turkish bureaucrats constituted an intelligentsia, and a political class 
whose mission was to retain control over the people: Turan, `Continuity... 
', p. 163. 
32 rj)jran, `Continuity... ', p. 103. 
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those years the power of the Foreign Office declined and became an office that merely 
implemented the commands from the Presidential Palace. 
The Army 
Another important foreign policy institution was the army. Like the Foreign Ministry 
the army was also a radically westernst institution since the nineteenth century, and 
was the only organised group the Kemalists could rely on. 33 Moreover, Kemal as a 
former general and war hero was perceived as the natural head of the army. 34 Moreover, 
almost all of the leading Republican statesmen were former army officers like Fevzi 
cakmak, Ismet Inönü, Kazun Özalp, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, Kazim Karabekir and Refet 
Bele. That is to say, in practice the army was in power, hence it did not directly 
intervene in politics. However, this did not mean that the army had no political 
ambitions. On the contrary, it saw itself as the guardian of Kemalist, westernst Turkey. 
Also, the law gave the army unusual powers, unparalleled in any democratic country. 
As Vaner put it, despite the radical changes in the Ottoman political system, the new 
Republican army was also the first institution of the nascent Turkish State. 35 It was 
above the Parliament and the Party. As noted by the ruling Republican People Party's 
1935 programme: 
`We especially take care that the army of the Republic, which is the unshakable 
foundation of the high State organisation, and which protects and guards the national 
ideal, the national existence, and the Revolution, as well as its valuable members, be 
always honoured and respected.... '36 
The same programme declared that the army was above all politics: `The Turkish army 
is above all political considerations and influences'. 37 This position was confirmed by 
such legislation as the 1935 Ordu Ic Hizmet Kanunu / 1935 Law of the Army Internal 
Service and the Constitution. Yet the ideological similarity between the policy-makers 
and the army made any military intervention unnecessary, and the army's inference 
happened when the government required that. As noted by Pusat, the most important 
33 Ümit äzdäg, Ordu-Siyaset Iligkisi, Atatürk ve Inönü Dönemleri, (Army Politics Connection, Atatürk 
and Inönü Period), (Ankara: Gundogan Yaymnlari, 1991), p. 43. 
34 Although some attempts were made by the other generals, like Kazim Karabekir Pala, Mustafa Kemal 
eliminated them by reorganising the army. He accused these generals in his Great Speech: Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, Nutuk (The Speech) Vol. II, (Istanbul: MEB, 1973). 
35 Semih Vaner, `The Army', in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Tonak (eds. ), Turkey in Transition, New 
Perspectives, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 237. 
36 The 1935 Program of RPP adopted by the 4th Congress, (Ankara: CHP), Article 73. 
37 The 1935 Program..., Article 72. 
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function of the army during these years was to suppress the opposition. 38 In the words 
of Ozdag, 1923-1938 period was a `militarist period without military'. 39 In brief, the 
army was at the core of the politics, yet did not need to challenge the civil government 
because it was the military's government. 40 There was a very close consultation 
between the generals and Atatürk, but the ultimate decision-maker was Atatürk himself. 
In external relations too, the army had privileges. Security issues in particular were its 
responsibility, and it did not consult or give information to the Foreign Ministry about 
these issues. While the bureaucracy was also Kemalist, the army officers saw 
themselves as the only guardian of Kemalism, and did not trust other state bureaucrats. 
As will be seen in the military coups of 1960,1971 and 1983, this tradition would 
41 continue well after Atatürk. 
The Parliament and the People 
The first Parliament was pluralistic and had real control over the government. It was 
also sensitive to foreign, security and economy policies because it saw them as the most 
important components of national independence. However, when Kemal took power, he 
first changed the structure of the Parliament and blocked opponents. Now Parliament 
had became Atatürk's parliament. Its members were also Party members and none of 
them could be elected without Atatürk's support. After the 1935 elections for instance, 
386 out of 399 parliamentarians were members of the RPP. 42 Despite this, Kemal still 
could not bear any kind of opposition. 43 Moreover, because the foreign policy and 
security issues were `high politics', they were not debatable in parliament. Therefore, 
for the policy-makers, parliament was not a place to discuss such an `important subject' 
Devrim Pusat, Militarizmin Tarihsel Sürekliligi, Ordu ve Siyaset, (The Historical Continuity of 
Militarism, Army and Politics), (Istanbul: Nam Yaytncihk, 1996), pp. 113-133. 
39 Ozda, Ordu - Siyaset..., p. 43. 40 Cem even argues that the army was governing the country with `its civil government' : Ismail Cem, 
Türkiye'de Geri Kalmi ingýn Tarihi, (The History of Backwardness in Turkey), (Istanbul: Cem 
Yayinevi, 1970), p. 297. 
41 See the relevant chapters of this thesis. Also see for the army's perception itself as the only guardian of 
Kemalism: Mehmet Ali Birand, Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Army, (London: 1991); 
Semih Vaner, `The Army', in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (eds. ), Turkey in Transition, 
New Perspectives, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 236-265; William Hale, 
Türkiye'de Ordu ve Siyaset, 1789'dan Günümüze (The Army and the Politics in Turkey, From 1789 to 
Today), (Tres.: Ahmet Fethi), (Istanbul: Hil Yayin, 1996), pp. 108-134 (the 1960 coup), pp. 160-184 (the 
1971 coup) and pp. 209-231 (the 1980 coup); Ki 1, Kemalism...., pp. 110-112; Dankwart Rustow, `The 
Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic', World Politics, Vol. XI, July 1959, pp. 513-552. 
42 Parker and Smith, Modern..., p. 63. 
43 Taha Parla, Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynaklan, Atatürk'ün Nutuk'u (The Official 
Sources of the Political Culture in Turkey, Atatilrk's Speech), Vol. 1, (Istanbul: tletiýim Yayuilan, 1991), 
pp. 123-124. 
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as far as foreign policy is concerned, and instead became an institution, which ratified 
international agreements signed by the government. 
In addition, the authoritarian political environment did not allow any political pressure 
groups. The only pressure groups were economic groups and almost all of them were 
formed by the members of the RPP or Atatürk' followers. Since the party governed and 
controlled the State institutions, foreign and domestic businessmen made efforts to 
affect party members so as to manipulate the government policies. However even these 
efforts were limited to economic matters and conditioned on respect for the Kemalist 
revolutionary principles. Since the political system was not pluralistic and the pressure 
groups were very limited and weak, the public was very ill-informed. Foreign policy 
issues were `high-politics' for the people, even for businessmen, press, and intellectuals. 
Thus, the effect of the public on foreign policy remained very limited. So, Atatürk and 
his close circle remained the only decision-makers in foreign policy making. ' 
Conclusion 
Atatürk established an autocratic state machine in order to form a secular, Western-style 
country. This machinery, in a short time, created its own guardians, namely the 
Kemalist group which was composed of the Republican People's Party, the army, 
bureaucracy and the Kemalist elite. This newly-emerged group had different values 
from the ordinary Turk. It was Westernist, secular -even anti-religious- and positivist. 
The most significant effect of the emergence of the Kemalist group was that not only 
the Kemalist principles but also the interests of this group became important. As a 
result, the Kemalists started to use Kemalist principles as a legitimating ideology for 
their own power and interests against other groups, such as Islamists, Ottomanists, 
Turkists etc. Atatürk had radical domestic aims, therefore foreign policy was a 
secondary matter, and Atatürk saw foreign policy as a tool in order to protect Turkey's 
economic and political independence and to implement its domestic reforms. 
So, it is 
hardly possible to say that he made efforts to form a theoretical or ideological 
foreign 
policy framework. Furthermore, such an autocratic political system could not produce a 
44 Hale, `Foreign policy... ', p. 92. 
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pluralistic foreign policy; Atatürk naturally was the only decision-maker in foreign 
policy. As mentioned, he did not even consult the foreign policy bureaucracy. 
In conclusion, foreign policy was a secondary matter in Atatürk's reforms and he did 
not form a completed foreign policy theory. However, his internal aims, personality and 
style with the state establishment (RPP, the army, bureaucracy etc. ) would deeply affect 
Turkish foreign policy in his era and the following years. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Ideological Background of Kemalist Foreign Policy 
`What particularly interests foreign policy, and upon which it is founded, is the 
internal organisation of the state. Thus it is essential that the foreign policy 
agree with the internal organisation. 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
`You must know the situation you are in. The Padisah (Sultan) is your enemy. 
The entire Western world is your enemy. Listen, don't say anybody, but the 
Turkish nation is also your enemy. They think you are the reason of the war. '2 Ismet inönü to army officers. 
`In my opinion, this country is Turkish. Non-Turks have only one right in this 
Turkish home: to be servant, to be slaves. '3 
Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), the Minister of Justice, 1930 
Having discussed the rise of Kemalism and its institutionalisation, this chapter will 
analyse the effects of the Kemalist reforms and principles on foreign policy. By way of 
doing so, it will examine the impact of several ideological principles, like secularism, 
westernism, republicanism, populism and nationalism, as well as other attitudes rooted 
in Turkey's unique experience, like scepticism towards the West and ethnic-political 
minorities in Turkey. In this fi amework, the chapter identifies pacifism, isolationism, 
legalism, non-alignment and neutrality, pragmatism and realism as the main pillars of 
Kemalist foreign policy. 
Ideological - Historical Principles 
In the Kemalist era Turkey's external relations and foreign policy principles were 
determined by three factors: the Ottoman experience, Turkey's weaknesses, and the 
nation-state building ideology. The most important factor was of course the nation-state 
- building project. Though Kemalism has no book or manifesto, containing all 
its 
principles and aims, Kemal declared six arrows (six principles), namely nationalism, 
secularism, populism, revolutionism (or reformism), republicanism, etatism, as the 
main pillars of his doctrine, 4 which in 1937 became the constitutional principles of the 
' Atatürk, Speech...., p. 378. 
2 Ulus 17 May 1968 and Taner Timur, Tnrk Devrimi ve Sonrasi, (The Turkish Revolution and Its 
Aftermath), (Ankara: Dogan Yaymevi, 1971), p. 26. 
3 Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kuralmasi 1923-1931, (The 
Establishment of the One Party Administration in the Republic of Turkey), (Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari. 
1981), p. 301. 
4 Six principles were first accepted as the basic principles of the RPP on 10 May 1931 and in the 1935 
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Republic. 5 However, the major concepts, like nationalism, secularism, the state etc., 
have a different meaning in the Kemalist discourse from the Western political literature 
both Marxist or liberal-democrat understand it. Therefore it is necessary to look at all 
aspects of the principles and compare actions with words, as well as to examine the 
impact of the undeclared features of ideology (the scepticism, obsessions and fears) on 
the Kemalist approach. 
Westernism and the Kemalist Civilisation Project 
There is little doubt that Kemal's nationalist, positivist, secular, Jacobean, anti-Ottoman 
and anti-religious ideology was one of the most important factors determining the 
Republic's policies. The Kemalists were close to the ideological stance of the Young 
Turks6, even it can be argued that the Kemalist secularism, nationalism and westernism 
rooted in the Young Turk tradition. This was understandable; Most of them were army 
officers and former CUP members and they were both members of the revolutionary 
generation of the 1890s who had been trained in the secular schools of the Ottoman 
Empire. As Zürcher put it 
`Kemal and his circle belonged to the radical wing of the Young Turks who believed 
implicitly in a popularised version of nineteenth-century European positivism. In their 
eyes only scientific rationalism could form the basis for the modernisation leap Turkey 
would have to make, and only a nation-state could give Turkey the coherence needed to 
complete with the national states of Europe. '7 
In this ideological framework, although Kemalism emerged as a nationalist movement 
against Western imperialism its ultimate struggle was against the traditional and 
religious Ottoman political system. In order to do that they not only accepted some of 
the Young Turk ideas, but also some of their methods; only the Kemalists were more 
careful, realistic and pragmatic. ' 
RPP Programme they were slightly modified 
S Levent Köker, Modernle4me, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi, (Modernisation, Kemalism and Democracy), 
(Istanbul: tletiim, 1993), p. 135. 
6 `He was a representative of Young Turk officer of his generation' : Mango, Turkey, p. 40. 
Zürcher, `Young... ', p. 175. 
8 For the connection and differences between Kemalism and the Young Turk ideas see Baskin Oran, 
Atat irk Milliyetciligi, Resmi Ideoloji Disi Bir Inceleme, (Atatürk Nationalism, An Analysis from the 
Unofficial Ideological Perspective), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1990), pp. 41-57; Zürcher, `Young... ', pp. 
174-176. 
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Westernism and the Ottomans as the `Others' 
For the Kemalists the major responsibility for the backwardness and collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire lay with religion, tradition, and Ottoman institutions. 9 This created 
Kemalism's the most important article of faith and the first principle of Kemalist 
foreign policy: Westernisation and secularism. Thus, a great Westernisation campaign 
was started and Turkey made all possible efforts to forge good relations with the West. 
Contrary to the Tanzimat Westernisation movement, Republican Westernisation 
demanded acceptance of Western civilisation in full arguing that neither an Islamic nor 
a Turkish civilisation was capable of dealing with the modern world. 10 For Kemal, 
Western civilisation was indivisible and had to be adopted as a unit or not at all. 11 He 
claimed that there is only one civilisation in the world, namely the western civilisation, 
and if a country wanted to be civilised it had to be Europeanised; this was the only way 
to become modern and advanced. '2 In Arnold Toynbee's words, `Mustafa Kemal's 
policy was to aim at nothing short of an out-and-out conversion of Turkey to the 
Western way of life-). 13 In a logical extension of this thinking the East was perceived as 
the source of uncivilised things, poverty and instability. The journalist Abdullah Cevdet, 
an influential Young Turk, described the essence of this ideology in 1913: `There is no 
second civilisation; civilisation means European civilisation, and it must be imported 
with its roses and its thorns. ' 14 
Contrary to earlier westernisation attempts, Ottomanism and Islamism, Kemal rejected 
Turkey's religious and cultural orientations: it was total westernisation which would 
save Turkey. Ügün argues that Kemal's nationalism did not produce the `other' in 
defining itself 15 It is true that it did not produce an external `other' but rather an 
`internal one': the Ottomans. When it produced the `Ottomans' as the `other', Kemalism 
9 Golam Choudhury, Islam and the Muslim World, (London: Scorpion Publishing Ltd, 1993), p. 104- 
105. 
10 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 
1964), p. 296. 
'1 Quoted in John Redmond, The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: 
Turkey, Cyprus and Malta, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), p. 21. 
12 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demecleri, 1918-1937, Cilt 3, 
(Ankara: Türk Inkilap Tarihi Enstitüsd Yaymlan, 1959), pp. 67-68. 
13 Arnold Toynbee, The World and the West, (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 27. 
l4 Quoted in Dankwart A. Rustow, Turkey, America's Forgotten Ally, New York, 1987, Council of 
Foreign Relations, p. 14. 
15S. Seyfi Qgün, `Turk Milliyetciliginde Hakim Millet Kodunun Dönüsümd' (The Transformation of the 
Dominant Nation Code in Turkish Nationalism), in N. Bilgin, Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik 
(Republic, Democracy and Identity) (Istanbul: Baglam Yayinlari, 1997), p. 224. 
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had to produce an imagined `us' concept as well, and it was the Western world. In other 
words, new Turkey looked at its own history through Western eyes. Gökay argues that 
the Turkish Republic assumed that the Western perceptions of the Ottoman Empire 
were mostly true and that the main task of the Republic was to transform Turkish 
society into a Western society. 16 Similarly, the Turkish sociologist Göle claims that 
Kemalism was a `civilisation project'. Western customs, books and so on were used to 
symbolised civilisation while old Turkish customs and language symbolise barbarity. '7 
As Göle put it, Kemal thought that the Ottoman culture contradicted civilisation, and he 
declared that, even if he were to do it on his own, he would struggle against the `eastern 
mind' . 
18 In the words of Pails: 
`New Turkey nourishes against the old regime. As far as Western civilisation is 
concerned, the Ghazi has shown himself to be an out-and-out partisan of Western 
thought, customs, and methods and of their introduction into Turkey in place of the old 
Islamic life and ideas. '19 
For George Lenczowski, Atatürk's aim was to separate Turkey from its Asiatic roots: 
`The major objective of Turkish reform was in general sense, to separate Turkey from 
the ancient Asiatic-Arabic sphere of culture and tradition and to transform it into a 
modem, westernised nation. 120 
Atatürk, in 1925, claimed that the aim of the reforms was to civilise the Turks, in other 
words to Westernise them: 
`The aim of the revolutionary measures that we have been and are taping is to bring the 
people of the Turkish Republic into a state of society which is entirely modem and 
civilised, in every sense and in every way... It is essential that we bring about the utter 
rout of mentalities incapable of accepting the fact. 21 
`We must become civilised men from every point of view... Our thinking and our 
mentality will become civilised from head to foot-The nation should realise clearly that 
civilisation is a powerful fire which bums and destroys those who disregard it. We shall 
acquire, keep and finally improve the place we deserve in the civilised family to which 
we belong. Prosperity, happiness and humanity demand it... '22 
16 Bülent G6kay, `From Western Perceptions to Turkish Self-Perception', Journal of Mediterranean 
Studies, 1995, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 259-269. 
17 Nilufer Gö1e, Modern Mahrem, Medeniyet ve Örtänme, (Modern Forbidden, Civilisation and 
Veiling), (Istanbul: Metis Yayinlan, 1991), pp. 48-51. 
18 ibid., p. 53. 
19 A. A. Pallis, `The New Turkey', The Nineteenth Century, 1928, Vol. CIV, No. 621, pp. 618-628, p. 
620. 
20 George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 
116. 
21 Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk'Iln KonuSmalan, (Atatark's Speeches), (Ankara: 1956), p. 48. 
22 Mustafa Kemal in Hekimgil, Mustafa..., pp. 18-19 
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Likewise, in his Great Speech he explained the reason for abolishing the fez: 
`Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on your heads as a sign of 
ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilisation, and to adopt in its place 
the hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilised world, thus showing, among 
other things, that no difference existed in the manner of thought between the Turkish 
nation and the whole family of civilised mankind. '23 
That is to say, the Kemal and his friends considered westernisation as synonymous with 
modernisation and `becoming civilised'. 24 In brief, if Turkey wants to become a 
civilised, modern country it had to give up all connections with the Ottoman and Islamic 
past. From the Kemalist perspective, the main trait of Turkish identity was not religion 
but nationalism. Thus, `the new Turks' were trying to prove that they were `the true 
Europeans'. Mustafa Kemal, in his interpretation of Turkish history claimed that the 
Turks were white men like other Europeans and noted that the Turks were the ancestors 
of the present European races. 25 Some Turkish historians and politicians further argued 
that all civilisations were the creation of the Turks spilling out of the Altay. 26 That is to 
say, for Turkey Europeanisation meant the construction of a new identity, a way of life 
that legitimated the state and the new regime. According to Kemalist ideology, Europe 
meant science, technology, rationality, democracy, progress, laicism and welfare, but 
not Christianity or the old European culture or traditions. For the Kemalist Republic, 
Europe was a universal concept, not regional, religious or cultural. In the last two 
centuries Europe had experienced a de-Christianization period, and according to Kemal, 
there was no room for any religious or metaphysical effect in the `European', `Western' 
concepts. Europe meant modern civilisation and Kemalism uncompromisingly aimed at 
reaching the level of a modern civilisation at all costs. 
Being a part of European society has been everything for the Turkish governments 
because it has been almost the only way to guarantee Turkey's secular, modern, 
Western-oriented choices. Therefore Turkey has seen Turkish-European and 
Turkish-Western relations in general as a matter of life and death (Turkey's 
European vocation). Obviously, Turkey was making efforts to change its very identity. 
23Atatürk, A Speech..., p. 738. 
24 Türkkaya Ataöv, `The Principles of Kemalism', TYIR, 1980, Vol. XX, p. 35; Helimgil, Mustafa..., p. 
17. 
25 Speros Vryonis, Jr., The Turkish State and History, Clio Meets the Grey Wolf, Second Edition, 
(New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, Publishers, 1993), p. 62. 
26 See A. C. Emre, Atatürk'ün Inkilab Hedefi ve Tarib Tezi (Atatark's Revolutionary Aim and His 
History Thesis), (Istanbul, 1965). 
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The new Turkish administration saw changing its own civilisational mode as the entry 
ticket to European society and to becoming a `normal' European, modem state. This 
perception would inevitably affect Turkey's foreign policy toward both East and West. 
Thus Turkish foreign policy during the Kemalist era and after that has consistently been 
pro-Western . 
27 Within this framework, Turkey has aimed to be part of all European co- 
operation and integration movements. As a result the `new Turks' most of the time felt 
that they had to support Western policies against others to be a part of the `Western 
family'. For example in the Algerian independence war Turkey supported the French 
side. In most cases Turkey has supported the Western arguments against other countries 
or alternatively abstained. In its relations with Arab world in particular the impact of the 
Turkish Western perception has been very effective as has been witnessed in the Fez 
Affair, in Turkey's indifference attitude towards the Arab world in general. 28 
The Kemalist Western perception has had such an impact on Turkish foreign policy that 
Turkey went out of its way to appeal the Europeans. Even the Western attempts to 
divide Turkey after the First World War could not prevent Turkey from seeking its 
friendship. Turkish-British relations offer a very good example. It is a well-known fact 
that Britain had led the anti-Turkish campaign during the First World War and the War 
of Independence, 29 and the British delegate also made an enormous effort to block the 
Turkish demands in Lausanne. Moreover, as will be seen in detail, when Turkey's 
capital was moved from Istanbul to Ankara Britain resisted this decision for a long time. 
Furthermore, the Ankara government suspected of British support for the Seyh Said 
uprising. Nevertheless, none of these affected Turkey's enthusiasm to establish friendly 
relations with the British. For instance, in the Lausanne negotiations Turkey made 
concessions to Britain about the Straits issue just to get British support_30 Even after the 
Seyh Said uprising Turkey continued to develop its relations with Britain and saw 
Britain as a partner in Europe and the region. In an interview in Stamboul on 5-6 
February 1927 Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rü tü Aras made clear how Britain's 
friendship was important for Turkey: 
27 Oguz Ünal, Türkiye'de Demokrasinin Dogu*u, Tek Parti Yönetiminden Cok Partili Rejime Gecij 
Süreci, (The Emergence of Democracy in Turkey, The Transformation Process From One Party to Multi- 
Party Regime), (Istanbul: Mill yet Yayin A. $., 1994), p. 117. 
28 The Turkish western perception's role in Turkey-Middle East relations is discussed in Chapter V of this 
thesis. 
29 K&kooglu, 'Turm-British... ', p. 81. 
30 Ates, `Cumhuriyet... ', p. 72. 
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'(Relations with Britain) ... 
have become friendly since the treaty was signed... Turkey 
sacrificed Musul in the higher interest of peace. 311, 
During the Cold War years some Kemalist academics claimed that Atatürk would have 
been opposed to the alliance between Turkey and the United States because he was an 
anti-imperialist. However, Kemal did not miss any opportunity to express his sympathy 
for the West, including the USA. In a letter to President Roosevelt, Atatürk stated his 
admiration of American society and his desire for a close relationship with the US: `I 
would like to take this opportunity to express my admiration for the USA. Our two 
countries have the same ideals for general peace and happiness of humanity. '32 
As will be seen, the other factors would appear like the Russian, Italian, Nazi threats, 
Cold War etc., that forced Turkey toward a Western orientation, yet the main motive 
behind Turkish policy-makers was the cultural and civilisational one. Yet while Europe 
and the West meant everything for Kemalist Turkey, it was aware that the West did not 
see Turkey as an equal member of the Western state system. Turkish Western 
perception, as will be discussed, determined its relations not only with the West but also 
with the East and its own people. On the one hand Turkey was making great efforts to 
establish close relations with the West and to overcome the problems with these 
countries, even with Greece33, on the other hand, as will be seen in the next section, it 
was very reluctant in relations with the Islamic world. 
Secularism 
Secularism' constituted the second most important pillar of Kemalism and the 1927 
RPP Programme declared that secularism was one of the priorities of the Republic: `It is 
essential to completely separate faith from earth in state's and nation's affairs. 35 Nayir 
even argued that Kemalism was nothing but secularism. 36 In many ways secularism was 
31 Omer Kürkgdoglu, `Turco - British Relations Since the 1920s', in Hale and Ba ý (eds. ), Four 
Centuries of Turco - British Relations, Studies in Diplomatic Economic and Cultural Affairs, 
(Northgate: The Eothen Press, 1984), p. 86. 
32 Sadi Borak, Atatürk'iin Özel Mektuplan, (Atatürk's Private Letters), (Istanbul: 1970), p. 184. 
33 Alexis Alexandris, `Turkish Policy Towards Greece During the Second World War and Its Impact on 
Greek - Turkish Detente', Balkan Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1,1982, pp. 157-197. 34 For theoretical discussion of secularism see: Mert, The Early...; Ayfer G6ze, 'Dirk Kurtulus Savasi ve 
Devrim Tarihi, (The Turkish War of Independence and the History of the Revolution), (Istanbul: Beta, 
1989), pp. 415-499; Timur, Türk Devrimi-, pp. 122-131. 
35 CBP 1927 Nizamnamesi, (RPP 1927 Programme), Article 3, Ankara, CHP, 1927. 
36 y N. Nayir, `Ataturkism is Secularism', in Kemal Karpat, Political and Social Thought in the 
Contemporary Middle East, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), pp. 322-324. Many present day leftist- 
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inextricably linked to Westernism, not least since Kemal was an admirer of the French 
philosophical school of thought which inevitably shaped his secularist approach as 
well. 37 According to the French revolutionary school, religion was an anachronistic 
institution, which, moreover, posed a challenge to secular power. Hence it was to be 
placed under the control of the secular power, namely the state so as to protect the 
political order and the national good. This secularist understanding constitutes the 
opposite of the Anglo-Saxon (or American) religious and secularist approach. For the 
latter religious and secular power areas are different, hence neither posed a danger to the 
other and could co-exist independently from each other. 38 As a result, in American 
historical evolution, both of religion and secularism have maintained their 
independence, and the state did not need to take religious affairs under its control. 
These theoretical differences borrowed from the Christian world proved detrimental to 
a Muslim country. With the effect of positivism, everything related to Islam was 
considered as symbol of backwardness. In the words of Lowry, `Islam in Turkey, like 
all religious expression in the Soviet Union, was treated as a dangerous current which, 
although impossible to eradicate, had to be placed firmly under the control of the 
state. '39 As a result of this secularisation process, the Turkish state came to perceive 
Islam as both internal and external threat from the universal leader of all-Muslims for 
centuries. Kenialist secularism inevitably determined not only the state-citizen relations 
but also Turkish foreign policy. The effects will be discussed in detail in the next 
section and in the `implementation' chapter. 
Kemalist Eastern Perception 
Kemalist civilisation understanding with the effect of `hard-secularism' determined 
Turkey's attitude towards the East. `The more westernising reforms had been 
materialised the more Turkey turned its face from the East to the West. ' 40 In time 
Turkey's alienation towards the Muslim and Middle Eastern states became the 
Kemalists share Nayir's argument like Yekta Gvngör Ozden, former head of the Court of Constitution. 
For the effects of French tradition on Kemalism: Lewis, `The Impact.. ', pp. 105-125. Paul Dumont 
'The Origins of Kemalist Ideology', in Jacob M Landau (ed-), Atatnrk and the Modernization of 
Turkey, (Leiden: Westview, 1986), esp. p. 28; Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood. The 
Modern World, Turkey, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 129. 
' For a similar comparative analysis of the French revolutionary tradition and English evolutionary 
approach see Timur, Törk Devrimi.... pp. 64-65. 
3 Lowry, `Challenges... ', p. 93. 
40 Cahn, The Role..., p. 63. 
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permanent principle of Kemalist foreign policy. This aspect of Kemalist foreign policy 
was an offspring of Kemalist Westernism, positivism and secularism. Since the West 
meant the only civilisation for the new Turkish ruling class and they sought to prove 
that they were a part of this civilisation, they did so by turning them back on the East. 
As Bobby Sayyid41 put it, the Kemalists had to deny and suppress any traces of the 
Orient because the West was constituted in its opposition to the Orient. Sayyid further 
argues: 
`To modernize, the Kemalists believed they had to Westernize; but paradoxically, the 
very nature of Westernization meant Orientalization. For, given that the identity of the 
West was constituted vis-a-vis the Orient, they had to continue to articulate an identity 
of the Orient to constitute themselves as Westem... '42 
Kemalism, by orienting itself toward the West, recreated the `East' concept; and in 
doing so rejected everything evoking the `East' from the veil to Arabic script and 
Ottoman customs. Muslim and the Middle Eastern societies were seen as 
representatives of technological and cultural backwardness. Muslims were still in the 
`dark ages' and the young Republic had to rid itself of these `traitors' and ideas. `The 
notion of an Islamic state was anathema to Mustafa Kemal and his supporters. They 
viewed such a state as the way to maintain the status quo and perpetuate the 
backwardness of Turkey'. 43 Despite a few instances of co-operation with these 
countries, Turkey never identified itself as an Eastern country or as part of or a friend of 
the Eastern world. Any attempt at easternising Turkey had to be destroyed pitilessly, 
because the East was the source of uncivilised, immature, irrational ideas. Thus many 
`bad' qualities were equated with Easterners like dirtiness, ugliness, or immaturity. 
In addition to the Kemalist Eastern perception, the memories of World War I still 
rankled in Turkish policy-makers' minds. For them, the Muslims had not 
helped the 
Ottoman war effort, but sold out to the `infidels'. This understanding, on one 
hand, 
deepened Turkey's Western orientation; on the other hand it created obsession with the 
backwardness of the East. Thus, for example, Turkey never considered itself a Middle 
Eastern country and did not make any effort to foster relations with these countries. 
44In 
41 Bobby Sayyid, `Sign 0' Times: Kaffirs and Infidels Fighting the Ninth Crusade', in Ernesto Laclau 
(ed. ), The Making of Political Identities, (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 264-286, p. 269 
42 Sated, 'Sign... ', p. 270. 
43 ad The Making..., p. 53 
`4 Henri J. 
i Barkey (cd. ), Reluctant Neighbour, Turkey's Role in the Middle East, (Washington: United 
States Institute of Peace, 1996); Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, (London: 
Pinter Publishers, 
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Barkey's words, `Turkey's relations with the Middle East has been accidental'. 45 Even 
agreements and pacts between Turkey and the regional powers were a result of Turkey's 
defensive considerations or were imposed by Western countries. For example, the 
Balkan, Sadabad and Baghdad pacts were mainly against non-regional powers like Italy, 
Germany or the Soviet Union. 46 The 1937 Sadabad Pact, for instance, was a good 
example of how Kemalist foreign policy distanced itself from the Middle East. 
Although some commentators interpreted Turkey's adherence to this Pact as a return to 
Pan-Islamism47, the pact was of a purely defensive nature, and helped to secure 
Turkey's eastern frontiers. Kemal's ultimate aim was to cut Turkey off from its oriental 
and Islamic past, hence several Islamic congresses held in the 1920s and 1930s received 
no support from Turkey. The Pact's principles were those of non-interference in each 
other's affairs rather than an example of regional co-operation and collaboration. 48 
When its security was in danger, Turkey proved willing to co-operate with its 
neighbours, yet this co-operation was ad hoc. Turkey's attitude toward these countries 
would worsen in the future as happened during the Suez crisis (1956) and the Algerian 
war of independence. With Turkey's increasing pro-Western policies it was perceived 
as a servant of the West especially by the Arab states. 49 To sum up, Turkey's Eastern 
perception and its hostile attitude toward the east and its region were the most important 
factors in forming its foreign policy toward such vast areas as the African, Asian, 
Islamic countries, the Arab world, the non-aligned movement, and even the Third 
World as a whole. As a result, some of Turkey's traditional rivals, notably Greece, 
managed to outwit it in the Asian, African and Arab arenas. so 
1991). 
45 Private notes from the interview with Barkey, in The New Millennium, Strategic Perspectives in the 
Middle East seminar, London, 19-20 October 1998. 
46 Gönlübol, Olaylarla..., p. 103. 
47 G. L. Lewis, Turkey, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1955), 115. 
48 Bilge Criss and Pinar Bilgin, `Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East', Journal (of MERIA), 
Issue 1, January 1997, p. 10-11. 
49 Selim Deringil, `Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatürk', in Clement H. Dodd (ed. ), Turkish Foreign 
Policy, New Prospects, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), p. 4. 
so Turkey's this policy cannot be explained by using only the Cold War circumstances. For example. 
Greek and Bulgarian foreign policies, although both are in the different blocks, were more successful than 
Turkey's foreign policy in using the Asian and African platforms. 
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The Caliphate Issue 
In addition to Turkey's eastern perception, the Caliphate problem left a long-lasting 
mark on Kemalist and Muslim minds. The abolition of the Caliphate in particular was a 
turning point, which not only showed the Kemalist attitude towards religion but also 
underlined its pragmatic nature. As discussed above, the Kemalist regime sought to 
remove the Islamic character of the state. However Kemal, until he was certain of his 
victory, never mentioned his secular aims. To the contrary, he gave religious speeches 
to gain the support of the Muslims in the British Empire. The Caliph was the religious 
leader of all Muslims and during the Hamidian era his political influence on the 
Muslims, especially in India, grew. Kemal and the Ankara government used this during 
the War of Independence War to get diplomatic, moral and financial support, and as 
discussed in Chapter II of this thesis Kemal's `Islamic foreign policy' perfectly worked 
and the Muslim support eased the nationalists' difficulties. This policy even continued 
in the early years of the republic as Aykan put it. `during the first years of the republic, 
religion was used as an instrument of propaganda to secure the material and moral 
support of Muslims abroad. '51 However, after the victory this policy was eliminated and 
Kemal started to implement his real policy toward the Muslim countries. After the 
abolition of the caliphate, relations were completely changed and the sympathy among 
the Muslims turned to an antagonism which was to last to the present day. Kemal's 
logic on abolishing the caliphate was that the caliphate might serve as a focal point for 
the opponents of the secular RepublicS2 and might invite external interventions. On 3 
March 1924 the Parliament voted to depose the Caliph Abduhnejid, to abolish the 
caliphate and to banish from the country all members of the house of Osman. Then the 
office of 'eyhul-ul Islam was abolished, and the religious schools were closed down. 
For the Kemalists this was a secular triumph53 , 
but its impact on Turkish foreign policy 
can not be labelled as victory. Hereafter, Turkey's hostile foreign policy towards the 
Arabs54 nourished the Arabs' misperception. During these years Turkey was very 
reluctant to improve relations and very strict on the problems between the Turks and 
Arabs while it was approaching western states with sympathy, or it was even looking 
51 Aykan, Ideology..., p. 47. 
52 Roderic H. Davison, Turkey, A Short History, second edition, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1991), 
129. 
53 Davison, Turkey..., p. 129. 
54 The Kemalist orthodoxy does not accept this term and claims that Kemalist foreign policy was against 
nobody, but I persistently use `anti-Arab p4olicy' or `anti-Eastern civilisation' policy terms, because the 
mind behind these policies was biased against the Arab and the Eastern culture. Therefore the policies 
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for friendly relations with its `arch-enemy' Greece. 55 For Kemalist foreign policy 
doctrine, the Arabs evoked Islam for the Turks and Turkey had to rid itself of Islamic 
and Arab elements from in foreign policy just like it did in domestic politics. Thus, as 
Vali pointed out, Turkey turned its back on the Middle East and especially on the Arab 
world in order to eliminate the Islamic and eastern foundations of the Ottoman Empire 
and `cut Turkey off from its oriental past. 56 Another minor reason was that Vahdettin, 
the exiled sultan and former caliph, was still active and was looking for a way to regain 
his position again. 57 
Kemalist Nationalism 
Kemal was also from the Turkist school in the Ottoman era, yet his Turkism was 
completely different from Enver Pasha's adventurist nationalism. His approach was 
close to Gökalp's and Akcura's Turkism, which advocated Turkification of society in a 
limited territory. For them the priority was to create a homogeneous society, while 
Enver aimed at founding a Turkic Empire including Central Asia. 58 With the dramatic 
failure of the Young Turks' nationalism, Kemal limited the scope of the Turkish nation 
concept. First of all he needed a homogeneous society that could be united by common 
values. Ironically the only common value for the majority of Anatolian society was the 
sunni sect of Islam. Even the Turkish language, or the Turkish race could not serve as a 
handy tool to create a Turkish nation. For example the Karaman Turkish Christians, the 
first Turks to have entered Anatolia, were forced to migrate to Greece in the 1920s, 
though they were Turkish and spoke only the Turkish language. On the other hand, the 
Muslim Greeks who lived in the Aegean islands were invited to Turkey, although they 
were Greek and could not speak the Turkish language. 59 Similarly, the Gagavuz Turks 
were `pure' Turkish, but Christian. Moreover, their language was Turkish. However, 
when the Gagavuz Turks demanded a mass migration to Turkey, Turkey refused their 
p5roduced by this understanding unavoidable would be anti-Arab, anti-Islam or sometimes anti-Eastern. 
Alexandris, `Turkish... ', p. 157. 
56 Vaii , Bridge, p. 
310; Lewis, Modern, p. 133. 
57For example he wrote a letter to Seyh of Ezher demanding a place to continue his political activities in 
22 March 1926. For full text of the letter see Orhan Kologlu, 'Vahdettin'in Hilafetle Ilgili Son Mektubu'. 
(Vahdettin's the Latest Letter About Caliphate), Tarih ve Toplum, June 1998, Vol. 29, No. 174, ss. 25- 
26; Orhan Kologlu, Türk 4Cagda4laWasi 1919 - 1938, Islam'a Etki 
Islam'dan Tepki, (Turkish 
Modernisation 1919 - 1938, The Effect to Islam and Islam 
Reaction), (Istanbul: Boyut Yayinlan, 1995). 
58 Ziya Gokalp, The Principles of Turkism, (Leiden: 1968); Ziya GOkaalp, Turkish Nationalism and 
Western Civilazation, (London: 1959); Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era, 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992); Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, Westport, Connecticut: 
Hyperion Press, 1950). 
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wish. The reason was their religion. 60 A mass Christian immigration would damage 
cultural harmony and unity in Turkey. On the other hand, the same state accepted 
millions of migrants from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece although they were not 
Turkish and they were not able to speak Turkish. Kemal's aim was clear: to find a 
common culture and transform it to a Turkish nation. To do so he targeted the Sunni 
Muslims and accepted them as the core of the newly projected-Turkish nation. That is to 
say, Kemal's nationalism was based on a common culture, not on a common race. The 
1935 RPP Programme defined Kenialist nationalism understanding as `the nation is the 
political unit composed of citizens bound together by the bonds of language, culture and 
ideal. '61 From this perspective the common religion and language provided a common 
culture to reach the common ideals, or the Kenialist ideals. 
However, despite the unifying character of Islam, there were many minorities inside 
Anatolia: Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Protestants and other sects of Christianity, 
Jews, Sunni and Alevi Muslims and other Muslim sects. In addition to the religious 
diversity Anatolia was home to many races such as Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, 
Georgians, Arabs etc. Therefore the first task was to punish them if they rejected their 
new national identity. The second phase in creating a nation-state was to re-write 
Turkish history. Because Atatürk sought to establish a secular Turkish state, he ignored 
the Islamic past of the Turks and claimed that the Turks had been civilised before 
converting to Islam. For him, Islam, like an epidemic disease had spoiled Turkish 
civilisation. Atatürk not only rejected the religion but also the other things, which 
reminded of the Ottomans, like the Ottoman language. The Arabic script was changed 
into the Latin one, and many old Ottoman words were replaced by `pure Turkish words' 
(Öz Türkce). 62 All these were parts of the Kemalist Turkification project. 
Kemalist nationalism had a key role in shaping the Kemalist foreign policy. First, it was 
not aggressive and irredentist. Atatürk saw nationalism as a matter for the Anatolian 
Ottoman subjects, not all Turkic peoples. 
59 Oran, Atatürk..., p. 158. 
60 Oran, Atatlirk..., p. 159. 
61 CHP 1935 Parti Programs (RPP 1935 Party Programme), Kimm 1 (Part 1), Madde 2 (Article 2), 
Ankara: 1935. 
62 Atatürk even claimed that all languages in the world emerged from Turkish (dil teorisi). All these 
efforts can be considered as a part of the campaign to create a Turkish nation 
based on secular values. For 
the language campaign: S. Engin, Kemalizm Inkilabinin Prensipleri, (The Principles of Kemalism 
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`Mustafa Kemal's strict territorial definition of Turkey on his firm rejection of Pan- Turkism virtually brought to an end all adventures and engagements outside Anatolia. With the establishment of the republic, the focus of the country shifted away from 
empire to nation-state. 63 
Therefore, Kemalist nationalist perspective contributed to the relations with those 
countries that had Turkish minorities, like Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Greece, China or 
Iraq as Atatürk distanced Turkey from the Turkish diaspora in the neighbouring 
countries arguing that Turkey should not meddle in the other countries' internal 
problems. 64 Also Atatürk's peaceful nationalist language contributed to regional order 
in the Middle East and the Balkans and made co-operation possible. 65 On the other 
hand, the policy of using the external threat to unite different groups increased Turkey's 
scepticism towards the West. 
Republicanism 
Republicanism is one of the officially - declared Kemalist principles, (alte ok, six 
arrows). In domestic politics it shows a radical shift from a monarchic political structure 
to a Republican system. Republican system does not have to mean a democratic system 
and for Mustafa Kemal the most important priority was stability and the reforms while 
some scholars, like Ataöv, claimed that Atatürk's republic meant a democratic state. 66 
In foreign policy Republicanism means a complete departure from the imperial legacy. 
According to the imperial mind the main elements of national power were the size of 
the territory and the population. The Ottoman Turkists, Islamists and Westernsts had 
seen foreign policy through these values. For the republicanist Kemalist approach, the 
priorities were a homogeneous (Turkified) population, a strong national economy, a 
secular, Western-styled State based on the nation-state values and a relatively small 
territory, which can be defended by the Turkish armies. Therefore, as shown earlier 
Revolution), Vol. I, (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1939), pp. 146-167. 
63 Gökay and Langhorne, Turkey..., pp. 4-5. 
64 Rouleau, `Turkey:... ', P. 39. 
65 Certainly, the main reason of friendly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union was real political 
interests and security concerns. As a relatively small country Turkey had no power to implement a pan- 
Turkist or any other kind of irrendentist foreign policy. However, the significant contribution of the 
Kenialist nationalism to the relations cannot be ignored. Atatürk even sometimes avoided from using the 
`Turkist' term not to provoke the other states and not to cause a misperception: `When asked "Are you a 
Turkist" Atatürk replied "I am Turkish, that's all. " : Kemal Ariburnu, Atatärk'ten Anilar (Memoirs from 
Atatark), (Istanbul: Inkilap Kitabevi Yayin, 1998), p. 214. 
66 Ti ' ya Ata 
, 
'The Principles of Kemalism', Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1980- 
1981, Vol. XX, p. 29. 
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while Atatürk saw Lausanne as a victory, Islamists and the Ottomanists claimed that it 
was a total defeat. 
Etatism 
Etatism is one of the officially declared Kemalist principles, and shows how Kemalists' 
stressed the state's role in development. 67 In foreign policy terms, this meant full 
independence, and economic independence was viewed as indispensable to such 
independence. 68 With the effect of scepticism, etatism determined new Turkey's 
economic policies. In this context, most foreign companies in Turkey were nationalised 
and the state tried to replace the minorities and private sector's role in the economy. The 
main assumptions behind these policies were the regime's mistrust of these factors. For 
the Kemalists the regime was still fragile hence it had to be protected against foreign 
elements (protectionism). They also thought that the Turkish private sector was still 
fledgling and thus it could not be an engine for Kemalist Westernisation. Although 
etatism was borrowed from the socialists, Kemal was not very rigid on this principle. 
On the contrary, he only in a later period turned to etatism when realised that relying 
largely on private sector for industrial development was not enough and refused to make 
etatism a dogmatic principle but rather saw it as a compulsory tool to develop the 
country. Boratav claims that one of the important factors caused etatist policies was 
1929 world economic crisis. He further argues that etatism was a term without any clear 
content until the second half of 1932 and apart from public investment in railways, and 
also there was no significant state activity in the productive field, and public 
intervention in the economy was carefully limited to the area of foreign trade. 69 
However, the Kemalists after Atatürk used etatism against the people and the private 
sector in order to protect their privileges. 70 
67 Korkut Boratav, Türkiye'de Devletcilik, (Etatism in Turkey), (Istanbul: Gercek Yayincilik, 1974); also 
see Z. Y. Herslag, `Atatiirk's Etatism', in Jacob M. Landau (ed), Atatürk and the Modernization of 
Turkey, (Leiden: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), pp. 171-180; Ilhan Tekeli and Selim Illdn, Uygulamaya 
Gecerken Türldye'de Devlecili in Olusumu, (The Formation of Statism in Turkey When It was 
Realising), (Ankara: ODTU Yayinlan, 1982). 
68 Ince, p. 10; Korkut Boratav, `Kemalist Economic Policies and Etatism', in Kazancigil and Ozbudun, 
(eds. ), Ataturk, Founder of a Modern State, (London: Hurst&Company, 1997), pp. 165-190. 
69 Korlcut Boratav, `Kemalist Economic Policies and Etatism', in Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun 
(eds. ), Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State, (London: Leiden: C. Hurst & Co., 1997), p. 172. 
70 tnönü's Varlik Vergisi policy can be considered a good example of exploitation of Kenialist etatism and 
nationalism. Later the leftist - Kemalists fu ther claimed that Kemal was a good socialist giving etatism 
as an evidence for his leftism. 
114 
Populism71 
Kemalist populism did not mean democracy or the people's self-rule although some 
Kemalists, like Ataöv claims that Kemalism's ultimate aim was a democracy with a 
populist dimension: `He (Kemal) added a populist dimension to the democratic concept 
of the French Revolution. '72 However, despite the rhetoric populism was a reflection of 
a classless society dream, rather than a democratic concept. As vividly seen in the 1935 
RPP Programme, on the one hand populism was described as `the source of the will and 
sovereignty is the nation', on the other hand it further continued in a contradictory 
direction: 
`It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic, not as 
composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions 
according to the requirements of the division of labour for the individual and social life 
of the Turkish people. The aims of our party (... ) are to secure social order and solidarity 
instead of class conflict, and to establish harmony of interests. ''' 
To summarise, in the words of Akural `in dealing with Kemalist ideas on populism, one 
must distinguish between political rhetoric and political practice... Practical populism 
was a luxury that the Kemalists could not accord, especially while engaged in the kind 
of unpopular reforms which Atatürk had in mind. '74 The first function of populism was 
legitimising the regime. The traditional legitimising sources - the Sultan and Islam - 
were negated by Kemal who declared that `the voice of the people is the voice of the 
God'. 75 By using the nation's power in the name of the people Kemal legitimised his 
regime although in fact there was no popular support for the Kemalist regime. As such, 
it was an essentially domestic tool whose impact on Kemalist foreign policy was 
limited. 
71 For populism see Ismail Arar, Atatürk'ün Halkgilik Programi ve Halkcilik Dkesinin Tarihcesi, 
(Atatürk's Populism Programme and the History of the Populism Principle), (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 
1963); Ilhan Tekeli, `Turkiye'de Halkcilik Ideolojisinin Evrimi', (The Evolution of the Principle of 
Populism in Turkey), Topium ve Bilim, No. 6-7, Summer-Autumn 1978, pp. 65-71; Tanyol, Atatürk ve 
Halkcilik (Atatürk and Populism), (Ankara: Ti rkiye Is Bankasi Kültür Yayinlari, 1984); Zafer Toprak, 
`Halkcilik Ideolojisinin Olusumu', in Atatürk Döneminin Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarihiyle 11gili 
Sorunlar Sempozyumu, 14-16 January 1977, (Istanbul: 1977), pp. 13-31. 
72 Ata6V, `The Principles... ', p. 30. 
73 RPP 1935 Programme (with Kili's English, Kemalism..., p. 78. 
74 Sabri M. Akurel, `Kenialist Views on Social Change', in Jacob M. Landau (ed. ), Ataturk and the 
Modernization of Turkey, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), p. 137-140. 
75 quoted in Lewis, The Emergence, p. 466. 
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Scepticism 
Scepticism of course is not a declared Kemalist principle, and most academics tend to 
overlook its importance in the Kemalist revolution. However, the first and perhaps the 
most important characteristic of Kemalism and Kemalist foreign policy was its sense of 
insecurity in the face of tough opposition. 76 The Kenialist regime felt insecure about its 
political ability to maintain power both within Turkey and in the outside world. Ismet 
(Inönü) Pasha's speech to the army officers in the Inönü Wars clearly shows the fear: 
`You must know the situation you are in. The Padisah (Sultan) is your enemy. The 
entire Western world is your enemy. Listen, don't tell anybody, but the Turkish nation 
is also your enemy. They think you are the reason of the war. '" 
Even during the years when Kemal had no real opposition and competition, this 
insecurity continued and deeply affected foreign policy. George Kennan has argued in 
case of the Soviet Union that insecurity could well have caused an activist, perhaps an 
aggressive foreign policy. 78 In the Turkish case, insecurity evolved into a permanent 
scepticism towards the West and foreigners in general, the former Ottoman subjects, 
neighbours, minorities, religious groups, liberals and all opposition groups. More 
specifically Kemalist Turkish scepticism can be considered the result of three factors: a) 
the Ottoman experience; b) Turkey's limitations and the Kemalist regime's lack of 
confidence; and finally c) European biased attitude towards the Turks. 
The Ottoman Experience: With the collapse of the Empire many Ottoman foreign 
policy principles were passed to Kemalist Turkey. These included a) Turkish aloofness; 
b) Paradoxical Westernism; c) Scepticism towards the West; d) Scepticism towards 
minorities; d) Russia as primary threat. The collapse of the Empire generated structural 
and long-lasting fears in Turkey. It was believed that the Turks were alone, and that 
they had no friend but the Turks. There were no Muslim friends, no Turkish world, and 
no Western friends at all. From this perspective, Turkey had no real friend in either the 
East or West. In addition to worries of the West, the new ruling class believed that 
enemies, hostile countries seeking to destroy it, surrounded Turkey. Not only the 
76 Kemalist scholars saw scepticism as a virtue and positive element of Kemalism. Kürkcüoglu names 
`scepticism' principle as `no total confidence on friends and the outer world' and further continues: 
`While he (Kemal) never closed all doors to dialogue even with the enemy, Atatürk, never placed too 
much confidence in friends, or the outer world as a whole, for that matter. ' 
Omer Kürkcüoglu, `An 
Analysis of Atatdrk's Foreign Policy, 1919 - 1938, TYIR, 1980 - 1981, Vol. XX, pp. 135-141. 
" Ulus 17 May 1968 and Taner Timur, Türk Devrimi ve Sonrasi, (Ankara- Dogan Yayinevi, 1971), p. 
26. 
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British, French and Russians, but also the former ottoman subjects, such as the Greeks, 
Armenians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Serbs and other neighbours, like Iran, were against 
Turkey. During the First World War and the War of Independence the Armenians and 
the Greeks helped the allied forces against Turkey. Even the `Muslim brothers', the 
Arabs, were seen as collaborating against the Turks. According to the Turkish 
nationalists, in First World War the Arabs, with the British, had murdered thousands of 
Muslim Turks while the Turks were defending the holy sites, like Mecca and Medina; 
hence they were not brothers or friends but traitors. Even the end of the war could not 
put an end to Turkey's sense of isolation. The situation in Turkey was alarming during 
the 1920s and the 1930s. Therefore even after Lausanne, security remained at the top of 
the agenda. Almost all-great European powers were neighbours of Turkey79 at a time 
when tensions in Europe were increasing. Nazi Germany's and Italy's aggressive 
policies raised the spectre of a possible war in Europe. On top of it Turkey confronted a 
direct great menace: the Soviet Union. The military gap between these two neighbours 
was unbridgeable. Despite good relations during the 1920s Turkey perceived the Soviet 
Union as a primary threat to its territorial integrity and independence. In brief, Turkey 
was alone, and had to overcome from its security, political and economic problems. 
Turkey's and the Regime's Limitations: The second and third reasons of Kemalist 
insecurity and scepticism were Turkey's economic, military and political limitations, 
and the regime's weaknesses. After a string of continuing catastrophic wars, the already 
fragile Turkish economy had been further weakened. Turkey was still an agricultural 
country and economically dependent on the European powers. Only 155 industrial 
establishments employed more than 100 workers by the tally of the 1927 census. 80 Even 
agriculture was largely undeveloped and based on primitive methods. Worst of all the 
1929 economic crisis badly hit the growing Turkish economy. Exports plummeted and 
Turkey confronted dire financial difficulties. At the political level, Turkey was 
vulnerable to international crises due to its geographical position, and felt obliged to 
devote a large part of its budget to defence expenditure. Apart from these, the inherently 
fragile political system and lack of external and internal political support worsened the 
situation for the regime and made it more radical and autocratic. In this framework, 
78 George F. Kennan (X), `The Sources of Soviet Conduct', Foreign Affairs, 25, July 1947, pp. 566-582, 
79 The Soviet Union in East, Britain in Iraq and Cyprus, France in Syria, Italy in some of the Aegean 
Islands (Oniki Islands and Meis Island). 
80 Davison, Turkey, p. 140. 
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Kemal thought that Turkey had to be more careful than any other country to protect its 
integrity and independence, and should be aware of an irredentist, aggressive foreign 
policy. Therefore Kemal's first priority was to strengthen the regime and the Turkish 
economy and military. Thus it can be said that the ultimate aims of Kemal's foreign 
policy were dictated by the internal reforms and the need to protect the country's 
integrity and political independence. That is to say, Turkey directed all its energies to 
domestic political and economic reconstruction, while foreign policy was perceived as a 
supportive element of this reconstruction. As a result Turkey's insecurity determined a 
sceptical, pacifist, survival policy. 
The European Biased Attitude: As seen in the Independence War, the European 
attitude towards the Turks was far from friendly. Old habits die hard. Despite the 
sustained secularisation of Turkish political life, Europeans continued to view the Turks 
through the old religious prejudices. 81 For them, the Turks remained the `terrible Turks' 
and there was no place for them in Europe. Most of the Europeans apparently agreed 
with Captain John Still: `... morally speaking, where the Turks rules there is Asia. '82 
Naturally, Europe's unfriendly approach towards the Turks created its counterpart in 
Turkey, where not only the regime, but also all the people became sceptical about the 
West. 83 
Kemalist Western Scepticism 
The first effect of Kemalist scepticism was on Turkish-Western relations. Despite its 
enthusiasm for being European, Kemalist scepticism vis-a-vis the West was a 
significant factor in shaping Turkey's relations with the West. The ultimate aim of the 
Kemalist governments had been to be an equal part of the Western world, yet they were 
aware that the West did not consider Turkey an equal member of the 'family'. The 
Ottoman experience had proved that the Turks could not trust the Europeans. Not only 
Russia but almost all the great European powers had undermined the Empire by using 
81 Inalcik and Söylemez argue that the West has always tended to see Turks as foreigners while Turks 
have identified themselves as Western: Halil Inalcik, `The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modem 
Europe', in Kemal Karpat (ed. ), The Ottoman State and Its Place in the World, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1974), p. 54; Yuksel Soylemez, `The Turks in Europe: A Historic, Cultural and Diplomatic Perspective', 
in Erol, Manisali (ed. ), Turkey's Place in Europe, (Istanbul: Logos, 1988). 
82 John Still, A Prisoner in Turkey (London: 1920), cited in James Pettifer, The Turkish Labyrinth, 
Atatnrk and the New Islam, (London: Viking, 1997), p. 51. 
83 For the role of European attitude see: Sedat Laciner, `Türkiye Avrupa ili lerinde Kültür ve 
Medeniyet: Tarihsel ve Ideolojik Kökenler' (Culture and Civilasation in Turkey-Europe Relations: 
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economic pressure, minorities or military pressures. Western policies toward Turkey 
during the First World War alleviated the mistrust between the two sides. Henceforth, 
the Turkish people and state were obsessed with the idea that the European powers 
wished to remove them from Europe and eventually from history altogether. They, 
therefore, regarded all European actions with reserve and suspicion. Kemal when 
explained the reasons of the failure in the First World War he accused the West: our 
nation's fault is to have manifested over-confidence in the honesty of Europe. '84 
Similarly, many years later, in 1937, Kemal expressed his scepticism related to Britain 
and the West in general to visiting Metaxas, Prime Minister of Greece: 
,... You and we, are both friends of the English... You say that England will not let 
others touch us (Turkey). All right. But (England) may think of taking up a convenient 
attitude towards those who would touch us... (England) may show such tolarance for the 
purpose of winning time and more freedom in its operations by engaging us with a large 
enemy force. In other words, it may tolerate an enemy landing in our shores. Didn't it 
act like that towards Ethiopia?... We took into consideration even such a probability. 
We have taken measures in this direction. That was the essence of our recent 
manoeuvres in the Aegean... ' ss 
That is to say Turkey's westernisation was in spite of the West as its republicanism was 
in spite of its own people. 
Internal Threats and Foreign Policy-Domestic Politics Relations 
As discussed above, the Turkish Republic inherited the fears and obsessions of the 
Ottoman Empire. The external threats were the West, Turkey's neighbours and the 
Soviet Union. Yet, from the regime's standpoint there were internal menaces as well, 
like minorities, liberals and radical Muslims. As it saw it, the external forces were using 
these groups to undermine Turkey from the inside, therefore the Republic had to be 
aware of these groups. In Kemalist ideology, the minority groups and democratisation 
were the most effective tools of the Western countries against Turkey, since these 
constituted the weakest side of the Turkish state. Thus, homogenisation of the country, 
with its attendant secularisation, became the most important priority of the Kemalist 
governments. 
Historical and Ideological Roots), Liberal Dü ünce, Vol. 4, No. 13, Winter 1999, pp. 39-57. 
84 Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk (Speech), Vol. III (Documents), (Istanbul: Turk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, n. d. ), 
p. 1185. 
85 Bilal N. $imsir, `Atatürk'iin Yabanci Develet Adamlarryla Görü. ýmeleri, Yedi Belge (1930-1937)', 
(Atatilrk's Meetings with the Foreign Statesmen, Seven Documents), Belleten, Vol. XLV/1, No. 177, 
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The Sevres Syndrome and the Role of the `Minorities'" 
Since a new Sevres-type arrangement was the worst thing the new Republic could face, 
the status of the minorities remained one of the most important issues on the Turkish 
foreign policy agenda. Like the CUP, Kemal considered the minorities one of the most 
dangerous threats for the unity and independence of the state. As he saw it, the Empire's 
substantial Christian populations, formerly an economic and financial asset, had became 
a potential weapon in the hands of foreign powers. 87 He also viewed the various 
minorities - the Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Macedonians and Arabs - as acting in a 
disloyal, even traitorous way towards the Ottoman Empire. As he put it: 
We are a nation which was late and negligent in applying the idea of nationality... our 
nation has suffered because our nationality was ignored. Various nationalities within the Ottoman Empire saved themselves by embracing the nationalist faith and by the force 
of their nationalist ideal. We understood what we were, that we were a nation that was different and foreign to them after we forced from among them. They insulted and humiliated us when our power declined. We understood that our fault was to have 
forgotten what we are. If we want the world show us respect, first let us show respect 
towards our own character and nationality... let us be aware that a nation which has not 
found its national identity is a prey to other nations. " 
According to this approach, non-Turkish subjects in Turkey were potential `traitors'. 
Yet the foremost problem was that nobody knew what the term `Turk' meant. Mustafa 
Kemal knew that he had to create a `non-existent' Turkish nation. After severing the 
connection with Islam and the Ottoman past, this was a daunting task, because Turks 
had identified themselves with religion and Ottoman culture. Moreover, even the new 
Turkish state contained numerous ethnic groups with different languages, religious, and 
historical backgrounds and the exchange population with Greece meant a growing 
dominance of Muslims in Turkey, the diversity remained still huge. 89 Inönü, Atatürk's 
successor, summarised the official position in 1925: 
`We are frankly nationalists ... and nationalism 
is our only factor of cohesion. In the face 
of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. We must turkify the 
January 1981, pp. 191-192. (with Kwrkcuoglu's English: `An Analysis of ... ), p. 137. 86 According to the founding agreements, like Lausanne, there is no legal minority in Turkey, except the 
Greek Turkish people. Also the minority groups strictly refuse to being recognised as minority, even 
Kurdish, Jewish, Christian peoples. When we say minority we do not mean legal minorities, but people 
who are not majority in population and in policy-making process. 
87 F. A. K. Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy, Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878-1888, (Istanbul: 
The ISIS Press, 1996), p. 2. 
88 Mustafa Kemal's Speech to the Youth of Konya quoted in Kili, Kemalism, p. 82. 
89 Ingvar Svanberg, Kazak Refugees in Turkey, A Study of Cultural Persistence and Social Change, 
(Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1989), pp. 55-57. 
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inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks 
or `le turquisme'. '90 
From this perspective there was only one nation - Turkish - even though there were 
many ethnic groups. In the 1924 constitution, for example, the term `citizenship' had 
been equated with Turkishness. 91 In 1930 Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), the Minister of 
Justice, declared that non-Turks had no rights in Turkey: 
`In my opinion, this country is Turkish. Non-Turks have only one right in this Turkish homeland: to be servant, to be a slave. '92 
All people within Turkey's borders were Turkish from the time of their birth, and their 
problem could not be the business of any other nation. From this perspective no country 
could interfere in the affairs of Turkey's ethnic or religious groups in Turkey. 
According to Kemalist understanding, if any country tried to muddle in this issue, that 
country would become an open enemy of Turkey's unity and stability. Hence Turkish 
governments perceived the Western protestations about human rights and minority 
issues as another attempt to divide and destroy Turkey. Thus, as will be seen in the post- 
Cold War era, the Kurdish issue and human right issues became the most important 
factors in Turkey's relations with both the Western countries and Turkey's neighbours, 
and this also determined many issues in Turkey's foreign policy leaving no room for 
any change or manoeuvre. 
Liberals and the Radical Muslims 
In addition to the minority issue and external threats, for the Kemalist regime, there was 
another threat: the lack of sufficient support. As noted by Eisenstadt, the revolution was 
undertaken by army officials with strong and ideological tendencies which were against 
the political ideas of the low and the middle classes, who moreover were not allowed 
autonomous access to the new political centre. 93 On top of this, the mistrust, if not 
antagonism towards some ethnic and political groups, such as the liberals, Kurds and 
radical Islamic groups which it perceived as internal enemies. Kemal, though aiming at 
90 Bilal $imýir, Ingiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye'de `Kürt Sorunu', 1924-1938, ('The Kurdish Problem' in 
the British Documents) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basunevi / Turkish History House Publication, 
1991), p. 58. 
91 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question, (Lanham: Carnegie Corporation, 
1998), p. 10. 
I Tuncay, Türkiye...,, p. 301. 
93 S. N. Eisenstadt, `The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective', in All Kazancigil and Ergun 
pzbudun (eds. ), Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State, (London: Hurst&Company, 1997), p. 138. 
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a Western - style democratic capitalist state, viewed liberal democracy as constraining 
his ambitious reforms, at least for a while. 94 Beside, for the Jacobean westernists, liberal 
westernists were unrealistic, even gullible and naive who could easily fall for the 
machinations of the revolution's enemies: foreign powers, minorities and radical 
Muslims. Similarly, from the Kemalist perspective, radical Muslims were `sick people' 
who sought to take Turkey into the dark ages and who could not differentiate between 
right and wrong. They had therefore to be manipulated, directed and, if necessary, 
destroyed. For instance, in his speech, Kemal labelled the only opposition party the 
Republican Progressive Party covering the religious, Kurdish and the liberal opposition 
as traitor: 
`... Facts and events have proved that the programme of the republican Progressive Party 
has been the work emanating from the brain of traitors. The Party became the refuge 
and the point of support for reactionary and rebellious elements. They worked in order 
to facilitate in our country the application of plans which had been hatched by our 
enemies for the ann ilation of the new Turkish State, the young Turkish Republic. '95 
Given its initial limited appeal, Kemalism had to adopt an autocratic approach in order 
to survive. Moreover, for the Kemalists, democracy and liberal values had been used as 
a `Trojan horse' to weaken Ottoman power and could be used again against the Turkish 
Republic. Democracy could also help the radical Muslims who still hoped to re- 
establish an Islamic state like the Ottoman Empire and who were seen as the deadliest 
threat to Kemalist Turkey and Turkey's unity. Islam was thus treated as a dangerous 
current which, though impossible to eradicate, had to be placed firmly under state 
control. 96 The Kemalist prescription for this issue was similar to the one for the Kurdish 
issue: to create `a state-Islam' and eventually demolish religious influence in society. 
The Seyh Said's revolt of 1925 directed against both secularism and the authority of the 
central government turned these fears to an `Islam-phobia'. 97 According to the 
government, the Kurdish Islamists were used to block Turkey's interests in Northern 
Iraq by the British. As a result, the Kemalist state used secularism and unity of the 
94 Ahmad, The Making..., p. 56. 
95 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, (Ankara: Basbakanlik 
Basimevi, 1981), p. 735. 
96 Heath Lowly, 'Challenges to Turkish Democracy in the Decade of the Nineties', Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. V, Fall 1996, pp. 89-11, p. 93. 
97 Ward, Turkey, p. 15. For Seyh Said revolt see also: Ugur Mumcu, Kürt - Islam Ayaklanmasi 1919- 
1925, (Kurdish - Islamic Revolt), (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1992); K. 
Öke, Musul ve Kurdistan 
Sorunu 1918-1926, (Musul and Kurdistan Issue), (Ankara: Turk Kiiltürü Ara rma Enstitüsü 1992) and 
Genelkurmay Ba*anhgx, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar, 1924-1938, (The Revolts in the 
Turkish Republic), (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi - Turkish Headquarter of the General Staff, 1972) 
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country to suppress the democratic and cultural demands of different political and ethnic 
groups. These two terms were useful for the ruling class, especially the army, to prevent 
public participation in the policy-making process. 
Methodological Principles and Attitudes of Kemalist Foreign Policy 
Kemalist foreign policy's ideological background inevitably determined its other 
characteristics and methodology. Thus, owing to Kemal's authoritarianism he readily 
imposed his pacifist, isolationist, legalist, pragmatic, and `realist' foreign policy. 98 
Pacifism & Isolationism 
The First World War and the War of Independence left Turkey a weak and poor 
country. The economy had collapsed, the treasury was empty, and the army and the 
people were tired of fighting. Under these circumstances the last thing Kemal needed 
was a war which could abort his reforms. That is to say, Kenialist foreign policy was 
largely an offspring of the internal aims and it did not have irredentist, aggressive and 
imperialist aims. Thus, its most important priority was the preservation of the status quo 
and peace, 99 `The most important watchwords of Kemalist foreign policy were "peace at 
home and peace abroad (Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh)"'loo and this principle has 
constituted the keystone of Turkish foreign policy. '0' This did not mean an intention to 
defend peace in the region and in the world. Such objectives were well beyond Turkey's 
reach; and beside Turkey was not interested in making the world a safer or more 
peaceful place as were universal ideologies like socialism. 102 `Peace at home, peace 
abroad' symbolised the hope for a peaceful international environment so as to gain an 
98 Different scholars add more Kemalist principles and `basic elements'. For Kürkciioglu for instance 
main elements of Atatürk's foreign policy are a. Artful use of Tactics, b. the usefulness of personal 
contacts, c. Dialogue even with the enemy, d. No total confidence on friends and the outer world, e. 
Discreteness, £ Honour and dignity, g. Difference between personal and government affairs (continuity of 
foreign policy - No dependence upon passing individuals: Kiirkcüoglu, 
`An Analysis... ', pp. 135-141. 
Berke Dilan adds more principles like anti-imperialism, rationalism: Hasan Berke Dilan, Atat irk 
Donemi T firkiye'nin Dis Politikasi, 1923-1939, (Turkey's Foreign Policy in Atatürk Period), (Istanbul: 
Alfa, 1998, pp. 6-7. 
99 Abdülahat Akgin, Atatiirk'ün Did Politika Ilkeleri ve Diplomasisi, Dcinci Kisim, (Atatürk's Foreign 
Policy Principles and Diplomacy, the Second Part), (Istanbul: Inkilap ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1966), p. 1. 
100 Kili, Kemalism, p. 113. 
101 Metin Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats, Guardians of the National Security and Modernization 
of Turkey, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press 1976), p. 299 Roderic H. Davison, 
`Peaceful 
Foreign Relations: An Achievement of Atatürk', AÜSBF Dergisi, Nos. 1-4, January-December 1981, 
Vol. XXXVI, p. 167. 
' 02 Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, A Case Study in National Development, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 163. 
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important respite to implement the reforms. In short, the first feature of Kemalist 
foreign policy was its pacifism, 103 and as will be seen in the next chapter, Turkey 
always sought to solve its disputes with the other states through pacific means. '°4 
For Mustafa Kemal Turkey was a weak country that should avoid a pan-Turkist, pan- 
Islamist, Ottomanist or even internationalist-activist foreign policy. He qualified these 
approaches as `illusions which are a long way from any practical value' and which 
`aroused fear and anxiety in the rest of the world' los In his Great Speech Kemal 
criticised these approaches: 
`To unite different nations under one common name, to give these different elements 
equal rights, subject them to the same conditions and thus found a mighty state is a brilliant and attractive ideal; but it is a misleading one. It is an unrealisable aim... There is nothing in history to show how the policy of Pan-Islamism could have succeeded or how it could have found a basis for its realisation on this earth. "°6 
As early as 1921 Kemal argued that `let us recognise our own limits'. 107 For him, 
Ottomanism, pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism were adventurist foreign policy courses 
which had undermined Turkey's security by rising fears about Turkey's foreign policy 
aims. Kemal underlined the importance of security in foreign policy making: `In 
formulation of our foreign policy we pay particular attention to safety and security of 
our country and to our capacity to protect our rights against any aggression. ' 108 
From this perspective, Turkey was not able to pursue any aggressive or irredentist 
foreign policy, nor could it even entertain such ideas, which were bound to raise fears 
and doubts about its intentions. Turkey was surrounded by former Ottoman provinces or 
historical enemies of the Ottoman Empire, and this kind of aims might provoke these 
countries and might risk Turkey's sovereignty and unity. Hence, Turkey had to be kept 
small and should convince other countries of its goodwill - the only means to maintain 
its independence. Henceforth Turkey had two foreign policy aims: territorial integrity 
103 Kili, Kemalism, p. 113. 
1°4 Metin Tamkoc, `Turkey's Quest for Security Through Defensive Alliances', Turkish Yearbook of 
International Relations, 1961, p. 10. 
105 Vladimir I. Danilov, `Kemalism and World Peace', in Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun (eds. ), 
Atatiirk, Founder of a Modern State, (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), p. 110. 
106 Atatürk, Speech..., p. 379. 
107 Kinross, Ataturk..., p. 458. 
108 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk'ün Sdylev ve Demerleri, (Atatürk's Speeches and Statements), 
Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basunevi, 1961), p. 356. 
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and peace to complete the reforms. 109 
Legalist Foreign Policy 
The second characteristic of Kemalist foreign policy was its legalism. Kemalist Turkey 
chose a legalistic approach to diplomatic disputes since 1923 for two main reasons. 
Domestically, the Kemalist ruling-elite had no public support for their secularist, 
nationalist policies. They were mainly civil and military bureaucrats, who were opposed 
by people, religious leaders, royal family and even external powers. Under these 
circumstances the only thing they could rely on was the law. They had to be legalist to 
protect themselves. Thus, since the days of the CUP, a hidden coalition emerged 
between the Westernists, namely civil bureaucrats, intellectuals and military officers. 
Similarly, they believed that Turkey's foreign policy had to be legalist. Also, it was 
widely believed that weaker states were the main beneficiaries from international law 
and Turkey was a relatively weak and small state compared with the Soviet Union, the 
British Empire and other imperial powers surrounding it. Thus Turkey refrained from 
using military force to solve external problems, even border issues. For example in 
Hatay and the straits problems Turkey always looked for a legal solution, although the 
international environment was very suitable for a unilateral resolution of the problems. 
For the policy-makers Turkey was part of the civilised world and this meant written 
agreements. As they saw it, one of the main reasons for the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire was its `aggressive' foreign policy. Also, Turkey's legalist foreign policy was a 
natural extension of its pacifist orientation, as it was hoped that Turkey could guarantee 
its territorial integrity and independence by achieving an equal membership in the 
European state-system and getting support of international law. Thus, in terms of the 
settlement of disputes with foreign powers, Turkish diplomacy was marked by great 
reliance upon political and legal procedures of pacific settlement. 
11° 
Another practical reason for this policy was that Turkey wanted solutions to be long 
lasting. Thus Turkey became the first state to use legal methods for the revision of post- 
109 This Kemalist approach brought concessions and wanes in the foreign policy aims, yet 
for Fukuyama, 
Atatürk's foreign policy understanding is a good example for a `power maximising 
foreign policy'. He 
argued that Kemal by growing smaller guaranteed Turkey's power 
in the long run: Francis Fukuyama, 
The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Penguin Books, 1992), pp. 
256-257. 
110 Metin Tamkoc, The Warrior..., p. 303. 
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war agreementsi ll though other defeated states, like Germany, chose an aggressive 
revisionist foreign policy. This policy continued during the 1920s and the 1930s and it 
succeeded in changing some parts of the Lausanne Treaty. The legalist foreign policy 
mainly used bilateral and multilateral diplomatic negotiations, international agreements, 
international organisations and bodies, conciliation etc. Even after the Atatürk era, 
legalism, together with pacifism, remained an unalterable feature. 
Non-Alignment Policy and Desire for Neutrality 
Despite its pacifism and legalism, the third feature of Kemalist foreign policy was its 
obsession with internal and external sovereignty. As a result of the Ottoman experience, 
equality with the European powers and sovereignty was put at the top of the priority list. 
Thus, Turkey avoided agreements or co-operation with any country, which would lead 
to a pact or bloc. As noted earlier, during the First World War the Ottoman Empire had 
aligned itself with Germany and this resulted in its own destruction. Earlier the Ottoman 
Empire had lost Cyprus as a result of British-Ottoman military co-operation against 
Russia. Kemal feared that Turkey had no power to manipulate international politics 
while it was exposed to their vicissitudes. Hence a pact or military-political grouping 
might cause a war or crisis Turkey could not control. After the First World War the 
defeated nations became revisionist and aimed to change the balance of power, while 
the winners sought to protect the status quo. Turkey was obviously a loser yet it strictly 
avoided this polarisation, 112 refraining even from any political or military co-operation 
which could provoke any third party, like Italy or the Soviet Union. The only exceptions 
are the Balkan and Saadabat pacts which were not directed against any country but were 
defensive alliances. Atatürk was very reluctant to enter into international commitments, 
including participation in the League of Nations. 
113 Thus, Turkey assiduously guarded 
its non-aligned status during the Atatürk era, adhering to a policy of non-involvement 
outside and concentration on national development at home. 
114 Even after Kemal this 
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policy continued and Turkey managed to remain outside the Second World War though 
it admitted the need for `powerful friends'. 115 
Pragmatism and Realism 
Although Kemalism was a revolutionary movement with certain unchangeable 
principles, ironically, pragmatism was one of them, especially in foreign relations. This 
can be considered a continuity of Ottoman foreign policy. The Ottoman Empire had 
been preserved by exploiting the rivalry among the European powers' 16 to protect its 
territorial unity. Kemal, as a former Ottoman officer, also used the same method. He 
and his successors played off one power against the other to protect Turkey's interests. 
As a result Turkey, though not a communist country, benefited from Soviet military and 
financial aid against the West during the Independence War. At the same time, Kemal 
tried to establish good relations with the French, Italian and British to balance Russian 
power in the region. Moreover, despite his ultra-secular ideas, Kemal sought to get the 
support of the Muslims. For example, in his first speech to the newly gathered 
parliament in April 1920, he argued that the parliament was not composed of the 
representative of Turks, Kurds, Circassians and the Lazs, but rather of the 
representatives of a strongly unified Islamic Community. 117 He even promised the 
Muslims of the British Empire that he would restore the Caliphate. Islamic solidarity 
was one of the significant factors, which helped the Turkish nationalist movement's 
foreign policy. 118 Thus even Islam was used to create a secular nation-state. However, 
after the attainment of independence, Kemal's `Islamist' policy changed completely and 
the Constitutional Commission of the Second Parliament declared that there was only a 
Turkish nation in the Turkish territories and no more nations. 119 
In addition to the Ottoman heritage, pragmatism was also necessitated by Turkey and 
the Kemalist regime's economic, political and military weaknesses. The regime and the 
country's weaknesses were very important, because Kemalism did not have universal 
"5 Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, p. 6; Deringil, Turkish..., p. 71- 
116 Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey, A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923, (New York: Howard 
Fertig, 1966), p. 19 
117 Atatürk'ün Sdylev ve Demecleri, Vol. 1, (Ankara: Türk Inkilap Tarihi Ensiitäsü Yayinlan, 1961), 
73-74. 
'8 Mim Kemal Öke, Güney Asya Müslümanlan'nm istiklal Davasi ve Türk Milli Mücadelesi Hilafet 
Hareketi, 1919-1924, (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanhgi, 1988), p. 55. 
1' 9 $eref Gözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin, 1924 Anayasasi Hakkindaki Meclis Gör i meleri, (The 
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aims, but it was solely concerned with the Turkish experience. Kemalism was a 
`homeland ideology' 120, and the circumstances in Turkey inevitably formed and 
changed Kemalist ideology. Apart from these factors, this pragmatism was a direct 
result of Kemal's personality. Kemal was not a rigid ideology-minded person but rather 
a pragmatic and realist leader. In his speech to the army generals he expressed 
flexibility of his ideology: 
`My general, this party has no doctrine... Of course it does not; if we had a doctrine, we 
could freeze the movement. ' 121 
In the words of Harris `... he was a pragmatist and an experimenter; he did not seek to 
bind Turkey to an ideology or to set foreign policy in a rigid mold. ' 22 
Kemal's pragmatism and realism ultimately determined his foreign policy orientation. 
After the war Turkey continued to use competition among the western powers to 
achieve its national interests, as evidenced by the Hatay problem, which was solved 
when France was in trouble in Europe. Even during the Hitler and Mussolini eras, 
Turkey sought to maintain relations both with Germany and Italy and with their enemies 
like Britain, the United States and France. 
120 Karal, The Principles... ', p. 23. 
121 Aydemir, Tek..., p. 502. 
122 Harris, Turkey..., p. 180. 
128 
CHAPTER V 
Foreign Policy as Atatürk Implemented 
`Musul is very valuable for us. First, there are round it oil wells which 
constitute an unlimited source of wealth. Secondly, there is the 
equally important question of Kurdishness. The British want to set up 
a Kurdish government there. If they do so, this idea will spread to the 
Kurds inside our borders. To prevent this, the border must be drawn 
further south. " 
Mustafa Kemal Atatfirk President 
`Turkey sacrificed Musul in the higher interest of peace. 72 
Tevfik MOO Aras, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Having examined the evolution of the main ideological and methodological principles 
of the Kemalist approach, this study will now discuss the implementation of these 
principles in the foreign policy sphere by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Certainly a detailed 
exploration of the events in these decades falls out of the scope, aims and limitations of 
this study. Rather it has three aims. to identify Kemalist attitudes in the implementation 
of foreign policy; to test how Mustafa Kemal's Kemalism was Kemalism; and to find 
the determining factors in Turkish foreign policy, which emerged in the Kemalist era 
and continued for several decades. 
The 1920s: Diplomatic Restoration 
Although Turkey gained its independence after a bitter war (The War of Independence) 
with the European powers, the Kemalist ideology was not anti-Western. On the 
contrary, as noted earlier, it was pro-Western and Kemal's ultimate aim was to win the 
friendship of the West, notably Great Britain as the most influential power in Europe 
and Turkey's region. Moreover, with its weak economy and army, Turkey could not 
protect its independence and integrity without Western support. Therefore, 
from the 
Kenialist perspective, the West constituted not only the economic and political model 
for the Republican regime but also a security tool against an attack from the Soviet 
Union or any revisionist state, like Italy. However, even after Lausanne, relations with 
the European powers were still problematic. These powers were not aware of Kemal's 
1 Atatürk, quoted in Andrew Mango, `Reflections on the Atatürkist Origins of 
Turkish Foreign Policy and 
Domestic Linkages', in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds. ), Turkey's New World, 
Changing 
Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy), 
2000), p. 12. 
2 K&kcüoglu, `Turco-British... ', p. 86. 
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desire for friendly relations, perceiving Turkey as a new version of the Ottoman Empire. 
These (mis) perceptions were further aggravated by unresolved issues left over from the 
Lausanne conference, such as the Musul problem. 
When Turkey transferred its capital from Istanbul to Ankara, Britain, France and Italy 
tried to prevent this move. This was an old tendency left from the Ottoman years: In the 
last decades of the Ottoman Empire, the great European powers had a control over the 
government and the sultan could not simply ignore France, Britain or Germany's ideas 
on the internal problems. France, for instance, opposed the new regulations in the 
Turkish educational system regarding the status of French schools in Turkey, while Italy 
viewed Turkey as falling within its sphere of influence. In addition to the capital issue, 
the Turkish Straits and Musul were at the top of the agenda with the British. Turkey was 
not happy with the order established by Lausanne in the Straits because their 
demilitarisation infringed on Turkey's sovereignty. For its part Britain was also 
unhappy with the situation because it wanted an international commission that would 
control the Straits with an independent flag. As will be seen shortly, Turkey managed to 
resolve the problem in line with its preferences, in an international conference, by 
exploiting an international crisis. 
A no less thorny issue in Anglo - Turkish relations was the Musul dispute. This oil rich 
area was vital for the security of the British Empire in Asia. The British had occupied 
Musul, whose population was composed mainly by Turkish, Kurdish and Arab people, 
on 15 November 1918.3 When the Mudros Armistice was signed, the British were 30 
km away from Musul. 4 In other words, the occupation was not based on any agreement. 
Even the Sevres treaty did not assign the region to Britain but to an envisaged Kurdish 
state where the region would be a part of Kurdistan. 
5 However, the Ottomans and the 
Nationalist movement never accepted these intentions, and the National Pact declared 
3 Turkey had confidence on that the local people preferred Turkey. Therefore Turkey continuously 
insisted on a plebiscite in the region: Hasan Berke Dilan, Türkiye'nin Dis 
Politikasi, 1923-1939, 
(Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1923-1939), (Istanbul: Alfa Yayin, 1998), p. 31. 
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Musul Ottoman territory. 6 Though Kemalist Turkey reconciled itself to the loss of the 
Arabian portion of the former Ottoman Empire, it refused to accept the loss of northern 
Iraq, 7 which it viewed as Turkish territory. Atatürk declared Musul's importance as vital 
for Turkish development: 
`Musul is very valuable for us. First, there are round it oil wells which constitute an 
unlimited source of wealth. Secondly, there is the equally important question of 
Kurdishness. The British want to set up a Kurdish government there. If they do so, this 
idea will spread to the Kurds inside our borders. To prevent this, the border must be 
drawn further south. ' 8 
For the Turks, there were 263,000 Kurds and 146,000 Turks in the region9 and they 
preferred Turkey to Iraq. 10 During Lausanne the area was still under British occupation, 
but failure to reach a decision and the need for an early conclusion to the conference 
necessitated the issues' deferment to the post-Lausanne era. When the Istanbul 
conference failed on 5 June 1924, the negotiations continued in the League of Nations. 
At the time Britain was the dominant power in the League while Turkey was not even a 
member. During the negotiations some clashes between British and Turkish soldiers 
ensued and Britain threatened Turkey with possible war. Turkey believed that Britain 
would go to war over the Musul dispute or could use the Kurdish, Islamist or economic 
cards to intervene in Turkey's internal affairs in order to get Musul. There was a serious 
Islamist-Kurdish revolt near the border and Turkey believed that Britain provoked and 
helped the rebels. Since Turkey could not accept such risks it gave in, and the 
Agreement on Borders and Good Neighbourliness was signed in Ankara on 5 June 
1926, and accepted the League of Nation's decision on Musul, recognising the Turkish- 
Iraq border and received £500,000 in return for its 10 per cent share in the oil 
company. " Lord Kinross argued that the surrender of Musul to Iraq was `Atatürk's sole 
6 The British did not recognise the National Pact: A. Toynbee, Survey, Vol. 1,1925, p. 482. 
K. Krüger, Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932), 
175. 
8Atatürk, quoted in Andrew Mango, `Reflections on the Atatürkist Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy and 
Domestic Linkages', in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds. ), Turkey's New World, Changing 
Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 
2000), p. 12. 
9 Seha L. Meray, Lozan Bare Konferansi, Tutanaklar ve Belgeler (The Lausanne Peace Conference, 
Documents), Vol. 1, No. 1, (Ankara: SBF Yayinlarii, 291), p. 343. 
10 Kemal Melek, `Turk Ingiliz I1iýkileri (1890-1926) ve Musul Petrolleri' (The Musul Oil in Turkish- 
British Relations, 1890-1926), in Toktamis Ates and others, Türk Did Politikasinda Sorunlar, (The 
Problems in Turkish Foreign Policy), (Istanbul: Der Yaymlan, 1989), pp. 38-39. 
" Stephen F. Evans, The Slow Rapprochement, Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatfirk, 
1919-1938, (University of Hull, 1982), p. 96. 
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mistake in foreign policy'. '2 However, the Musul dispute was not an exception in 
Kemalist foreign policy, but rather an excellent example of its typically over-cautious 
reaction to risky situations. According to Tevfik Rüýtü Aras, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, `Turkey sacrificed Musul in the higher interest of peace. ' 13 Of course Musul 
was an important territory in terms of the Turkish economy. However, for Kemal, 
maintaining this area would risk Turkey's independence and most importantly the 
success of his radical reforms. Even the British could not understand the Kemalist mind 
in this crisis. For Kemal neither the territory nor the oil were the priority, but rather a 
homogeneous population and a strong nation-state. But not all-Turkish political groups 
thought the same way. Non-Kemalist groups were to raise issue on numerous future 
occasions. 14 Islamists, Ottomanists and Turkist groups were to claim that Northern Iraq 
was a natural part of Turkey, hence it should be annexed to the Republic. Certainly such 
claims echo remaining imperial notions in the Republican era. 
The resolution of the Musul problem enabled Anglo-Turkish relations to improve, albeit 
at a slow pace. This was due to Britain's scepticism about Turkey. Although Atatürk 
sought Britain's long-lasting friendship and support, the British politicians 
underestimated his reforms. 15 Sir Clerk, the British ambassador to Turkey, frequently 
assured London of Turkey's desire for closer relations with Britain having been 
impressed by Kemal's warm references to Britain. 16 But his messages fell on deaf ears 
as the British government failed to grasp the Kemalist worldview. 17 As a result relations 
remained friendly but on a low level until the British realised Turkey's importance in 
south-eastern Europe against the revisionist powers. '8 
12 Kürkcüoglu, `Turco - British... ', p. 98. 13 Kürkcüo 
, 
1u, `Turco - British... ', p. 86. Mustafa Kemal's Musul policy is seen as a traitorous to the 
National pact, particularly by the Islamist scholars. For different approach: Kadir Misirhoglu, Musul 
Meselesi ve Irak Türkleri, (The Musul Dispute and the Iraqi Turks) (Istanbul: Sebil Yayinevi, 1976); 
Ziya Arif Sirel, Ingilizler Musul 'u Nasil Aldilar, (How the English got Musul? ), Yakin Tarihimiz (Our 
Current History), Vol. 1, No. 9, (Istanbul), 1962. 
14 Particularly ultra-Turkist group did not give up the idea of that Musul is a Turkish town. Even some 
Kemalists sounded similar claims. Once Tevfik Rüýtü Aras, Turkish Foreign Minister at that time, said: 
Turkey gave Musul to Britain but this was not only to satisfy Britain but also to satisfy the Iraqis. By 
doing this we aimed to gain their heart for a possible confederation between Turkey and Iraq. ' Omer 
Kürkcüoglu, Türk - Ingiliz Ili$kileri, 1919-1926, (Turkish - British Relations, 1919-1926) (Ankara: 
Ankara University SBF, 1978), p. 321. 
15 Türkkaya Ataöv, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945, (Ankara: 1965), pp. 2-3. 
16 Stephen F. Evans, The Slow Rapprochement, Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatürk, 
1919-1938, (University of Hull, 1982), p. 97. 
17 Evans, The Slow..., p. 97. 
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Diplomatic Isolation from the West and Involuntary Friendship with the Soviet Union 
These British attitudes help explain why, despite Atatürk's pro-Western orientation and 
Westernist, secularist aims, Turkey was not comfortable with the European powers 
during 1920s. Worst still, all the major European powers were now Turkey's 
neighbours: Syria was under French rule, Iraq was a British mandate, Cyprus had been 
annexed to Britain, Meis island and the Twelve Islands in the Aegean Sea were under 
Italian occupation. Thus, Turkey was pushed into the directions of the Soviet Union by 
Western, notably British policies. '9 
For its part, the Soviet Union felt besieged by the West. Like Turkey, it was not a 
member of the League of Nations (LIST), which was perceived as a Western tool to 
undermine Soviet security. As a politically and economically isolated country, the 
Soviet Union's strategy was based on two main columns: to improve its relations with 
Germany and its neighbours including Turkey. 20 Turkey, in particular, was an important 
country for Soviet security, as vividly underscored by the Dardanelles campaign during 
the First World War and the Soviet Union was keen to improve relations with Turkey 
and to keep Turkey outside the LN and the `anti-Soviet bloc'. The LN's `impartial' 
decision on the Musul dispute created an excellent opportunity for these countries and 
on 17 December 1925 the day following the decision of the League of Nations to award 
Musul to Iraq (Britain), the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non- 
Aggression was signed by Chicherin and Tevfik Rüýtü Aras in Paris. As Melek put it, 
this agreement was very much a protest against Britain and the LN. 21 Chicherin blamed 
the LN for its Musul decision stating: 
`If Britain doesn't be more conciliatory, its attitude would may cause inevitable results. 
Musul is very important for Turkey and despite Turkey's peaceful desires, Turkey's 
border cannot be drawn further north. '22 
The efforts for co-operation gave its fruits in a short time and two years later, the trade 
volume between Turkey and the Soviet Union was doubled as a result of a commercial 
18 Evans, Slow..., p. 97. 
19 Dilan, Türkiye'nin..., p. 56. 
20 Dilan, Türkiye'nin..., p. 56. 
21 Kemal Melek, `Turk - tngiliz lliýkileri (1890-1926) ve Musul Petrolleri'. in Toktanu* Ater and others, 
Türk Did Politikasunda Sorunlar, (Istanbul: Der Yayuilan, 1989), p. 73. With these treaty both 
promised not to attack each other and not to enter any alliance against each other (Article 2). Also 
according to the treaty in any possible conflict they had to be neutral toward each other (Article 1). The 
unofficial aim of this treaty was to give a free hand to Turkey and the Soviet Union against the West. 
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treaty. 23 Furthermore, in 1928 the Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov proposed Turkey's 
participation in the Preparatory Disarmament Talks - Republican Turkey's first 
appearance in an international gathering. 24 In this meeting Turkey supported the Soviet 
argument by proposing a total disarmament. The political co-operation continued and 
Turkey was the first country to sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact prohibiting war. In 
Karakhan's Ankara visit, the Non-Aggression Treaty was reaffirmed. Notwithstanding 
some problems Turkey greatly benefited from the co-operation with the Soviet Union: it 
guaranteed its north-eastern borders, found a new economic market and source of 
financial support and counterbalanced the West strategically. However, Kemal never 
lost sight of the Soviet lethal threat to Turkish security. As he saw it, the Soviet Union 
would not be Turkey's friend forever. 25 Ankara also feared of potential Soviet attempts 
to import its ideology to other countries, including Turkey and Iran. 26 As a result, even 
at a moment of diplomatic isolation from the rest of the world, the Turco-Russian 
Treaty of Neutrality reaffirmed the Turks' fears of the Russians. Consequently Turkey 
continued to work on improving its relations with the Western powers, signing a treaty 
with France on 30 May 1926, and a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Italy 
on 30 May 193 8. These agreements further underscored Turkey's non-aggressive policy 
and its determination to keep itself free from any entanglements in the conflicts of the 
European powers. 
Turkish - Greek Reconciliation 
In addition to the great powers, Turkey consolidated relations with its immediate 
neighbours and smaller states in the region. It signed friendship and neutrality 
agreements with Yugoslavia in 1925, with Persia (Iran) in 1926, with Hungary in 1927, 
with Afghanistan in 1928 and with Bulgaria in 1929. In doing so, Turkey sought to 
22 Bilge, GOV..., p. 99. 
23 For the official text of the agreement see: Dilan, Türkiye'nin..., pp. 59-60. 
24 Di1an, Tiirkiye'nin..., p. 61. 
25 Atatürk saw the Soviet Union as a source of instability and threat not only for Turkey, but also for both 
Europe and Asia: The beneficiary of a war in Europe will be neither Britain, France nor Germany but 
Bolshevism. As a neighbour and such a nation who had conflicted with this country (Russia), we 
carefully watch the developments in Russia and we can easily realise the danger. The Bolsheviks, who 
exploit the Eastern nations, are not only threatening the European states but also the Asia countries: 
Atatürk's conversation with MacArthur in Kemal Ariburnu, Atatürk'ten Anilar, (Memoirs from 
Atatiurk), (Istanbul: Inkilap Kitabevi Yaym, 1998), pp. 336-338; Cumhuriyet (Istanbul, daily), 8 
November 1951; George S. Harris, Turkey, Coping with Crisis, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 178. 
26 As will be seen below Stalin's intention was understood as early as in 1935 when he declared Turkey, 
Iran and all Near East as the `Russian region': Herbert Melzig's memoirs in Anburnu, Atatürk'ten..., p. 
203-205. 
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prove its peaceful intentions, and no where was this as important as its relations with 
Greece. Atatürk was keen to put an end to the century-old feud between the two nations. 
He believed that as neighbours, the two countries could not secure their stability without 
peace. He, therefore, expressed his readiness to end the hostility between Turkey and 
Greece: 
`I could never myself keep on hating a nation for the mistakes of its Government... And 
towards the Greeks I feel the same. I am confident that we shall soon be great friends, 
friends as we were before the Powers intervened. '27 
The first problem between Greece and Turkey in the Lausanne negotiations was the 
exchange of minorities. Despite the migration wave caused by the war, there was still a 
Greek minority mainly in Istanbul, and a Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Both 
countries had sought to keep some minorities in each other's territory to protect their 
property, and possibly to use them as a fifth column. Moreover, the mass migration 
from Turkey frightened the Greeks. 28 To eliminate this source of friction, a treaty was 
signed on 30 January 1923 and an exchange commission was set up. 29 According to the 
treaty (Article 1) the Istanbul Greeks and Turks living in Western Thrace were to be 
exchanged. However, Greeks settled in Turkey before 30 October 1918 and Turks 
settled east of the borders drawn by the Bucharest agreement were excluded from the 
exchange (Article 2). 30 The Commission worked smoothly till mid-1924 and the 
exchange of some population had been realised, before a crisis erupted over Article 2. 
For the Greeks and the Turks the term `settled' meant different things: Turkey 
interpreted settled Greeks as those who lived in the Istanbul municipality, while Greece 
understood it as those who lived in the greater Istanbul province. The negotiations 
continued until the 1930s, and increased Greek fears of a possible Turkish attack . 
31 But 
these fears were not necessary, as Kemal viewed Greece as both an important 
27 Mustafa Kemal cited in Alexis Alexandris, `Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Greece During the Second 
World War and Its Impact on Greek-Turkish Detente', Balkan Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1,1982, p. 157. For 
the details of the statement see also Grace Ellison, An Englishman in Angora, (London: 1923). 
28 Georges Castellan, Balkanlarin Tarihi, (History of the Balkans), (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1995), 
p9 440. 
3 
Soysal, Tnrkiye'nin..., pp. 177-184. 
30 League of Nations, Category VII, 1924, Assembly Council Circular Letters, 10/34,4 9.1924. 
31 Greece also tried to get British and the LN's support against the Turkish, and both Britain and the LN 
gave clear political support to the Greek thesis. Even the General Secretary of the LN, Drummond, gave 
the organisation's guarantee to protect Greece's borders against Turkish attacks. Drummond even advised 
Venizelos to strengthen the Greek air force to stop a possible Turkish attack in the Aegean Sea: 
Öliden 
Zeynep Alantar, `Turk Did Politikasmda Milletler Cemiyeti Dönemi' (The League of Nations Period in 
Turkish Foreign Policy), in Faruk Sönmezoglu (ed. ), Turk Dij Politikasinin Analizi, (The Analysis of 
Turkish Foreign Policy), (Istanbul: Der Yaymlan, 1994), p. 55. As will be shown later, the West's these 
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cornerstone in Turkish security against Russia and Italy and a springboard to improve 
relations with the West. Despite this, as a result of Greek policy, relations were frozen 
in 1929.32 But not for long. The disagreement worked against Greek interests; while the 
number of Turks in Greece was merely 60,000, there were 200,000 Greeks in Turkey. 
Therefore, an exchange agreement was signed in 1930 which solved the problem mainly 
in favour of the Turkish argument. 33 The problem was now over, but Turkey learnt from 
this crisis that it could not rely on the West and international organisations against 
Greece because the latter had more friends than Turkey. On the other hand, the solution 
of the exchange problem, and with the Greco - Turkish Treaty of Neutrality, 
Conciliation, and Arbitration of 30 October 1930, made a close Turkish-Greek co- 
operation in the Balkans possible. Another factor was the situation the Greeks in; 
Greece was in a political turmoil and an economic depression in the 1920s and the 
Italian threat to Greece was increasing. Under these circumstances Greece turned its 
face to Turkey and sought good relations with the Turks. 34 Thanks to these 
agreements, 35 as Kemal planned, Turkey and Greece played a leading role in the 
establishment of the Balkan Pact in 1934. Also the Greek-Turkish co-operation helped 
to make British foreign policy more favourable to Turkish security strategy. The more 
Italy increased pressure on the Balkans, the better relations between Turkey, Greece and 
Britain became more clear. 36 
Relations with the Muslim World and the Caliphate Issue: Escape from Its Own 
Civilisation? 
Similar to relations with the West, Kemalist foreign policy had an emotional dimension 
in its policy toward the Eastern world. As noted in the previous chapter, Turkey's 
relations with the East were determined by Kemalist ideological perceptions. These 
viewed the East and Islam as a source of backwardness and led to a reluctance to 
improve relations with the Muslim and Eastern countries. 37 Apart from this ideological 
artial' attitudes strengthened the mistrust between the Turks and the West. 
31 Alantar, `Turk... ', pp. 54-55. 
33 Baskin Oran, Türk - Yunan 
Iliýkilerinde Bati Trakya Sorunu, (The Western Thrace Problem in 
Turkish - Greek Relations), (Ankara: Bilgi Yaymevi, 1991), p. 81; Also see S. Akgün, `Turkish - Greek 
Population Exchange', Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, Vol. 1,1993. For the text see, Ismail Soysal, 
Tari. hceleri ve Aciklamalan he Birlikte Türkiye'nin Andlqmalan, (Turkey's Agreements with Their 
History and Explanations), Vol. 1, (1920-1945), (Ankara: TTK, 1989), pp. 353-396. 
34 Gürel, Tarihsel..., p. 40. 
35 Soysal, Tarihceleri..., pp. 353-396. 
36 Gurel, TarihseL.., p. 42. 
37 Because the effects of ideology on Turkey-Eastern countries relations are detailed in `the Kemalist 
136 
perception, the Caliphate issue and Turkey's unwillingness to challenge European 
interests in the Eastern countries worsened the relations. As a result, Turkey declined to 
join the Cairo Conference of the Muslim organisations and countries (May 1926), 38 
being opposed to any external and internal policy that involved Islam. 
The `Fez Affair' offers a vivid illustration of Turkey's Eastern perception and approach 
towards the Arab world. As discussed in Chapter IV, Atatürk had banned the fez in 
Turkey on 25 November 1925, accusing this hat of symbolising the Eastern-Islamic 
civilisation. For the Kemalist regime, removing the fez from Turkish heads was a part 
of the Turkish revolution. 39 Some opponents of the removal law were even sentenced to 
death and hanged by the regime. 40 It was so important, yet the Turkish government 
naturally had no power to interfere in the Arab world. In one of the official receptions in 
Ankara Hamza Bey, the Egyptian Ambassador wore the fez, considered a proper 
ceremonial dress for the Egyptians. When Kemal saw the ambassador, he asked him to 
remove his headgear41 even implying that he did not like the Egyptian uniform: 
`At a reception in Ankara one evening Atatürk's eye lighted on with a salver for the fez, 
remarking `Tell your King I don't like his uniform. ' When the news of the episode 
reached Cairo... a break in relations with Turkey was only avoided by tactful 
diplomacy on both sides. '42 
Inevitably Turkey's attitude toward Egypt made a close relationship impossible. After 
the fez scandal Egypt demanded an apology and Turkey refused. Anti - Egyptian and 
anti-Turkish campaigns were started in both countries' press and misunderstanding was 
deepened. a3 
Foreign Policy's Main Principles and Actors' chapter, it is assumed not necessary to repeat Turkey's 
eastern perception here. 
38 Toynbee, Survey..., 1925, Vol. 1, pp. 80-90, see also cah4, The Role..., p. 70. 
39 Atatürk, Speech..., p. 738. 
40 For the details see Chapter IV of this thesis. 
41 `Diplomatic Storm a Fez May Cause', Daily Herald, London, 11 November 1932; `Fuss Over a Fez', 
Evening Standard, daily, London, 11 November 1932; `Two Nations Quarrel Over a Hat', The Daily 
Express, London, 8 December 1932. 
42 Kinross, Atatlirk..., p. 462. 
43 'Hiisniniyetimize Rahmen' (Despite Our Goodwill), Cumhuriyet, (Istanbul daily), 12 December 1932; 
`Ne4riyahmiz Misir'da Tahrif Ediliyor' (Our Words are being Changed in Egypt), Milliyet, Istanbul 
daily, 12 December 1932; `Misir Politikacilan Tahrif, Tezvir ve Entrika Yolunu Tuttular' (The Egyptian 
Politicians Chose), Milliyet, Istanbul daily, 12 December 1932. 
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Similarly, Turkey did not allow Muslim pilgrims to wear the traditional turbans while 
visiting Turkey. This increased tension between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. 44Obviously, 
for Turkey the Arab world was not very important, but rather a place Turkey had to get 
away from. The roots of this policy touched the very identity of the new regime. 
Between 1923-1938, Turkey's lukewarm attitude to the Islamic states did not damage 
relations so much because most of them were under European rule45 and had no power 
over external relations. 46However, this attitude would determine Turkey's relations in 
more volatile times. For example, as will be discussed in the next chapter, Turkey was 
one of the first countries to recognise Israel in 1949; for Altemur Kihc, assistant to the 
Turkish Ambassador to the UN at that time, the decision was taken to emphasise 
Turkey's Western identity. 47 In the light of all these evidences it can be argued that 
ideology was one of the most important determinant in early Republican foreign policy 
vis-a-vis Islamic states, preventing Turkey from establishing closer relations with these 
countries. 
Turkey's Unwillingness to Challenge European Interests in the Region 
The third factor which shaped Turkey's relations with the Middle East, and the Islamic 
world was its reluctance to challenge the European powers. Turkey, during these years, 
always supported the strong party but not necessarily the morally-right one. Its approach 
to the 1924-25 upheavals in Morocco is a good example. At first, the Turkish press took 
interest in the Rif rebellion and drew parallels with Turkey's own War of Independence; 
however, from 1925 onward, the government, its press and the elite began to voice 
concern that it might hurt Turkey's interests to draw the wrath of the French and the 
Spanish at a time when their support was needed at the League of Nations over the 
Musul dispute 
. 
4" Though Turkey had gained its independence as a result of an anti- 
imperialist war, `Atatürk was not willing to contribute actively to the Arab struggle for 
44Mahmut B. Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 1960-1992, The 
Nature of Deviation from the Kemalist Heritage, (New York: Vantage Press, 1994), p. 23. 
45 Andrew Mango, `Turkish Policy in the Middle East, Turning Danger to Profit', in Dodd (ed. ), Turkish 
Foreign Policy, New Prospects, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), p. 59. 
``6 Also see for Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East: Türel Yilmaz, Cumhuriyet Döneminde 
Türkiye'nin Orta Dogu'ya tli$kin Did Politikasinin Genel Bir Degerlendirmesi, (A General Outlook to 
Turkey's Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East in the Republican Era), Tiirkiye Günlügü, No. 52, 
September-October 1998, pp. 43-51. 
47 Altemur K1hc, Turkey and the World, (Washington: 1959, p. 189; Andrew Mango, 'Turkish', p. 59. 
48 Bilge Criss and Pinar Bilgin, `Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East', Journal (of MERIA), 
1, January 1997, p. 3. 
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independence from the Western powers'. 49 The reason for that, as mentioned was not 
only Turkey's weakness, but also Turkey's ideological orientation, namely Kemalist 
pragmatism and secularism. S° 
The 1930's: Active Neutrality 
The 1930s were crisis years. Europe was divided into revisionist and anti-revisionist 
states. Turkey's dilemma was that it sought to defend the status quo but at the same 
time needed to maintain good relations with the revisionist powers. As will be shown 
later, Germany was Turkey's biggest trade partner; the Soviet Union was on the one 
hand a formidable threat, on the other hand it was a source of credit and political and 
diplomatic support; Italy was dangerously close to Turkish territories, while France and 
Britain, the old enemies of the War of Independence, were the only countries that could 
counter balance the revisionists and the Soviet Union. In the 1930s, this dilemma 
together with Atatürk's desire for a very close relationship with Britain and fear of the 
Soviet Union determined Turkey's relations with the European powers. The 
international developments and the Soviet Union's attitude51 would not be conducive to 
Turkish-Soviet relations, and the relations worsened gradually towards the end of the 
1930s. 52 Also the changes in Italian and German politics affected Turkish foreign 
policy. The rise of Mussolini and Hitler alarmed Turkish officials who became 
increasingly anxious about the revisionist states. According to Kemal a new world war 
was coming and Turkey had to do its best to avoid being drawn into such a conflict. In 
1936 he predicted that: `There are black clouds over the European sky. For me, in four 
or five years period, Italy and Germany will unite and will cause a second world war 
catastrophe. ' 53 
By way of bracing for these uncertainties Turkey as mentioned sought partnership with 
the status quo powers, and tried to resolve the problems left over from Lausanne, and 
49 Aykan, Turkey's Role..., p. 23. 
50 Aye Turkey's Role..., p. 22-24. 
51 As discussed, Stalin had implied that Turkey with Iran was in `the Soviet Zone' and this kind of 
statements rose historical Turkish fears about the Russian intentions. For Atatürk's reaction to Stalin's 
plans regarding Turkey's region see Ariburnu, Atatürk'ten..., pp. 203-205 (for Atatürk's reaction to 
Stalin's speech in 1935) and pp. 208-210 (For Atatürk's reaction in the Soviet Embassy in Ankara in 
1937). In the words of Gönlübol, `The Turks may have suspected long-term Russian designs to reach the 
warm waters of the Mediterranean.: Gönlübol, `A Short... ', p. 3. 
52 Gönlübol, `A Short... ', p. 3. 
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strengthen Turkey's military power. In this framework, stability in the Balkans and the 
Middle East, full Turkish sovereignty over the Straits, militarisation of the Straits Zone, 
securing the borders and participating in the decision-making processes of international 
organisations were the Turkish priorities. At the same time, Turkey tried to take all 
necessary measures, like international agreements, to protect itself from possible Italian 
aggression, and aimed at keeping the Soviets friendly, or at least neutral by making 
agreements and not to provoke the Russians. All this while continuing the internal 
reforms. The next part will discuss the relations and measures taken by Turkey for 
stability in its external relations. 
Turkey and the League of Nations 
As demonstrated by the Musul and Etabli disputes, the League of Nations was not a 
favourable platform for Turkey. However, Kemalist foreign policy was Westernist in its 
orientation and saw Turkey's security as lying with the West. Turkey was also 
defending the status quo in the region like the League. Thus, as another measure against 
the looming international crisis, 54 Turkey made great efforts to join the League. Mustafa 
Kemal clearly declared Turkey's expectations from the LN: 
`(... ) one of our primary desires is to see the League of Nations to be able to strengthen 
international security, to remedy the remnants of the old wounds and to achieve 
humanitarian results. 'S" 
However the first attempts failed due to Soviet hostility to the organisation and its 
subsequent attempts to keep Turkey out. First, Soviet officials warned Turkey not to 
join. In 1931 Litvinoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, visited Ankara and said that the 
friendship with Turkey was the corner stone of Soviet foreign policy. 
56 Then the Soviet 
Union increased its economic support to Turkey, and both agreed on an eight-million- 
dollar fresh credit to Turkey. 57 Also the Soviets supported the Turkish line over the 
Straits, fearing that if the Straits were captured by a major power, like Britain, this 
would pose a deadly threat to the Soviet Union. In brief, the Soviet Union was the 
largest country, supporting Turkey economically, diplomatically and politically and its 
53 Erkin, Dqiýlerinde..., p. 83. 
54 Ta m, 'Turkey's Quest for Security Through Defensive Alliances', Turkish Yearbook of 
International Relations, 1961, p. 9. 
55 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatiirk'iin Söylev ve Demecleri, (Atatürk's Speeches and Interviews), 
Volume 1, (Ankara: Türk Inkilap Tarihi Ensitüsü Yayinlari, 1961), pp. 367-368. 
56 Bilge, Güs..., p. 106-107. 
57 Bilge, Güg..., p. 107. 
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will was considered vital in Ankara though the Soviet Union was still perceived as a 
potential enemy. Moreover, according to the 1925 agreement Turkey could not enter 
such an organisation against Soviet will (article 1), and the latter's approval was 
conditioned on Turkey's being a permanent member of the League of Nations Council; 
for otherwise it would have no control over its decision-making process. 58 Turkey 
insisted on that, but it was obvious that the dominant members of the League would 
oppose this request and until 1932 Turkey could not risk the friendship of the Russians. 
However, by 1932, the threat to Europe had grown and Turkey saw itself alone and 
isolated and the LN would be a way to protect the status quo against the revisionist 
countries. This time even the USSR seemed convinced about the visibility of Turkey's 
participation in the LN, and this year Turkey was accepted as a full member of the 
League. Although the LN membership proved ineffective, it confirmed Turkey's 
intentions. Henceforth, being an equal member of European-Western institutions, like 
LN and NATO would become the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy. 
The Italian Threat, the Balkan Union and the Sadabad Pact: Departing from the 
Neutral Stand? 
Italian pressure was growing over the Balkan states during these years. 59 Italy's 
fortifications on the islands of Leros, Rhodes and the Dodecanese -all situated very 
close to the Turkish Aegean coasts- posed a direct threat to Turkish security. Italy also 
harboured ambitions in Africa and Asia including Turkish territories. 60 Although a 
Treaty of Mutual Friendship and Non-Aggression had been signed on 30 May 1928 
between Turkey and Italy, Turkey was alarmed by the Italian demands and plans on 
Turkey. In the words of Ismet Inönü, Turkish Prime Minister, the main characteristic of 
Italy Turkey relations in the 1930s was `the problem of security. '61 In search for 
security, Kemal sought good-neighbour relations with the Balkan, Black Sean and the 
Eastern neighbouring states, and tried to normalise relations with the great European 
powers, notably Britain and France. The membership to the LN was a part of this 
strategy. As has been seen Turkey had ensured a friendly relation with the Soviet Union 
and had solved its problems with Greece. Under the Kemal's strategy, Turkey would 
58 Gönlübol, Olaylarla..., pp. 77-78. 
59 For the developments in the Balkans in the inter-war period see Sina Akin and Melek Firat, 
Lid Sava4 
Arasi Dönemde Balkanlar, (The Balkans in the Inter-war Period), (Istanbul: 1993). 
60 Dilan, Türkiye'nin..., p. 87. 
61 Ismet Inönü, Indnü'nün Söylev ve Demecleri, (Inbnü's Speeches and Interviews), (Istanbul: Milli 
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involve almost all peaceful international arrangements in its region from the Sadaabat 
Pact to the Balkan pact, trying not to provoke Italy or any other great power. In these 
years `Turkey also always sought to settle its disputes with the other powers through 
pacific means. '62 The Balkan Pact one of the most important columns of this strategy: 
Neither Turkey nor the other Balkan countries could defend themselves against an 
Italian attack and any support from the European powers seemed unlikely. 63 Moreover, 
the Balkan states were saddled with serious domestic problems, such as differences 
between Serbs and Croatians over the future of the Yugoslav Federation. " Under these 
circumstances a joint Balkan defence alliance was viewed as a matter of urgent 
necessity by Turkey. Initiated by Turkey and Greece65, the First Balkan Conference met 
in 1930. In the following three years Turkey exerted great diplomatic efforts to 
transform the relationship into a binding, political agreement; and its negotiations with 
regional states, like Greece and Romania, over a series of friendship and non - 
aggression treaties formed the core of the Balkan Pact of 1934.66 To Turkey's 
disappointment, Bulgaria and Albania did not join the Pact: the former had territorial 
designs on Greece and Romania, and `its desire to secure a revision of the terms of the 
peace treaties was stronger than its desire to establish friendly relations with its 
neighbours'67 while the latter was under Italian pressure not to join. 
The Pact was an important step in Turkish foreign policy orientation. As Eren68 pointed 
out, it can be considered a departure from Turkey's neutral stance to a multilateral 
defence system. However, the Pact's ultimate aim was to protect the status quo, and 
Turkey could not do that on its own. Turkey sought to eliminate the differences between 
the small Balkan states and to fortify Turkish defence of Turkey and the Balkans against 
a possible Italian attack. Also, as will be seen, Turkey would never act aggressively or 
Egitim Basimevi, 1946), pp. 287-288. 
62 Tan&N, `Turkey's... ', p. 10. 
63 Robert J. Kerner and Harry N. Howard, The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente: 1930- 
1935, (California: California University Press, 1936), pp. 35-41. 
64 For Turkey's policy toward this issue: Cumhuriyet'in Ilk On Yili ve Balkan Pakti, (The Republic's 
First Ten Years and the Balkan Pact), (Ankara: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971); Erkin, 
Dijiýlerinde..., Vol. 1, pp. 123-125. 
65 The Greek efforts for a Balkan Pact was significant. The Greeks had even advocated a Balkan Union: 
Kerner and Howard, The Balkan..., pp. 25-27. 
66 Dilan, Tiirkiye'nin..., p. 92. 
67 Türkkaya Ataöv, `Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1938', Turkish Yearbook of International 
Relations, 1961, p. 125; also see Dilan, Türkiye'nin..., p. 147. 
142 
even think of getting involved in Balkan conflicts in the following years despite its 
commitment to the defence of the joint frontiers of the member states. So, despite the 
appearance, to the contrary, in the Balkan Pact, as has been seen, Turkey did not break 
with Kemalist tradition, but its membership of the Pact confirmed Kemalism's 
principles of pragmatism, desire to protect the status quo, and realism. Atatiirk clearly 
stated in his speech on 1 November 1934 in the parliament that the Pact was established 
to preserve the status quo: 
`Balkan agreement is a document which considers the special respect among the Balkan 
states. It is very important in protecting the existing borders. '69 
The Pact made its last meeting in 1940 and then it was de facto dissolved, but Turkey 
had largely benefited from its existence. First, the members of the Pact supported the 
Turkish position over the Straits dispute. Second they joined the LN economic measures 
against Italy together with Turkey. Third, the joint action of these countries 
strengthened the defence of the Balkans and Turkey's diplomatic and political position. 
Finally, the Pact eliminated the danger of aggression from Bulgaria. 
Similar to the Balkan Pact, another measure against a possible great war was the 
Sadabad Pact of Non Aggression (July 1937) between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The signatories undertook to consult each other in all matters of common 
interest, and to commit no aggression against one another's territory. 70 Unlike the 
Balkan Pact, Turkey in particular shunned a mutual guarantee of Pact members' joint 
frontiers, not least since Iran and Afghanistan bordered on the Soviet Union and such a 
commitment could implicate Turkey in a conflict with the Soviet Union. When the 
Soviet Union occupied Iran the Pact would collapse. 
68 Eren, Turkey..., p. 295. 
69 Atatürk's speech in Atatiirk'ün Milli Dis Politikasi, Cumhuriyet Dönemine Ait 100 Belge, 1923- 
1938, (Atatürk's Foreign Policy, The 100 Documents of the Republican Period, 1923-1938), (Ankara: 
Kültiir Bakanligi, 1981), pp. 59-60. For more details for Turkey's pacifist, legalist and pragmatist foreign 
policy attitude regarding the Balkan Pact and the Pact's defensive features see: 
Mustafa Yilmaz and 
others, Atatürk and Türkiye Cumburiyeti Tarihi, (Atatürk and the History of the 
Republic of Turkey), 
(Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1998), p. 168; Tamkoc, `Turkey's... ', p. 9-10; Dilan, Türkiye'nin..., p. 145; 
Gönlübol and others, Olaylarla..., pp. 99-101; Lewis, Turkey, p. 114. 
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The Straits Issue and the Montreux Convention as an Example of a Legalist 
Foreign policy 71 
It will be recalled that Turkey was not satisfied with the Lausanne stipulations about the 
Turkish Straits, 72 having made great compromises on the issue in order to save the 
conference and gain British support. It did not formally raise the question in the 
international arena, but made frequent soundings on the matter until 1934. After this 
date, alarmed by the Italian aggression in Ethiopia, German revisionism and the re- 
armament trend in Europe, Turkey viewed the question of the Straits as a matter of 
urgent necessity, and made official efforts to solve it by assenting full Turkish 
sovereignty over the Straits. 73 According to the Mudros, Sevres and Lausanne 
agreements, warships could freely pass through the Straits74, but Turkey wanted some 
restrictions on war ships as war was close. Also, the straits zone had been demilitarised 
by the Lausanne Convention (Article 18), and Turkey could not defend it against a 
possible attack. Hence, the Straits Convention had to be revised before a possible war. 
Turkey's argument was legally based on rebus sic stantibus (change in circumstances) 
principle. On 17 April 1935 Turkey brought the matter before the Council of the LN, 
with the Soviet Union's support. Were these seaways to pass to an anti-Soviet state 
Soviet security would be in great danger. On the other hand, Turkey was seen as a 
country that could be controlled on this matter. Italy openly opposed Turkey, and 
Britain and France gave indefinite replies. Likewise, in the Balkan Entente, held on 10- 
13 May 1935, Turkey won Greek, Yugoslav and Romanian support for its position. On 
11 April 1936 Turkey warned all signatories to the Convention about the urgent need 
for revision of the Convention. Then, Numan Menemencioglu, the General Secretary of 
70 Lewis, Turkey, p. 115. For the text of the treaty see Dilan, Türkiye'nin..., pp. 211-215. 
" For Turkey's official position on the Straits question see Montreux ve Savas Öncesi Yillari, 1935- 
1939, (Montreux and the Pre-war Years, 1935-1939), (Ankara: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
1973). For the Straits issue in general in these years see also: Mahmut N. Latin, The Importance of the 
Straits in the Foreign Relations of Turkish Republic, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Southern 
California, 1948; Ismail Soysal (ed), Turkish Straits, New Problems and New Solutions, (Istanbul: 
Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, 1995); James T. Shotwell and Francis Peak, Turkey at 
the Straits, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1940). For the details of the conference and the text see Seha 
Meray and Osman Olcay, Montreux Bogaziar Konferansi, Tutanaklar - Belgeler, (Montreux Straits 
Conference, Documents) (Ankara: 1976); Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, `The Straits Convention of Montreux, 
1936', British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 18,1937, pp. 186-191; Cemil Bilsel, Türk 
Bogazlan, (The Turkish Straits), (Istanbul: Ismail Akgün Matbaasi, 1948). 
72 Ataöv, `Turkish... ', p. 109; Dilan, Türkiye'nin..., pp. 123-125. 
73 Gönlübol and others, Olaylarla..., p. 121. 
74 Montreux ve..., p. 3 and p. 24; Mensur Akgün, `Turk Did Politikasmda Bir Jeopolitik Etken Olarak 
Bogazlar' (The Straits in Turkish Foreign Policy as a Geopolitical Factor), in Faruk Sönmezoglu (ed. ), 
Türk Dio Politikasinin Analizi (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), (Istanbul: Der Yayinlari, 
1994), p. 215. 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a part of a diplomatic campaign, visited many 
capitals, except Rome and Tokyo, to get international support for the Turkish thesis. By 
April 1936, all the signatories except Italy declared their intention to participate in the 
Montreux Conference to revise the Convention. Even Britain, which was against any 
revision clearly supported the Turkish position. 75 Actually, as argued by many 
scholars, 76 Turkey was able to confront the international community with a fail 
accompli on the issue. The Soviet Union and Britain would have probably not opposed 
such a change and the other countries did not have the power to prevent Turkey from 
doing so because they were enough with revisionist policies in the European politics. 
Sir Percy Loraine had warned the British that Turkey was capable of re-militarising the 
Straits Zone without the permission of the Lausanne signatories and had advised his 
government to respond favourably to the Turkish request. " Kemal was also aware of 
this situation. Once he had said: `In my opinion the situation in Europe is quite suitable 
to revise the Convention... I am sure we can succeed to do this. '78 Similarly, Tevfik 
Rü§tü Aras stated that: `Turkey will not hesitate to take the necessary steps to ensure the 
security of the Straits in unforeseen circumstances. '79 
Nevertheless, Turkey made great efforts to persuade other countries. This policy can be 
given as another example of Kemalism's legalist foreign principle. As a result, all the 
Lausanne signatories, except Italy, which boycotted the negotiations, 
80 met in 
Montreux, Switzerland, and with the Montreux Accord of the Straits signed on 22 June 
193681 Turkish sovereignty over the Straits was re-established and Turkey gained the 
right to militarise the zone. The international Straits commission was abolished, and 
naval vessels in the Black Sea were to be limited to specific quotas and were not 
permitted to remain there more than 21 days. Thus, the access of non-Black 
Sea powers 
75 According to a report of the British Head of the General Staff Turkey's friendship was priority 
in the 
Mediterranean region. The report also underlined the importance of security of the 
Straits. These factors 
shifted British position in the issue. For the report see: Ludmila 
Zhivkova, Anglo - Turkish Relations, 
1933-1939, (London: 1976), p. 31. 
76 Like Evans in his The Slow..., p. 100. 
" Evans, The Slow..., p. 100. 
'g Gönlübol, Olaylarla..., p. 121. 
79 Evans, The Slow..., p. 100. 
ßÖ Mehmet Gönlübol, `A Short Appraisal of the Foreign Policy of the Turkish 
Republic, 1923-1973', 
Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1974, Vol. XIV, p. 4. 
81 For the full text of the Accord in Turkish: Resmi Gazete, (Turkish 
Official Gazette), 5 August 1936; 
Reha Parla (ed), Belgelerle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Uluslararasi 
Temelleri, (The International 
Foundations of the Republic of Turkey with the Documents), 
(Lefkose, TRNC: 1985), pp. 119-135. 
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was limited. 82 On the other hand, merchant shipping was given complete freedom of 
passage. Under any war all crossing had to be during daytime. All warships were to 
inform the Turkish authorities 8-15 days prior to passing in both wartime and peacetime 
(Article 13). There were no restrictions on Turkish vessels and warships. 83 The Accord 
enhanced Turkey's strategic importance as crossing through the Straits without 
Turkey's permission became almost impossible. This, in turn, helped to alter Britain's 
attitude toward Turkey. 
The Hatay (Sancak) Issue and Kemalism's Legalism" 
Another example of Turkey's legalist foreign policy understanding was the Hatay 
(Sancak) issue85 and Turkey's attitude to this problem affords a vivid illustration of 
Atatürk's step-by-step problem-solving approach. For instance, Abdurrahman Melek 
claimed that for Atatürk, settlement of the Hatay problem was impossible before a 
solution in the Straits question, therefore he had planned these two problems step-by- 
step. 86 Though Turkey's claim to the Hatay province was solidly grounded in 
international law, Kemal did not press this claim at once. Before starting a diplomatic 
campaign for Hatay, Kemal ensured the British and Russian support for the Turkish 
arguments. 87 Turkey sought not only the great powers' support, but also the small and 
regional states' diplomatic support. For instance the Balkan conference declared its 
support for Turkey in the Straits question on 4 May 1936.88 It was only after the 
Montreux Agreement had been signed that he voiced the Turkish claim to the province89 
declaring hereafter the main focus of the Turkish-French relations would be the Hatay 
82 The Soviet Union wanted to close the seaway to the non-Black Sea powers. 
" The Convention in Ismail Soysal (ed. ), Turkish Straits, New Problems and New Solutions, (Istanbul: 
Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, 1995). 
84 For Hatay issue and its importance in Kemalist foreign policy see Abdurrahman Melek, Hatay Nasil 
Kurtuldu? (How was Hatay Saved? ), (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991); Arnold Toynbee, 
`The Franco-Turkish Dispute over the Sanjak of Alexandretta', Survey of International Affairs, Vol. 14, 
1936; Ismail Soysal, `Hatay Sorunu ve Turk - Frantz hiýkileri, 1936-1939, (The Hatay Dispute and 
Turkish - French Relations), Türk Tarih Kuremu Belleten (Ankara), Vol. XLIX, No. 193,1985; 
Gönlübol, Olaylarla..., pp. 126-133. 
85 Melunet Gönlübol, `Atatiirk'ün Did Politikasi: Amaclar ve Ilkeler' (Atatürk's Foreign Policy: Aims and 
Principles), in Tarihi Geliýmeler Icinde Türkiye'nin Sorunlan Sempozyumu (The Symposium of 
Turkey's Problems in Their Historical Developments), (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1992), p. 
49. 
86 Melek, Hatay..., p. 26. 
87 Gönlübol, `Atatürk'ün..., p. 50. 
ss Gönlübol, `Atatürk'ün..., p. 50. 
89 Soysal, `Hatay... ', p. 83. For more details see the memoirs of the first President of the Hatay State: 
Tayfur Sökmen, Hatay'in Kurtulu$u trio Harcanan cabalar (The Efforts to Free Hatay), (Istanbul: 
Cumhuriyet Yayinlan, 1999). 
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problem. 90 Thereafter Kemal used both the Turkish press91, and the French press to 
warn the French government. When he thought that the French public was ready and the 
French government was weak enough he involved the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 
issue and launched diplomatic initiatives in Paris and the League of Nations. Turkey, in 
this framework, was not using purely nationalist arguments, but based its claim on 
international law. In a decade when nations took their rights by force of arms, Kemal's 
methods were quite different. It can be argued that the Kemalist strategy was based on 
that if Turkey gained its rights by using force or without securing great-power 
endorsements it would easily lose them. That is why Turkey attached great importance 
to France's approval, although the latter was in no position to undertake any militarily 
operation in the region. By 1936 Turkey had solved most of the problems with France 
according to international law, but Hatay, whose majority population was Turkish92, 
was still under French rule. When France transferred all its sovereignty rights on the 
province to newly independent Syria on 9 September 1936, Turkey publicly opposed 
this. Moreover in the province there was a strong Turkish opposition to Arab 
nationalism. 93 
The international political situation was also favourable to Turkey: It enjoyed British 
and Soviet support and was an active LN member. Turkey could take military action 
but, similar to the Straits dispute, it aimed at a long-lasting solution through a legalist 
approach. Thus, Turkey gave an official note to France on 9 October 1936 and asked 
France to give the same status (independence) as it had given to Syria and Lebanon. 94 
At first the French stance was negative, but when Turkey implied the possibility of 
military operation. Atatürk told the French Ambassador: 
`Such issue cannot cause a military clash between Turkey and France under the 
extraordinary circumstances the world faced today. But I considered that and decided. If 
there is any possibility for a clash. Having resigned from my posts I will personally 
enter Hatay with a few voluntary friends. '95 
90 Atatürk's speech on 1 November 1937 in the Turkish Parliament in Atatürk'ün Milli Dij Politikasi, 
Cumhuriyet Dönemine Ait 100 Beige, 1923-1938 (Atatürk's National Foreign Policy, 100 Documents 
of the Republican Period), Volume II, (Ankara: Kültiir Bakanhi, 1981), p. 65. 
91 The campaign was mainly led by Tan and Cumhuriyet daily papers. For example: A. Emin Yalman, 
`Karanhgi Aydmlatmak Lazimdir' (The Darkness must be Enligtened), Tan (daily, Istanbul), 17 
September 1936 and Yunus Nadi, `Davanuzda Revizyon Yoktur' (There is no Revision in Our Struggle), 
Cumburiyet (daily, Istanbul), 19 September 1936. 
92 Nurettin Ardtc, Antakya - Iskenderun Etrafinda, (Around Hatay and Iskenderun), 
(Istanbul: A Halit 
Kitabevi, 1937; Sökmen, Hatay'in..., p. 37. 
93 Sökmen, Hatay'm..., p. 35. 
94 Sökmen, Hatay'm..., p. 17; Ataöv, `Turkish... ', p. 114; Dilan, Tfirkiye'nin..., p. 139. 
95 H R. Soyak, Atatürk'ten Hattralar, (The Memoirs from Atatürk) volume two, (Istanbul: n. d. ), p. 607. 
147 
France changed its position and the official negotiations were started in December 
1936 
. 
96 The negotiations were held in the LN and Turkey and France accepted the 
Sandler Report on 26 January 1937. The final regulations between the sides, the Report, 
the Statue and the Constitution recognised the separate political identity of Hatay 
province from Syria. 97 This was a diplomatic success for Turkey, which preserved its 
good relations with France while at the same time giving Hatay the right to determine 
its own fate; indeed, two years later, in 1939 Hatay declared its independence and 
France accepted the situation with a written agreement with Turkey on 23 June 1939.98 
Turkey in this issue never even considered Syria. Even when the Syrian Parliament 
protested over the detachment of the province, Turkey and France ignored it 
altogether, 99 and the Hatay issue would remain a sore point in Turkish-Syrian relations 
to this very day. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, on the one hand, the regime's sense of insecurity became the pillar of its 
policies. On the other hand, Kemalism's ultimate aim was to be an equal member of 
Western civilisation by rejecting the Eastern cultural links. Thus two main attribution 
appeared: scepticism and Westernism. The dilemma was clear. Neither the Turkish 
people, nor the West supported this Westernisation and this impasse was reflected in 
external issues. As a poor and weak country Turkey wanted to enter European 
civilisation, which clearly rejected the Turks. Thanks to the authoritarian regime, the 
intense contradictions proved manageable as all opposition was suppressed. However, 
in foreign affairs the situation was different. No country can shape the international 
arena. As a result Kemal used a pacifist, isolationist, legalist, neutral foreign policy 
orientation in order to gain time for his internal reforms and to protect Turkey's 
economic and political independence. 
`I think Atatürk's these words were a bluff, yet it worked and after a couple of days Leon Blum, the 
French Prime Minister, in his letter to the Turkish Ambassador on 18 January 1937 expressed his support 
for diplomatic efforts and soften the French attitude in the issue. ' Sökmen, Hatay'm..., p. 21. 
96S6kmen, Hatay'in..., p. 17. 
97 Soysal, `Hatay... ', p. 85. 
98 For the full official text of the Turkish-French Agreement see Parla (ed. ), Belgelerle..., pp. 147-154. 
99 ikdam Gazetesi (daily, Istanbul), 3 December 1939. 
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Fortunately for Kemal, the international crises of the 1920s and the 1930s helped to 
reduce the contradictions in Turkish foreign policy. The competition between the West 
and the Soviet Union and the latter's economic difficulties saved Turkey from the 
Communist threat. Similarly the problems in Europe helped Turkey resolved many 
problems without any clash, like the Straits issue and the Hatay issue. Moreover, 
Turkey's civilisation understanding did not harm Turkey's foreign policy because the 
Muslim nations were still under European colonial rule and failed to notice the 
ideological changes in Turkey. Thus, Kemalist contradictions were frozen for a while, 
and Turkey gained vital time for internal reforms. 
Although the Kemalists after Kemal argued that Mustafa Kemal had set up all the 
necessary foreign policy principles for Turkey's external relations, in the light of this 
information, whether Atatürk's foreign policy was solely an ideological foreign policy 
understanding is still a debatable question. It is true Kemal's domestic aims, his 
personal ideas and his personality deeply affected Turkish foreign policy, and the era 
between 1918 and 1938 can be called as a Kemalist foreign policy. However, apart from 
Kemal and his ideas, many other factors also affected Turkish foreign policy in these 
years, such as the international crises, the problems inherited from the Ottoman Empire, 
Turkey's weaknesses etc., and these factors sometimes forced Kemal for a certain 
policies, like a pacific and pragmatic foreign policy. loo 
10° Ismet Giritli, `Kemalist Ideology and Its Characteristics', in Papers and Discussions, Türkiye 14 
Bankasi International Symposium on Atatärk, (Ankara: Turkiye Iý Bankasi Cultural Publications, 
1984), p. 314. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Inönist Kemalism: Deviation or Transformation? 
`Stalin succeeded in frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans. " 
Khruschev, the Soviet leader 
`We must Turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will 
annihilate those who oppose the Turks or `le tu quisme. ' 
Ismet Inönä, Turkish President 
Turkish foreign policy between 1918-1939 was a policy of survival. Two basic foreign 
policy goals reigned supreme throughout this period: The creation of a strong, modern 
state which could defend its political independence and territorial integrity, without 
foreign assistance, against external and internal aggression; and to make Turkey a full, 
equal member of the European community of nations by disengaging Turkey from its 
Islamic and Eastern legacy. Turkey continued these policies after Atatürk because the 
security problem was still at the top of the agenda, and the new regime needed a respite 
both domestically and internationally. All the fears and problems which had created the 
Kemalist principles were still there. Even, when he lay on his deathbed in 1938, Kemal 
was advising his followers that 
`A world war is near. In the course of this war the international equilibrium will be 
destroyed. If during this period we act unwisely and make the smallest mistake, we will 
face with an even graver disaster than in the Armistice years (1918 Mudros 
Armistice). '2 
As Atatürk had predicted, the Second World War erupted, leaving an enormous mark on 
Turkish foreign policy. The Kemalist foreign policy school evolved dramatically in this 
era due to the international crises. Yet, while identifying themselves as Kemalists in the 
Inönü era a new version of Kemalism appeared with a slightly different ideological 
approach. Another significant development of the Inönü era was Turkey's departure 
from neutrality towards pro-Western activism. 
' Quoted in Strobe Talbott (ed. ), Khruschev Remembers: The Last Testament, (Boston: Little Brown, 
1974), pp. 295-296. 
2 $evket Süreyya Aydemir, Ikinci Adam (The Second Man), Vol. 2, (Istanbul: Remzi, 1976), p. 87. 
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The Determinants of Inönü Policy 
Four main factors formed Turkey's internal and foreign policy3 in the Inönü era were: a) 
Turkey's structural, economic and political limits; b) the regime's weaknesses; c) 
Inönü's personality; d) the international situation. 
Turkey's Structural, Economic and Political Limits 
The first factor affecting Turkey's foreign policy was its economic limits. So much so 
that at times, Turkey's relations with the outside world ran parallel to the course of its 
economic and financial relations. As Deringil put it, economics was not exactly the forte 
of the Turkish leaders, who came from a predominantly military background. 4 For 
example at Lausanne, Inönü's ignorance of finance and economics handicapped him 
tremendously. ' The priority of the governments was the state and independence of the 
country, hence a huge portion of the budget went to military sphere. Furthermore, the 
Turkish leaders sought, first of all, to make Turkey self sufficient in foodstuffs and 
some industrial products, like guns. As a result of this, with the lack of technical and 
administrative manpower, the damage caused by continuous wars could not be repaired, 
and the per capita income was just a little higher in 1945 than it had been in 1929.6 The 
budget deficit in 1939/1940 was 125.3%, which was the highest since 1930.7 In other 
words Turkey was still an economically weak country. Furthermore, Turkey was a 
relatively low populated country with 17,820,950 (1940), of whom 13,475,000 lived in 
rural areas. A weak economy and manpower problem not only undermined the regime 
but also limited Turkey's security and foreign policies and increased dependence on 
other powers. Despite their obsession with `economic self-sufficiency and 
3 For analysis of Turkish foreign policy in Inönü years see: Türkkaya Ataöv, Turkish Foreign Policy, 
1939-1945, (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayuilan, 1965; Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the 
Second World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Edward Weisband, Ikinci Dünya 
Savqi'nda Inönü'nün Di Politikasi, (Inönü's Foreign Policy in the Second World War); (Istanbul: 
Milliyet Yayinlari, 1974); O. Faruk Logoglu, Ismet Inönü and the Making of Modern Turkey, 
(Istanbul: Inönü Vakfi, 1997), pp. 61-90 ('The Diplomat'); Erkin, Dijillerinde...; Gönlübol and others, 
Olaylarla...; Fahir Armao , lu, `Ikinci Dönya Harbinde Türkiye', AÜSBF Dergisi, Vol. XIII, June 1958, 
pp. 139-179; Yusuf Sannay, Tnrkiye'nin Bati 
Ittifakina Yöneiiji ve NATO'ya Giriji, (Turkey's Move 
Towards the Western Alignment and Its Accession to the NATO), (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanhg7, 
1988); Türkiye Da Politikasinda 50 Yil, Ikinci Dünya Savage Ydlari, 1919-1946, (The 50 Years in 
Turkish Foreign Policy, The Second World War Years), (Ankara: Diooeri Bakanligi Yaymlar4 1973); 
4 Deringil, Turkish..., p. 12. 
5 Sonyel, Turkish..., p. 200. 
6 Sefik Bilkur, National Income of Turkey, (Ankara: National Statistics Office), 1949. 
7 istatistik Yiligi, 1942-1945 (The Statistical Yearbook of the General Directorate of Statistics), Vol. 15. 
(Ankara: T. C. Ba bakanlilc, Istatistik Umum Mudürlügü), p. 393. 
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independence' the Turkish leaders realised that foreign aid was unavoidable. Turkey's 
need for aid facilitated German economic and financial domination of the Turkish 
economy' with its attendant political influence. For example between 1933 and 1937 
Germany's share in Turkey's total foreign trade increased over 50%. 9 Germany's aim 
was to integrate the Turkish economy into the German economy as it did in many 
Balkan countries. As a matter of fact that the German plans to dominate Turkish 
economy had started in the early years of the 1930s. Thanks to the first five year plan of 
the Nazis, Germany got an opportunity to infiltrate into Turkish economy, and the trade 
between Germany and Turkey dramatically increased during the 1930s. 1° However as 
Kruger pointed out the Turks perceive no political aspiration behind this trend during 
these years, " yet the picture changed with the Second World War and the German 
intention was not loot on the Turkish government. 12 Thus, for instance, Hamdi Arpag, 
the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin, suggested to increase the portion of soybean in 
Turkish agricultural export, the government viewed the suggestion as a part of a 
German attempt to colonise the Turkish agriculture and discharged the ambassador. 13 
Germany was even buying some of the Turkish products, which it did not need, 
sometimes at prices above the normal level to re-sold them to the other countries. The 
aim was simply to maintain the German dominance in the Turkish economy. 14 To 
counterbalance German influence, Turkey turned to Britain and France, - to little 
avail. '5 Britain and France were mainly importing from their own colonies, thus forcing 
Turkey to lean even more heavily on the German economy. 
The Regime's Weaknesses and Legitimacy Problem 
Apart from the economic difficulties, the new regime was still saddled with domestic 
problems. In the 1930s, the RPP (The Republican People's Party) was the ruling and the 
only legal party in Turkey. Yet it failed to make inroads into the hearts of the Turkish 
people. So long as Atatürk was alive his personal prestige compensated for this failure, 
8 70% of Turkish cotton and chrome went to Germany. By 1937 Germany had supplied 69.7% of its iron 
and steel, 78% of Turkish wool yarns and tissues, 61% of its machinery and 55% its chemicals. 
9 Istatistik..., pp. 394-396. 
10 Ataöv, `Turkish... ', p. 129. 
" Karl Kruger, Kenialist Turkey and the Middle East, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), p. 112. 
12 Ahmet Izzet Feridun, `Ankara Thwarts Hitler's Economic Invasion', Free Europe, 8 May 1942, p. 
154. 
'3 Senior diplomat Feridun Cemal Erkin states that the government was aware of the German plans and 
was trying to defuse them. Erkin, Dqi1lerinde..., p. 121. 
14 Ataöv, `Turkish... ', p. 130. 
15 Ward, Turkey, pp. 92-93. 
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though not fully. 16 For example, seven years after the declaration of the Republic, 
Atatürk had to be protected from the people by the military. 17 This lack of popular 
support for the regime increased after the death of Atatürk, driving the regime towards 
greater authoritarianism and making it ever more wary of the internal minorities 
(Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Kurds etc. ) and the foreign powers (Soviet Union, Italy etc. ). 
Inönü's Personality 
A critical role in shaping Turkey's policy was, naturally played by President Ismet 
Inönü. In the words of Akgönenc, `the successor of Ataturk was not a man of revolution 
and change but rather status quo. ' 18 He was a more sceptical and extremely prudent 
person. During the Atatürk era he was described as the strict side of Kemalism. When 
Atatürk needed a Prime Minister, to forcefully suppress the opposition he always used 
Inönü, as had been seen in the Seyh Sait Revolt. Inönü was radically secular, modernist, 
Turkist and authoritarian, at times more radical on Kenialist principles than Atatürk 
himself There is no doubt that Inönü was an important figure, yet he lacked Kemal's 
charisma, hence he had to use force or rules in a strict way to carry out his radical 
policies and to make the people obey. To underscore this, he made himself life-time 
chairman of the ruling party (Milli 3ef) and fully controlled the instruments of 
government. Moreover he personally maintained tight control over the press and other 
forms of the mass media. i9 Thus, Inönü's ideology and practice increased domestic 
tension, made the party more authoritarian. As an extremely suspicious person, inönü 
perceived the opposition and the minority groups as a threat to his power. He also knew 
that he could not rely on the West for Turkey's unity. Alongside a highly authoritarian 
domestic policy he followed an isolationist foreign policy, which was over-cautious and 
over-sceptical about the world. For Inönü, Turkey had no friend, but itself the West 
16 As noted by Aydemir `The RPP could not become a people's party. During the 1930's the RPP was 
very far from the people. In addition to a coalition between the few bureaucrats the few people in the 
small towns formed the RPP, that's all. The members of the party was just for their own interests but not 
the Republican ideas. ' Aydemir, Tek..., pp. 402-403. 
17 Oguz Ünal, Tnrkiye'de Demokrasinin Doguu, Tek Parti Yönetiminden cok Partili Rejime Gegi4 
Süreci, (The Emergence of Democracy in Turkey, The Transformation Process From One Party to Multi- 
Party Regime), (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1994), p. 42. 
18 Oya Akg©nenc, A Study of Political Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy with Particular 
Reference to New Trends in Turco-Arab Relations, 1960-1975, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The 
American University, 1975, p. 35. For a different view see Metin Toker, Demokrasimizin Ismet Pqa'h 
Yillari, 1944-1973 (The Ismet Pasha Years of f Our Democracy), (Ankara: Bilgi Yaymevi, 1990) and 
Metin Heper, Taint Inönü, The Making of a Turkish Statesman, (Leiden: Brill, 1998), and Lagoglu, 
ismet... 
19 Weisband, Turkish..., p. 34-35. 
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would sacrifice Turkey any time, and Russia was poised to occupy Turkish territories; 
Germany and Italy were also not very friendly; and Turkey was not ready for a possible 
war. In this environment, Inönü was extremely worry of making any mistake in foreign 
policy. In his own words: `The one cardinal principle in setting foreign policy which I 
followed throughout the war was that an early mistake is hard to make up'20 
The International Environment and the Second World War 
There is no doubt that the most important development during the Inönü years was the 
Second World War. 2' The War and the post-war events left a remarkable mark on 
Turkish foreign and internal policies. Inönü took office on the eve of the Second World 
War and was immediately confronted with a dangerous international situation. On the 
one hand, having stabilised his personal rule, Stalin now focused on expanding Soviet 
power and influence, and Turkey, as a traditional enemy, was high on the list. Not only 
was Turkey an obstacle to Soviet expansion to the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
regions, but the Soviets viewed parts of Turkey as historically belonging to them. Even 
during the 1930s, which can be considered the `good-relations years', Stalin had 
implied that the Soviet Union could possibly occupy some Eastern provinces of 
Turkey. 22 Consequently, with the rising tension in Europe the Soviet Union was seen as 
a primary threat to Turkey's security. So were revisionist Germany and Italy which 
threatened stability in Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Mussolini's 
aggressiveness in the Mediterranean became a real menace after the seizure of Albania. 
According to the fascist outlook, the Mediterranean Sea was an Italian lake and Italy 
was a new Roman Empire. Obviously there was an immediate concern for Turkey's 
security because Turkey was not powerful enough to resist these aims. Under these 
circumstances Turkey had no alternative but to seek a closer relationship and co- 
operation with the Western democracies in defence of the status quo. However, France 
and Britain had no power to counterbalance the revisionists, and the United States had 
no interest in European political `games'. That is to say, after more than a decade, 
Turkey's security problem was still there, and Turkey's foreign policy, even after 
Atatürk, was still a survival policy. Thus the main principles of Kemal's era remained 
20 In6nü, cited in Weisband, Turkish..., p. 36. 
21 Aydin, `Determinants of.. ', p. 105. 
22 Sanca, Atatürk'ten Hatiralar, (Istanbul: Inkilap ve Aka, 1998). 
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intact, or even deepened. The only advantage of the situation was that the West also 
needed Turkey for its own defensive system against Germany, Italy and the 
communists. As seen in the Hatay issue, for example, France altered its policy toward 
Turkey and it sought a closer relationship. 23 Thus, Turkey found some opportunities to 
solve the remaining problems from Lausanne. However, when the Soviet Union made a 
pact with the Nazis on 23 August 1939 and these countries started to divide Eastern 
Europe, Turkey was caught between two stools. 24 On the one hand, it needed the West 
for its security. On the other, the last thing Turkey wanted was a conflict with the Soviet 
Union and Germany. Hence it sought a treaty with all the opposing sides. When all 
attempts for an agreement with the Soviet Union failed, Turkey made every possible 
effort to protect its neutrality and not to provoke the Soviet Union. However, Soviet 
intentions were similar to those of tsarist Russia's. As the price of its co-operation, in 
negotiations with the Axis powers, the Soviet Union demanded the establishment of a 
base for land and naval forces within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and 
recognition of its expansionist policy in the Caucasus. 25 Further, Germany and Italy 
were enemies of Turkey, and it could not easily challenge and any treaty with Britain or 
France would to provoke these countries. On the other hand, Turkey could not protect 
its territorial integrity and independence without the Western alliance's support because 
it did not have resources to fight a war. Yet the Western powers precisely expected a 
Turkey which fully participated the war. When Turkey understood that the Soviet 
intention was to prevent a possible Turkish alignment with the West, but not an 
agreement with Turkey, it signed a mutual defensive alliance treaty with the Western 
powers, namely Britain and France, on 19 October 1939 (Mutual Assistance Pact of 
1939). 26 Under this agreement Turkey would provide aid if war came to the 
Mediterranean region, but according to the special provision it would not be obligated 
to fight against the Soviet Union27 and if a European nation attacked Turkey, Britain 
23 For the details of France's Hatay policy see Erkin's (diplomat in Hatay in that date) memories: 
Diiiolerinde..., pp. 104-105. 
24 Faruk Sönnnezoglu, `1I. Danya Sava p Döneminde TUrkiye'nin Di Politikase: Tarafsizliktan 
NATO'ya', (Turkish Foreign Policy in the Second World War: From Neutrality to the NATO), in Faruk 
Sönmezoglu (ed. ), Turk Dis Politikasinin Analizi, (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), (Istanbul: 
Der Yayinlan, 1994), p. 79; Barbara Ward, Turkey, (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 104;; 
Yulug Tekin Kurat, `Elle Yil ik Cumhuriyetin Di Politikasi, 1923-1973', (Foreign Policy of the 50-Years 
Republic), Belleten, Vol. XXXIX, No. 154, April 1975, p. 270; Sannay, Türkiye'nin,.., p. 15 
25 Gönlübol and others, Olaylarla...; Eren, `Foreign.... ', p. 300 
26 Sarinay, Tärkiye'nin..., pp. 13-14; Ismail Soysal, `1939 Türk - Ingiliz - Fransiz 
Ittifali', (The 1939 
Turkish - British - French Ally), Belleten, Vol. XLVI, 
Nos. 181-184, January 1982, p. 370. 
27 Article I, Article 2 and Protocol H appended to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939. 
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and France would come to its aid. Despite Turkey's efforts not to provoke the Soviet 
Union, the Mutual Assistance Pact marked the turning point in Turkish-Soviet relations 
since the Soviets perceived the pact as a part of an anti-Soviet strategy. 28 This alliance 
may seem contradictory to Kemal's non-alignment policy because Atatürk's one of the 
primary concerns was to keep Turkey out of great power games. But Turkey had no 
choice and considered the alliance with the West as the least of all evils which gave 
Turkey a measure of security without joining the war. 29 However Inönü was severely 
criticised for the Mutual Assistance Pact particularly in the 1970s by the leftist- 
Kemalist groups. For instance, Avcioglu accused Inönü for `his departure from the 
Kemalist non-involvement principle'. Avcioglu further claimed that Inönü with a 
`useless' agreement damaged the `traditional Turkish-Soviet friendship'. ") 
In 1941 the Nazi armies poured into Greece. All the Balkans and some parts of the 
northern Black Sea were now under the German occupation. Syria was under the control 
of Vichy France, Iran had been invaded by the Soviets and the British, and the Germans 
were very active in Iraq. Turkey was thus surrounded by the Nazis and the communists. 
It had signed a tripartite treaty with France and Britain and tried to forge its economic 
and political ties with these countries but this did not mean that it felt itself as a true 
partner of the West. Britain and its allies were not reliable in Turkey's eyes. 31 As 
mentioned above, the treaty would be operative in the course of conflict. However, 
though Italy declared war on the Allies, Turkey retained its neutrality. This abstention, 
in the latter years of the war, became a major axis of Turkey's relations with the Allies. 
The main reasons for Turkey's neutral position were its mistrust of the Allies and its 
own weaknesses. However, the Allies could not appreciate the circumstances and 
applied pressure on Turkey to join the war. So did Germany. In July 1941, for instance, 
it pressed for free passage of its troops from the Balkans to Syria and Iraq and offered 
28 Jacob C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 
Inc., 1957), Vol. III, pp. 226-228; Altemur Kihc, Turkey and the World, (Washington, D. C.: Public 
Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 76-80. 
29 Inönü knew from his personal experiences in the First World War that Turkey could not rely on 
Western countries' words for Turkey's security. For him, the West could easily sacrifice 
Turkey to 
Germany, Soviets or Italy (Bilge, Ac..., p. 233), as they handed Czechoslovakia over to Hitler. The Axis 
victories also increased Turkey's scepticism about the strength of the alliance. 
The fall of France in 
particular showed how the German army was strong and Britain was powerless 
in protecting its allies. 
Moreover Inönü was aware of that Turkey was unprepared (Necmettin Sadak, `Turkey 
Faces the Soviets', 
Foreign Affairs, April 1949, pp. 449-461). 
30 Dogan Avcilu, `Ili Inönü', Cumhuriyet, 8-9 January 1974. 
31 Aydin, 'Determinants of... ', p. 105. 
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Western Thrace and some of the Greek islands in return. As expected, the Turkish 
refusal was a direct result of its legalist, sceptic, pacific foreign policy principle. When 
the carrot policy did not work Germany tried the stick. Yet Turkey stood its ground and 
maintained its neutrality. Von Papen, the German Ambassador to Ankara reported 
Turkey's position to his government: 
`Turkey reiterates and repeats her unchanged desire to keep out of hostilities and to 
refuse to let herself be drawn into the struggle for any interests which do not directly 
concern her... any attempt to force the Turks to pronounce themselves definitely would 
cause Turkey to adhere to the enemy. '32 
After some Allied victories, in the spring of 1943, the British Prime Minister Churchill 
decided that it was time for Turkey to join the war. Also the Soviet Union had changed 
sides by joining the Allies and wanted to weaken the German armies with a Turkish 
front in south. The Soviet determination to push Turkey from neutrality to war became 
evident, 33 and it pressed for an Anglo-American commitment to force Turkey into the 
war. The United States was reluctant to give such a commitment but in time it also 
demanded Turkish support for a final strike. Thus, the Allies replaced Germany in 
pressuring Turkey to join the conflict. Paradoxically enough, though realising that an 
Allied victory was close, the Turkish leaders became more reluctant to enter the war. 
Apart from a possible German attack, they feared that a Russian invasion was bound to 
occur, as indeed would happen in many Eastern and Central European countries, with 
neither Britain nor the United States being able to curtaine the Russian appetite for 
Turkish territories. If Turkey entered the war its territorial integrity and political 
independence must be guaranteed, or otherwise, as Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen stated, 
Turkey would be in a position of risking its whole existence by coming in. 34 Inönü was 
convinced that if Turkey entered the war without enough legal and military guarantees, 
`the Soviets would occupy Turkey either as a member of the Axis or as a liberator. '35 
These fears were confirmed when the Soviets argued that `The arms England was 
sending to Turkey were not going to be used against Germany, but rather were to be 
used to reinforce Turkey against Russia after the war. 'm 
32 Von Papen, cited in Eren, `The Foreign', p. 301. 
33 Weisband, Turkish..., p. 167. 
34 Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat in War and Peace, Diplomats in Peace and War, 
(London: John Murray, 194? ), p. 203. 
35 Aydin, `Determinants of... ', P. 105. 
36 met $ard Esmer, and others, Olaylarla Türk Dij Politikase: 1919-1965, (Ankara: Di iýleri 
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Apparently the Soviet Union mistrusted the West and considered Turkey weapon to be 
used by the West. At the Moscow Conference, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, 
proposed that the three great powers coerce Turkey immediately into the war. 37 The 
pressure increased even further at the Cairo conference where the Allies implied that 
Turkey would not be able to assume a respected position in the post-war world without 
contributing to common effort . 
38 Unable to resist the Russian and British pressure, 
Turkey agreed in principle to join the war. 39 Yet this was merely a tactical move 
designed to keep Turkey out of the conflict. Turkey now understood that it could not 
convince the United States and Britain about a possible Russian attack, hence used a 
military pretext to resist the Allied demands. The Turkish conditions for entering the 
war were the freeing of the Aegean islands from the Germans by the British, and 
increasing the heavy arms and plane deliveries to Turkey because the Turkish army 
lacked modern equipment and Axis planes were within easy striking range of Turkish 
cities. 40 Turkey demanded 500 tanks, 7,000 trucks, 2,000 tractors, 2,000 artillery and 
aircraft pieces, and 300 planes by the end of 194341 -which it believed that the Allies 
could hardly deliver. This delaying tactic was understandable: for Turkey, the primary 
threat was Russia, not Germany, and Turkey's participation would strengthen the 
Soviets against Turkey. Moreover, the Soviet post-war designs on Eastern Europe were 
apparent to Turkey at a time when the US and the UK still ignored them. Furthermore, 
the Turks felt that the great powers were forcing it into the war in disregard of the costs 
to Turkey. In the words of Weisband, `Turkish policy-makers soon gathered the 
impression that the British and Russians wished to force their country into the war, 
whether or not Turkish cities could be adequately protected, whether or not Turkish 
troops could be properly supplied and reinforced. A2 
Bakanhi Matbaasi, 1968), p. 158. 
37 Robin Denniston, Churchill'in Gizli Savaji, Diplomatik Yazmalar, ingiliz Di; ijleri Bakanlgi ve 
Türkiye, 1942-1944, (Istanbul: Sabah Kitaplan, 1998), p. 178; Bilge, Güc..., p. 188; Sönmezoglu, 'H. 
Dünya... ', p. 81. 
38 Yusuf Tekin Kurat, `Kabine Konferansi Tutanaklan, (4-7 Arahk 1943) ve Türliye'yi Sava. a Sokma 
Giriýimleri', (The Minutes of the Cairo Conference, 4-7 December 1943, and the Efforts for Turkey's 
Entrance to the War), Belleten, Vol. XLVII, No. 185, January 1983, p. 296; Bilge, Gä,.., pp. 192-219. 
39 S6nmezog1u, 'Il. Dunya... ', p. 82. 
40 David, J. Alvarez, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy, The United States and Turkey, 1943- 
1946, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980), p. 26; Kamuran Gürün, `Türkiye'yi H. Dünya 
Savai'na Solna cabalan' (The Efforts for Turkey's Entrance to the War), Belleten (Ankara), 1988. 
4' Alvarez, Bureaucracy..., p. 27. 
42 Weisband, Turkish..., p. 173. 
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Most importantly, the Turkish government felt that the inherent trend of the 
international political equilibrium in the post-war era would lead the British and the US 
to negotiate with the Soviet Union about their sphere of influence. 43 This consideration 
proves that Kemalist Western scepticism and mistrust was still etched on the minds of 
Turkish decision-makers. The mistrust of the West was at such a level that Turkish 
diplomats even avoided written communications about the Soviets with the British and 
the Americans in case the documents would be leaked to the Soviet Union which in 
turn, would use them after the war. 44Hence while the Allies insisted on Turkish 
participation, the Turks continued to demand extensive military assistance before action. 
In fact, the Allied promises to equip the Turks never fulfilled though they continued to 
press Turkey for joining the war. After the failure of the Big Three Conference in 
Tehran, Stalin told Britain that Turkey would never enter the war and that the war 
would last longer because of this. For his part, Churchill used Turkey's fear about the 
Soviet Union again and again. After the 1943 Cairo meeting, for example, he implied 
that Britain would support the Soviet demands in the Dardanelles if Turkey did not 
submit to Allied desires. 45 Subsequently Britain accused Turkey of bad faith and 
recalled its military mission from Turkey without notice. It limited diplomatic relations 
and suspended those military deliveries planned. The US followed it. 46Thus Turkey lost 
military aid, close diplomatic relations and traditional British political support against 
the Soviet Union. 
Throughout 1944, although it limited its economic relations with the Axis and some 
diplomatic relations with Germany in August, Turkey kept stalling and did not declare 
war until the Allies victory was very close. However, it remained greatly alarmed by the 
Soviet advance in Eastern Europe. On 5 September 1944 the Soviet army started to 
occupy Bulgaria, near the Turkish borders. At the same time, Stalin was pressing the 
British and the Americans over Soviet post-war demands over Turkey. In January 1945, 
Churchill and Eden implied that they accepted Stalin's demands on the Turkish Straits47 
by not commenting on these demands to maintain the Soviet support in other fronts, like 
43 Akgonenc, A Study..., p. 49. 
44 Harry N. Howard, Turkey, The Straits and U. S. Policy, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1974), pp. 201-209. 
45 Gönlübol, Olaylarla..., p. 183. 
46 Weisband, pp. 273-283; Sänmezoolu, `II. Dünya... ', p. 82. 
47 Nuri Eren, Turkey, Today and Tomorrow, An Experiment in Westernization, (London and 
Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1963), p. 235. 
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the Pacific. The next month, at the Yalta Conference, Stalin once more sounded the 
issue but did not specify his demands. Thus, at the Yalta, the revision of the Montreux 
Convention was discussed by the Soviet, British and the American leaders, but they 
could not reach any decision. However even discussion of a possible revision alarmed 
the Turks. 48 
In February 1945, when Turkey understood that its neutral policy would isolate it from 
the West, it declared war on Germany. Yet this was too little too late. Victory was very 
close, and the post-war order would be established in full partnership with the Soviet 
Union and, as will be seen later, the Soviet designs on Turkey were anyting but friendly. 
Still as a fruit of the declaration of war, Turkey was a founding member in the San 
Francisco conference and signed the United Nations (UN) Charter. Henceforth three 
trends determined Turkey's internal and external policies: a) The Soviet pressure; b) 
Turkey's approaching to the West, and as a result of this c) democratisation of the 
Turkish political system. 
The Impact of the War and the Domestic Dimension of Turkish Foreign Polic 
Deepened Fears and Scepticism 
Turkey's success in avoiding the war was due to Inönü's personality, the country's 
limitations, the regime's weaknesses and Atatürk's ideological heritage. Kemalism 
provided both the determination to remain impervious to any temptation beyond 
Turkey's borders and the confidence to accept sacrifice for self-defence. 49 
Turkey did not enter the war, but preparations for war cost millions and weakened the 
economy. These difficulties were further exacerbated by world-wide rise in prices and 
the mobilisation of almost a million men. The nation was on constant alert. No one 
knew what to expect from day to day. After the occupation of Greece, the Germans 
could cross to Istanbul and canakkale (Gallipoli) overnight. The entire industrial 
establishment Turkey was able to develop in thirty years could be destroyed. The 
metropolitan areas of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, the heart and spirit of the new regime, 
could similarly be destroyed. In addition to fears of a possible German 
invasion or a 
48 Tan koc, `Turkey's Quest... ', p. 15. 
49 Eren, Turkey..., p. 303. 
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Soviet attack, the pressures from the Allies to enter the war and the economic 
difficulties deepened Turkey's historical fears for its independence and integrity, 
inherited from Atatürk and the Ottoman eras. In other words, the `Sevres-phobia' of the 
1920s reappeared. From the Turkish perspective, the British and the Americans were 
ready to sacrifice the country to the Russians, Germans or Italy; foreigners were 
conspiring yet again to partition Turkey and finally share it between them. 
Postdam gave Turkey its worst nightmare. The West and the Soviets joined against the 
Turks. At the Postdam, Stalin demanded military bases on the Straits with a joint 
control and the Kars and Ardahan provinces of Turkey back to the Soviet Union. 50 
Worst of all, the Conference agreed on that the Montreal Convention should be 
revised. 51 The Second World War underlined Turkey's aloneness in the world once 
more. This constantly preoccupied Turkish decision-makers in the following years to 
become one of the most important principles of Kemalist foreign policy. That is to say, 
fear became a permanent part of the ideology as Turkey's fears about its independence 
and territorial integrity and scepticism of the West evolved into paranoia. Ironically, 
despite its Western scepticism Turkey understood that it could not protect itself against 
the Soviet Union without Western support, and as will be discussed, this in turn made it 
a prisoner of the Western bloc. 
The minorities were among the first victim of the regime's siege mentality. They had 
been viewed as Trojan Horse of the foreign powers in Turkey. The Nazi influence and 
the pressure created by the War aroused these fears again. Varlik Vergis? 2, the Property 
Tax, is an excellent example of this. The National Assembly on 11 November 1942, 
ordained a capital levy on all property-owners, big farmers and businessmen, including 
`those who, while not being merchants, commission-agents, brokers or middlemen by 
profession, have at any time since 1939, be it only on one occasion, received money or 
payment in kind as brokerage or commission, under any name whatsoever, through 
engaging in commercial transactions. 53 The amounts to be paid were fixed by 
50 Bilge, Gäg..., p. 280; Sannay, Türkiye'nin..., p. 50; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, I, (Garden City, 
N. Y.: Doubleday, 1958), pp. 413-416. For `Turley' in Truman's Memoirs also see pp. 424-426 and 451. 
51 Tamkoc, `Turkey's Quest... ', pp. 15-16. 
52 For Varlik Vergisi see Faik Ökte, Varbk Faciasi (The Varhk Disaster), (Istanbul: Nebioglu Yayinlan, 
1951). For a more recent study Ridvan Akar, Varhk Vergisi (Property Tax), (Istanbul: Beige Yayuilan, 
1992). 
53 Lewis, Turkey, pp. 117-121. 
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government local officials and there was no appeal against their assessment. If someone 
could not pay the tax, his / her property would be sold at public auction and if the price 
obtained was insufficient they were sent away to do forced labour. 14 People liable to 
pay were classified under three categories: M, G and D. `M' for Müslümanlar 
(Muslims), `G' for gayrimüslümler (non-Muslims) and `D' for donmeler (converted 
Jewish Muslims who maintained their identity as a different religious sect). Geoffrey 
Lewis claimed that the non-Muslims paid up to ten times the amount levied on a 
Muslim of the same estimated wealth, and dönmes paid about twice as much. ss 
Although this policy was ended on 15 March 1944, by that date it had worked as the 
main tool of Turkification of the Turkish economy because many factories and 
businesses were sold off to ethnically Turkish people. Moreover, its impact continued 
after the war though Turkish governments became more sensitive to ethnic and religious 
minorities and tried to reduce the inequalities among the country's various groups. 
Indeed, religious and ethnic issues have remained one of the taboos in Turkish foreign 
policy and any external attempts to intervene in these issues have been conceived as 
another plan to divide Turkey. As a result, Inönü's minority policy left a permanent 
mark on Turkish foreign policy, making the Kemalists more suspicious of 
democratisation and human rights issues. 
Authoritarianism and Resurgence of the Pan-Turkist School of Thought 
The war years deepened the regime's scepticism about the people in general. 56 As a 
natural result of its ideology the government saw the people as a tool for its ultimate 
aims. Especially foreign relations were perceived as too sophisticated issue for ordinary 
citizens. Throughout these years both domestic politics and the press were kept under 
tight control. Even the semi-official daily papers were closed down on numerous 
occasions. 57 The press and politics were also manipulated in Turkey's effort to stay out 
of the conflict. Under these circumstances liberalism and Islamism, two leading 
opposition groups, were kept under tight control. Some mosques were even closed 
down, and many people were accused of reading religious books, including the Qu'ran. 
54 Ökte, Varbk..., p. 57 and 237. 
55 Lewis, Turkey, p. 119. 
56 Haluk Gerger, Türk Did Politikasmin Ekonomi Politigi, (The Political Economy of Turkish Foreign 
Policy), (Istanbul: Beige Yayinlan, 1998), p. 53. 
57 Cumhuriyet five, Tan seven, Vatan nine, Tasvir-i Eckar eight, Vakit two times. For details of the 
situation of the Turkish press in the war years see: Cemil Kocak, `Ikinci 
Dünya Sava. i ve Turk Basim' 
(The Turkish Press and the Second World War), Tarih ve Toplum, No. 25, November 1986, pp. 
29-33. 
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As a result, in addition to Kemalism, the only ideology allowed by the state was pan- 
Turkism. One of the reasons of this was the German propaganda activities. The 
Germans atempted to control some of the Turkist groups by offering certain Soviet 
territories (some part of Central Asia and the Caucasia). The Turkish government on the 
other hand could not destroy them with a fear of provoking the Nazis. 58 Therefore, it 
can be argued that one of the direct effects of the war was the resurgence of the pan- 
Turkist school in Turkish politics. As noted earlier, Atatürk had focused on the 
reconstruction of Anatolia and the creation of a more homogeneous nation-state rather 
than a Turkist or pan-Turkist empire. However in the 1930s he did not prevent pan- 
Turkist activities since he saw them both as a tool in underscoring the greatness legacy 
of the Turkish race and as a potential political benefit in the future. However during the 
Second World War years, with the effect and support of Nazi Germany Turkists became 
more active and aggressive. When Germany seemed to be on the verge of defeating the 
Soviets, there was a resurgence of Pan-Turkist propaganda, encouraged by the 
officials. 59 Some high ranking officials even gave public support for pan-Turanist 
groups; like General Ali Fuad Erdem; Nuri Pasha, brother of Enver Pasha, a romantic 
figure for Pan-Turkists; General H. E. Erkilet who frequently contributed to Pan-Turkist 
journals such as cmaralta. 60 Even Cumhuriyet, the semi-official paper of the 
government during the 1930s, called several times on Turkey to join Germany in the 
war against the Soviet Union. For pan-Turkists a possible German victory over the 
Soviet Union would give an excellent opportunity to rescue the Turks who were still 
`slaves under the Russian yoke'. The Pan-Turanist movement won many converts 
among university students and the elite. 
61 However its effect on foreign policy was very 
limited. Their fanatic and aggressive attitude had never been accepted by the 
Inönü 
government, which used them for internal and external balancing act. 
For example, the 
pro-Turkist Alparslan Tiirke§, who headed the ultra-nationalist 
Turkish Party for three 
decades, sent a letter including suggestions on foreign policy to 
Inönü in 1939, advising 
the government to occupy the entire Balkans: 
`.. As long as Bulgaria exists we cannot establish long-lasting co-operation with 
Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece.... We have to capture the territories where a million 
Turks live and we have to erase the nation, which strongly 
desires the Turkish country. 
sa Lewis, Turkey, p. 117. 
s9 rib M. Landau, Pan-Turkism, From Irredentism to Cooperation, 
(London: Hurst & Company, 
1995), p. 113. 
60 Landau, Pan-Turkism..., p. 113. 
61 Lewis, Turkey, p. 120. 
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If we do so our influence would increase on the Balkan states. Thus we can set a Balkan bloc. Thanks to this bloc we can stop the Italians and we can redirect the Germans to Russia. After that, if Italy attacks Anatolia we would attack the Italian peninsula through Yugoslavia.... In a possible Russian-German clash we can capture the Caucasia. Then we will attack the Germans with the British and the French because the Germans 
would be too tired to defend themselves.... '62 
This ultra-nationalist and imperial foreign policy and defence understanding differed 
from Inönü's Kemalist foreign policy. Nor were Türkq's means more amenable to the 
regime: 
`To destroy Bulgaria: We must organise some military actions and justify military 
mobilisation.... We must annex Hatay to Turkey to surprise the totalitarian states. First 
we must paint 15-20 of our air planes with the Bulgarian army colours and... thus the 
world will support us and blame the Bulgarians for the war. '63 
In short, despite the resurgence of Pan-Turkism in domestic politics, Inönü did not 
consider this ideology a viable foreign policy alternative. Once the German defeat had 
become clear, pan-Turkist organisations and propaganda were suppressed. TM Henceforth 
pan-Turkist movements would be perceived as a threat by the regime and their activities 
would be restricted or banned. However, Inönü's policies left two long-lasting effects 
on Turkish politics. First, the pan-Turkists were to maintain their ground for a possible 
hatching in future years, as seen in the 1970s. Second, Inönü's harsh policies against the 
Turkists in the last years of the war set Kemalist Turkism apart from the Pan-Turkist 
current, as the Inönü-type Turkism rejected right-wing Turkism by approaching the 
Turkish left. 
From Neutrality to Pro-Western Activism 
Turkey's wartime policy was a survival policy and its only aim was the preservation of 
Turkey as a sovereign independent state. These years clearly underlined the differences 
between the Ottoman adventurist approach and the Republican sceptic and prudent 
foreign policy. Contrary to Ittihat Terakki's alliance with Germany to regain lost 
territories before the First World War, the alliance with the West was entirely a 
62 Lieutenant Alparsian Tärkefs Letter to the President ismet inönii, 18.4.1939. (Letter No. 3-6547, 
The Prime Ministry Archives, Ankara). 
63 This part of the letter cannot be read in the original copy, but it can be guessed that 
Türkei suggest to 
bomb some Turkish small towns by using these Turkish air planes and then to accuse the 
Bulgarians. 
64 Zürcher, Turkey..., p. 214. Many pan-Turlists were prosecuted and the leading figures were put 
in 
prison: Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism, from Irredentism to 
Co-operation, (London: Hurst & 
Company, 1995), pp. 113-116. 
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defensive measure and Turkey was a reluctant partner in this. However, Turkey's war 
time policies led to its isolation after the war. Turkey was accused of having behaved 
selfishly in sparing itself at a time when other countries suffered greatly. The apparent 
contradiction between the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation with Britain and France 
(1939) and the Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact signed with Germany in 1941 was 
seen by the West as a sign of Turkey's unreliability. 65 Also after the disappearance of 
the German threat, Turkey was no longer worthy of great-power attention and became 
peripheral. Turkey felt itself in greater isolation than at any time since 1923.66 The 
Soviet claims and threats came in these circumstances. The war had ended, but not for 
Turkey. It was still under a great danger and had no friends, either the West, or the 
Russians. Furthermore, not only the external pressures but also the internal problems 
threatened the Kemalist regime. The economic difficulties of the War and the regime's 
strict policies had played a crucial part in the emergence of opposition against the 
government and this pushed the government to follow a different strategy in foreign 
relations. As a result, the Turkish government began a democratisation and economic 
liberalisation campaign to attract the West's economic, political and military support. 
External Threats: The Soviet Pressure 
As the World War progressed the importance of the Soviet Union for the Allied war 
effort grew steadily. This led the British and Americans to lend a more sympathetic ear 
to the Soviet demands, and Turkey's extremely cautious policy did not help change 
their attitude. Traditionally, Turkey helped Britain check Russian ambitions in the 
region, or had looked for a partner to counterbalance Russia, but the circumstances had 
changed. The Soviet Union was now the dominant power not only in the region but also 
in Europe, while Britain accepted a division of influence in the region. The Allied states 
had even agreed on possible future changes of the 1936 Montreux convention regulating 
the Turkish Straits and hinted that they would not react to a greater Soviet influence on 
Turkey. 67 The Soviet Union lost no time in using this window of opportunity. The 
Soviet Union's demands focused on the Straits68 and the Turkey's north-eastern 
65 Deringil, `Turkish... ', p. 2. 
66 Eren, Turkey..., p. 303. 
67 Gursel, Tarih..., pp. 232-237; Bilge, Güc..., pp. 280-292. 
68 For the role of the Straits issue in the Second World War and aftermath see: 
Harry N. Howard, Turkey 
on the Straits and the US Policy, (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1974); Harry N. Howard, 
`The United States and Turkey: American policy in the Straits Question, 1914-1963'. 
Balkan Studies, 
Vol. 4, No. 2,1963, pp. 225-250; Fletcher Standefer Crowe, The Soviet Union and the 
Turkish Straits, 
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provinces, 69 but from the Turkish perspective the real Soviet intention was to make 
Turkey a satellite state in a communist bloc . 
7() However, the US and the UK were 
reluctant to give support to Turkey against the Soviet Union. 7' 
In March 1945 the Soviet Union gave Turkey notice that it would not renew their 
bilateral treaty in the following autumn, when it was due to expire. A couple of months 
later the Soviet intention transpired when it declared that it would negotiate a new 
Treaty of Friendship with Turkey if the latter agreed to hand back Kars and Ardahan, 
Turkey's two easternmost provinces, to the Soviet Republic of Georgia, and to accept 
Soviet participation in defence of the Turkish Straits. Moreover, the Soviet advance in 
the Balkans aroused fears in Turkey. The Red Army was in Bulgaria and the communist 
guerrillas seemed poised to take over Greece. In the east, the Russian troops were 
invading Iran. On the northern front, the Soviet navy in the Black Sea posed serious 
threat to Turkey's control of the Straits. 72 Since it could not resist the Soviet Union on 
its own, Turkey desperately searched for Western help. In another word, Turkey was 73 
1933-1945, unpublished PhD thesis, The Florida State University, 1973; Ahmet $ükrü Esmer, `The 
Straits: Crux of the World Politics', Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXV, April 1949, pp. 183-201. 
69 Bilsel, Türk..., pp. 65-86; Yusuf Sannay, Türkiye'nin Bah Ittifakma Yönelioi ve NATO'ya Giriýi, 
(Turkey's Move Ttowards the Western Ally and Its Accession to the NATO), (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm 
Bakanhgi, 1988), pp. 43-45. 
70 Hurewitz claims that the historical Russian strategy to reach the warm seas (i. e. the Mediterranean) was 
unchanged: J. C. Hurewitz, `Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of the Problem', 
World Politics, Vol. XIV, October 1961-July 1962, pp. 605-632. 
71 For the American Foreign Secretary Grew the relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey was 
`friendly' and there was no necessity to intervene their relations: Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk 
Ülman, 
`Ikinci Dünya Savapndan Sonra Turk Did Politikasinda Genel Durum', (The General Outlook of Turkish 
Foreign Policy after the Second World War), in G6nlübol and others, Olaylarla..., p. 194. 
72 Despite the official Soviet demands, the Turkish leftists, like Oran, Ataöv and Gerger, argue that the 
Soviets were not genuinely interested in any territorial gains from Turkey. Of course it was not easy to 
express pro-Soviet ideas during that time, but in the period of 1960-80s the leftist academics criticised the 
Turkish policy-makers and advocated that Turkey and United States provoked the Soviets in the post-war 
era. For example, the leftist academic Baskin Oran claims that the Soviet Union's attitude towards 
Turkey 
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join an alignment with the anti-Soviet states: Personal interview with Baskin 
Oran, 15 December 1997, 
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forced to abandon its pre-war neutrality by the Soviet Union. 74 The year 1945 was 
perfect timing for the Soviet designs, because the Western powers were busy re- 
establishing the post war international order and needed Soviet support. In the words of 
Eren, `under the leadership of the United States, the democracies were engulfed in 
comatose co-operation with Soviet Union'. 75 In these circumstances Turkey's territorial 
integrity could be sacrificed to maintain peace. 
The Turkish efforts to win Western support in the face of adversity did not fail to leave 
and impact on the domestic scene. Foremost among these was the democratisation of 
the Turkish political system. As noted in the next section, there were also internal 
reasons for this development, but the main factor was external. Severe criticism was 
made by the United States Congress of the Inönü regime and some Western countries 
advised Turkey to democratise its political system if it wanted to join the Western 
bloc. 76 Turkey was in such a desperate position that it would even change its political 
system to get American assistance against Soviet aggressiveness. Feridun Cemal Erkin, 
who represented Turkey in the San Francisco conference, wrote in his memoirs that 
before they departed to the United States President Inönü told them that 
`The Americans may ask you when we are going to establish a multi-party regime. If 
they do, tell them that Atatürk's dream was to set up a full democracy, but the wars did 
not allow this. Now that the war is over Inönü's task and desire, as the president of 
Turkey, is to realise this dream. " 
Similarly, Nihat Erim, another delegate, confirmed Erkin's recollection in his memoirs, 
saying that Inönü gave them full authority to declare that Turkey would shortly become 
a multi-party regime. 78 As a result, ironically the Americans learned of the Turkish 
government's plans to change the essence of the regime before the Turkish people. The 
democratisation policy helped but it was not enough to get American support. As will 
be seen, the trigger of a shift in the American policy came from the Russians. For 
example, in the Postdam conference (17 July-2 August 1945) American President 
74 Hale, `Foreign Policy... ', p. 92. 
75 Eren, Turkey..., p. 303. 
76 Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System, (Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 188-192; fiter Turan, Cumhuriyet Tarihimiz (The History of 
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" Feridun Cemal Erkin, `Inönü, Demokrasi ve Did Ili kiler' (Inönü, Democracy and External Relations), 
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Truman said that the Soviet Union's territorial demands from Turkey was a bilateral 
subject between the Russians and the Turks, and should be solved by the two sides. 79 
On the other hand Truman and Churchill claimed that the Straits issue could not be only 
a Soviet - Turkish problem, but international because the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the other countries also had an interest in that. 80 Stalin insisted on the 
Soviet demands and the problem remained unsettled in this conference. 
From Neutrality to Alignment with the West 
In mid-1945, developments in the international balance of power were in Turkey's 
favour. The collapse of Germany created a vacuum in central and eastern Europe which 
was being filled by the Soviet Union. It penetrated deep into the Balkans, and the Red 
Army advanced right to the heart of the European continent - Berlin. Consequently, 
sympathetic or `satellite' regimes were established under Soviet control or influence, 
from Yugoslavia, to Albania, to Bulgaria to Romania. In other countries, like Hungary 
or Poland communists were on the rise. This in turn shattered the American high hopes 
for the post-war order and drove the United States to consider the Soviet-American co- 
operation of the war years. In his memoirs, Truman explained the radical shift in 
American foreign policy: 
`(... ) without American participation there was no power capable of meeting Russia as 
an equal (... ) `Fortress America' notions could only result in handing to the Russians 
vast areas of the globe (... ) this was the to align the USA clearly on the side, on the 
head, of the free world. ' 81 
Thus the United States left its isolationist approach and pacifist attitude towards the 
Soviet Union involving the European security. This development apparently generated a 
positive shift in the American and British policy towards Turkey. 
82 Thus Stalin's plans 
were reversed. In Khruschev's words, `Stalin succeeded in frightening the Turks right 
into the open arms of the Americans. '83 
79 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1958), p. 96. 
80 Gönlübol and Olman, pp. 195-196. 
81 Truman, Memoirs II..., p. 102. 
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As the United States became deeply involved in the defence of Western Europe, Greece 
and Turkey became ever more crucial in blocking the Soviet threat. 84 This cultivated in 
the Truman doctrine of March 1947 which viewed these two countries as the corner 
stone of US containment policy, 85 and accepted a firm Turkish line vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union. When, in 8 August 1946, a formal Soviet note declared the inadequacy of the 
Montreux Convention for the security of the Black Sea and proposed a new regime for 
the Straits, 86 and Turkey, thanks to the American encouragement, was able to reject 
these demands and did it. 87 
The Truman doctrine was not confined to the political area. It also included a$ 400 
million aid package to Turkey and Greece, the largest American bilateral government 
aid programme in peacetime. Moreover, the Truman Doctrine was the start of the 
American commitment to those states threatened by communism wherever they were. In 
this framework, by 1962, Turkey was to receive economic and military aid from the US 
worth of $ 3,7 billion, $ 2,1 billion of which for military purpose. 88 Turkey was also 
admitted into the 1948 Marshall Aid Programme. As a result, Turkey's dependency to 
the West peaked. S9 
84 Bruce R Kuniholm, `Turkey and the West since World War II', in Vojtech Mastny and R Craig 
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Efforts to Enter the Western Block 
Having obtained US support Turkey sought to strengthen its relations with the West 
through written agreements aimed at long-lasting association. It can be argued that to 
achieve this, the Turkish government was ready to do almost anything. Thus Turkey's 
foreign policy was fully geared for incorporation into the Western world. For example, 
though a Muslim country, Turkey supported Israel against the Arabs: `By voting in 
favour of the establishment of the Palestine Conciliation Commission in December 
1948 despite negative Arab votes, Turkey for the first time acted with the West on a 
matter of great concern to the Muslim world. '90 Moreover, Turkey became the first 
Muslim state to recognise Israel on 28 March 1949. The intention was to get the 
sympathy of the perceived influential Jewish community so as to secure US aid. Yet in 
following this course of action, inönü's foreign policy once more underlined the 
Kemalist outlook of the Middle East and the Muslim world. For Turkey the Middle East 
was not its own region but somewhere in the world. Nor was there any room for 
religious considerations in Turkish foreign policy. From the Kemalist point of view, 
Turkey had to be in the Western bloc. Inönü's policy continued another component of 
the Kemalist pragmatic approach: alignment with the powerful side. It also 
demonstrated Turkey's dependence on external developments, as Turkey's attitude was 
also a result of the necessity for American aid. 91 This attitude helped Turkey's relations 
with the West, yet as will be seen in the Baghdad Pact and the Cyprus issue led to 
alienation from the Arab world and left a lasting scar in Turkish - Arab relations. 
92 
Turkey's eagerness to join the Western bloc made it the most ardent proponent of 
European political integration. But as Eren put it, in almost every instance, Turks had to 
fight there way in. 93 Thus Turkey was left out of the European Council at the beginning, 
and a similar case pertained to its entrance into NATO. The problem was that, although 
the US saw Turkey's role in the European defence, European prejudice about `the 
terrible Turks' was still in Europeans' sub-consciousness, and it was difficult for them 
90 Mahmut B. Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference: 1960-1992, The 
Nature of Deviation from the Kemalist Heritage, (New York: Vantage 
Press, 1994), p. 35. 
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to accept the Turks as equal members of the European-fani ly. 94 Hence, even the clear 
American stance and aid could not completely restore Turkey's sense of security. The 
Iranian example and the experience of many Eastern European countries after the war 
reaffirmed Turkey's conviction to be at the core of the Western political and military 
system, lest it be sacrificed on the altar of the Cold War. Moreover, the idea of 
economic aid detached from political considerations was dangerous for Turkish 
security. Turkey had no word in the decision-making process though this was closely 
related to its national interests. Turkish Foreign Minister, Necmettin Sadak, expressed 
Turkey's worries in 1948: `Turkey, already more than an ally of the United States, is 
looking forward to crystallisation of this relationship in an Alliance. ' From the Turkish 
perspective, only full political, military and economic integration with the West could 
guarantee Turkey's security and independence. 95 Furthermore, as noted earlier, Turkey 
had ideologically seen its Europeanisation / Westernisation as a matter of life and death 
and the catastrophic effects of the Second World War and the Soviet pressures on 
Turkey made the regime more desperate for being politically, economically, militarily 
and even culturally part of the Western world. The Western support for Turkey was 
now not only the source of military or financial aid but also the legitimising factor for 
the Kenialist establishment inside. However, even though the West needed Turkey as a 
bastion against the Soviet Union, as will be discussed below, its main role in Western 
eyes was in the Middle East In 1949 NATO was established. The next year, on 1 
August 1950, Turkey, claiming that it had been the first to stand up to Soviet aggression 
formally applied for membership. 96 But the Turkish application met with opposition 
from every quarter (Britain, Belgium, France etc. ), the only supportive country being 
Italy. Britain and France proposed a separate Middle Eastern Alliance with a link to 
NATO because they did not want to guarantee a country so much on the Soviet Union's 
doorstep. They even promised financial and military aid to keep Turkey outside. 97 
When Turkey was rejected, the Inönü government proposed a bilateral alliance to the 
United States in the same year, but this was also refused. 98 During this time the Soviet 
Union was attempting to separate Turkey from the Western bloc, including through the 
94 For the role of the European biases in the relations see Chapter VII of this study. 
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use of inducements. However, by now the Turks had come to view the Soviets as 
historical enemies considering a permanent Turkish-Russian friendship impossible due 
to the historical Soviet demands over Turkey. Besides thanks to the Korean War, on 15 
May 1951, Turkey would be invited by the United States to join NATO. 99 The 
orientation of Turkish foreign policy would be thus firmly set with the West. 
Deviation from Kemalism? 
In the Inönü era three significant developments occurred. First, Inönü gave his own 
interpretation to Kemalist ideology. Second, changes in the international balance of 
power forced Turkey from neutrality to a Western stance. Third, Turkey's security 
dilemma in the post-war years underscored its dependence on the international balance 
of power. 
inönü 
- Type Kemalism: inönism 
Under Inönü, Kemalism as an ideology was dramatically changed, as Inönü's 
interpretation dominated the Kemalist ideology. As noted earlier, Atatürk had avoided 
drawing strict, unchangeable ideological rules. It is true that the Kemalist regime was 
authoritarian, and that Kemalist values determined the Republic's policies. However, 
there was no universal ideology, rather such aims as economic development, 
secularisation of the political life, maintaining Turkish independence etc. 
In the Inönü era, even this set of aims was frozen as the regime became increasingly 
authoritarian and detached from the masses. Whether this new course can be named as 
Kemalism is debatable as it was different from that of Kemal. As has been noted, the 
main reasons for this radical transformation were Inönü's over-cautious personality; 
international developments, particularly the unreliable attitudes of the Western allies; 
economic problems; the resurgence of the traditional Russian threat and bureaucratic 
corruption. As a result, obsessions soon became paranoia and the regime saw enemies 
inside and outside. Atatürk's scepticism of minorities and the West turned into paranoia 
under Inönü. The political opposition groups, like Islamists and liberals and the ethnic- 
religious minority groups (Jewish, Christians etc. ), took the brunt of this paranoia. 
100 As 
99 See the next chapter. 
100 For a vivid example of Indnist interpretation of Kemalism see: Atatürk 
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will be seen, despite Turkey's close relations with the West in the 1950s and the 60s, 
under the impact of the Inönü years, Turkish policy-makers would continue to see these 
groups as a threat to unity and stability. 
This situation inevitably reflected on foreign policy. As in the Atatürk era, the president 
exercised supreme power over foreign policy issues, and Parliament's power was 
limited. 101 Moreover, Inönü tightened his control of the state agencies, press and the 
people. As mentioned earlier, even the press was under serious pressure and the 
government closed down many newspapers. 102 Foreign policy problems were very 
sensitive issues and no one had the right to voice ideas unless allowed by the 
government. 
The most lasting effect of the Inönü era was the transformation of the civil service and 
other Kemalist elites into a significant political force with a clear group-consciousness. 
The war and the attendant need to maintain tight control greatly increased the number of 
civil servants. Also their responsibilities and power were widened during these years. 
The party, RPP, was the home of all Kemalists, evolving from a political party to a 
state-party in the 1930s and 1940s, providing provincial governors. Opposition to the 
Party was considered an act of national treachery. In the words of Shaw and Shaw: `The 
RPP was more than just a political organisation; for many its members, it was a religion. 
'103 It was their lives, it was the nation... 
Inönists claimed that they were Kemalists, and that the state belonged to the Kemalists. 
They used the state power to become the most powerful political group and holding the 
political and military posts. Unfortunately they lacked Atatfirk's pragmatism. This 
spelled future trouble by putting this elite in a collision course with the political and 
economic groups such as liberals, Marxists, Islamists, nationalists, villagers and 
businessmen who desired a more liberal political and economic system. As will be seen, 
the 1960 military coup would prove how serious this conflict was. 
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From Scepticism to Paranoia 
As noted earlier, the Ottoman experience and the War of Independence had caused a 
`Sevres-phobia', namely obsessive fears that the external world was conspiring to 
partition Turkey and share it. Ironically, this suspicion towards the world, the West in 
particular, as has been discussed, had become one of the characteristics of Kemalist 
foreign policy. However, Atatürk's pragmatism and realism had balanced his 
scepticism. Yet the Second World War with the Soviet demands on some Turkish 
territories and the Turkish straits in the post-Second World War as discussed revived the 
Sevres-phobia turning it during the Inönü era into a paranoia. Even in the post War 
years, despite Turkey's participation in the Western security system this paranoia would 
continue to determine Turkish foreign policy. 
The second development in the Inönü era was Turkey's shift from neutrality towards a 
pro-Western position. It can be said that, this did not fit with Kemalist neutrality. So it 
can be claimed that Inönü's foreign policy implementation deviated from Kemalist 
foreign policy understanding. As narrated in the previous Chapter Atatürk had always 
aimed at the preservation of Turkey's neutrality. He had also sought a good relationship 
with the West. During his period, the problems left over from Lausanne, the 
international crisis and the West's attitude had prevented this. Under these circumstance 
Kemal had no alternative but neutrality between Russia, Germany, and Britain. Turkey 
also used small organisations, like the Balkan Pact, to build a security belt albeit an 
ineffective one. This policy continued in the Inönü era. But after the war it was almost 
impossible to preserve Turkey's neutrality. The end of the Second World War increased 
Turkey's isolation from the West. The Soviets had publicly threatened Turkey, and 
there was no power to counterbalance this but the West. In addition, internal economic 
and political problems partly caused by the Second World War forced the Turkish elite 
to find a new way. For instance Turkey's GDP decreased 25 % in these years. 
104 
Moreover, Turkey's own resources were too limited to overcome the post-war economic 
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Aydemir, 
Ihtilalin Mantigt ve 27 Mayis Ihtilali, (The Logic of Revolution and The Revolution of 
27 May), 
(Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1973), p. 141. 
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problems. Almost all political groups agreed that Turkey needed foreign economic aid 
in post-war era. 105 
Under these circumstances, it can be said that the West was not a choice for Turkey but 
rather a necessity, aimed at preserving its integrity and security. Because Turkey could 
not meet the Soviet threat with its own resources, it chose to enter the West. 106 Hence, 
Turkey's entrance to NATO did not fit with neutrality but it was not a contradiction of 
Kemalist foreign policy understanding, on the contrary, if Mustafa Kemal had found the 
opportunity he would have done the same thing. In this framework, Inönü's foreign 
policy can be considered a restoration of Kemalist foreign policy, not a real deviation 
from it, because in Kemalist ideology pragmatism was more important than 
isolationism. In another words, Turkey's alignment with the West was a deviation from 
isolationism, not from Kemalism. The ideological impasse and the international 
circumstances imposed this course of action on Turkey. '°7 
The Inönü era also showed that Turkey, though a small-state, confronted the same 
problems the Ottoman Empire had faced. Turkey did not have the power to shape 
international relations even for preserving its own independence and regime. As seen 
above, the regime was in a legitimacy crisis after the War. The economy had collapsed 
and Stalin demanded some Turkish territories. Inönü had no tool for all these threats, 
but the international balance of power and saw to join the West and adopt Western 
economic and political models in domestic politics as the only solution. 108 As a result, 
the autocratic Inönü government realised a radical shift in the economic and political 
systems, and efforts were started to liberalise the Turkish economy and democratise the 
political system. Thus, similar to the last years of the Ottoman Empire, integration with 
the West became the most important factor in democratisation and improvement of 
human rights conditions in Turkey. The West's push for democratisation would increase 
Kemalist scepticism, yet they had no alternative but the West. 
105 Haluk Gerger, Turk Dij Politikasimn Ekonomi Politigi, Soguk Savq'tan Yeni Dünya Düzenine, 
(The Political Economy of Turkish Foreign Policy), (Istanbul: Beige Yayinlan, 1998). 
106 Gönlübol, `A Short... ', p. 17. 
107 The Turkish scholar Cem Erogul claims that the 1947 Turkish-American agreement was a 
deviation 
from Kemalism and Turkey's Western alignment was simply against the Kemalist foreign policy 
understanding: Ccm Erogul, Demokrat Parti, Tarihi ve 
Ideolojisi, (The Democrat Party, Its History and 
Ideology), (Ankara: huge: Kitabevi, 1990), p. 178. 
108 Gerger, Türk Die..., pp. 37-39. 
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Finally, the end of the Inönü era marked the end of the setting of Kemalist foreign 
policy ideology and the one-approach years. Contrary to the Ottoman period, 109 in the 
Atatürk and Inönü eras the State did not allow any alternative understanding and 
suppressed them by law or by force. Ironically, hereafter Turkish political life became 
the story of the conflict between the Kemalist forces and the other alternative schools, 
such as conservatives, Islamists, pro-nationalists, Marxists etc.. The struggle between 
them would naturally reflect on foreign policy issues as well. Turkey in these years 
under the war circumstances became more autocratic, yet security needs forced the 
Inönü regime to a multi-party system inside Turkey and a pro-Western stance in the 
world. As will be seen in the next chapter, these two currents, namely democratisation 
and Cold War politics determined Turkey's domestic and foreign policy in the 
following years. 
109 As discussed in Chapter I, there has been a relatively pluralistic political environment 
in the Ottoman 
years compared with the one-party regime. 
Islamists, Turkists, Socialists, Ottomanists and the other 
political groups were able to defend their 
ideas, in particular after the II. Mesrutiyet, while as has 
been 
seen in Chapter III the Republican Turkey allowed only 
the secular Westernst Kemalists to form 
political party and surpassed all the other oppositions. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Democratic Approach vs. Kemalism 
The post-war era saw a pro-Western policy in Turkey. As Turkey moved away from 
neutrality in foreign policy and continued a democratisation process aimed at achieving 
American support and regime legitimacy. These two trends - westernisation of foreign 
policy and democratisation - determined Turkish political life in the post-war decades 
and began with Democrat Adnan Menderes. The Democrat approach in domestic and 
foreign policy under Menders was the first serious challenge to Kemalism and first 
serious deviation from the Kemalist foreign policy tradition. ' 
Internal Changes: Liberalisation in Politics and Economy 
Until the 1950s the experiments with political democracy conducted in Turkey had been 
imposed from the above, starting with the Union and Progress experiment of 1908 and 
continued with Atatürk's establishment of the Republic in the 1920's. These 
experiments were limited in duration and were replaced inevitably with authoritarian 
regimes. 2 The war and the etatist policy of the Inönü government increased the 
economic problems and dissatisfaction among the middle class and the villagers. 
Combined with the need for US economic and political support, and with increasing 
pressures from domestically and externally, President Ismet Inönü reintroduced a multi- 
party system after the Second World War. Despite Inönü's decision, the local party and 
state authorities and the other authoritarian forces resisted democratisation, and the 
elections of July 1946 highlighted the RPP's obstinacy. The official elite had, for more 
than twenty years, been enforcing the dictates of the Government, and as pointed out in 
the previous chapter, they had developed group-consciousness during the 
Inönü years. 
They believed that a multi-party regime was unnecessary and even a betrayal of 
Kemalism, at least for a while. As the owner of the state they perceived power as not 
' As argued in the previous chapter, tnönü period also saw slight 
deviations from Kemalism yet the 
change was limited. Moreover the change in the 
Inönü period was a transformation of Kemalism more 
than a deviation into a new understanding. Hence it can be argued that 
the Menderes era is the first 
serious challenge to Kemalist orientation. 
2 Osman Okyar, `Stepping Stones to Europe, A Historical Perspective', in Turkey and Europe 
in a 
Cultural Context, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1998), pp. 9-16, p. 15. 
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only a right, but also as a responsibility, as a task. 3 However the multi-party system 
provided alternatives for internal and foreign politics. 
Despite the resistance from his party, 4 Ismet Inönü, addressing the parliament on 1 
November 1945, declared himself in favour of having an opposition party and argued 
that as the war was over there was more room for democracy. This speech encouraged 
some prominent members of the RPP to establish an opposition party and resulted in the 
resignation of four of them - Adnan Menderes, Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, Refik Koraltan 
and Celal Bayar- to found the Demokrat Parti, DP (Democratic Party) on 7 January 
1946. Although the first `democratic' elections of July 1946 were not fully democratic 
under a tensioned atmosphere and repression in many provinces. ' the DP gained a 
significant number of the seats, 62 of the 465.6 Following the elections the widespread 
support for the DP and its political and economic liberalism, which used the basic 
Kemalist tenets of nationalism and secularism, led alarmed the RPP, but it was too late. 
The Democrats claimed that it was the only political group, which would finish what 
Mustafa Kemal had begun and Bayar had made an agreement with Inönü that the DP 
would respect the Atatürk principles. 7 Moreover the DP identified itself as anti- 
communist8 and accused the government of being soft on communism, thus justifying 
its existence in Turkish political life and gaining American support. In the years 1945 to 
1946, fifteen new parties were founded. However, thanks to its good relations with the 
regime and other power sources, the DP emerged as the major opposition party while 
some parties like Türkiye Sosyalist Emekci ve Köylü Partisi (Turkish Socialist Workers 
and Peasants Party) founded in 1946 by $efik Hüsnü Degmer, were closed down. The 
DP opposition forced the RPP to allow religious education in the schools and to reform 
the Village Institutes known as `atheist schools' by the conservatives. 
Furthermore the RPP had no choice but to move even closer to the DP programme on 
many issues, such as the economy. For instance, Turkey in 1950 applied for 
3 Frank Tachau, The Republican People's Party, 1945-1980', in Metin Heper and Jacob M. L Landau 
(eds. ), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991), p. 102. 
4 Tachau, `The Republican... ', p. 101. 
5 Ahmad, The Making..., p. 107. 
6 Celal Bayar stated that according to an enquiry of the DP the real number of seats won by the party was 
279! Zürcher, Turkey..., p. 222. 
Cem Erogul, Demokrat Parti, Tarihi ve Ideolojisi, (The Democrat Party History and Ideology). 
(Ankara: Ankara tUniversitesi SBF, 1970), p. 12. 
8 Robinson, The First..., p. 175. 
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membership of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and devalued the Turkish lira by 
120 per cent. With additional liberalising measures Turkey was slowly integrating into 
the US led-world economy. However RPP's hard-liner members were resisting the 
change9 arguing that etatism was the best way for Turkish development. Therefore, for 
certain RPP members economic liberalism meant losing power. The elections of 14 
May 1950 put an end to the one-party regime and only four years after its establishment 
the DP received 408 seats (53.4 per cent of the vote) in parliament while the RPP got 69 
seats (39.8 per cent of the vote). 10 Moreover, all the provinces where the RPP won were 
to the east of Ankara, the less developed region of Turkey. In other words, most of the 
RPP support came from the areas controlled by the tribal chiefs of the Eastern Turkey, 
while the relatively rich provinces supported the DP. 
The new DP government was very different from those of the Kenialist era. Although 
the central leadership came out of the RPP, most of its members were young and from 
the rural areas. The DP had very close links with the people but had not much 
representation in the bureaucracy or military. Indeed much of what the DP promised 
went against the interest of officers such as strengthening local government against the 
governors and the bureaucracy; greater religious freedom; support for the private sector 
instead of state enterprise; liberalisation in politics; devoting a significant percentage of 
the budget to the villages and agriculture; easier farm credit; protection from excesses 
committed in the villages by the gendarmes. In short, the DP promised to protect the 
people from the state by `exploiting the hostility of the people towards their 
government" and this made a clash between the party and the bureaucracy inevitable. 
Ideological Sources and the Main Determinants of the Democrat Foreign Policyi2 
There was no essential difference between DP and RPP foreign policies before the 1950 
elections. Both of them based their foreign policy on friendship with the US and the 
9 Alimad, The Making..., p. 105. 
lo After the election the people organised meetings to celebrate the DP's victory. The celebrations were 
protest-like and showed the people's dissatisfaction with the one party-years: Cumhuriyet, 15 May 1950. I' Ahmad, The Making..., p. 105. 
12 For general discussion of DP's foreign policy see: Hüseyin Baaci, Demokrat 
Parti Dönemi Diý 
Politikasi, (Foreign Policy of the DP Period), (Ankara: Imge Yaymlan, 1990); Malimut Dikerdem, 
Ortadogu'da Devrim Yillan, Bir Büyükelcinin Andari, (The Revolution Years in the Middle East, 
Memoirs of an Ambassador), (Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1990); Gönlübol and others, 
Olaylarla..., pp. 13 7- 
334; Erogul, Demokrat..., pp. 61,68-74,82,99-101. 
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Western bloc and believed that communism was the greatest menace that Turkey faced. 
Both also had a Kemalist foreign policy heritage, and the DP Programme hardly 
differed from that of the RPP. However, Kemalism was not the only ideological source 
of the DP's foreign policy, and this created an altered foreign policy from that of the 
RPP. The Democrats were fed by three different ideological sources: Kemalism, 
liberalism (in economic issues) and conservatism (more tolerant to the religious 
matters). 
Kemalism and DP Foreign Policy 
Despite their rivalry with the RPP, the DP founders were fervent supporter of Atatürk. 
Celal Bayar declared in his memoirs that he was fanatic of Kemalism. 13 As former RPP 
members, they were Republican and loyal to the Kemalist values, particularly 
secularism, nationalism, Westernism and republicanism. The DP founders did not claim 
a new ideology, but differed in the application of ideas. Therefore it can be said that the 
DP made efforts to carry out some Kemalist foreign policy aims, such as partnership 
with the West, and defending status quo in the region etc. However a different 
methodology, external factors and the structural economic and political changes shifted 
the DP's political ground away from Kemalism. Hence, the Kemalist effect on the 
Democrat foreign policy was limited. The DP's policies were not against the Kemalist 
tenets in essence, but a mixture of Kemalism and other considerations. Moreover, the 
developments in this period forced them to find a new way. The core-Democrats were 
not anti-Kemalist, 14 however the Democrat Party in a short time became the focal point 
of anti-Kemalist groups. Remembering how Kemalists had suppressed the opposition in 
the 1920s-30s, anti-Kemalists claimed they were Kemalists claiming Kemalism needed 
a new interpretation. Thus a new tradition emerged in Turkish politics: takiyye 
(pretence) policy. Especially the marginal groups had to hide their real aims to save 
themselves. 
Americanism and Westernism 
The second pillar of the Democrat approach, perhaps the most 
important, was its 
American style Westernism. Unlike the RPP's radical Republican 
Westernism based on 
the revolutionary French experiences, Democrat Westernism was 
based on the British- 
13 Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdhm, (I Wrote too), (Istanbul: 1968), p. 145. 
14 Erogui, Demokrat..., p. 12; Bayar, Ben de... 
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American model. It was evolutionary not revolutionary and was a resurgence of the 
Americanist school of the 1920s and 1930s. The Democrats sincerely believed in an 
American political, economic model and dreamed to transform Turkey into a `little 
United States'. 15 It is true that, after the Second World War, the Inönü government had 
also looked for American friendship and even implied some structural changes in 
Turkish political life towards the American style, and the transformation to the multi- 
party regime was one of the direct results of this. However, the shift in the RPP's 
policies was tactical; while Inönü believed in the need for American support, the DP's 
ideology was based on Western liberal democratic philosophy. 16 Kemalists attacked the 
DP's Americanism claiming its aim was not Westernisation of Turkey but making 
Turkey a bastion of the West. '7 The DP saw itself as the representative of the people 
with the mission to transform the country to a modern, liberal, democratic Western 
country. Indeed, most RPP members were openly against American values, the DP saw 
American civilisation as the ultimate aspiration for Turkey. In this context, the 
Democrats, for a first time in Turkish history, adopted a systematic American political 
approach and became the pioneers of the Americanist political school in Turkey. '8 
The impact of this ideological orientation was significant: First, the Americanist 
Democrats encountered antagonism from RPP members particularly those with leftist 
leanings who identified with the Soviet Union. Not only the radicals in the RPP but the 
party itself was still sceptical about the West and blamed the West for exploiting and 
colonising the third world. Secondly, thanks to the Democrat's American civilisation 
project, Turkey's post-war foreign policy under the Democrats was perceived as a 
crucial element in the Democrat vision to transform Turkey. 
19 Third, the Democrat 
Americanism or British Westernism not only determined Democrat foreign policy, but 
also affected all aspects of the political and social life in Turkey, and was perceived as a 
serious challenge by the Kemalists which culminated in a military coup in 1960. 
15 Gerger, Turk Di$..., p. 65. 
16 Shaw and Shaw have a different argument: `... one of the brightest aspect of the new 
Turkey has been 
the general agreement of all the major parties on the basic lines of foreign policy. 
' Shaw and Shaw, 
History of..., p. 429. 
17 Niyazi Berkes, `Satihk Memleket' (A Homecounhy to Sale), Y6n, No. 98,12 February 1965, p. 8. 
"3 In fact there were some Americanists in the Independence War, like Halide 
Edip Adivar and then 
Ahmet Emin Yalman, who advocated American mandate, annexation or close relations with the 
US to 
save the country from the Europeans, but these attempts were mainly personal and not 
influential. Also 
most of them were not aware of the American political 
/ economic system but aimed the US military 
support for Turkey. 
19 Ahmad, The Making..., p. 118. 
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Besides the ideological orientation, another factor that demolished Turkish scepticism 
of the West was the Soviet and communist threat. Thus, despite Turkey's tradition of 
diplomatic bargaining, the rise of a hostile Soviet power forced the Democrats into a 
firm commitment to the Western allies. 20 Hence, DP foreign policy, contrary to the 
Kemalist understanding, lacked Western scepticism; for the DP Turkey was not alone, 
there were common threats to the democrat world, not only to Turkey. According to this 
understanding, international solidarity could save Turkish interests as well. As a result, 
Turkey under DP rule championed international co-operation and organisations against 
the communist attacks. DP's anti-communism not only ensured Western support in the 
international arena, but also legitimated its scepticism-free Westernism and gave it a 
free hand in domestic politics. 
Capitalism and the Need for Foreign Aid 
The DP's economic policies, like its political policies, were also based on liberalism. 
Contrary to the etatist RPP, the DP advocated a state-free economy similar to the United 
States economic model. As a result, despite its good relations with the State, one of the 
leading groups in the DP were members from private business class, especially esnafs 
(small tradesmen). This group was against the etatist RPP policies, and demanded a 
more liberal economy. The DP soon became the spokesman for private enterprise and 
individual initiative. 2' Not only businessmen, but also villagers, workers and the liberals 
fed up with the etatist policies. Poverty and lack of basic services such as education and 
health, had worsened during the war years and after, particularly in the villages and the 
poor districts of the cities, but they were neglected by the RPP. The DP's 
liberal 
promises led ordinary `little man' to believe that `by helping the Democrats come to 
power not only would he liberate himself from an oppressive state 
but the DP would 
also improve his material lot. '22 The DP aware that the most 
important factor in its 
power was the people's support, had promised a relaxation of government controls, 
more opportunity for private initiative, 
increased public services and greater 
concentration on agricultural development and modernisation. 
Indeed one of the slogans 
of the DP in the elections was `Her mahalleye 
bir milyoner'(a millionaire for every 
20 Robinson, The First..., p. 175. 
21 hmd, ThMaking... A , p. 
105. 
22 Robinson, The First..., p. 106. 
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district). After the election, Turkey's economy grew rapidly for five years. 23 The 
transport, telecommunication and energy systems were developed. The road network 
rose from about 10,000 km in 1950 to about 24,000 km in 1960. The number of private 
cars climbed from 8,000 to 45,800. Electric power increased four times in ten years 
while agriculture was being modernised, land under cultivation rose to 23.264 billion 
hectares from 14.5 billion hectares. The number of tractors increased about three times 
from 1,756 to 43,436 by 1960.25 Total agricultural output was doubled, and industrial 
production rose from an index of 100 in 1948 to 256 in 1960.26 Turkey thanks to the 
improvements in the agricultural sectors became one of the world's major wheat- 
exporting countries with its production of cereals in 1953 totalled over 14 million metric 
tons, which was just 8 million in 1950.27 Especially the early 1950s were the golden 
years of the DP era. Between 1950-1953 in particular Turkey experienced a miracle-like 
13 percent a year increase in its GDP. 28 With this economic development literacy 
increased, the health system was reformed and many new goods that Turks had never 
seen became available. 
The problem was that, in reality the role of the DP's liberalising policies in bringing 
economic success was limited, and the main reasons for the rapid growth between 1950- 
1955 were the good weather, the bumper grain crop and foreign aid. 29 The economy 
began to show signs of stagnation with a radical drop in the growth rate by 1954.30 
However the government was unaware or underestimated these factors as it maximised 
popular support. But economic development creating more pressure on the suffering 
budget brought its own problems, such as price inflation and a trade gap. The budget 
fell into chronic debt (to almost 20 per cent of average revenues). 31 The new desire for 
consumer goods awakened among the social groups supporting the DP government, yet 
the government had no fresh source to continue development. Thus the government 
23 For the economic development in the DP period see: William Hale, The Political and Economic 
Development of Modern Turkey, (New York: 1981); Morris Singer, The Economic Advance of 
Turkey, 1938-1%0, (Ankara: 1977); Osman Okyar, `Development Background of the Turkish Economy, 
1923-1973', Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Winter 1993, pp. 20-21. 
24 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., pp. 408-409. 
25 Hale, The Political..., pp. 87-113. 
26 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., 409. 
27 Lewis, Turkey, p. 131. 
28 Ahmad, The Making..., p. 116. 
29 Davison, Turkey, p. 152; Türkkaya Ataöv, `The 27`h of May Revolution and Its Aftermath', Turkish 
Yearbook of International Relations, 1960-1961, p. 15. 
30 Gerger, Türk Die..., p. 75; Ahmad, The Making..., p. 116. 
183 
expenditure upon industrial and agricultural areas was increased. As a result, Turkey's 
foreign debt reached to 12 billion US American dollars at the end of the DP period. 32 In 
addition to the trade gap, chronic debt and inflation, economic problems also created 
social and political problems in the last years of the 1950s. The civil and military 
officers, who had the real power in a fledgling democracy, were suffering economically 
because inflation had decreased the real value of their salaries. They believed that the 
government was supporting other social groups, namely businessmen, tradesmen, 
villagers, workers, religious people etc., at the expense of revolutionary groups, officers 
and the Kemalist elite. 33 Apart from the army officers, the DP's economic and political 
policies caused a social tension. High inflation was in particular was the main 
responsible for instability. The unrest among the university intellectuals, writers and the 
youth was significant. The student riots for instance increased the tension in the 1960s. 34 
Under these circumstances, not only the government but also the regime was in danger 
in the late 1950s. Therefore the DP was desperate to find fresh foreign loans. Thus 
foreign aid became an important factor in Turkish foreign policy. In these circumstances 
the DP declared that its principle mission was the introduction of foreign capital into 
Turkey. 35 In this context, the need for foreign loans would play a crucial role in making 
the DP's pro-Western Middle East and Balkan policies and increase Turkish economic 
dependence on USA. 
Besides the domestic needs, the second cause for foreign aid was external. Menderes 
always emphasised that Turkey was the bulwark of defence of the region, however its 
power was limited to play such a role, and it was necessary to increase its economic 
strength with the American help. 36 Hence, Turkey's military expenditures increased to 
match US's design for the region. 
Conservatism and Islam in DP Foreign Policy 
31 Gerger, Türk Die..., p. 74. 
32 Erogul, Demokrat..., p. 180. 
33 Aydemir, Ihtiialin..., pp. 264-270; Ahmad, The Making..., pp. 121-122. 
34 Aydemir, I6tilalm..., pp. 221-286. 
35 Cem Erogul, `The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-71, in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugnil Ahmet 
Tonak (eds. ), Turkey in Transition, New Perspectives, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), pp. 101-141, p. 110. 
36 Ara Sanjian, `The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact', The Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, 
April 1996, pp. 226-266, p. 228. 
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In the area of religion, DP's policies were similar to its economic policies: It was not 
against Kemalism's secularism and `DP did not exploit religion for its own gain'37 but it 
opposed applying the secular principles in an Inönist way. The RPP, believing religion 
was a most dangerous area, argued that it could not be left to the people's initiative. The 
Inönü era, for instance, was the most difficult years for Islamic practitioners. Islamists 
claim that many Muslims had to hide thousands of Qu'ran, the holy book, and other 
religious materials under the soil. Also many more, accused of reading the religious 
books or practising Islamic worships, 38 were arrested by the gendarme. The Democrats 
were also mainly secular, but since public support and foreign support were the main 
legitimising force for power, they were more moderate. Thus, the first cracks in 
Turkey's religious taboo appeared in these years, when politicians began to realize that 
proper playing of the religious card was an effective way of garnering votes. 39 For the 
DP, religion was one of the inseparable elements of the Turkish nation and the Turkish 
history. They argued that demolishing the religious values would undermine the unity of 
the Turkish nation and as a result would damage social harmony. Moreover, for the 
DP's understanding people's demands were essential and more important than the 
state's official principles. Menderes, for example, told parliamentarians: `if you want 
you can bring seriat (Islamic law) to Turkey '. 40 In this framework, in the election 
campaign the Democrats promised greater religious tolerance. Thus the Turkish 
people's yearning for more religious freedom at last found an outlet with Turkey's 
transition to multi-party democracy with the DP. 41 
The second factor for the resurgence of Islam was due to the DP's economy policies. 
The majority of Turks benefited from rapid economic development in the 1950s, 
particularly the businesses sector and people in the rural areas. The fledgling Turkish 
bourgeois gained self-confidence; the working class started to gain a class- 
37 Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy (1950-1975), (London: C. Hurst, 1977), p. 19; 
Richard Tapper, `Introduction', in Richard Tapper (ed. ), Islam in Modern Turkey, (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1991), p. 9. For a different view see Ataöv, `27th of May... ', pp. 16-17 and Erogu1, Demokrat..., 
pp. 80-81. 
38 For the details of the claims see Islamist author-journalist Abdurrahman Dilipak's studies esp.: 
Bir 
Ba4ka Acidan Inönü (Inönü from a Different Perspective), (Istanbul: Beyan, 1990). 
39 Heath Lowry, `Challenges to Turkish Democracy in the Decades of the Nineties', Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. V, Fall 1996, pp. 89-111, p. 
94. 
40 Ömer Dedeoglu, Bir Milletvekilinin Günlügänden, Amlar (From a Parliamentarian's Memoir), 
(Ankara: 1999), p. 45. 
41 Abdullah al-Ahsan, Ummah or Nation, Identity Crisis in 
Contemporary Muslim Society. 
(Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1992), pp. 78-80. 
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consciousness and contrary to the RPP era, there were now many economic classes and 
power centres in the country. 42 The population was growing very quickly and the many 
villagers were pouring into the towns and the cities and bringing their traditions and 
values. 43 All this demolished the Kemalist monopoly in political life. Particularly the 
lower-classes, the new workers who had come from the rural areas found an opportunity 
to show their cultural and traditional values and demanded policies that accorded with 
their values. As mentioned, the DP was a populist party and as such gave more 
importance to popular cultural and religious demands than the RPP did. Also, as seen, at 
this time people were relatively powerful and had financial and political power to 
nourish the Islamic movement. Actually, the ordinary Turkish citizen demanded more 
freedom in the religious matters, but not an Islamic state and `it was not the religious 
basis of the DP's political ideology, but its tolerant attitude towards religion, which 
made the Democrat Party popular among the voters. '44 They were identifying 
themselves as Muslim Turkish people, not only Turkish, or Muslim. In other words, 
they demanded peace with religion and tradition. The poor popular support for the 
Millet Partisi underscored this reality. The Millet Partisi (the Nation Party), which 
represented the more religious wing of the opposition to the RPP, got a poor vote in the 
1950s elections. 45 The Nation Party (NP) had used more religious slogans in the 
elections yet the obvious choice of the Muslim Turk was the moderate DP. The DP saw 
these demands and tried to make peace among the state and the people to reconcile the 
nationalist ideas with religious values. Unlike the RPP the DP formed its policies 
according to people's preferences. This new understanding resurrected the 
liberal 
Ottomanist school of thought in a different form. Their slogan highlighted the difference 
between the DP and the RPP: `Enough is Enough! It's the people's turn to speak'. As 
will be seen, this school of thought would continue under the AP, 
ANAP and DYP in 
future years, under the name of Türk-Islam Sentezi (Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis). 
As a result of the DP's religious tolerance policy, the traditional 
Arabic call (ezan) to 
prayer from the minarets was restored with its Turkish equivalent. 
The State radio 
stations began to broadcast Arabic Quran verses. 
New mosques were built both 
42 Erogul, Demokrat... and Gerger, Türk..., pp. 64-97. 
43 liter Turan, `Religion and Political Culture in Turkey', Richard Tapper 
(ed), Islam in Modern 
Turkey, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p. 45. 
44Turan, `Religion and... ', p. 45. 
45 Tom, 'Religion and... ', pp. 78-79; Lewis, Turkey, p. 16. 
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privately and by the state. The türbes (religious mausoleums) were officially opened. 
The role of the Islamic groups in politics and society also increased. 46 The people's 
warm welcome to the DP's policies alarmed the Kemalists and the RPP, and the 
Kemalist bureaucracy and the Kemalist elite perceived these developments as a betrayal 
of Kemalism, and blamed the DP for undermining the secular Kemalist revolution. 
Indeed when a campaign opposed to the statues and the portraits of Atatürk began, the 
DP realised that it had started a process which it could not control. Thus, the Democrats 
slowed down the Islamists, and cracked down on extreme religious organisations while 
the NP (Nation Party) known as a religious party was dissolved. 47 Despite these 
measures the DP continued its tolerant religious policy and religious Turks mainly 
supported the DP and its successors. 
The differences between the DP and the RPP naturally influenced their foreign policy 
attitudes. The DP's conservatism brought about a new line in Turkish foreign policy, 
but this had little impact on Turkey-Muslim world relations as the Menderes 
governments determined their policies according from a Western perspective. 
The first effect of the DP's position was on its anti-communist attitude. DP supporters 
were mainly religious -at least traditional- and from the middle classes. Therefore there 
was an ideological barrier to co-operation with the communist Soviet block. On the 
other hand, as the member of a party which carried out the radical anti-religious 
reforms, most the RPP members, like the communists, were against the religious 
tolerance of the DP and many declared that they were atheists. This ideological 
similarity with the communists increased the Kemalist Western scepticism in the RPP 
and widened the gap between the RPP and the DP on foreign policy issues. 
The third reason for the Islamic resurgence was the US's containment policy. 
As the 
Americans saw Islam as a bulwark against Marxism, particularly in the Middle East, 
they supported the Islamic movements in the region and in Turkey. 
Moreover, the West 
demanded from Turkey a more active role in the Middle East. According to this plan, 
Turkey would be at the heart of an anti-Soviet security organisation 
in the region. Since 
46 Al-Ahsan, Umnah..., pp. 78-79; Lewis, Turkey, P. 16. 
47 Howard A. Reed, `Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics', Current History, 
32, June 1957, pp. 337- 
338. 
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Turkey was perceived as an atheist regime by the Arabs, it had to increasingly Islamise 
its policies. Thus, with American encouragement and the people's warm welcome the 
DP opened doors for a more Islamised Turkey. 
While its economic and foreign policies helped the Islamic resurgence, Democrat 
conservatism also helped to push the Turkish people towards pro-Western policies. 
Despite Kemalist perceptions (or obsessions), the Democrats played the most active role 
in the Islamic world since the end of the Ottoman Empire. In some degree, the 
Democrats' conservatism made possible such a policy. Thanks to the DP's new Islamic 
understanding, Menderes sought co-operation with Egypt, Iraq and Jordan and even 
seriously planned to occupy some countries like Iraq when the Westernist regimes were 
in danger. " 
Cold War Ideology and Turkish Foreign Policy 
The differences between the DP and RPP inevitably reflected on the DP's foreign 
policy, and created an emotional dimension in its policies in favour of the West, notably 
the US. 49 As an elected government the DP accepted the American political and 
economic system as the best model for Turkey. In addition to the DP's ideological 
preferences, Democrat foreign policy was not free from the lessons of historical 
experience and the fears: The DP perceived the Russian communists as the most 
dangerous threat to Turkish independence and remembered the military weaknesses of 
the Turkish Army during the Second World War. Moreover, economically Turkey 
needed Western credit and aid for its economic development. As a result Turkey 
became the champion of the Cold War and amended its foreign policy considerations 
according to Cold War circumstances. 
50 The Cold War tension dramatically increased in 
the DP years and NATO and the West's rigid responses to the Eastern Block widened 
the gap between the two sides. Turkey, due to its strategic location 
between the East and 
West benefited greatly from the Cold War. The `terrible Turks' of the past, thanks to the 
Cold War, became full member of the main Western political and military systems: 
48 Of course the main motive behind the Democrat Middle 
East policy was Turkey's pro-Westernism and 
anti-Communism. However the similar factors were there 
in the RPP period and the Inönü governments 
did not show any interest to be part of the region. 
49 Gerger, Türk Die..., pp. 64-65. 
50 Gerger, Türk Die..., pp. 83-91; Ahmad, The Making..., pp. 118-119. 
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OECD (1948), the Council of Europe (1949) and the NATO (1952). Moreover, the US 
gave open political, military and economic support against the Soviet Union and for 
Turkey's modernisation-democratisation process. Thus Turkey became a member of the 
Cold War lobby and provoked radical attitudes as the Cold War and American support 
became a central column of Turkish foreign policy with Kemalism. s1 
With the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was based on an assumption that Turkish 
national interests were identical with Western interests. In other words, the Turkish 
leaders assumed what was good for the West was good for Turkey52 although Turkey's 
national interests many times contrasted with Western interests. However as will be 
seen Turkey sacrificed its interests in the Middle East, the Third World and the Muslim 
World in order to maintain this Western support. 53 In the Middle East, for example, 
Turkey, as US advised it, condemned the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, 
and supported both the American intervention in Lebanon and the British military 
intervention in Jordan in 1958,54 while during the Algerian Independence War, Turkey 
supported the French side. SS Moreover, during these years the foreign policy 
bureaucracy particularly identified itself with the NATO. 56 This undoubtedly damaged 
Turkey's relations with the non-Western world. Indeed this was understandable because 
the Turkish foreign policy machinery was still slow to grasp the radical change in the 
world political order. Turkey had missed the rise of the Third World for example. Also 
under the Kemalist ideological assumption Turkish foreign policy had assumed that the 
Western world was a religious and cultural bias free society and could easily accept 
Turkey as an equal partner. 
European Turkish Biases as a Determinant in Turkish Foreign Policy 
Despite American support, secularisation in Turkey, the Second World War and other 
international events European Turkish biases over Turkey remained and, similar to the 
Ottoman experiences, the European attitude towards the Turks, as will be discussed, 
deeply affected Turkish foreign policy in the DP era and the future. Although 
its effects 
51 Gerger, Türk Die..., p. 65. 
52 Cumhur yet, 25 December 1955; Also see salis, The Role... 
53 See the next chapter, esp. the Cyprus Issue section. 
54 Gönlübol, Olaylarla..., pp. 303-305. 
55 Gerger, Türk Die..., p. 77. 
189 
were limited in the DP era because of the reasons will be discussed below, the European 
resistance to the Turks was vital in understanding the motives behind Turkish policy 
makers' mind. Also the European attitudes, by nourishing the Turkish Western 
scepticism shaped the Turkish Westernist and the Islamist schools in different ways. 
Therefore, before moving the implementation of the Democrat policy and testing 
ideologies' role in DP foreign policy we will discuss the European reluctance towards 
the Turks and its impact on Turkish foreign policy. 
NATO Membership and European Resistance to the Turks 
It can be said that, during the first years of the DP period, the Kemalist scepticism about 
the West was not influential in Turkish foreign policy, and the American policies were 
never questioned. The DP was ready to do anything to enter the Western bloc and these 
efforts resulted in NATO membership, yet the first experiences were a disappointment 
for the Turkish Westernst school, particularly for the Democrats. As have been seen 
Turkey immediately applied for NATO membership after the founding of the 
organisation in the Inönü era, but was rejected. S7 For the West Turkey's role was in the 
Middle East. Also, for many Europeans, the Turks were not European and had no place 
in Europe. Even some of the European politicians argued that there was no difference 
between the Turks and the Russians in hostility against Europe. 58 A British diplomat in 
1950 for example declared that Turkey could not enter the NATO because it was a 
Muslim country, 59 while Hamilton Armstrong, a British observer, claimed that Turkey's 
membership would weaken `the ideal of a Christian, democratic community of free 
states. j60 This European approach confirmed the failure of the Westernsts in Turkey, 
and disappointed both the Democrats and the Republicans who as positivist and secular 
Kemalists believed in science and technology and argued that there was no place for 
religion in the modern world, yet now they, after 28 years of the revolution, confronted 
the religious biases at the heart of the civilisation. As will be seen, the Western 
56 Interview With iffier Ortayh. 
57 For Turkey's efforts to enter the NATO see, Oral Sander, Turk Amerikan Dilkileri, 1947-1964, 
(Turkish American Relations, 1947-1964), (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayinlan, 1979), pp. 67-80; Sannay, 
Türkiye'nin..., pp. 70-104; Selahattin Deniz, Dnnya Siyasatinde Türkiye'nin Yeri ve 
NATO, (The 
Place of Turkey in the World Politics and the NATO), (Ankara: n. 
d). 
58 Sedat Lariner, The Cultural and Civilisational Dimensions in Turkey-Europe Relations (London: 
IAA, 1999). 
59 Ism Bei Olgaray, Tasman celirge (Collared Grasshopper, The Memoirs of Ambassador 
Olgacay), (Istanbul: Iz Yaymcihk, 1990), p. 311. 
60 Hamilton Armstrong, `Eisenhower's Right Flank', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 29, July 1951, p. 661. 
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politicians would not abstain from expressing their anti-Turkish feelings in future, but 
Turkey pretended not to see them. In this framework, especially the Europeans, namely 
Britain and France, made enormous efforts to keep Turkey out of the core of the West 
by promising financial and military aid. The Turkish application for NATO membership 
failed meeting opposition from every quarter. Moreover, when Turkey offered to 
contribute to the UN forces in the Korean War, it gained a great deal of credit among 
the NATO governments. 61 The Korean venture was a clear demonstration of Turkey's 
potential contribution to NATO. Also the Korean War underlined Turkey's importance 
in containing the Soviet Union. However, this was not enough for NATO entry and 
when on 15 May 1951, Turkey and Greece were invited to NATO by the United States, 
the UK, Denmark, Belgium and Norway made efforts to block Turkish entry. 62 For 
Britain, Turkey was a Middle Eastern country and the West should not risk its security 
for the Turks. The British argued that Turkey should be directed to the East despite its 
enthusiasm to be a European power63 and that Turkey should join a regional pact or 
joint command in the Middle East, rather than take part in the European defence 
system. " As a result the third attempt also failed, and with the American support, 
Turkey accepted the British request to co-sponsor a proposal for the establishment of an 
anti-Soviet organisation in the Middle East65 and as a result of this, Britain withdrew its 
objection. 66 Thus, Turkey proved that it was ready to do anything to win the confidence 
of the Western bloc. Turkey's insistence on its entry to the core of the West as the 
reward for its full support for the West against the Soviet Union worked and on 18 
February 1952 Turkey became the only Muslim member of NATO and the only 
member, which shared a border with the Soviet Union. 67 For the Turkish Westernists 
61 Hüseyin Bagci, `Türkiye'nin NATO Üyeiigini Hiziandiran 11d Önemli Faktör: Kore Sava. i ve ABD 
Büyükelcisi George McGhee', (Two Important Factors That Speed Up Turkey's NATO Membership: The 
Korean War and the US's Ambassador George McGhee), ODTÜ GeliWe Dergisi I METU 
Development Journal, Vol. 18, No. 1-2,1991, pp. 1-35; Olgacay, Tasmah..., pp. 306-307; Tamkoc, 
`Turkey's Quest... ', p. 24; Mango, Turkey, pp. 74-75; Sannay, Türkiye'nin..., pp. 88-89. 
62 Edip (elik, 100 Soruda Türk Dio Politika Tarihi (The History of Turkish Foreign Policy in 100 
Questions), Istanbul: Gercek Yayinevi, 1969), p. 157; Yulug Tekin Kurat, `Turkey's Entry to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization', Foreign Policy (Ankara), Vol. 10, Nos. 3-4,1983; Mehmet Gdnlübol and 
Haluk Ülman, `Turk DiS Politikasinui Yirmi Yih, 1945-1965, (Turkish Foreign Policy's 20 Years, 1945- 
1965), AÜSBF Dergisi, Vol. 21, No. 21, March 1966, pp. 147-148; Vati, Bridge..., pp. 116-117. 
63 Ercu"ment Yavuzalp, Liderlerimiz ve Did Politika, (Our Leaders and Foreign Policy, a Diplomat's 
Memoirs), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1996), p. 78; Kürkcüoglu, `Turco - British... ', p. 95. 
6' Kurkcüog1u, `Turco - British... ', p. 95. 
65 ()me ,r Kürkcüoglu, 
Turkiye'nin Arap Orta Dogusu'na Karp Politikani, 1945-1970 (Turkey 's 
Foreign Policy on the Arab World, 1945-1970), (Ankara: AUSBF Yaymlan, 
1972), p. 45. 
66 Giinlübol, `A Short... ', p. 7. 
67 It is certain that one of the most important factors helped 
Turkey's inclusion to the NATO was the 
American support and George McGhee's, the American ambassador to 
Ankara, personal efforts. For 
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Turkey was now a full member of the Western family. In the words of Altemur Kilic; 
`the NATO alliance filled Turkish hearts with pride and exaltation. They were no longer 
"outsiders". They were at last part of the West. '68 
Apart from the debates mentioned above, Turkish researcher Baskin Oran's approach 
must also be noted: One of the main reasons for Turkey's NATO application naturally 
was the Soviet threat, Oran however argues that it was not the case because Turkey did 
not consider the Soviet Union as a threat when it applied for NATO. According to him, 
the main reason was Turkey's vocation to be part of the capitalist western world and 
need for fresh credit. Oran further argues that the DP saw the NATO membership as the 
guarantee for the future of the Turkish multi-party regime . 
b9 This thesis does not share 
Oran's idea of that the Soviet Union was not a threat for Turkish security, yet as 
discussed above the other part of his argument confirm the findings of this study. 
Clash of the Civilisations and Turkey's EEC Application 
Turkey's NATO membership highlight the strength of Kemalist ideology in Turkish 
foreign policy, because the only cause for Turkey's efforts to enter the Western block 
was not the Soviet threat, rather ideological considerations played crucial role in 
Turkish application. It was an extension of the Kemalist civilisation perception. Yet, 
Turkey's membership also underlined the European unwillingness to accept the Turks, 
and proved how Kemalism failed to anticipate the role of religious and the cultural 
values in international relations. However, like the previous RPP governments, the DP 
perceived the European civilisation as a religion-free civilisation, based on the 
scientific, positivist values. Thus, the DP government did not lose any opportunity to 
make its Europeanness confirmed. When the EEC was established in 1957 the Turks 
saw this economic organisation as another opportunity to bind Turkey to the European 
security and political system and help the ailing Turkish economy. When the DP 
government applied for membership only two years after the Rome Treaty was signed, 
it perceived no historical and cultural biases from its European counterparts. In spite of 
McGhee's role in this process see Bam, `Türkiye'nin..., ' pp. 1-35; George C. McGhee, `Turkey Joins the 
West', World Affairs, July 1954, pp. 617-630. Turkish diplomat Olgaray says the multi-party regime 
and the 1950 elections in Turkey changed the feelings of the Americans about the 
Turks in favour of 
Turkey. For the details Oigacay, Tasman..., pp. 304-305. For the official text of Turkey's accession to the 
NATO see Düstur, III. Tertip, Vol. 33, p. 314 and Resmi Gazete (The 
Official Gazette), 19 February 
1952), No. 8038, pp. 232-233. 
68 Kihc, Turkey..., p. 159. 
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the naive Turkish European perception, even in the Cold War, Europe was not ready for 
Turkey. Indeed as Rene Albert-Carrie noted in 1965: `one of the major components of 
the idea and the culture that are Europe is undoubtedly the Christian and the territorial 
domain of Europe may roughly be equated with what that of Christendom. '70 Similarly, 
for the historian Braudel, Western Christianity is the main constituent in European 
thought: `a European, even if he is an atheist, is deeply rooted in the Christian tradition. ' 
71 Obviously there was no room for Turks in these western definitions yet the Turks, 
thanks to the `ideology's blindness of ect', could not see this cultural block to Turkish 
entry. In this context, for the European countries, Turkey's NATO membership never 
meant a full acceptance of Turkey as a European country by the West. However for the 
Turks `it was taken as a sign that Turkey had been fully accepted by the Western nations 
on equal terms'. 72 Rose argues that the only reason for Turkey's acceptance into NATO 
was its strategic borders with the Soviet Union. 73 Even under the Cold Word 
circumstances Turkey's cultural Europeanness problem was seen as a far-fetched reality 
to the Europeans. For example, to historian Lichtheim, Turkey's place was the Middle 
East, not Europe: `if cultural criteria are applied, Turkey forms part of the Middle East, 
whereas East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia unquestionably 
belong to Europe. , 74 Geography said 'NO' (the vast bulk of the country and its 
population were in Asia), religion said 'NO' (Turkey was secular, but the Turks were 
Muslims)75. In addition to the problem of European identity, the Turkish economy was a 
typical Mediterranean agricultural economy with more than 75 per cent of the labour 
force in agriculture and four-fifths of total exports agricultural products. 
76 The private 
sector was protected by high-tariff barriers and unofficial state aid. In spite of the high 
economic growth rate (five per cent) and the relatively strong democratisation 
movement, Turkey was a typical agricultural society. In other words, Turkey was not 
ready for an economic organisation, the European Community (EC). 
" 
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'o Rene Albert-Carrie, The Unity of Europe: An Historical Survey, (London: Secker&Warburg, 1965), 
p. 334. 
71 F. Braudel, A History of Civilizations, (London: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 333-334. 
72 Zürcher, Turkey..., p. 246. 
73 Richard Rose, What is Europe, (New York: HarperCollins, 1996, p. 42- 
74 George Lichtheim, Europe in the Twentieth Century, (London: Weidenfeld&Nicolson Ltd, 
1972), 
p. 381. 
Quoted in Birol All Yeýilada, `Prospectus for Turkey's Membership in the European 
Union', 5 
International Journal of Turkish Studies, 1992-1993, Vol. 6, Nos.: 1&2, Winter, p. 
42. 
76 Yeýilada, `Prospectus... ', p. 42. 
77 Yeýilada, `Prospectus... ', pp. 42-44. 
193 
Nevertheless, Turkey immediately applied for EC membership on 31 July 1959. Similar 
to the NATO case, the Russian threat once again helped Turkey's position in Europe, as 
the Western European countries needed Turkey's support against the Soviet threat 
because of its vital geo-strategic position between the two blocs. Also `the new 
European ideology' allowed the entrance of Turkey to the European society. Turkey 
was a country that would contribute directly and substantially to the defence of the 
West, and notably the EC countries. 78 As a result, it can be said that, similar to the 
NATO application, the EC accepted Turkey's application for association agreement 
because of security and political considerations, not economic or cultural. The second 
reason for the EC's `enthusiastic' response to the Greek and Turkish applications was 
competition between the UK and the EC. The UK had chosen to remain outside the EC 
and insisted on looser and wider free trade as an alternative to the EC. Therefore, an 
application from any European country was important to the EC as a welcome token of 
international recognition. 79 To conclude, Turkey's application was welcomed by the 
EC, yet the EC's attitude towards Turkey's application was motivated by problems of 
politics and security. Thus, the problems rooted in history were in fact ignored for a 
while. While Europe saw the Turks as `foreigners' in the continent, for the Turks 
NATO, the EEC and other agreements and memberships in the European political 
system were more than an organisation and agreements: As will be seen in the European 
Community (then the European Union) case Turkey has always shown a tendency to 
perceive any agreement or membership in a Western block as a sign of its European 
identity. The gap between Turkish and Western perceptions caused misunderstandings 
and increased the role of identity in Turkish foreign policy. In the mind of the Turkish 
decision-makers Turkey had no alternative to the West. Turkey had to be a Western, 
European country. Economically, politically and culturally, this could be costly, but, for 
them, the other alternatives were even more costly. Yavuz argues that the Kemalist elite 
saw the Soviet Union's aggressiveness as an opportunity to strengthen Turkey's secular, 
European character. S° Likewise, Lefler claims that the Turkish elite exaggerated the 
78 Yeilada, `Prospectus... ', p. 44. 
79 Meltem M"er-Bac, `Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe', Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 
1, Spring 2000, p. 29. Also see Mehmet Ali Birand, Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar 
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Russian danger to become a part of European political system. 81 At this point, we see 
the apparent influence of the ideology, that is the impact of Kemalism and Westernism 
in general on foreign policy, which gave no manoeuvre area for Turkey, and almost 
fixed Turkish foreign policy in many areas for the Cold War years- 
In brief, although the West showed its reluctance over Turkish membership of the 
Western club, Turkey ignored this negative attitude. The main reasons for Turkey's 
attitude were: a) ideology. Both the RPP and the Democrats were from the same school 
of thought and their ultimate aim was a Western Turkey. The RPP, in particular, 
rejected Turkey's Islamic, Ottoman and Eastern heritage. They saw the West as an end- 
mark for Turkey's Eastern adventure, hence they pretended not to see the European 
resistance to their efforts, b) a weak economy. The need for Western economic support 
for the undeveloped Turkish economy, c) The Soviet threat, which frightened the Turks 
into the Western orbit, d) a weak army, which did not have power to defend the country 
and needed the Western defence system against the Soviet threat, e) The Greek factor. 
In the first years of the Republic, Turkey did not give enough importance to Greece as 
an enemy because there were relatively greater dangers. But in the DP era the Cyprus 
and minorities problems worsened relations. Since Greece had grown four times in size 
with Western military and political support by taking over the Turkish territory, the 
Greek application was seen as potential disaster, by the DP government. Thus Turkey 
thought that it had to be represented on each platform where the Greeks stood. Indeed, 
Greece had not applied, Turkey would have taken much longer to decide what kind of 
relations it wanted with the Community. 
82 Turkey's application to the EEC was a 
response to the Greek initiative in 1959 and aimed to neutralise the 
Greek attempts in 
Europe against Turkey. As a result, Turkey officially applied to the 
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Implementation 
Relations with the US and NATO84 
Despite resistance from European members, Turkey continued its pro-Western policies 
and after 1952 in particular `Turkish foreign policy loyally followed the Western line. '85 
Actually the Democrats relied on the Americans and were happy with the America's 
pro-Turkey policies. Indeed, almost all moderate schools of thought, including the DP 
and RPP, regarded Turkey's NATO membership as the main pillar of Republican 
foreign policy. 86 Hereafter Turkish foreign policy was based on the assumption that 
there was no difference between Western interests and Turkish national interests. The 
NATO alliance took precedence in all considerations of foreign policy. 87 Izmir became 
the headquarters of NATO's South-East Europe command. Thus, Turkey, under the DP 
government, indeed developed its closest association with the West in history and 
frequently announced that it was loyal to the Western camp and `championed the Cold 
War'. 88 As Fuat Köprülü, Turkish Foreign Minister, declared, the DP considered the 
NATO agreement as a national policy. Köprülü said that there was no difference 
between the main principles of Turkish foreign policy and those of NATO. 89 With the 
economic, military and political mutual engagements Turkey re-organised its position in 
politics and certainly left its neutral position. Turkey, after joining NATO signed other 
security arrangements like the Balkan Pact with Greece and Yugoslavia (1953) and the 
Baghdad Pact (1954) which were the results of open US encouragement and part of an 
anti-Soviet strategy. That is to say even the regional security arrangements were 
designed according to Turkey's position in the Western block. 
84 For Turkish - American relations see Nasuh Uslu, Türk -A merikan 
ili*ileri, (Turkish Ameri can 
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Ironically, during these years, as Turkey anchored itself to the West, the Soviet Union, 
after Stalin died, was moving to a more co-operative position. But Turkey had serious 
doubts to soften its relations with the Soviet Union. At Stalin's funeral Molotov, for 
example, told the Turkish Ambassador that the Soviet Union denounced Stalin's 
aggressive policies and wanted friendly relations with Turkey. 90 Moreover, the Soviet 
Union's `friendly' declarations could not persuade the Turkish side and both President 
Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes, expressed their mistrust of Soviet leaders. 91 
Similarly, the Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rü§tü said that he could not see any 
improvement in the Soviet policies towards Turkey. 92 The Soviets hoped for 
relationship as realised in the 1920s, but now Turkey was a NATO member and 
committed to the West. In turn, Khruschev denounced the Menderes government for its 
position: 
`Our relation with Turkey was very good during the Mustafa Kemal and the Inönü 
years; but then it was shadowed. We know it was not only Turkey's false, we also gave 
some speeches and declarations (Stalin's demands for some Turkish territories and the 
Straits, s. l. ) which shadowed the relations. But we then made efforts to rectify our 
mistakes and made great efforts to establish good friendly relations. Unfortunately, the 
Turkish statesmen do not respond our call as we did. '93 
Khruschev was right to think that the Turks were reluctant friends, but it is not fair to 
say that the DP's Soviet policy was so different to that of Mustafa Kemal and Inönü's 
policies as Khruschev claimed. The main direction of Turkish Soviet policy remained 
unchanged since the 1920s. Turkey co-operated when possible, but nobody could expect 
co-operation with a country that had territorial aspirations in Turkey. 
During the 1950s relations with the US reached their high point as Turkey identified its 
interests with American ones. 94 In 1959 the DP government signed a bilateral pact with 
the US that enabled the US to intervene in Turkey's internal affairs on behalf of the 
regime. 95 In foreign policy, co-operation was even closer. As Mahmut Dikerdem, the 
Turkish Ambassador, recalls the Menderes government ordered the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to vote in the United Nations as the US voted. Dikerdem 
further says that 
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according to the government's orders, the Ministry had to support the British, French 
and Americans against the national liberation and independence movements. 96 As a 
result, Turkey gave open support to the American policies in any part of the world, from 
Lebanon97 to South Korea. Likewise, the DP government supported the French attitude 
in North Africa and the British for their Egypt policy. 98 
Relations with the East 
The RPP had very much ignored the eastern world though there was very suitable and 
profitable circumstances for Turkey in the Middle East and in the Eastern world in 
general. By the 1950s the eastern nations saw a number of independence struggles 
against the imperialist states and identified with Turkey as a country that defended its 
independence against European powers. From Iran to Africa, to Bangladesh nationalists 
praised Turkey and its independence struggle. Even Atatürk's indifferent policies could 
not change their feelings about the Turkish revolution. The situation was even more 
favourable in the Middle East. For example, in Egypt the blue bloods (aristocrats) were 
Turkish, Egyptian King Fuad and his son King Faruk were half-Turkish. In the Fuad era 
Turkish was the Palace language. Though Faruk had banned the use of Turkish in the 
Palace Turkish blood was the primary indication of noble birth in Egypt and a pre- 
condition of entry to the distinguished Mohammed Ali Club in Cairo was Turkish 
origin. 99 Not only the Egyptians but also many other Middle Eastern statesmen spoke 
fluent Turkish, and many more perceived Turkey as a natural ally, notably Ibrahim 
Haim Pasha, the Jordanian Prime Minister, and Samir Rifai Pasha, the Jordanian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 1°° Similarly, the Turks had governed Algeria for centuries, 
and despite this, many Algerians saw the Turks as their ancestors and there were many 
Turkish districts in the country. Moreover the ordinary Algerian perceived the Turks as 
mediator between Algeria and the West. Furthermore, the Middle Eastern countries had 
gained their independence and they lacked experience in the international arena. They 
needed Turkey's support, as Turkey was the only Muslim NATO member and the 
96 Dikerdem, Ortadogu'da..., p. 66. 
97 In the 1958 Lebanon Crisis Turkey clearly supported the US and the Turkish air bases were open to the 
American usage: George Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American 
Problems in Historical 
Perspective, 1945-1971, (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), p. 67. 
98 Bölükba i, Tdrkiye ve..., pp. 4-5; Ahmad, The Making..., p. 119. 
99 For the Egyptian' feelings about the Turks see the memoirs of Mahmut Dikerdem, the Chief of the 
Turkish Mission in Cairo for three years: Dikerdem, Ortadogu'da..., pp. 27-28. 
100 Malimut Dikerdem, Turkey's Ambassador to Amman, says that Samir Rifai Pasha was one of the few 
genius friends of Turkey in his Ortadogu'da Devrim Yillan book p. 169. 
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successor to their former ruler, the Ottoman Empire. Turkey had the opportunity to be 
an excellent mediator between these states and the colonialist countries. With the DP 
government Turkey also found an excellent ideological ground to improve its relations 
with these countries. 
Despite such suitable circumstances in the region Turkey designed its Middle East 
policy according to its relations with the Western block. As a direct result of the 
identification of the Turkish and Western interests in the Turkish decision makers mind, 
Turkey carried out the US policies in the region and Menderes deserted Atatürk's and 
Inönü's pacific, non-alignment policies in the Middle East, claiming that Inönü had 
neglected the Middle East despite Turkey's location. Menderes defended an active 
Eastern policy as an integrated part of an active Western policy. For Menderes and 
Köprülü, Turkey could play a `big brother' role in the Middle East because it was the 
strongest country in the region in terms of the military and economic power, and would 
unite the Arab states against the communist block. In return the US would provide 
military, political and economic aid to these countries notably to Turkey. '°' 
Similar to the Turkish assessments, the US saw Turkey as a cornerstone of its Middle 
Eastern security operations. After withdrawal of the British from the region, the US 
needed an `assistant state' to carry out anti-communist policies in the region. 102 The 
intense dislike of the colonial powers had prevented the British to establish an 
organisation in the region. Also, the US needed partners in the region, as it had no close 
relations with the regional countries in terms of culture, history and politics. Moreover, 
the Americans did not want to incense the Soviet Union in the region. For the US, 
Turkey, as a Muslim, Middle Eastern state, was a perfect state to organise a defence 
system against the Soviets. However, Turkey did not consider itself as a Muslim, 
Eastern state, and the Middle East did not accept Turkey as a regional, Muslim country. 
Moreover, there was a misperception about the threat between the Arabs, Turks and 
Americans. From the American perspective the threat to the region was communism. 
101 Hiiseyin Bagm names Menderes' eastern policy as `locomotive foreign policy'. However, as Menderes 
followed the American instructions in the Middle East, this name is arguable. Hiiseyin Bagci, `Demokrat 
Parti'nin Ortadogu Politikasi' (Ae DP's Middle Eastern Policy), in Sönmezoglu (ed), Türk Di* 
Politikasinin Analizi, pp. 89-120, p. 93; Baaci, Demokrat.... 
102 Sander argues that not only the Soviet threat but also security of Israel shaped US' Middle East and 
Turkey policy, and one of the aims of Baghdad Pact was to protect the young Israeli state: Sander, 
Türk..., pp. 125-126. 
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The western prescription was containment of communism by using any tool including 
religion. As an Eastern country Turkey might play a crucial role in these Western plans. 
For Turkey, however, the menace came from the north. Turkey also perceived 
Islamisation and Easternisation as threats as dangerous as the Soviet Union. The 
Turkish solution was the integration of Turkey with West. However on the other hand, 
for the Arabs, who had never seen any Soviet occupation, the threat was not the Soviet 
Union but Western imperialism. Therefore the Turks', the Arabs' and the West's 
expectations from the region were completely different. 
Thus, Turkey's Middle East policy, similar to the Kemalist approach, was an 
inseparable part of its Western policy. The Kemalist Middle Eastern policy was 
defensive arrangement and an extension of relations with the West. However, now the 
West's condition was an active Turkey in the Middle East. Turkey, according to the 
British and the American strategies, had to organise a Middle Eastern block against the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, the DP's other difference from Kemalist Middle Eastern 
policy was its readiness for such an active policy. Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü stated 
his unhappiness with Atatürk and Inönü's policy towards Arab states promising to 
restore relations. 103 
Thus Turkey became the voice of NATO in the region and did not act without asking 
the Americans and the British. This made many Middle Eastern states hostile to Turkey, 
like Nasser's Egypt. 
The second factor that worsened Turkey's relations within the region was the Menderes 
government's inexperience in foreign policy, as the Tugay Affair shows. Turkish 
diplomat Hulusi Fuat Tugay, whose wife was one of the closest relatives of the 
Egyptian King, had been sent to Cairo as the ambassador of Turkey in the period of 
King Faruk. It was considered a good idea to improve the relations by the Menderes 
government. When the regime changed and Nasser took power it caused a disaster in 
relations as Turkey did not recall its ambassador. Even as Nasser implied that Turkish 
ambassador would be declared persona non grata Turkey did not change its position 
103 Dikerdem, Ortadogu'da..., pp. 14-15. 
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and the affair climaxed with Tugay insulting Nasser1' and Egypt removed the 
ambassador's diplomatic privileges and forced him to desert the country. 
Apart from Turkey's pro-Westernism and the DP's inexperience Menderes' personality 
badly affected Turkey's Middle Eastern policies. Menderes always wanted to complete 
the plans at once, but, as a well-known fact, foreign policy needs patient and time. 
Therefore, the Jordanian and Iraqi Prime Minister's were always complaining about 
Menderes' impatience. 
The Baghdad Pact 
The Baghdad Pactlos is an excellent opportunity to analyse the Menderes government's 
Middle Eastern policy and to examine deviation from Kemalist foreign policy towards 
an active and internationalist approach. However, for Kürkcüoglu, the Baghdad Pact 
cannot be considered as a deviation from Kemalism. He argues, like the Balkan Pact 
(1954), the Baghdad Pact was a direct result of the Kemalist approach, although it failed 
because of the certain circumstances in the Middle East and because of that Menderes 
and his friends were not of Atatürk's calibre: `... Turkey believed that it was acting in 
compliance with Atatürk's foreign policy of maintaining peace in the Balkans and in the 
Middle East. However, especially since the roots for bi-polarity did not exist in the 
Middle East... the Baghdat Pact in particular... did not work out well. 106 However as will 
be examined Menderes' enthusiasm to lead the region in the name of the West and, as 
will be seen in the Syrian and Iraq crises, his militarist activism regarding to Iraq and 
Syria prove that the Menderes' Baghdad Pact and Middle Eastern policies in general 
can be taken as an example in order to test the deviation from the Kemalist approach. 
For Turkey, the pact was defensive, as it feared the Soviet Union was becoming 
increasingly involved in the Middle East, and this obviously threatened Turkey's 
security. Therefore Turkey saw collaboration with the Muslim states useful for Turkey's 
' 04 When the Egyptian press severely attacked to Tugay, Turkish Ambassador, and his wife Tugay blamed 
Nasser and told him `You didn't behave like a gentleman with your press attacks'. Dikerdem. 
Ortadogu'da..., p. 77-78. 
105 Treaty of Mutual Co-operation. For Turkish text, see Düstur III, Vol. 36, p. 422. For the Baghdad Pact 
see Robert Devereux, `Turkey and the Baghdad Pact', SAIS Review, Vol. 3, Autumn 1958; Ismail 
Soysal, `The 1955 Baghdad Pact', in Studies on Turkish Arab Relations Annual, (Istanbul: Foundation 
for Studies on Turkish Arab relations, 1990); Ayýegül Sever, `The Compliant Ally? Turkey and the West 
in the Middle East, 1954-58', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2,1998, pp. 73-90. 
106 Ktirkcüoglu, `An Analysis... ', p. 180. 
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security against the Soviets. But Turkey viewed this co-operation as an extension of 
political realities rather than of religious affinities. That is to say there was no change in 
Turkey's secular policy understanding of its relations with the Muslim states. That is 
why Turkey hesitated to sign the Treaty of Friendly Co-operation with Pakistan in 1954, 
which would be the first step of the Baghdad Pact, at this time the Pakistanis were still 
dreaming of a greater Islamic block, and the Arabs were aiming to unite all Muslims 
against Israel. 
Moreover, unlike the Turkish, the Arabs did not see communism as a great threat. 107 For 
them the biggest problem was Israel and western imperialism. '08 Under these 
circumstances Turkey's reluctance can be understood. However, with American and 
British encouragement or enforcement Turkey was persuaded to construct the Baghdad 
Pact with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Great Britain, but Turkey was still suspicious for the 
success of the pact, and was cautious not to be drawn into the Arab-Israel conflict. 
When Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement on 24 February 1955 the Pact became 
operational and Britain on 5 April, Pakistan on 23 September and finally Iran on 3 
November 1955 joined the Baghdad Pact. 109 The US desisted from full membershipllo, 
but all knew that the US was the hidden member of the Pact. The aim was to unite the 
Muslim states against the Soviet Union by using the Turks. Menderes' government was 
aware of that fact and for the Kemalists even he encouraged the US policy-makers for 
such a pact to lure American aid despite the suspicious Kenialist bureaucracy. 
ll' In 
other words, in addition to the defensive character of the pact, Turkey for the first time 
in Republican history, joined in a pact for other than defensive aims. As noted, with the 
pact, it was hoped that Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt would enter the pact. Egypt accused 
it of being a device of western imperialism for dividing the Arabs. Egypt 
led Lebanon 
and Jordan by insisting that the Arab League should defend the Middle 
East not a West- 
107 Yavuzalp, Liderlerimiz...., pp. 78-79. 
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led organisation. In Lebanon pro-pact leader Camille Chamoun lost power as a result of 
a pro Nasser coup by General Shahap and under the shadow of these developments 
Jordan avoided from joining the pact. 112 
Nasser's anti-Western policies welcomed the Soviet entrance into the Middle East, and 
this alarmed the Turks. The Russians were now in south of Turkey. Under these 
circumstances, Turkey did not try to understand Nasser or other national anti-Western 
movements but looked at the problem through Cold War considerations. Hence, with 
the outbreak of the 1956 Suez Crisis the Menderes government faced a formidable 
dilemma. It was obvious that the British, French and Israeli joint action against Egypt 
did not have international support and the operation infringed on international law. 
Turkey, as a member of the Baghdad Pact, accused Israel of being the greatest threat to 
the Middle East peace, and withdrew its representative from Israel on 26 November 
1956. In spite of this official attitude, Turkey was trying to assure the Israelis that 
Turkey and the Baghdad Pact was not against Israel, and that Turkey had no alternative 
but to denounce Israel. Turkey's policy failed in a short time, and Turkey damaged its 
relations with both Israel and the Arabs as neither believed in Turkey's sincerity. Even 
some Arab leaders accused Turkey of helping the colonialist foreigners in the region as 
Anwar Sadat stated over Suez that Turkey encouraged the British to attack Egypt in 
1956 in El Cumhuriye, a Cairo daily: `As a matter of fact, Turkey is the country which 
through the Baghdad Pact encouraged the British to attack Egypt in the first place. "13 
In addition, the Soviet Union was also not happy with Turkey's role in the Pact. That is 
to say the Pact was a complete failure for Turkey. Thus the Pact, which aimed to unite 
the Middle Eastern states against the Soviet Union, became a divisive organisation and 
contributed to the 1958 revolution in Iraq 114 and finally it was foundered in 1958. After 
the military coup in Iraq, the new Irqi government boycotted the meetings and finally 
Iraq withdrew from the pact. When Iraq left, the other members change the pact's name 
as Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and its headquarter was moved to Ankara 
from Baghdad. 115 The Baghdad Pact, later CENTO, experience showed that not only 
112 Yavuzalp, Liderlerimiz...., pp. 78-81. 
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Turkey but also the Middle Eastern states saw Turkey as a non-regional country. 
Moreover, most of the regional states perceived Turkey with Israel as the West's 
outpost or `Trojan Horse' in the region. It was ironic to be seen as a non-regional power 
for the Turks, who were the leaders of the Muslims and the governors of the region for 
centuries. 
The Syrian Crisis also confirmed Menderes' foreign policy perspective. The increasing 
Soviet influence in Syria frightened Turkey, and the DP government considered this as 
part of a Soviet policy to surround Turkey from the south. In the 1956 crisis Syria had 
supported Nasser. When the Syrian officers harmed the oil pipelines in Syria Western 
states were alarmed. By 1957 Nasserist officers increased their power and when General 
Afif al-Bizri, a suspected communist officer, replaced a moderate Syrian chief of staff, 
Turkey's fears about Syria were confirmed. Turkey viewed that Syria was becoming a 
satellite of the Soviet Union. 116 Also Turkey had concern over the Syrian intentions 
regarding Hatay. As a result Turkey moved its troops to the Syria-Turkey borders with 
close US Support. 117 In September Soviet Premier Nikolay Bulganin officially warned 
Turkey not to intervene in Syrian internal affairs and not to attack Syria. '" The message 
was clear: The Syrians are not alone. Later that month a Soviet fleet visited the Syrian 
seaport of Lazkiye. With Turkey's efforts, the crises became a global crisis, and the US 
and the USSR appeared as its major actors. Menderes argued that `The crisis is not 
between Turkey and Syria but between the two blocks. ' 119 This attitude proves the 
Democrat tendency to see the regional problems through the Cold War ideology. 
Apart from the Syrian Crisis, Menderes repeated his Cold War-obsessed regional policy 
in the Iraq Crisis. In July 1958 Menderes decided on military intervention when the pro- 
Western Iraqi government was overthrown on 14 July 1958.120 The US dissuaded 
Menderes from military intervention by recognising the new Iraqi regime and Turkey 
followed the Americans. 121 In a short time, Camille Chamoun, Prime Minister of 
Lebanon, who was frightened by the events in Iraq, officially invited the Americans to 
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intervene the Lebanese politics while the Jordanian King Hussein called the British to 
restore the order in Jordan. 122 As a result of these invitations the US troops landed in 
Lebanon and the British in Jordan in the summer of 1958. In these crisis Turkey fully 
supported the Americans and the British. '23 It allowed about five thousand American 
troops to use NATO Adana base (Incirlik) in case of emergency. All these were seen as 
the return of the Western imperialism to the Middle East by the Arab nationalists and 
marked the end of the Baghdad Pact. l24The Soviet propaganda also provoked the Arabs 
that the Turks were coming to dominate the Arabs. Inönü, RPP's leader, strongly 
opposed the US airlifting in Incirlik air base for the Lebanon problem. For Inönü, 
Menderes' Middle East policy was obviously a deviation from the Kemalist 
understanding because it was aggressive and adventuristic. 125 Inönü called Menderes' 
Iraq and Lebanon policies as `illegal and adventurous' which risked Turkey's 
security. 
126 
As will be seen below, the overall Turkish policy shifted in the late 1950s. The growing 
internal opposition to the DP policies included opposition to DP's active, Westernst 
policy in the Middle East and demanded a policy of strict non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries, particularly of Iraq. In addition, 
Menderes realised that his Middle East policies were fruitless and the politics in the 
Arab world had different dimensions than the global Cold War. Thus Turkey recognised 
the revolutionary Iraqi regime in July 1959 and a year later a Turkish delegation went to 
the anniversary celebrations of the revolution. 
Before moving to the summary of the DP policies the last thing to be mentioned 
is 
Turkey-Israel relations in this period since relations between these two countries are a 
perfect example of ideology's role in Turkish foreign policy. 
Although its people were 
Muslim, Turkish foreign policy always implied a hidden support for Israel, Turkey saw 
Israel as a way to gain sympathy in the West. 
127 For example, Foreign Secretary Sadak, 
in an interview in the New York Times on 7 February 
1948, argued that Israel had 
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become a reality and the world recognised it, underlining that the Turkish had never 
prevented migration of the Israelis to Palestine in history. 128 Turkey recognised Israel 
officially on 21 March 1949, and made efforts to develop its relations despite Arab 
protests. Turkey, from time to time, seemed anti-Israel, but these policies did not always 
showed `real' Turkish Israeli policy. As noted many Turkish diplomats declared that 
these policies were tactical not to provoke the other countries, namely the Arabs and the 
Soviet Union. For example Turkey's policy after the Suez Crisis toward Israel did not 
reflect its policy. The Suez War obliged pro-Western-Turkey to recall its Ambassador 
from Tel Aviv. However, Turkish ambassador Istinyeli informed the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry that Turkey's policy was not against Israel but a tactical policy to calm tension 
down-129 Turkish-Israeli relations proved the undeniable roles of Kemalist pragmatism 
and Westernism in foreign policy. It also showed that Turkey determined its Middle 
Eastern policy according to the Cold War and the West's global interests. 
Given this, it is no surprise that, Menderes' Middle Eastern policy is the most important 
example of the DP departure from the Kemalist tradition in foreign policy. 
Relations with the Third World 
One of the victims of Turkey's assumption-based foreign policy, which suggested that 
what is good for the West is good for Turkey, was Turkey's relations with the Third 
World. Turkey's dependence on NATO and the inflexible Cold War stance not only 
over shadowed its relations with the Middle Eastern states but also prevented 
establishment of healthy relations with the Third World. 
130 After the Second World War 
many Western colonies gained their independence. They neither supported the Soviet 
Union nor the US led West. Their aim was to form a new pact to unite developing 
countries like Egypt, Yugoslavia, Algeria and Indonesia and sought a strategy 
maximising their own gains while minimising their costs. 
13' Turkey, as a developing 
country was expected to support supported them, however, with the effect of 
its 
ideological orientation Turkey missed the rise of the Third World and saw the 
developments from the American perspective. When Third World countries held a 
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meeting to decide on their strategy in Bandung in 1955 Turkey perceived the movement 
as a part of the communist conspiracy when the US suggested Turkey join the 
conference, 132 Turkey it changed its policy and joined. At the conference Zorlu, the 
Turkish Foreign Minister, spoke as if he was a Western spokesman by rejecting 
neutralism in world politics. Turkey advocated that neutralism would help the advance 
of communism in the world. As Gönlübol pointed out, Turkey, though itself 
underdeveloped, acted as spokesman for the developed Western nations. 133 Naturally, 
Turkey's pro-Western attitude worsened its relations with many countries in the Third 
World. This was so at the United Nations where Turkey would lose many votes over 
national cases such as the Cyprus problem. Furthermore Turkey continued to support 
the Western countries in other cases. For example, Turkey supported the French in the 
Algerian Independence War at the cost of losing Turkish prestige and influence in the 
Middle East and Algeria. 134 Although many Western states supported the Algerians 
Turkey saw the matter as a part of NATO solidarity and voted in the UN against 
Algeria. 135 In other words, with the impact of ideology, namely the Cold War, DP's 
Americanism, Kemalist realism and pragmatism, Turkey sacrificed its national interests 
in the East to maintain good relations with the West. 136 
A Test of the Ideology: The Cyprus Problem: 
Although the Menderes government did not attach much importance to the problem of 
Cyprus, observers agree that the eruption of the Cyprus conflict constitutes the most 
important development during this period. The Cyprus problem, in fact, could have 
been a perfect motive for the DP to change its pro-American foreign policy since the 
West did not give political support to the Turkish side and the Western response to the 
Cyprus issue implied a resurgence of the traditional anti-Turkish feelings in Western 
minds. However, the DP's pro-American position prevented any change in its policies. 
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Cyprus before independence was a British colony with a Greek (80 percent) and 
Turkish (20 percent) population. The Greek Cypriot aim was Enosis (annexation of 
Cyprus to mainland Greece). However, Turkey could not see the Greek intention 
because the Turkish statesmen focused on the Soviet threat and relations with the West. 
For Sükrü Sina Gürel, Turkish State Minister, Menderes governments' West-East- 
obsessed foreign policy encouraged the Greeks to annex the island to Greece. 137 Gürel 
claims that DP's naive Westernst ideology was the main cause for the crisis. '38 In 1951, 
Menderes had implied the problem could be solved in a peaceful way and had given a 
clear message to Greece that the Cyprus problem was not so crucial for Turkey. 139 Also 
the US promised to support the Greek argument in the United Nations in 1954. 
Turkey similar to the early policies, did not resist the Greek efforts. In these years the 
United Kingdom, not Turkey, defended Turkish rights in the island as the British saw 
the Turkish Cypriots as a tool to prevent the partition of the island. 140 The Turkish 
government realised the importance of the problem with British encouragement and the 
people's enforcement. The developments in the period of 1959-1960 resulted in an 
independent Cyprus. 
The importance of the island for Turkish security was not debatable even in the 1950s, 
however the DP's ideological orientation (scepticism-free Westernism) prevented it 
from seeing its importance. As a result, Menderes governments' attitude to the Cyprus 
problem can be considered a perfect example of ideology's blinding effect. 
Nevertheless, the agreements signed by Menderes set the ground for Turkey on this 
issue of Cyprus problem. 
Since Menderes' government did not attach great importance to Cyprus, the study 
does 
not detail the Cyprus problem of the 1950s, but noted the cause of this policy. 
However, 
as will be shown, the Cyprus problem would become the most 
important subject for 
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Turkish foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s, creating a formidable challenge for both 
Kemalist and Democrat ideologies. 
The Clash of Ideas and Kemalist Resistance 
As seen above, the Democrats imitated the Republicans in political life and this 
nourished authoritarianism. But it was the multi-party era, and the Democrat years 
differed from the early years of the Republic. The Republican leaders, Atatürk and 
Inönü had almost unbridled freedom in all matters, internal or external. However in the 
DP years, the ideologies competing with Kemalism were actively rivalling one another, 
and the bans could not stop any of them. Indeed, the official prohibitions were 
strengthening them, as experienced in the ultra-nationalism and Islamism. As a result 
the Democrat era was pluralistic and colourful when compared with the previous eras. 
The new schools of thought emerged, like Marxist-Kemalism and leftism, and the old 
banned schools of thought in foreign policy became active, like Ottomanism and 
Islamism. Naturally the pluralist environment caused more discussion and foreign and 
government policies were frequently questioned. 
The second characteristic of the DP term was that the DP had the support of the masses. 
Thanks to the liberalisation of the economy and politics, more religious freedom, the 
effects of the rapid economic development, the DP government gained the hearts of the 
businessmen, tradesmen, small businesses, conservatives, Islamists, religious people, 
villagers and liberals. This support balanced the opposition, and gave the DP public 
support in foreign policy problems. 
As has been seen many aspects of the DP policies implied a clear deviation from the 
Kemalist tradition. The Democrats saw what the Kemalists perceived dangerous as a co- 
operation opportunity, like religion. Actually the Democrats never 
declared that they 
were against Kemalism. Indeed, they declared themselves as the 
`best Kemalists' and 
claimed that the RPP misunderstood Kemalism, and used 
Kemalism to mask its 
interests. Whether the Democrats were right or wrong, Kemalist supporters, most 
notably the RPP and the civil and military bureaucracy, perceived 
the DP as a direct 
threat to themselves and the Kemalist revolution. Ironically, the Marxists also 
joined the 
anti-DP bloc accusing Democrats of being undemocratic and argued 
that Turkey had 
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been more democratic under Atatürk's one-party regime than during the DP period. '41 
Thus a hidden opposition was born. The government belonged to the elected DP, but the 
bureaucracy was under the control of the Kemalist bureaucracy. Under these 
circumstances an ideological, even physical clash was inevitable and the Kemalist 
resistance came from four different places: the army, bureaucracy, parliament and the 
press. 
Bureaucracy 
As noted in the Inönü period the bureaucracy with other Kemalist groups had gained a 
group-consciousness. They became guardians of the Kemalist ideology and regime, and 
thanks to the Inönü governments, they were well equipped against a popular or elected- 
government control. In addition to the Constitution and the law, there was very strong 
co-operation between the military and civil bureaucracy as both considered themselves 
as leaders of the state and regime. When a party different from the RPP gained power 
with a different ideology and aims, the army and the civil bureaucracy perceived that as 
a counter-revolution against Kemalism and their privileged position. The Democrat 
reforms, as mentioned, were not actually against Kemalism or Kemalists but the one- 
party regime and privileged posts. The DP reforms were against the Inönü - type 
interpretation of Kemalism and the Democrat political and religious policies offered a 
different alternative to the bureaucrats and Army's autocratic interpretation of 
Kemalism as well as its economic policies undermined the bureaucrats' positions in the 
society. Now the Kemalists were not the only power-centre, but one of them. The rising 
business class and fledgling working class were claiming their rights from the 
bureaucrats. Apart from the economic changes, the economic policies increased internal 
migration and the social structure of the society was greatly changed. Villagers settled 
down around big cities, and even this migration was perceived as a threat 
by the 
bureaucrats, to the regime. For the bureaucrats the new comers invaded the cities, which 
had been the bastion of Kemalism. In their part, now relatively richer villagers and 
businessmen were replacing the posts of the bureaucrats as the most respected members 
of the soeiety. 142 With economic development and democratisation two things 
became 
the symbol of power. money and votes. The bureaucrats now 
had neither financial 
141 Mihri Belli, Milli Demokratik Devrim, (National Democratic Revolution), (Ankara: 
Aydinlik 
Yayinevi, 1970). 
142 Kemal H. Karpat, The Military and Politics in Turkey: A Socio-Cultural 
Analysis of a Revolution', 
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power nor votes. The main cause of the unrest among the civil and military bureaucrats, 
which resulted in a military coup in 1960, was the decline in their power. 
The situation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was no exception. As one of the leading 
Kemalist institutions there was unrest among the diplomats and the other foreign 
ministry officers over changes in the structure of society. For example, Ambassador 
Malimut Dikerdem blamed Köprülü, the first Democrat Minister of Foreign Affairs, of 
being köylü (villager). 143 Also most of the bureaucrats were against the Democrat's 
over-active Americanism. The Ministry had been the leader of Westernism in Turkey, 
yet they were publicly against activist interventionism. The Turkish diplomats memoirs 
prove that the Ministry was particularly against the Democrat's Middle Eastern policy 
as it was viewed as a clear deviation from Kemalist foreign policy. i44 Indeed, for the 
Kemalist bureaucracy the DP did not take the Kemalist foreign policy principles into 
consideration when it was forming Turkey's external relations. For them, the Democrats 
neglected secularism, pacifism, realism, legalism and the non-alignment principles of 
Kemalism. 
However, despite their unhappiness they did not resist the Democrat policies. One of the 
reasons for this was the bureaucracy's contentment with Turkey's integration into the 
West. Unlike the army, the Foreign Ministry had very close relations with the West, and 
accepted NATO membership as an inseparable part of Turkish foreign policy. 
Hereafter, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs championed NATO and the Western 
block in Turkey and similar to the DP leaders, they identified Turkey's interests with 
Western policies. Ortayli, for example, claimed the Turkish Foreign Ministry's 
Westernism was naive, and criticised Turkish diplomats of being idealist-Westernist. 
'45 
It can be argued that this idealism prevented a possible clash between the government 
and the bureaucrats. 
The Democrat governments for their part did not like the foreign policy bureaucracy, 
viewing it as timid. Moreover, their understanding and methodologies were completely 
different in many issues. Yet, it was very difficult to sack any officer due to the 
law. 
American Historical Review, Vol. 75,1970. 
143 Dikerdem, Ortadogu'da... 
144 Dikerdem, Ortadogu'da... 
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Therefore, the DP appointed its best men to key positions. For example, the Democrat 
Foreign Minister's brother was appointed as ambassador to Cairo. The second measure 
the Democrats took was to weaken the bureaucracy by dividing its responsibilities 
between other government departments, such as Foreign Ministry, Financial Affairs 
Ministry etc. 
In conclusion, similar to Atatürk's scepticism, but for different reasons, the Democrats 
did not trust the Foreign Affairs Ministry bureaucracy and did not share its power with 
it. The bureaucracy remained an institution, which just carried out routine jobs 
(protocol, translation, reporting the events in the world and consulate jobs). Apart from 
these, in decision-making the Ministry's role was limited. Even the Ministers did not 
solely rely on the Ministry bureaucracy. 
Parliament 
In Parliament, the Menderes government had a measure of freedom as the opposition 
had no real power to control the government because of the DP's overwhelming 
majority and internal parliamentary rules. The government rarely had to answer serious 
charges in parliament and `certainly nothing comparable to Great Debate or Agonising 
Reappraisal of the type to which the US Congress periodically submits the American 
leadership. "46 For example, many secret agreements between Turkey and the United 
States were not ratified by parliament. 147 In addition to the lack of a control-mechanism 
in parliament the consensus on the main pillar of foreign policy, namely Westernism, 
helped the DP. 
Conclusion: Challenge and Deviation 
Having discussed the ideological background, implementation and the reactions to the 
Democrat foreign policy we can draw the main features of the DP period. First of all, as 
happened in the Ottoman, Mustafa Kemal and Inönü eras, external factor remained the 
most important determinant in Turkish foreign policy. Despite the crucial changes 
in the 
145 Interview with fiber Ortayh, 14 December 1997, Ankara. 
146 Robinson, The birst, p. 163. 
147 Haydar Tuckanat, Ikili Anla*malann Ic Yiizü (The Inside Story of the Bileteral Aggrements). 
(Ankara: Ekim Yaymlan, 1970), p. 252; Sander, Tnrk-Amerikas..., p. 109; George Harries, Troubled 
Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971, (Washington D. 
C.: 
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aims, ideologies and the methods, the impact of these changes remained limited. The 
traditional Russian / communist threat, need for the external financial and military aid 
remained at the top of the agenda. Thanks to its geographic location and political 
position between the blocks Turkey was exposed to the Cold War may be more than the 
other countries. Thus, most of time the success of Turkish foreign policy remained 
dependent an international circumstances. 
Second, the close connection between the domestic and foreign policies continued in the 
DP era. The Menderes governments did not separate them and saw these two as 
inseparable. Therefore apart from the international circumstances Democrat foreign 
policy was deeply dependent on domestic policies. 14" This increased the importance of 
ideology in foreign policy. 
Third, as a result of the first two factors, in the Democrat years two more factors shaped 
Turkish foreign policy westernisation (under the Cold War circumstances) and 
democratisation. There was a close relationship between these two factors. The main 
force behind Turkish democratisation process was external factors. The more Turkey 
needed the West, the more it democratised. Democratisation provided alternatives to the 
Kemalist model and made the system more pluralistic. On the other hand, 
Westernisation had two contrary effects; it imposed on Turkey a capitalist Western 
economic model, thus, undermining the Kemalist elite and state structure by increasing 
the power of the bourgeois, villagers, religious-traditional groups and other periphery 
forces. At the same time the Kemalists legitimated their ideology by using the success 
of the Western block. From their perspective Turkey had to be an equal member of the 
West and the only way to do so was through Kemalism. 
Similar to its impact on the Kemalists, democratisation and the Cold War affected the 
Democrats in two different ways. On the one hand, they provided a legitimating 
ideological ground for alternatives to Kemalism. Democratisation granted power to the 
Democrats. The rise of the US as the leader of the Western block provided foreign 
support for DP power. On the other hand, the fledgling Turkish democracy 
denuded 
American Enterprise Institute, 1972), p. 55. 
' 42 For a similar argument see Yavuzalp, former diplomat in Menderes era: 
Ercüment Yavuzalp, 
Liderlerimiz ve Dij Politika, (Our Leaders and Foreign Policy), (Ankara: 
Bilgi Yaymevi, 1996), p. 75. 
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Turkish foreign policy from its balanced, realist cautious character. Under the populist 
understanding Turkey dramatically changed its foreign policy tracks without analysing 
the situation enough. Likewise together with the Democrat's economic and cultural 
orientations, the Soviet threat and close relations with the West left Turkey without 
protection and Turkey was exposed to the bad effects of the Cold War. The Cold War 
ideology created its own organisations and connections and a Cold War lobby emerged 
in Turkey with the DP power. This lobby threatened all Turkish people with the Soviet, 
communist menaces. It is true sometimes even the Turkish governments used the Cold 
War to justify their position in the West, yet most of the time Cold War considerations 
buried other considerations under the communist-capitalist competition, including the 
Kemalist and the Democrat ones. As a result Turkey heavily involved the Cold War 
competition in the name of the other countries. 
Fourth, thanks to the Cold War's impact, Turkish foreign policy was based on an 
assumption. For that assumption Turkish national interests and the Western interests 
were identical. However the Western countries did not share Turkey's exaggerated 
understanding of this. As a result Turkey sacrificed or risked its national interests to 
maintain Western support. As a part of that policy Turkey supported the Western states 
in any part of the world and almost on any subject at the cost of losing its good relations 
with these states. 
Fifth, the DP foreign policy can be considered a failure. The DP sought an alternative to 
the Kemalist approach because Kemalism could not provide a sufficient framework for 
foreign policy. Ironically the Democrats also suffered from lack of a sufficient ideology 
in foreign policy. In other words, they had an ideology or a bulk of the ideologies, but 
none of these were for foreign policy. The DP's inexperience and thirst for success 
made it impatient in foreign policy and deprived it of ability to carry out a consistent 
foreign policy. Particularly in the Middle East and the Third World the DP's 
contradictory policies damaged Turkish foreign policy's reliability and predictability. 
Also its alliance with the West was based on naive assumptions. 
Having drawn the general features of the DP era, it can be said that the sixth feature of 
the DP era was that the Democrats could be considered as the 
first organised and 
successful challenge to the Kemalist ideology. The Democrats changed 
the essence and 
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methods of Kemalist foreign policy. In some degree they were forced by the 
international developments to do so, yet most of time they knew what they did. It is 
true, the Cold War and the economic, military weaknesses decreased the effect of the 
ideological changes, but their different ideological orientation distinguished from their 
foreign policy from the Kemalist one. They mainly failed in foreign policy 
implementation in some degree, but this failure cannot be taken as proof of the success 
of the Kemalist approach. It can be said that the Democrat's success was to shake the 
Kemalist monopoly. The Democrat power sowed the seeds of opposition and pluralism 
over Turkish political life. The coming political groups would take the Democrat 
example to oppose the Kemalist revolutionary approach. Particularly the centre-right 
political parties would see themselves as the extension of the Democrat political school. 
In foreign policy, despite its challenge to Kemalism, the DP was inevitably under the 
effect of the Kenialist legacy as well. The impact of Kemalism's secularism, 
pragmatism, realism, Eastern perception and the Western obsession could be seen in the 
Democrat foreign policy. However, the DP left the Kenialist understanding in many 
foreign policy issues. The Democrats heavily criticised the Kenialist non-alignment, 
pacifism principles and the Kenialist Middle Eastern policies. For example, the DP's 
Middle East policy represented a departure from traditional Turkish policy of not 
committing itself irrevocably to any particular position in the Middle East. 149 Moreover, 
since the Ottoman-German ally, Turkey for the first time identified its national interest 
with a foreign power's interests. As witnessed in the Iraq and Syrian affairs Turkey was 
almost militarily involving itself in the other countries' internal affairs. In other words 
Turkey risked its own national security for a foreign country, namely the US. 
Obviously, all of these imply a clear deviation from the Kemalist foreign policy 
understanding and a challenge to the Kemalist foreign policy bureaucracy. 
Finally, thanks to the relatively pluralistic environment, the traditional foreign policy 
school of thoughts re-emerged (like Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism) and the new 
schools appeared or the marginal currents strengthened their 
influence (like 
Americanism and communism). The difference between these schools was somewhat 
large. The communists defended closer relations with the 
Soviets while the Democrats 
149 Robinson, The Mrst..., p. 186. 
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perceived the communists as if not the biggest the only threat to Turkey. The Islamists 
saw the common religious values as the only co-operation consideration in the 
international arena, while the Kenialist Republicans argued religions are the main 
reason for backwardness and poverty. Ultra-Turkists aimed for a greater Turkish state. 
In other words, now there were many alternatives in addition to Kemalism. The 
Kemalists were still the strongest group yet they were now under heavy criticism from 
the other schools. Pluralism not only demolished the Kenialist monopoly but also 
damaged governmental freedom on foreign policy issues. Parallel to the increase of the 
people's effect on the political system, the governmental monopoly on foreign policy 
issues was demolished. Hereafter the governments had to consider the people as an 
actor in foreign relations, and they at least made efforts to manipulate them as seen in 
the Cyprus crisis. Thus populist policies appeared in the Turkish foreign policy making 
process as well. When populism re-appeared, as will be seen in the next chapter, the 
ethnic groups' influence was increased, because Turkey was an immigrant's country. 
Since then the Azerbaijani, Western Thrace Turkish, Georgians, the Chechen, Abkhaz, 
Kurdish, Bulgarian Turkish, Iraqi immigrants, the Cypriots and others became an 
important factor that no government could ignore in foreign policy. 
Contrary to the existing literature, '5° as discussed in this chapter, it can be said that the 
deviation from Kemalist foreign policy understanding in the DP era is certain. The 
change was dramatic. The Democrat counter-attack was met by the Kemalists in 27 
May military Coup and the Kemalists would make effort to turn back the country to the 
early Republican years. But now the challenge was greater than the Democrat challenge, 
namely international developments. The next chapter will explore the efforts to re-set 
Kemalism and its policies against the challenge of the international realities. 
150 For example Hale argues that, despite the drastic 
domestic changes, there was no change in foreign 
policy in Inünü and Menderes eras: Hale, `Foreign... 
', p. 94. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Neo-Kemalism vs. Neo-Democrats 
(1960-1971) 
`I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a 
chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey 
against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO 
allies. " 
Lyndon B. Johnson, US President, 1964 
`Atatürk taught us realism and rationalism. He was not an ideologue. '2 
Si leyman Demirel, Turkish Prime Minister 
The Democrats, as the first organised and successful challengers to Kemalism, 
undermined Kemalist policies. Turkish foreign, economic and domestic policies were 
re-shaped by the DP. However, the DP not only challenged Kemalism but also the 
privileged Kemalist class, namely the bureaucracy, the army and the Kemalist elite. 
When they lost their economic and political privileges, the military made a coup to stop 
the Democrat reforms. Hence, the 27 May Coup can be viewed as a revenge of 
Kemalists. After the coup, the military and military-supported governments tried to 
change the DP policies and return to the early Republican foreign and domestic policies. 
As has been seen, the domestic and foreign policies were not clearly distinguished and 
as a result of this, Turkish foreign policy was as one of the branches of Turkish 
domestic politics. In the post-coup era, however, almost all-political groups focused on 
foreign policy issues and made an effort to set up an ideological foreign policy 
framework. These efforts and international developments caused a great change in 
Turkish foreign policy. This chapter will therefore explore the causes of this 
transformation. Moreover, in this period Turkey saw the rise of a neo-Kemalist foreign 
policy approach, in other words the Kemalist left. Although they used `Kemalism' as a 
name, as will be seen, their foreign policy understanding was very different from 
Atatürk's foreign policy understanding. In this framework, the chapter also examines 
the roots of this school, and aims to explain the ideological ground of leftist-Kemalist 
foreign policy approach. Furthermore, there is no doubt that one of the most important 
events, which left traumatic marks on Turkish policy makers, is the Cyprus Crisis. The 
' The Middle East Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 1966, p. 387. 
2 Ihsan Sabri caglayangil, Andanm, (My Memoirs), (Istanbul: Güne§, 1990), p. 125. 
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Cyprus Crisis changed almost everything in Turkish foreign policy. The Western 
attitude in the Crisis can be considered as the greatest challenge to the Kemalist and 
liberal-conservative Westernism in Turkey. Turkey's aloneness in front of the crisis 
created a great shock and caused a radical shift in Kemalist and conservative-liberal 
foreign policy understanding. Also, the Cyprus Crisis provided a good example to test 
the success of ideology in Turkish foreign policy. Finally, we will focus on Demirel's 
Justice Party's foreign policy understanding and its implementation. In a period, in 
which resurgence of Kemalism was witnessed, neo-Democrat Justice Party tried to 
establish a more balanced foreign policy and made efforts not to make same mistakes of 
the DP. 
The Army: Kemalist Revenge 
Democrats vs. the Army 
The Army, which was the most respected institution in Turkey, saw itself as the 
guardian of Kemalism and the state. 3 In this context, the Democrats, aware of the 
importance of the army in Turkish politics, gave a priority to the military needs at the 
cost of economic development. 4 However, with the establishment of multiparty rule, the 
army inevitably lost its privileged position, hence it found itself in an identity crisis. 
Moreover, the Democrat anti-etatist policies diminished the financial power of the 
military compared with the business and agricultural classes. In particular the high 
inflation undermined the economic power of military officers. Also, they no longer 
enjoyed their previous level of direct representation in political power, as the percentage 
of deputies of military origin fell sharply after the 1950 elections and the same was true 
for the executive body where five of the six ministers of National Defence during the 
Menderes period were civilians, although eleven of the predecessors of the Inönü period 
had a military background. As a result, as Vaner put it, `the change in ruling elites, 
which derived from important social transformations and reflected a shift in political 
structures, was perceived by the army as the degradation of its own institutional prestige 
3 Robinson, The First..., p. 88; Also see Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, `Swords and 
Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force', World Politics, October 1960, pp. 19-44. 
4 William Hale (Trn. Ahmet Fethi), Türkiye'de Ordu ve Siyaset, 1789'dan Günümüze, (The Army and 
the Politics in Turkey, Since 1789), (Istanbul: Hil Yayin, 1996), p. 94 and Morris 
Singer, The Economic 
Advance of Turkey, 1838-1960, (Ankara: Turkish Economic 
Society, 1977), p. 415. 
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and a challenge to its image within society. 'S After the 1954 elections the relations 
between the civilians and the army worsened as for the first time in centuries, the army 
was now under civilian authority. 
Under these circumstances the army declared that they were Kemalist soldiers and the 
DP policies had damaged Kemalism, saw no alternative but a military coup - called 
`revolution' by the Kenialist elite. The first report of the Constitution Commission 
established by the coupe for instance stated that the Menderes government was 
`antagonistic to the army, courts, university and Atatürk's reforms. '6 For the army the 
revolution marked the beginning of the process of its affirmation in the political arena? 
in order to protect Kemalism. 8 Under the coup administration, Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes, Fatin Rüýtü Zorlu, Foreign Minister, and Hasan Polatkan, the Finance 
Minister, were executed by a military court on 16-17 September 1961 and 12 more 
politicians were also sentenced to death. The party was closed down, and two hundred 
people, including many deputies, were given prison sentences. After the coup, the 
military officers set up the Ulusal Birlik Komitesi (National Unity Committee, hereafter 
NUC). The NUC remained in power for more than a year to carry out the revolution's 
reforms: banks were closed, the personal accounts of leading politicians and 
businessmen were frozen, and loans were suspended. Also all inflationary policies were 
cancelled, like large construction projects. The purchase of government bonds was 
made compulsory for wage earners. Price controls were introduced. Land taxes were 
increased. On the other hand the salaries of army officers were greatly increased and 
special army stores were opened. 9 The Army Mutual Assistance Association (OYAK) 
was established and the army collecting capital from its officers started to run business 
like a civilian corporation. OYAK also set up army bazaars to support the officers. 10 
Moreover the Democrat Party supporters or sympathisers were purged from the army 
and the bureaucracy and 147 academicians were dismissed. 
" 
5 Semih Vaner, `The Army', in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (eds. ), Turkey in Transition, 
New Perspectives, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 236-265, p. 237-238. 
6 Ataöv, `The 27th of May... ', p. 20. 
Vaner, `The Army... ', p. 328. 
8 Andrew Mango, Turkey, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), p. 89. 
9 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., pp. 414-415. 
10 Ahmad, The Making..., pp. 130-131 
11 W. F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961 , Aspects of 
Military Politics, (Washington D. C.: 
1963), p. p. 54-55; Saw and Shaw, History of..., p. 415. 
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The Coup's Ideology: Leftist and Kemalist 
The coup leaders were anti-Democrat and opposed all DP reforms. They named their 
policies Kemalist, 12 however, their Kemalism was less pragmatic than that of Atatürk. 
They were idealist and aimed to transform the country without any compromise. 
Surprisingly, as will be seen, they were idealistic on foreign policy matters as well. 
Thirdly, unlike with Atatürk's Kemalism, the importance of the socialist ideas on their 
Kemalism was obvious. Social justice, equality, independence, anti-imperialism were 
the main pillars of the `revolution-like-coup' and this leftist attitude also reflected on 
their foreign policy approach. 
Kemalist Measures and the Re-structuring of Foreign Policy Machinery 
After the coup, the army declared that they would not give up the democratic multi- 
party political system, however, they attempted to maintain their Kemalist hegemony 
within a multi-party system. As such, they set a political structure around a politically 
strong army. The system was fully-democratic in appearance and the 1961 Constitution 
made by the soldiers was considered as the most democratic Turkish constitution. Yet 
army control over the political life was obvious. 
In foreign policy, the 1961 Constitution aimed to restore Kemalist principles. As Server 
Tani li put it, the Constitution accepted `independence' and `peace' as the two main 
pillars of Turkish foreign policy. 13 The Introductory section underlined Kemal's `peace 
at home, peace in the world' principle. 14 Thus the Kemalist pacifist principle was 
constitutionalised by the coup. Likewise in that section and in article V, 77 and 96 the 
independence principles were underlined. 15 Apart from the independence and pacific 
principles, other Kemalist principles, namely secularism, Kemalist nationalism, 
republicanism, etatism and populism were maintained. In particular, secularism 
continued to determine Turkey's relations with the Muslim countries. Thus, the coup 
aimed to secure Kemalism in foreign policy with constitutional obligations. Moreover, 
the 1961 Constitution drew a pluralistic legal framework in domestic matters in order to 
divide and balance the civilian power. As will be seen this pluralism caused resurgence 
12 Aydemir, Ihtilalin..., pp. 5-12. 
13 Server Tanilli, Devlet ve Demokrasi (State and Democracy), 6th edition, (Istanbul; Say Yayinlan, 
1990), pp. 593-595. 
14 Constitution of the Turkish Republic, (Trs.: S. Balkan, A. Uysal and K. Karpat), (Ankara: 1961), 
Intr. Section. 
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of left and right ideologies, particularly the rise of Marxism. Thus, the constitutional 
changes indirectly helped to create more alternatives in foreign policy creating a 
pluralistic foreign policy in future. 
Second, the state machinery was re-structured. The National Security Council (NSC, 
Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) was also created. The members of the Council were the 
President, Head of the General Staff, four other generals (from Air, Naval, Ground and 
Gendarme forces), Prime Minister, Minister for Defence Affairs and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. The body's main task was to maintain Kemalism in state and society 
and to control politicians and bureaucrats. According to the 1961 Constitution, the NSC 
was more powerful than the Prime Minister, President, Cabinet and on some occasions 
even Turkish Parliament. For example, the Constitution stated that the Cabinet had to 
consider decisions taken by the NSC, 16 and in practice the Cabinet had to carry out NSC 
decisions without debate. '7 The NSC had great power also in foreign policy decision 
making and as an extension of the revolutionary ideology, the NSC's priority in external 
relations was national security. Therefore the NSC looked at the foreign policy issue 
through the national security prism. The problem was that there was no clear definition 
for national security or as Orhan Erkanh, Coup leader, stated national security covered 
all political issue: `From the price of rice to roads and touristic sites, there is not a single 
problem in this country which is not related to national security. If you happen to be 
very deep thinker, that too is a matter of national security. ' 18 
As a result, the NSC had incredible freedom in deciding domestic and foreign policies 
and in reality the Cabinet and foreign policy bureaucracy were only assistants to the 
NSC in implementing the policies. In addition to the NSC's approach to foreign policy, 
the army also saw the national security issues as its constitutional task. Therefore, 
neither the NSC nor the army consulted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Cabinet 
in many foreign policy issues. 
15 Constitution... 
16 The 1961 Constitution, Article 118/3. 
17 Bülent Tanör, `Türkiye'de Diq I1i lerin 14; Hukuk Rejimi' (The Legal Regime of Turkey's External 
Relations in Domestic Framework), in Faruk Sönmezoglu (ed. ), Türk Dij Politikasmin Analzi (The 
Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), p. 324. 
113 Ahmad, The Making..., p. 130. 
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Another institutional change introduced was the creation of the Supreme Court 
(Anayasa Mahkemesi). In democratic systems Supreme Courts are established to protect 
the people and minorities against the state's unjust policies. However, in Turkey the 
priority was protecting the state from the people and the Constitutional Court was set to 
protect the Kemalist state from the people, parliament and `unreliable politicians'. Also 
the High Court of Justice was reorganised to try accused members of the DP19 and 592 
leading members were brought to trial at Yassiada. Furthermore, other laws and 
institutions were introduced by NUC, like the State Planning Organisation (SPO) 
formed to plan and control the official expenditures aimed at completely changing the 
Democrat economic structure because for the Kemalist elite the Democrat's liberal 
market economy was decaying the social structure of Kenialist ideology. 
Contrary to the Democrat market economy model, the NUC promoted a planned 
economy with an import substitution strategy. Moreover, the 1961 Constitution set a 
bicameral parliament and cut parliament's duties of legislation, ratification of the 
treaties and the authorisation of the use of armed force (Articles 63,64,65 and 66). The 
lower house with 450 deputies was to be elected for four years by a direct general 
election. The upper house, the Senate of the Republic (Cumhuriyet Senatosu) was to be 
composed of 150 members elected for a six-year term. Also according to the 
constitution, 15 additional members were to be appointed by the President from 
individuals distinguished for their services in various fields, at least ten of whom were 
to be independent of political parties (Articles 70 and 72). Furthermore the chairman 
and all of the members of the NUC were automatically appointed members of the 
Senate. With these amendments, the NUC aimed at a balanced political system to 
prevent civilian `autocracy' over the elite and aimed to guarantee the military, 
bureaucrats and the Kemalist elite's privileged position in society. Also the NUC aimed 
to maintain the Kemalist values in the state system with the Constitution 
law and the 
institutions. With these reforms, the challenge to Kemalism was ended and the generals 
and the bureaucrats once more became the privileged most respected group 
in society 
and as will be seen they were dedicated to the preservation of the status quo. 
19 Düstur, Dördüncii Terhb, two vols. (Ankara: 1961). 
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Post-Revolution: The Need for a Transformation in Foreign Policy 
The 1960 Revolution alarmed the United States and the world, 20 as it became difficult to 
predict political developments in Turkey. Aware that they needed international support, 
notably that of NATO, the coup leaders moved quickly to dispel anxiety about Turkey's 
international position, and pointed out that the reason for the coup was domestic not 
external. 21 In his first speech on national radio, Alparslan Türke, the coup's 
spokesman, declared Turkey's position after the coup: 
`(... ) We are addressing ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbours, and the entire 
world. Our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nations Charter and to the 
principles of human rights; the principle of peace at home and in the world set by the 
great Atatürk is our flag. We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe 
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Central Treaty Organisation 
(CENTO), and we are faithful to them. We repeat our ideal is peace at home, peace in 
the world. '22 
Not only the army, but also the Inönü JP governments had reaffirmed Turkish 
commitments to the West and the world. 23 In the early 1960s in particular Turkey did 
not change its foreign policy, 24 however in the later years Turkish foreign policy 
underwent remarkable changes. It can be argued that there were six main reasons for 
these changes: The failure of the DP policies; the army's scepticism over the Democrat 
Americanism; the resurgence of opposition in foreign policy matters; the rise of the 
anti-Western Marxist school; the marriage between Kemalism and the left; and finally 
the Cyprus Crisis. We, now, discuss the first two of them, and then we will focus on the 
other issues in the following sections. 
Failure of the DP's Foreign Policy: The failure of the DP in foreign policy was obvious. 
In the Middle East the Baghdad Pact had resulted in a disaster for Turkey while thanks 
to Menderes' policies over Iraq, Syria and Turkey's support for the 
former colonialist 
powers, anti-Turkish feelings had dramatically increased 
in the Arab world. Turkey's 
pro-Western policy did not even make Israel happy. In the 
west though Menderes had 
sacrificed Turkish interests in the East to maintain 
Western support, the Western 
20 New York Times, 28 May 1960, The Times 29 May 1960. 
21 Milliyet, 27 May 1960. 
22 Deniz Atiye Erden, Turkish Foreign Policy Through the United Nations, 
1960-1970, unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts, 1974,46-47. 
23 Ismail Arar, Hükümet Programlan, 1920-1965 (The Government Programs, 
1920-1965), (Istanbul: 
Burcak Yayinevi), pp. 312-350. 
24 Gerger, Turk Die..., pp. 94-99. 
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attitude especially over Cyprus proved that the West would not support the Turks. As a 
result, in spite of its domestic success DP foreign policy was considered a failure and 
this failure forced the policy makers to look for a new way, and encouraged the 
opposition to challenge the existing policies. 
Army Unhappiness with DP-Type Americanism: The May 1960 coup had been 
triggered by the deteriorating domestic political and economic situation in Turkey yet, 
the execution of the Minister for Foreign Affairs is significant, and shows the extent of 
Army's unrest over the Democrats foreign policy. Under the heavy influence of the left- 
wing groups, the army perceived the Democrat foreign policies as a deviation from the 
Kemalist path and the Democrats policy in the Middle East especially dissatisfied Army 
officers. For example, General Esengil argued that the Turkish army lost prestige and 
control over Turkey's security while NUC member Karan claimed that Turkey had 
become a sacrificeable country for the American interests. 25 For the army, Menderes' 
foreign policy was a deviation further from Kemalist secularism, Westernism and 
realism. 26 The Army was not happy with Democrat foreign policy, and planned a radical 
change in foreign policy. Despite their words, the army was more sceptical about 
relations with the West. In addition, the revolution's leaders were under the influence of 
left-wing groups and the army, thus attached greater importance to the concept of 
equality and national independence within bilateral relationships than the DP regime 
had. For the revolutionary leaders particularly, secret agreements with the United States 
were against Kemalist realism and independence principles as the DP had placed total 
trust in United States, even Turkish customs did not control the American goods sent to 
Turkey. 27 However the United States let Turkey down in foreign policy, as seen in the 
Lebanon and Cyprus affairs. As one American Ambassador to Ankara accepted in his 
memoirs, the United States did not even ask Turkey when it used its bases in Turkey. 
28 
As a result, the Coup leaders made an effort to change secret agreements and the 
direction of Turkish-American relations and to do so they even encouraged public 
debates on that matter. In particular the army requested to increase Turkey's power to 
25 Kenan Esengil, 27 Mayis ve Ordudaki Kiynnlar (27 May and the Sacrifices in the 
Army), (Istanbul: 
1978), pp. 10-11; Orhan Erkanli, `Die Yardunlar ve Di Tesirler' (Foreign 
Aid and Foreign Effect), 
Gercek Fikir Ajansi Bülteni, No. 3, January 1966. 
26 George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Research, 1972), p. 49. 
27 Cumhuriyet (daily, Istanbul), 2 July 1961. 
28 George McGhee, ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Ortadogu (USA-Turkey-NATO Middle East), 
(Ankara: Bilgi 
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decide the status of American soldiers and officers in Turkey. According to the 1954 
Agreement with the United States, an American solder was not under Turkish 
jurisdiction if he was on duty and the army considered these privileges an extension of 
capitulations in the Ottoman Empire. More generally, the army was against the DP's 
Americanism and wanted more balanced relations with the world on the basis of the 
principles of equality and independence. 
Rise of Neo-Kemalism (Leftist Kemalism) in Foreign Policy 
Until the 1960 coup the difference between foreign and domestic policies was not clear 
for Turkish political groups. For Atatürk, foreign policy was an extension of domestic 
goals and he saw foreign policy as a tool to maintain his reforms. Inönü followed 
Atatürk's way and did not promote a distinct foreign policy theory. In the Menderes 
period, foreign policy matters increased importance, but foreign policy was still a `high 
politics' issue even for the parliamentarians. However, after the coup, with the effect of 
political polarisation, the gap between the political groups on foreign policy matters 
widened and also the coup leaders, contrary to the previous Turkish leaders, encouraged 
public debates on foreign policy. 29 These debates deepened the differences. The first 
response came from the Kemalist leftists who shared the ideology of the military coup. 
Particularly the Yon circle made efforts to set a different foreign policy ideology based 
on leftism and Kemalism. 
Marriage of Kemalism and Leftism: Yön Movement 
As has been seen, Atatürk had severely suppressed the Marxist movement in Turkey. 
However, in the liberal atmosphere of the constitution of 1961, works of many leading 
socialist writers and leaders were freely translated and circulated in Turkey. Socialist 
ideas were rising among the people and the intellectuals in the 1960s. 
3° The 1960 
Coup's leftist ideas became more influential in certain sections of the Kemalist elite and 
bureaucracy and their influence over the educated elite was remarkable. 
In particular 
RPP members during the Inönü era were exposed to the communist 
ideology and it can 
Yayuievi, 1992), p. 275. 
29 Changes in international relations also provided a suitable environment for such 
debates: Omer 
Kürkcüoglu, `Div Politika Nedir? Türkiye'deki Dünü ve Bugünü-', (What is Foreign 
Policy? It's Past and 
Today in Turkey), AÜ SBF Dergisi / Ankara University SBF Journal, Vol. 
35. Nos.: 1-4, January- 
December, 1980, p. 235. 
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be said that the Inönist interpretation of Kemalism provided a suitable ground for 
Marxists in the state machinery. In the DP period, similar policies of the RPP and of the 
Marxists, like etatism, anti-religious and anti-liberal economic policies connected these 
two political groups and increased the Marxist influence over the bureaucracy, the army 
and the RPP. This culminated in the 1960s when similarities between the leftist groups 
and the RPP increased and the leftist Kemalists became the strongest group among the 
Kemalist elite. 
The marriage of Kemalist Western scepticism with leftist anti-capitalism and anti- 
imperialism resulted in reinterpretation of the goals of Turkish foreign policy and 
opened an era of criticism over Turkey's Western orientation. 31 Until that time the 
Islamists had protested over Turkey's commitments to the West, but they were weak, 
and had no influence over the state. On 20 December 1961 the leftist Kemalists 
established their influential journal, Yon (Direction). This journal provided the first 
serious and organised criticism of Turkish foreign policy. Yön advocated new security 
strategies for Turkey outside of NATO and propagated rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union. 32 In doing so, for the first time in Republican history Turkey's Western 
connections were severely criticised. 33 
While the need for change was real and there was serious concern over the Turkish- 
Western alliance among the academics, the army and politicians, nobody knew any 
alternative to the West. For example when the Forum journal began a serious debate on 
Turkish foreign policy, academics claimed that any change from the traditional foreign 
policy was impossible although the need for such change was essential. 34 The neo- 
Kemalist response came from Haluk Ülman whose article can be considered as the first 
serious Kemalist critique of Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy. In his article, Ülman 
claimed that the international system was changing and the Soviet Union was no longer 
such a threat. Ülman further claimed that NATO could not guarantee Turkey's security, 
but might increase Turkey's defence expenditure, and risk Turkish security by 
30 G6nlübol, `A Short... ', p. 8. 
31 GOnlübol, 'A Short... ', p. 8. 
32 Mumtaz Soysal, `YalnMIlk' (Aloneness), Yön, No. 143; Haluk Ülman, `Did Politikamizin Deii*enleri 
II', Yön, No. 27,20 June 1962, p. 16. 
33 Ergun Aydlnoglu, Eie$tirel Bir Tarih Denemesi, 1960-1971, Türk Solu (A Critical History Essay, 
1960-19 71, Turkish Left), (Istanbul: Beige Yaymlan, 1992), pp. 38-42. 
34 'Die Politisamuz Üzerine' (On Our Foreign Policy), Forum, 15 December 1960 and Forum, 15 
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provoking other nations. Therefore, Turkey had to end all NATO commitments and he 
suggested that Turkey improve its relations with the communist block and the Third 
World. 35 Ulman's argument encouraged others and literally opened an era of criticism. 
Leftist Türkkaya Ataöv, Dogan Avcioglu and Mumtaz Soysal, all are lecturers in 
Ankara University, followed Oman and claimed that Turkey's pro-Western policies 
harmed Turkish interests. 36 They also tried to reconcile Kemalism and leftist ideas with 
the aim of formulating a Kemalist-leftist doctrine arguing that the Kemalist reforms 
were socialist. Yön authors named Kemalism `national socialism 1,. 37 For neo-Kemalists 
Atatürk was the greatest leftist in Turkish history and the War of Independence and the 
Kemalist reforms were the greatest anti-imperialist, leftist achievements of the Turks. 38 
For example Ataöv criticised Turkey's policy towards the Algerian Independence War 
as `Turkey lost its credits, which it had gained with the War of Independence. The only 
way to get them back and to be a leader for the developing states was Kemalist 
Socialism. '39 Similarly Avcioglu saw Turkey's place among the Third World states. 40 
In fact, the contradiction was obvious: As has been seen Atatürk's aim was never to be 
the leader of any group of nations. His first and only priority was Turkey, not the 
developing countries. Despite such obvious differences the new leftists continued to use 
the Kemalist name. Avcioglu, the leading columnist and publisher of Yon, suggested a 
revolutionary take-over by the Kemalist-leftist army officers in order to realise all these 
objectives because for him, there were `native collaborators of imperialism' in Turkey. 41 
These collaborators were the Turkish bourgeoisie and its representatives, namely JP and 
February 1962; Aydinoglu, Elestirel..., p. 55. 
35 Haluk Ulman, 'Die Politikamizin De kenleri I', (Changeable Factors of Our Foreign Policy 1), Yön, 
No. 26,1962, pp. 14-15. 
36 Y6n authors claimed that Atatürk aimed at Westernism but he was against the West: Niyazi Berkes, 
`Gericilik ve Batinin Zararli Tesirleri' (Reactionary Movements and the Bad Effects of the West), Y5n, 
No. 58,23 January 1963, p. 8. 
37 Yakup Kadri Karaosmano , 1u, `Atatürk'un Özledigi Türkiye', Yön, No. 47,7 November 1962, p. 12; 
Sadun Aren, the leading socialist-Kemalist also argued that Kemal's populism and etatism principles in 
particular showed his socialist dream for Turkey: Sadun Aren, `Atatürk'ün Oz_ledigi Türkiye'yi 
Kurabildik mi? ', Y©n, No. 47,7 November 1962, p. 14. 
38 $evket Süreyya Aydemir, `Turk Sosyalizminin Ilkeleri' (The Principles of Turkish Socialism), Yön, 
No. 56,9 January 1963, p. 8; Cahit Tanyol, `Acik Oturum Konusma p' (The Open Negotiations Speech), 
Yön, No. 75,23 May 1963, p. 11; Sadun Aren, 'SBF'de Atatürk' (Atatürk in SBF), Yön, No. 49,21 
November 1962, p. 5. 
39 Türkkaya Ataöv, `Atatiirk'ün Ihr Politikasi' ( iaturk's Foreign Policy), Yin, Turkish journal, No. 47, 
1962, p. 18. 
40 Dogan Avcioglu, `Emperyalizmin cirptmglan' (Imperialism's Last Struggles to Live), Yön, No. 98,12 
February 1965, p. 3. 
41 Dogan Avcioglu, Devrim Üzerine (On the Revolution), (Ankara: Bilgi, 1971); Türkiye'nin Düzeni 
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other right-wing parties. 42 Similarly almost all leftist-Kemalists, like cetin Altan, 43 
Türkkaya Ataöv, 44 Mehmet Ali Aybar45 claimed that Western imperialism was 
responsible for Turkish backwardness. For example Ataöv argued that NATO and the 
United States brought nothing but infringement, instability and backwardness to Turkish 
society and risked Turkish security by provoking the Soviet Union. 46 
Another platform for the leftist-Kemalists was the Aydmlzk journal. In fact, it was a 
Marxist-Leninist periodical in essence and shared very little with Kemalism, however 
some of its members claimed that Mustafa Kemal was a good socialist and anti- 
imperialist. Belli, for example, argued that the Kemalist reforms prepared a suitable 
ground for a socialist revolution accusing the Democrats of being a bastion of `Western 
imperialism' in the Middle East. 47 Behice Boran also stressed socialism as an alternative 
for Turkey's foreign affairs arguing that the alliance with NATO hindered Turkey's 
economic progress and risked its security. " 
The leftist-Kemalist foreign policy framework was based on three main assumptions: a) 
the West was imperialist and wanted to colonise Turkey and other Third World 
countries. Therefore, Turkey's efforts for integration into the West did not help 
Turkey's development and security, b) The Turkish Right and business class were 
collaborators with Western imperialism, and enemies of Kemalism. In order to 
implement an independent, Kemalist and anti-imperial foreign policy a revolution led 
by the army and other `progressive' forces was compulsory, c) Turkey's foreign policy 
must be independent, socialist and Third Woridist and friendly relations with the Soviet 
Union and the Third World were essential. 
42 Cumhuriyet (daily, Istanbul), 15 November 1962. 
43 cetin Altan, Onlar Uyanlrken: Türk Sosyalistlerinin El Kitabi (When They are Awakening: Guide 
Book for Turkish Socialists), (Istanbul: Dönem, 1967). 
44 Turkkaya Ataöv, Amerika, NATO ve Türliye (America, NATO and Turkey), (Ankara: Ayduihk, 
1969). 
45 Mehmet All Aybar, Bagvmsjzhk, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm (Independence, Democracy, 
Socialism), 
(Istanbul: Gercek, 1968). 
46 Ataöv, Amerika. 
47 Niflui Belli, 'Ulusal Demokratik Devrim' (National Democratic Revolution), Aydinlik, 
27 May 1966; 
Mihri Belli, Yazilar, 1965-1970 (Collected Essays), Ankara: Sol Yayinlari, 1970), pp. 
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The creation of a Marxist Turkish Workers Party (Türkiye I4ci Partisi, TIP) increased 
criticism of traditional Turkish foreign policy. 49 The Marxists and other leftist groups, 
however, not only influenced and pressured government agencies but also organised 
street demonstrations and attacks against American interests in Turkey. 50 Foreign policy 
was crucial to the Marxists programme and unlike the JP, RPP or other parties, TIP 
focused on foreign policy. 51 TIP publicly criticised Turkey's alliance with the United 
States, and accused the West of occupying Turkey economically and politicall y. 52 TIP 
also accused Turkish foreign policy makers of this and attempted to prove that Mustafa 
Kemal was the greatest leftist in Turkish history by arguing that the RPP and the DP 
governments deviated from Kemalist policies. For TIP the real Kemalist foreign policy 
had to be based on independence and the struggle against the imperialist WestS3 as the 
TIP declared its foreign policy objectives were: `to protect the national independence, 
Republic, territorial integrity, equality in foreign policy... to struggle against 
imperialism and support the independence movements in the Third world and 
colonies. '54 
As will be seen in the next chapter Yon and the success of the TIP caused an ideological 
shift within them as the RPP became the home of leftist-Kemalism. In the 1960s Ecevit 
created a new ideology for the RPP, Ortamn Solu (Left of Centre). 
55 Ecevit argued that 
the RPP had to change its `non-Kemalist' policies because as the greatest anti- 
imperialist Atatürk's policies were good examples of leftist policies. Ecevit, in reaction 
to the elitist approach of the single-party system of the 1930s-40s, argued that elitism 
had alienated people from the party and caused repeated election 
defeats in the multi- 
party period. New understanding had to be on people and class-policies. 
56 Ecevit further 
claimed that like Atatürk the RPP had to follow a foreign policy 
based on more 
independence and good relations with the anti-imperialist states, namely the 
Third 
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World and Soviet Union. One of the most significant features of the Ecevit's foreign 
policy understanding was its American scepticism. Ecevit publicly accused the 
Americans of destabilising the other countries in his 1966 party speech: 
`In America it has been disclosed with what "dirty game" the CIA is involved affecting domestic politics in friendly and allied countries. It pours money into elections in order 
to bring those who it wants into power and unseat those it does not want; in some 
countries it even stuffs poling boxes with false ballots. In order to prepare a pretext for 
smashing legal and domestic opposition, it has claimed that there was a great 
communist danger. '57 
Though Ecevit could not find opportunity to implement his ideology at this stage, in the 
1970s he marginalised Inönü and his ideology from the party and leffist-Kemalism 
became the ideology behind Turkish foreign policy in the 1970s. 
Despite Marxist and Kemalist-leftist propaganda and the real need for change, Turkey 
needed time for such a great shift in foreign policy because the coup leaders and then 
Inönü needed fresh financial credits. Moreover, the Soviet Union was still a great 
menace, and Turkey saw no alternative to alliance with the West. As a result, NATO 
and the alliance with the West were generally considered taboo issues in Turkey. For 
example, Kemalist-socialist Sadun Aren notes that the TIP party could not start a 'NO 
to NATO' campaign for fear that their party would be closed down by the courts. 
58 
Only the Jupiter Missiles Affair and the Cyprus crisis demolished this taboo and 
allowed the neo-Kemalists to openly attack existing Turkish foreign policy. 
Apart from the leftists, even the traditionalist foreign policy experts started to criticise 
Turkey's pro-Western policy and its neglect of the Third World. For example Fahir 
Armaoglu, a traditionalist Kemalist academic, argued that Turkey could manage to 
improve its relations with the developing countries with NATO membership. 
59 
The inönü Government and the First Shock (1961-1963) 
Having strengthened its position and ensured the future of 
its reforms the military 
decided to transfer power to elected civilians. Perhaps, they would not 
have done that if 
the economy had gone well, but in the face of radical measures 
the economy almost 
51 Quoted in Harris, Troubled Alliance..., p. 136. 
58 Sadun Aren, TIP Olayi 1961-1971, (TIP Affair, 1961-1971), Istanbul: 
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carne to a halt and as Shaw and Shaw have argued not only businessmen but also 
workers and peasants began to show increasing unrest and a desire for the restoration of 
a civilian regime. 60 
Ater the coup, the RPP had emerged as the most important political party. However, 
the people associated the RPP with the coup and the RPP's programme was more liberal 
than ever, in particular the newly emerging mercantile class and the peasants feared that 
a possible RPP return to power would restore etatism and other early Republican 
autocratic policies. In the elections of 15 October 1961 the RPP received only 36.7 
percent of the vote and the JP 34.8 percent. The NTP gained 13 percent and the 
Republican Peasants Party (RPP) gained 14 percent of the vote. In the Senate the JP 
gained 47 percent of the seats and the RPP just received 24 percent. 61 The result was a 
great disappointment for the NUC, and the Council even thought of invalidating the 
results but the agreement between the RPP and the JP prevented that and the NUC 
agreed to retire from the scene and allow a coalition government to form under Inönü's 
leadership. 
First, as a reaction to the DP's activist Middle Eastern policy, Inönü made great efforts 
to keep Turkey out of the Middle East in the first years of the 1960s. 62 In other words, 
Inönü tried to restore Kemal's non-involvement policy in the region, however as will be 
seen the international developments would force Turkey for a more active Middle 
Eastern policy. Another foreign policy development of the second Inönü period was the 
Soviet attempt to improve relations with Turkey. The Soviet Union offered $ 500 
million to Inänü on 1 January 1962,63 and a$ 25 million trade agreement was signed. 
However Inänü could not dare to institute a complete change in Turkey's Soviet policy 
and declared that Turkey belonged to a different political system and could not change 
its foreign policy. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's moderate Turkish policy 
influenced the Turkish elite and nourished the neo-Kemalist approach. The neo- 
Kemalists claimed that Turkey should not lose the opportunity to improve relations with 
the Soviet Union in order to balance its foreign policy. Mehmet Gönlübol, a traditional 
59 Fahir Armao lu, `Türkiye ve NATO', (Turkey and NATO), Forum, No. 193,1962, p. 18. 
60 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., pp. 415-416. 
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Westernist, accused the neo-Kemalists of being ideological: `It is early to understand 
the real Soviet intentions. We cannot refuse the West at once just for a couple words of 
Khruschev. '64When Soviet credit failed to restore the Turkish economy, Inönü turned 
again towards the United States and demanded more economic aid. The United States 
agreed to increase aid, and as Sander put it, Turkey supported United States and the 
`colonialist states' against the developing countries or colonies in order to show its 
gratitude to NATO . 
65 
The third significant development was the Jupiter Missile Crises. Since Turkey focused 
on economic aid it made maximum effort not to annoy the NATO members. However 
during the Cuban Missiles Crisis the Turkish people and the state perceived the Jupiter 
Missiles as symbols of the NATO guarantee against a possible Russian attack. 66 
However, the United States decided to remove these missiles from Turkey as a 
bargaining chip vis-a-vis the Soviet Union following the Cuban Missiles Crisis without 
consulting or informing Turkey. 67 This decision shocked all in Turkey and increased 
doubts in the minds of Turkish statesmen about the credibility of the Turkish-American 
alliance. Turkey had to accept the decision but debates in parliament showed that even 
the pro-Western political parties had doubts about the reliability of the United States 
against communism, including the Justice Party. 68 Only the neo-Kemalists were happy. 
For them, Turkey had at last realised that the United States could not secure Turkey's 
independence. Dog-an Avcioglu declared the Cuban Crisis as a start of a new dawn in 
Turkish foreign policy69 and almost all political groups questioned the essence of the 
alliance with United States, which was considered a taboo in Turkish foreign policy. 
Leftist-Kemalist Abdi Ipekci for example claimed that the alliance with the United 
States and the American bases in Turkey had risked Turkey's security. 
70 
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There is no doubt that the most important reason for the transformation in Turkish 
foreign policy during these years was the Cyprus Crisis and the Western attitude toward 
Turkey on this issue. The armed clashes of 1963 between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 
particular stimulated the interest of the general public and many different political 
groups in foreign policy matters. 71 
According to the founding Zurich agreements between Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom, these three states undertook to guarantee the independence, territorial 
integrity, security and constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus. Also, the 
Cyprus Constitution set out that all governmental agencies and cabinet positions were to 
be shared between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in a 70: 30 ratio. The ratio in the 
armed forces was to be 60: 40.72 Despite both the written agreements and the 
constitution, inter-communal fighting broke out between the two groups. In Turkish 
eyes, the Turkish Cypriots were persecuted by paramilitary Greek groups, who pursued 
Enosis, union with Greece. In time, thousands of Greek volunteers came to the island. 
For Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots Enosis was against both international and Cypriot 
national law, and unacceptable to them. Turkey preferred to settle the question within 
NATO, or by direct negotiation with Greece. However, neither Greece, the UK, the 
USA, nor international organisations, such as NATO and United Nations (UN) could 
stop the clashes. Turkey accused Greece of encouraging the struggles to annex the 
island to Greece73 and when the problem could not be solved by international society, 
Turkey advocated the partitioning of the island or a federation of the two parts. 
74 
However the Greek Cypriots thought that they were near to victory as the Turks living 
Mil iyet, 23 April 1962. 
71 Gönlübol, `A Short... ', p. 8. 
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in the enclaves were relatively weak economically and militarily. Therefore they refused 
the partition option. When UN peace keeping efforts failed, Turkey periodically 
reaffirmed its right to intervene in the clashes in Cyprus. Finally Inönü implied that 
Turkey would use all the rights, which the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959 and 
1960 gave Turkey, to stop the `genocide' on the island. 75 This meant a military 
occupation, and Greece replied that a Turkish invasion would result in Greece 
defending Cyprus. The American reaction to the Turkish warning was both severe and 
surprising. Turkish statesmen believed Turkey was one of the loyalest allies of the 
United States and that it had sacrificed some of its national interests for NATO. 76 In this 
context, the Johnson letter77 was a big disappointment for the Turks, as Gürel states `the 
style used in the letter was not so polite. However its context was more upsetting than 
its style. 778 In his letter President Johnson warned Turkey not to use the American 
military aid in Cyprus: 
`I must tell you in all candor that the United States could not agree of any United States 
supplied equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances. '79 
Moreover Johnson threatened Turkey by saying that if Turkey intervened in the Cyprus 
crisis and if as a result of that action the Soviet Union attacked Turkey neither NATO 
nor the United States would support or defend Turkey: 
`(... ) Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey would lead to a direct 
involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies 
have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey 
against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet 
intervention 
without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies . 
'i0 
In other words, NATO and the United States were threatening to abandon 
Turkey if the 
Soviet Union invaded. The Johnson letter represented a complete failure in Turkish 
foreign policy and the anti-Turkish Western attitude was clear proof of the 
failure of the 
Turkish Westernist school in general. As Sahin pointed out, until the 
letter, Turkey was 
75 Clement Dodd, `Turkey and Cyprus', in David Shankland (ed. ), The Turkish 
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Five Years, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999), p. 74. 
76 Yavuz, Satihk Müttefik..., pp. 18-19. 
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3, Summer 1966, p. 387; Hürriyet, 13 
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one of the rare countries, where `no one said go home to the Americans. '81 The letter 
aroused indignation in the Turkish press; For example, the daily Cumhuriyet implied 
that the United States might stop Turkey by using military force claiming that after the 
Greek fleet United States Sixth Fleet had sailed off towards Cyprus. 82Turkish public 
during this crisis perceived the American intervention as a clear sign of political support 
for Greece. 83 As noted by Halil `the letter created the most ominous crisis Ankara had to 
face since the War of Independence84 and the letter was to shake the Turkish faith85 and 
with the Johnson letter, Turkish expectations of the American government proved 
fallacious. 86 In the words of Robinson, even the Americanist Turks were `saddened and 
puzzled'.? Moreover, the letter caused a resurgence of Kemalist Western scepticism. 
Now the Turkish policy makers were aware how they were wrong when they set a 
foreign policy based just on alliance with the West and ignoring the East and the Third 
World. Thus, the letter bitterly harmed the Turkish-American relations up to the present 
day. In the following years the Cyprus problem shadowed the relations and the Turkish 
policy makers always remembered the American attitude. Moreover, the problem 
triggered anti-American street demonstrations and a harsh press campaign led by the 
Turkish left (including the Kenialist left) championed anti-Americanism in these 
campaigns. " Thanks to the campaigns, the left increased its influence over the foreign 
policy matters. 
As a result, Turkey could not intervene in the clashes in Cyprus89 and the public and the 
press forced Inönü for a sharp response. Inönü in response stated 
81 $ahin, Gece..., p. 10. 
82 `Amerika'nin Altinci Filosuna Mensup Alta Sava Gemisi Kibns Aciklarmda', Cumhuriyet (daily, 
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`There are between us a wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles 
of the NATO... If NATO's structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's 
allegations, then it means this defect in NATO needs to be remedied. '90 
Thus, Turkey for first time since the War of Independence, felt itself alone and in need 
of new friends and support. Metin Toker, Inönü's son-in-law, expressed need for new 
friends: `it is natural for Turkey to search for strong friendships in the Third World. '91 
Now, the desire for change was clear among the Kemalists, neo-Kemalists and leftists. 
The conservatives and Islamists now also favoured an immediate change. Thus the 
Johnson letter raised anti-Americanism and increased the importance of the neo- 
Kemalist group on foreign policy. Moreover, the third effect of the letter was search for 
new friends in the international arena. Finally, the fourth result was that the foreign 
policy matters became at the centre of parliamentary debates. Now the governments 
were not free, as they had been. 
The Search for New Friends and the Response of the Non-aligned States 
With the failure of the NATO sponsored negotiations between the Greeks and Turks, 
Turkey decided that the United States and Europe were pro-Greek in the Cyprus matter 
realising that the anti-Turkish biases were still in the minds of the Europeans and the 
Americans. Thus Turkey turned towards the non-aligned countries for political support 
over the Cyprus problem as the Cyprus issue was now a topic at the UN General 
Assembly and the non-aligned states were in majority. Therefore Turkey needed to 
persuade these countries to win UN support for its case. 92 However, when the UN 
General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions detrimental to Turkish interest in 
March-December 1964, which limited Turkish rights in Cyprus, Turkey realised the 
position it was in. The number of the supporters for the Turkish side in the UN was just 
six, and four of them were CENTO members. 93 
As discussed, both the Atatürk and Inönü governments had focused on relations with 
the West and did not attached importance to the Muslim world or developing nations 
in 
Asia and Africa, nor were the Turks very interested in its Middle Eastern neighbours and 
90 The Middle East Journal, Summer 1966, pp. 386-3 93 . 
91 Merin Toker, `Bir Seyahatin Bilansosu' (Balance of a Trip), Akis (weekly, Turkish), 3 July 1964, p. 7. 
92 Leftist-Kemalists in particular argued Turkey needed Third World in solution of the 
Cyprus problem: 
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the Third World. Lack of experience in the region and Kemalist foreign policy's 
avoidance of regional affairs enabled successive Turkish governments not only to 
pursue but to justify this course. 94 Further, Turkey had declared that it was against the 
non-alignment movement at Bandung and had supported Israel against the Arabs during 
the Inönü period. However, Greece had better relations with these countries. While 
Turkey acted as the representative of the capitalist-West, the Greeks had given full 
support for the non-aligned states in Bandung. Likewise, Makarios, the Greek Cypriot 
President of Cyprus, was one of the most active leaders among the non-aligned 
countries. Therefore, Turkey's attempts to persuade the non-aligned states failed and for 
example, the Cairo Conference (1964) decided against Turkey and in favour of the 
Greeks, with Egypt's Nasser leading opposition against Turkey and the Arab and Afro- 
Asia group followed him. 95 Indeed, Turkish Ambassador Semih Günver, in his 
memoirs, stresses that the non-aligned states did not consider Turkey as a member of 
their world' and the only Arab-Muslim country that gave support to Turkey was 
Algeria although Turkey had supported the French against the Algerians in the UN in 
1950s. Thus, Turkey bitterly realised its isolated position because of its alliance with the 
West. It is true, Turkey had carried out an isolation policy in the Atatürk and Inönü 
periods, yet in those years Turkey had chosen isolation and neutrality, now the world 
did not want Turkey. The Cairo Conference brought home the fact that Turkey had no 
time to lose in gaining hearts of the Muslim, African and Asian states. For the neo- 
Kemalists Turkey had to make efforts to gain the support of the socialist states as well. 
Ironically the neo-Kemalists had attacked the DP governments for departing from a 
Kemalist national pact course, which caused the Cyprus Crisis to take such an 
unfavourable path. 97 In reality, it was Kemalist ideology that was responsible for the 
isolation as the reactions of the non-aligned states was the declaration of the failure of 
ideological foreign policy considerations. This contradiction undermined the neo- 
Kemalist ideological framework in future years as well. Following the Turkish 
disappointment in Cairo the Soviet Union renewed its offers to improve relations. Now 
Turkey was ready for such an improvement and succeeded to change the Soviet position 
93 G6111Übol, `A Short... ', p. 11. 
94 Bilge Criss and Pinar Bilgin, `Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East', Journal, No. 1, January 
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over the Cyprus issue. After his Moscow visit, Erkin, Turkish Foreign Minister, 
declared that there was a similarity and mutual understanding between Turkey and the 
Soviet Union on the Cyprus problem. 98 A cultural agreement was also signed and both 
countries declared that they would respect each other's territorial integrity. All these 
developments met with general approval in the Turkish press" that saw Turkey gaining 
new friends in addition to the West. Erkin accepted the radical shift in Turkish foreign 
policy and argued that it was a direct and natural result of the change in international 
politics and based on the Kemalist principles. '00 
Turkey also focused on the Muslim world starting a diplomatic campaign in the World 
Islamic Conference and received clear support on the Cyprus issue. These victories 
were followed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic (UAR) increasing their 
diplomatic representation in Turkey to the ambassadorial level. '01 
Inönü's Cyprus and `pacific' NATO policies were severely criticised not only by the 
leftist groups, but also the conservative JP, which was viewed as a neo-Democrat party. 
Despite the Inönü government's rigid position over the Cyprus crisis, the JP accused the 
government of being timid on this issue. Nevertheless, the JP gave support to the 
government at international platforms viewing the problem as a `national issue'. 102 The 
Islamist Nation Party (Millet Partisi) on the other hand, severely criticised both the RPP 
and moderate neo-Democrats over the Cyprus crisis accusing them of making co- 
operation with the `imperialist' West. 103 The criticism forced the Inönü government to 
resign. It was replaced by the Suat Hayri Ürgüplü government on 21 February 1965, 
which lasted until 22 October 1965. The Programme of the Ürgüplü government of 26 
February 1965 implied that Turkey had alternatives to NATO: 
`Our NATO membership and loyalty to the common security system never means we 
have to support a group (zümre) in foreign policy (... ) We sincerely want to improve 
14 October 1964. 
98 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Vol. 33,1964,12`h session, 1, p. 533. 
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our relations with the Soviet Union. Good relations with the Soviet Union is a subject that we attach great importance. c104 
Moreover, Hasan Isik, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister, visited Moscow and Peking to 
underline the policy change in Turkish foreign policy105 Also Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, 
Turkish Prime Minister, visited Moscow in 1955, and the Soviet Foreign Minister paid a 
visit to Ankara in the same year. Furthermore, Turkey refused to join the Multilateral 
Force within the NATO proposed by the US. '°s Another foreign policy initiative of the 
Ürgüplü government which showed the shift in foreign policy understanding was `seven 
goodwill delegations' affair. Turkey not only made efforts to persuade the Soviet Union 
and China to get diplomatic support for Cyprus, but also sent seven `goodwill 
delegations' to the Asian, African and Latin American countries to explain Turkey's 
position in the Cyprus problem. Isik, in his speech in the parliament, declared that the 
main aim of these delegations were not limited to the Cyprus issue, but the delegations 
would search `opportunities to establish a long-lasting co-operation' with these 
countries. 107 
The Marxist propaganda's impact was clear, yet the radical differences in the 
programme can not be explained in only ideological terms. It was obvious that the main 
factor was Western attitudes towards Turkey on the Cyprus issue and Turkey's isolated 
position in the world. Indeed, when Resolution 2077 was adopted at the UN on 18 
December 1965, Turkey once more realised its isolation: Forty-seven African states, 
almost all Arab states (except Lebanon, Syria and UAR out of fifteen) voted against the 
Turkish argument. '°8 After the shocking decision, the Turkish press and many 
parliamentarians had argued a structural change in foreign policy. 109 As mentioned the 
reason for the shift was not solely ideological, and the real needs forced Turkey for a 
different foreign policy, yet the radical left benefited most from these developments and 
tried to manipulate Turkish foreign policy towards the Third World and the socialist 
104 Kulm Öztärk, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükämetleri ve Programlan, (The Governments of Turkish 
Republic and Their Programmes), (Istanbul: Ak Yaymlan, 1968), p. 601-602 
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110 bloc. 
The 1965 Elections and New Turkish Foreign Poli : Neo-Democrats vs. Neo- 
Kemalists 
After the 1965 vote of the General Assembly over the Cyprus Crisis Turkey understood 
that its previous attitudes towards the Third World states had systematically alienated it 
from this influential group at the UN. 111 As a result almost all ideological groups 
focused on a new foreign policy framework and even Inönü promised a more diverse 
foreign policy. 112 In addition to the leftist-Kemalism, neo-Democrats, Islamists and the 
ultra-Turkists made efforts to form their own foreign policy ideological framework. In 
this environment, the 1965 elections put an end to the military-supported governments 
as the Justice Party came to power with 52.87 percent of the votes. RPP could only get 
28.75 percent of the votes. 1 13 For the Kemalists the JP's election victory meant the 
return of the DP: `The DP's legacy continues. 27 May Revolution attempted to 
demolish it, yet it is now understood that we returned all the way back. "' 14 Leading 
leftist-Kemalist Avcioglu viewed the election results as a counter-revolution against 
Kemalism. l}5 The second effect of the elections was the confirmation of leftist- 
Kemalism's victory over Kemalist Orthodoxy. It can be said that the 1965 election 
crystallised the differences between the political groups. 
Leftist-Kemalism's Victory over the Traditional Kemalism 
The JP were not the only victors in the 1965 elections. The TIP, the main representative 
of the Kemalist-left, also succeeded in entering the Parliament receiving 15 seats. The 
left's success and the neo-Kemalists opposition to Inönü-type Kemalism caused change 
in the RPP as well. The Bülent Ecevit-led group rebelled against the 
Inönü 
administration by claiming that the RPP's ideology must be a democratic leftist 
Kemalism and Inönü recognised the leftist character of the party. The deviation from 
t 1° Gönlübol, `A Short. .. ', p. 12. Deniz Atrye Erden, Turkish Foreign Policy Through the UN, 1974, p. 143. 
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113 Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay Ahmad, Türkiye'de cok Partili 
Politikanin Aciklamah 
Kronolojisi, 1945-1971, (The Explained Chronology of the Multi Party Era in Turkey, 1945-1971), 
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Kemalist Orthodoxy, however, resulted in a split in the party and 48 RPP 
Parliamentarians and Senators accused the RPP of being socialist instead of being 
Kemalist resigned in order to establish the Republican Thrust Party (RTP, Cumhuriyetci 
Güven Parfisi) under the leadership of Turhan Feyzioglu. The foundation of the RTP 
underscored the leftist character of the Republican People's Party. 
Moreover, in this period, the political parties mushroomed and the differences between 
the ideological groups became clearly distinguished. The resurgence of the Islamists, 
Turkists, ultra-Turkists, Leftists, Marxists, Kemalists-leftists (RPP, TIP), Kemalist- 
traditionalists (RTP), Democrats' 16 (DP) and neo-Democrats (JP) increased political 
polarisation in Turkey. Unlike the previous periods all these groups focused on foreign 
policy matters and saw these problems as the main pillars of their ideology. The real 
struggle was between the neo-Kemalists and the neo-Democrats, however the tension 
caused by the political polarisation limited the governments in foreign policy 
implementation and would create a terror environment in the 1970s Turkey. The TIP's 
victory and the swing to the left process in the regime's party, RPP, increased 
ideological polarisation. 
The Return of the Neo-Democrats: JP's Multi-Dimensional Foreign policy 117 
In the wake of the coup, several parties, like the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, JP) and 
the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi, NTP) were formed to secure the DP 
legacy, and the moderate conservative JP captured most of the DP votes. Although the 
JP could not declare that it was the successor of the DP because of the NUC, it 
advocated policies similar to those of the DP: economic liberalism, conservatism in 
politics, close co-operation with the United States against communism in foreign policy 
and more freedom in religious matters. During the first years (1961-1964) the RPP's 
etatism and the JP's liberalism were conflicting. The JP benefited from the failures of 
the weak Inönü coalition governments, and under Süleyman Demirel's leadership the JP 
gained a victory in October 1965 elections. The JP received 52.87 percent of the votes, 
16 26 former Democrat parliamentarians established a new party called as Democrat Party. 
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while the RPP gained only 28.75 percent of the votes. ' 8 The people's reaction to the 
military coup and the RPP policies were clear. However the JP did not perceive the 
election victory as revenge against the Kemalist elite. As neo-Democrats they knew the 
power of the army and the bureaucracy and they were cautious not to provoke the 
military or the Kemalist elite, even they claimed that they were the only true Kemalists 
who can implement Kemalist policies. 119 For them their priorities were the restoration 
of the liberal economy and political structure during these years which were considered 
as the first stage to full civilian government. Between 1965 to 1970 the JP tried to 
implement its liberal economic and political program. Since the 1960 Coup, first time a 
single party had majority in parliament, however, the Kemalist elite, bureaucracy and 
the rising leftist opposition did not allow the full implementation of JP policies as the 
1961 Constitution weakened governmental powers vis-a-vis the public and opposition. 
The Kemalist-left in particular enjoyed this. 
The Ideological Framework of the Justice Party's Foreign Policy 
Similar to the DP, the JP's foreign policy orientation was based on Cold War 
assumptions, nationalism, political conservatism, economic liberalism and pro- 
Westernism. Also, like the DP, the Justice Party was the follower of the Ottomanist 
school in foreign policy. It aimed for good relations with the Middle East and West, and 
was against isolationism. As an extension of the Ottomanist Turkish-Islam Synthesis 
idea, it pursued good relations with the Muslim and the Turkish world as well. The JP 
tried to apply this ideological orientation into Turkish foreign policy as long as the army 
allowed. 
Another feature of the JP's foreign policy understanding was that economy was as 
important as security. As mentioned in the JP programme, for Demirel foreign policy 
should support the economic development programmes of Turkey-'20 
1 18 For the details of the figures and the elections see: Shaw and Shaw, History, pp. 425-426; Ahmad, 
The Making..., p. 138-139; Ahmad and Ahmad, Türkiye'de..., p. 299; J. Landau, Radical Politics in 
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119 Süleyman Demirel's Speech, `Adalet Partisi'nin Kurulu5unun 5. Yilma Girerken', (When the JP is 5 
Years-Old), Zafer (daily), 1i February 1965. The Times argued Demirel had to persuade the army to 
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Despite similarities with the DP, neo-Democrats did not believe they could rely on only 
the United States, therefore, unlike the DP, the JP did not defend an absolute pro- 
American stance while it was still Americanist and advocated closer relations with 
United States. 121 In the words of Mango, despite the ideological similarities between the 
DP and the JP, `the JP government did not prevent the emergence of a new look in 
Turkish foreign policy. '122 Second, unlike the neo-Kemalists it continued to perceive 
communism as the greatest threat to Turkish society and security. 123 As has been seen, 
Inönü and Ürgüplü governments had used the Soviet factor to counter-balance `the pro- 
Greek' American attitude in the Cyprus issue. However the JP programme declared a 
new card: The Muslim world. The programme also aimed to improve relations with the 
UN and the Third World countries. 124 This foreign policy principle was a natural 
extension of the JP's neo-Democrat ideology. As a conservative, religious and capitalist 
party the JP's anti-Soviet attitude was understandable. Nevertheless, the fact was that 
the United States had let Turkey down and to balance United States the JP government 
looked to Europe. The EC was seen as the new source of political and financial support. 
As a result the JP championed Turkey's integration with Western Europe. As 
Tevetoglu, a leading JP member, stated, for the JP integration in Europe was the only 
solution to security and development problems of Turkey in a Cold War environment. 
125 The JP, unlike the leftist-Kemalists could not give up Westernism, because the West, 
for the JP, was not only a foreign policy choice but a guaranty of its existence inside. 
For them, integration with the West was the only way to stop the Kemalist elite from 
dominating the political system. In other words, though the JP was more cautious about 
the West, nevertheless it had little choice but to look towards it. 
The JP also attempted to improve Turkey's relations with the Muslim states, which 
Turkey had neglected since the Kemal era, in order to balance Turkey's dependency on 
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the Western block. The JP's moderate Islamic ideology also played a crucial role and 
made such a relation durable. The JP also made efforts to improve relations with the 
other Third world countries, however Demirel did not consider these countries to be an 
alternative to the West arguing that Turkey had to maintain good relations with United 
States, Europe, Muslim countries and the Third World as he once asked: 
`What would Turkey does any taking her place with the Third World or among the 
socialist countries? What interest would she have in it? Turkey's economic interests, her 
political interests, her defence requirements due to her geopolitical location and importance are in the policy she is pursuing today. ' 126 
In brief, Demirel's balanced foreign policy was multi-dimensional ((7ok Yönlü Dry 
Politika). Moreover, similar to the Democrats' foreign policy, the JP focused on 
economic issues and perceived economic development as an inseparable part of foreign 
policy. The 1965 Party Programme declared that Turkey's foreign policy must 
contribute Turkish foreign policy. 127 The difference between the neo-Kemalists and the 
JP was that the JP, like the DP, was economy-minded and more pragmatic. These 
economic considerations also motivated the JP for economic integration with the 
European Community. 
The Implementation of the JP's Multi-Dimensional Foreign Policy 
Despite the resurgence of leftist-Kemalism and army pressures, during the period 1961- 
1973, the Democrat's successor, the JP, won the majority in all elections, either by itself 
or with the NTP (New Turkey Party). However, the Justice Party was prevented from 
forming a government until 1965. Instead Inönü formed a series of weak coalitions. 
Furthermore, even though the JP won the majority of votes itself and formed its own 
independent governments in 1965 and 1969, it was effectively prevented from 
exercising full authority by the well planned strategies of the radical wing of the RPP. 
128 
Also the Court of Constitution, established by the 1960 coup leaders blocked much JP 
legislation and apart from these obstacles the bureaucracy was very reluctant to carry 
out JP policies. Moreover, the JP was aware that the real power was in the army's 
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hands, was very cautious in its relations with the military and its supporters, namely the 
Kemalist bureaucracy. '29 Thus, although the JP was in power, the army and the 
Kemalist elite, bureaucracy still had much influence, as called `hidden power' by the 
JP 13o A final decision was taken by Kemalist-elitist-Jacobean bureaucracy, the 
intelligentsia and Army. Süleyman Demirel frequently complained about this structure, 
calling it coklu idare (government by many) and claimed that with such a constitutional 
structure it was impossible to govern properly. Anti-JP coalition used Kemalism to 
attack the liberal policies as Demirel accused anti-capitalists and leftist in the Kemalist 
institutions of using Kemalism to mask their real aims and interests and to prevent the 
government from implementing the reforms. 131 
Secularism vs. Pragmatism?: Relations with the Islamic World 
Thanks to Turkey's aloneness in international arena, the Cyprus Problem and the JP's 
cultural-ideological orientations, the JP began restructuring Turkey's policy vis-ä-vis 
Muslim states. This shift was significant, because, as the first time in the republican 
Turkish history, a political party advocated the Arab arguments against the West and 
Israel in the Middle East in its party programme. 132 As has been seen Turkey had 
strictly refused to join any conference, meeting or organisation based on common 
religious or Islamic-Ottoman cultural values during the Atatürk period, and similarly 
Inönü, the 27 May and Ürgüplü governments had never seen the Islamic solidarity as an 
alternative or a card to use against the West. '33 However now the JP was perceiving the 
Ottoman culture and Islam as an inseparable element of Turkish social and political life 
claiming Turkey's indifferent attitude to the Eastern world was damaging Turkey's 
national interests. 134 As a result, Turkey initiated a diplomatic campaign focusing on the 
Muslim states and the other Third World countries. High level meetings for instance 
arranged with the leaders of the influential Muslim states, like Iran and Pakistan, and 
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Turkish representatives were sent to attend various meetings including non-aligned 
Third World countries' and the Islamic states', 135 
According to Demirel, the main principles of Turkish foreign policy in his term would 
be a. Seeking additional measures and guarantees, b) searching new way and political 
development, c. To find new support from Turkey of Turkey. 136 
Turkey had strictly refused to join any conference or meeting based on common religion 
and cultural values, as the Kenialist reforms aimed at a complete break with the 
Ottoman past. However the experience of 1960s proved that Ottoman culture and Islam 
were inseparable elements of Turkish social life and foreign policy. The successes of the 
DP and JP underlined the failure of the Westernst elite and the Cyprus crisis showed, 
Turkey's indifferent attitude to the Eastern world was harming Turkey's national 
interests. Thus even the foreign ministry bureaucracy, the champion of Westernism in 
Turkey for centuries, began to accept that Turkey was not only a European country but 
also an Asian, Middle Eastern, developing Muslim country. Hamit Batu, a senior 
Ministry official, in an article published by the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry 
accepted that: 
`Turkey was admitted into the European Community because of its geopolitical and 
strategic situation. It is the only Muslim member of that community. It was affiliated 
with another culture. Its position in the European Community cannot be regarded as 
strong... Because of its past and present social personality, Turkey occupies a certain 
position in the eyes of the Asian and African countries, and should aim at maintaining 
it. This Asian-African policy should not be pursued only on a temporary basis to gain 
support for certain political causes. It should be pursued on a permanent basis to gain 
the `friendship' and `intimate concern' o the Asian and African countries. ' 137 
The Ministry's approach was closer to the JP's foreign policy because diplomats, unlike 
the neo-Kemalists, did not see the Third World or the communist world as an alternative 
to NATO. For them, Turkey's NATO membership was not an obstacle while the leftist- 
Kemalists argued that Turkey's NATO membership prevented good relations with the 
rest of the world. Despite the change in the Ministry's approach, the impact of the 
traditional Westernism also continued among the diplomats. Ambassador 
Ikizer reveals 
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this mode of thinking in his memoirs: 
The only thing I can recall about Ambassador Olcay, Turkey's ambassador to India, 
was that he was radically admirer of the Western world. I do not know what was the 
reason: The missionary school he attended or the family roots? He was always disparaging the Asian nations. For example, once he confessed that the Pakistanis 
sicken him. For him the Indians were also disgusting... For instance he avoided shaking the hands of Indians. "3g 
Under the light of the above information it can be argued that the JP's new foreign 
policy indicated a clear departure from the traditional approach. Though international 
developments forced for a new way, the JP's warm feelings about the Muslim world 
could not be explained only by referring to the external factors because the JP was 
referring to Muslim states as `Turkey's brother countries' and declared that one of its 
main aims was to improve Turkey's relations with the Muslim states in the Middle East 
and Africa.. 139 
Turkey's practical aim was clear; to get support of Muslim countries against Greece in a 
platform where the Greeks were not represented and thus to counter-balance the Greek 
propaganda in the West and the UN. 14°Like Turkey, in these years the Arabs were also 
upset with the West's attitude vis-a-vis the Arabs and Israel in the Palestinian question, 
and seeking to establish an Islamic organisation to benefit from the religious solidarity. 
King Faisal of Saudi Arabia led the attempt to create political co-operation and 
solidarity based on the common Islamic values and to ensure Turkey's attendance at a 
future Islamic conference upholding such an idea. 141 For the Kemalists this obviously 
would violate one of the main principles of Turkish foreign policy, namely secularism. 
However, Turkish statesmen did not refuse Faisal's invitation for such a conference. 
Even Turkish President Cevdet Sunay, a former general, met with Faisal to discuss the 
matter. Turkey remained uncommitted yet seemed to be supportive of the general idea 
the official understanding. 
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of convening an Islamic conference in which Turkey would participate142 and viewed 
such a conference as a great advantage against Greece. " 
The Demirel government, for the first time in Republican history changed Turkey's 
stand vis-a-vis Israel and the Arabs and in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War announced that 
Turkey would not permit the United States to utilise Turkish bases to support Israel. l 
Also Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri caglayangil advocated an immediate Israeli 
withdrawal at the UN General Assembly meeting and gave clear support to the Arabs145 
- the first time Turkey did not follow the United States and the other Western states in 
UN voting and supported the Arab argument. '46Thanks to Turkey's pro-Arab policies, 
even Nasser's Egypt and Syria thanked Turkey and some Arab states including Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia and Libya supported Turkey in the Cyprus problem. 147 Domestically the 
religious, conservative groups enthusiastically supported the JP and even the leftist TIP 
and the Communist groups warmly welcomed the JP's pro-Arab Israel policy. The JP 
with the support of the left and right continued this policy. 
However, despite consensus on the Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey's participation in the 
first Islamic Conference caused a political crisis at home. The first attempts to organise 
an Islamic conference had failed but the Al-Aqsa mosque fire of 1969, started by some 
Zionists, changed the balance in the Middle East. The fire aroused great indignation 
among the Muslim nations against Israel and following the fire, Hassan II, the King of 
Morocco, invited all Muslim leaders, including Turkey, to an Islamic conference to 
show Muslim solidarity against Israel. According to the invitation to Rabat the two 
issues discussed would be the Al-Aqsa fire and the status of the city of Jerusalem. For 
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the Demirel-led JP the invitation was a perfect opportunity for Turkey to make its return 
to the Islamic world. Inönü opposed the invitation arguing that such a meeting would 
violate Kemalist secularist standing and the Turkish constitution because Kemal had 
refused all invitations for any meeting based on Islamic values. Moreover, Inönü argued 
that Turkish participation at the Rabat Conference would harm Turkey's neutrality vis- 
a-vis Israel and the Arab states. '" The left saw Demirel's decision as an election- 
tactic, 149 but also the army expressed its unease. Furthermore some leftist-Kemalists 
argued that Turkey might risk its neutrality in the region by involving itself in Egypt- 
Saudi Arabia competition. 154 Turkey participated in the conference, but it was not 
represented by the President or Prime Minister, but by the Foreign Minister. Also the 
Turkish representative declared that Turkey was a secular state and that its participation 
should not be viewed as an anti-secular statement. Moreover, Turkey said that it could 
not discuss any other issue but solely the Al-Aqsa fire in the conference. In his response 
to the invitation, furthermore, Turkish President Sunay refrained from using the word of 
Islam and underlined Turkey's secular characteristic 151 as Demirel argued `Whatever 
the name of the conference is not important, its agenda is well known. The Al-Aqsa fire 
and the status of Jerusalem. That's all. It is not a religious meeting, but political. True 
Muslim states participate, but this does not make the meeting anti-secular. ' 152 
At the conference the Turkish delegate said that Turkey would support any document to 
promote the Arab position or criticise Israel, but opposed any full condemnation of 
Israel and opposed the Palestine Liberation Organisation's (PLO) participation into the 
conference as a full member. '53 
The Turkish stance at the conference pleased neither Israel nor the Arabs. Also domestic 
opponent increased their criticism about the JP foreign policy. The only benefit for the 
JP was the conservatives' support domestically. Moreover, the Rabat Conference 
proved that NATO membership was not an obstacle for improving its relations with the 
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developing countries and that despite its good relations with Israel Turkey had been 
invited and this invitation showed that Turkey was still considered a natural member of 
the Muslim world. 
The Rabat Conference was followed by conventions of Islamic Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs at which the secretariat succeeded in drawing up a charter for the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference. 154 However, Turkey did not send its Minister, but the 
General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jeddah. Turkish representative 
did not oppose the idea of establishing a General Secretariat for the organisation, 
however Turkey cautiously refrained from committing itself to regular participation in 
the conference. Also Turkish delegates pointed out the political difference between 
Turkey and the other Muslim countries. 
In addition to the decision to participate at the Rabat Conference and the Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers, the JP also refused to utilise the NATO bases for 
United States forces to intervene the Jordan Affair as a part of its new eastern policy. 155 
Demirel explained Turkey's position as follow: 
`We live in a dangerous region. We have to be in good relations with the regional 
countries. The block we are in could not change this reality. "56 
All these were clear signs of the radical shift in Turkey's Kemalist foreign policy 
towards the Muslim world. 
Relations with the West: the EEC and United States 
Demirel suffered from the army and bureaucracy's obstinacy at home and feared a 
possible military intervention. In this context, he saw the West as a guarantee of safety 
for non-Kemalist political groups and Turkish democracy. Thus, Demirel attempted to 
fasten the integration process with the European Community. Further, the need for new 
financial assistance157 and the need for political support after the disappointment with 
the United States had pushed Turkey into the EC. The Turkish economy was far from 
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capable of competing with the EC economies, nevertheless, in the third year of the 
preparatory stage, in May 1967, the Demirel government demanded negotiations to start 
the transition stage to entry. This proves that the motive behind Demirel's EC policy 
was a political one more than economical. Although economic considerations, such as 
new concessions for Turkish agricultural and industrial exports; improved conditions 
for Turkish migrant workers; and financial aid were also important, but the main motive 
for entry was political. The negotiations concluded with the Additional Protocol on 22 
July 1970 which became effective in January 1973. Thus the transitional stage was 
started. 15' The Protocol deigned a programme for the creation of a customs union and in 
order to reach a customs union, a strict preparation programme was planned, which 
would abolish Turkish tariff barriers for EC exports within 12 to 22 years. It also 
provided free access for all Turkish industrial goods except textiles and petroleum 
products while free movement of labour and capital between the EC and Turkey would 
be phased in between the 12' and 22nd year. Finally the second financial protocol would 
provide $ 195 million over a five-year period. l59 
Despite the change in the United States' Turkey policy, similar to the Democrats, neo- 
Democrats could not give up their Americanist ideas. They were more cautious in 
America policy, 160 but they still could not accept Turkish security without United 
States' support. 161 Demirel stated: 
`We must search a way not to demolish Turkish-American friendship. Also we should 
remember that the strongest relations are based on mutual interests rather than 
emotions. ''62 
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In addition, Demirel saw the United States as a financial aid source for his economic 
reforms and the US as an ideological model for the new Democrats. For instance at the 
first congress of the JP Demirel had exhibited his picture with American President 
Johnson to underline his close ties to the US. Turkey's rush for an agreement with the 
EC and the agreement itself also showed Demirel's enthusiasm for integration with the 
West. Contrary to the communists, neo-Kemalists and the Islamists, Demirel, despite 
his Eastern policy, did not neglect the EC and United States. Therefore, the leftists and 
the Islamists blamed Demirel for selling Turkey to the West calling him as `Morrison 
Süleyman'. 163 
Conclusion: Towards a Multilateral Policy or Deviation from Kemalism 
In the post-coup years two important factors started a chain-reaction process in Turkish 
foreign policy, which would continue until the 1980s. The first factor was external, the 
detente process and as a result of the detente the change in United State's Turkey policy. 
Turkey's security challenge remained the most important issue in the 1960s and Turkey 
was still exposed to the Cold War. However, after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the 
change in East-West relations became more visible and the detente process allowed 
United States strategies and at the same time Turkey lost confidence in the US. 
164 The 
weakening Turkish fears about the Soviet threat in the beginning of the 1960s also 
helped the change. The second American shock came with the Johnson Letter, in which 
United States threatened Turkey not to intervene in the Cyprus problem. In addition, 
other European countries pro-Greek declarations let Turkey down, and 
forced the 
Turkish policy makers to search a new foreign policy. In the Cyprus crisis particularly 
Turkey turned its face to the Muslims states and the Third World. Moreover the 
Western attitude undermined the Kenialist and other Westernst schools and caused an 
ideological transformation in Turkish foreign policy. The second factor was internal, the 
military coup and disintegration process that it triggered. 
The disintegration as will be 
seen below nourished the ideological crisis and 
forced the ideological groups to find 
new approaches in foreign policy. 
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Coup and the Ideological Transformation in Foreign Policy 
The European and American attitudes not only undermined Westernst assumptions in 
foreign policy, but also made the Turkish elite extremely sensitive to criticism from 
within the Western block. In fact, the West by undermining Westernism in Turkey 
caused an ideological crisis in Kemalism and other foreign policy schools. Moreover, 
the 1960 military's leftist orientation nourished socialist ideas among the Kemalists. 
This development led to a transformation in the RPP from pragmatic, realist and pro- 
Western Kemalism to an idealist, leftist and a more Western sceptic Kemalism. 
Although this ideology could not find opportunity to implement its policies, with 
Ecevit's government, this would influence Turkey's foreign policy in the 1970s. The 
1960s also saw the start of the disintegration process in Turkish politics which made a 
suitable environment for the resurgence of the Ottoman schools of thought, such as 
Islamism and Turkism. As noted above, the neo-Democrats were no exception and 
similar to the Kemalists they had to set a new foreign policy understanding in the post- 
coup era. They were now more cautious about the West, and more understanding 
towards the east. 
Finally, after the 1960 Coup, thanks to the 1961 Constitution's pluralistic approach 
Turkey witnessed a divergence of political and social ideas. 165 Islamists, Turkists, and 
the liberals composed the Right-wing, while the Kemalists (all of them), Marxists, 
Socialists and separatist Kurdists composed the Left-wing of the political system. For 
Kili this new environment represented a `struggle' after the Kemalist period; 
`... since 1960 Revolution Turkish politics has been characterised by a "struggle" 
between ideologues, sharply different political views, and by the breakdown of elite 
7166 unity. 
The effects of the Ottoman legacy was clear. The Islamists were suggesting a 
better 
relationship with the Islamic world, while the Turkists were 
dreaming of a Turkic world 
including all the Turkic peoples from the Balkans to China. The 
liberals advocated more 
freedom and integration with the Western political and economic system. 
The 
conservative-liberal Democrat Party tradition aimed to compromise all 
these 
approaches, which can be called a Turkish-Islam 
Synthesis with pro-Westernism. By 
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contrast the left-wing wanted neither the West nor the East. For them the Islamic world 
was the symbol of backwardness, while Western capitalism was the symbol of 
colonisation and exploitation of the Third World. They advocated a more balanced 
foreign policy. For them Turkey was a Third World country and it must co-operate with 
these countries. Also for them Turkey should improve its relations with the Soviet 
Union and must not rely on only the United States. In the midst of divergent ideologies 
Kemalism became the object of refutation as it represented the ideology of the 
establishment. 167 Islamists, liberals and Marxist heavily criticised the Kemalist (Mustafa 
Kemal's and Inönü's Kemnalism) foreign policy. All these critics forced the 
governments to re-consider its foreign policy. In this trend the Marxist impact on 
Turkish foreign policy was significant. 
167 Sadiq, `Intellectual..., p. 509. 
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CHAPTER IX 
Neo-Kemalism vs. Kemalism 
(1971-1980) 
`... the sources of imminent threat to Turkey changed 
considerably in recent years. Turkey does not see the Soviet 
Union as a threat... ' 1 
Bülent Ecevit, Prime Minister, 1978 
With the 1971 coup a leftist government, headed by Bülent Ecevit came to power. 
Although he called his foreign policy `Kemalist', Ecevit's idealist, leftist foreign policy 
understanding ran counter to Atatürk's pragmatist, realist policy. With his Islamist 
partner Necmettin Erbakan, Ecevit followed a radical foreign policy. This orientation 
constituted a dramatic shift in Turkish foreign policy in terms of both ideology and 
practices. However, Turkish foreign policy in the 1970s was not only shaped by one 
ideology, but was rather affected by a multitude of ideologies, from left to radical Islam. 
In what follows, this chapter will look at the ideological changes in the main political 
groups - leftist-Kemalists, Justice Party and the Islamists - before examining the 
implementation. A special emphasis will be placed on the Cyprus Crises and the 
attendant disappointment with the United States and the EC and their effect on Turkish 
foreign policy. 
1971 Coup and the Disintegration in Turkish Politics 
The Army as a `Political Power' 
On 12 March 1971 the leading generals of the army presented Prime Minister Süleyman 
Demirel a memorandum demanding that he form a government that could take 
firm 
steps to maintain public order. 2 According to the memorandum, responsibility 
for the 
anarchy and socio-economic unrest in the country lay with the parliament and the 
government's policies. Therefore, as the army saw it, Turkey needed a new, credible 
and strong government inspired by Kemalist principles. 
3 As Demirel rejected the 
ultimatum and resigned, President Cevdet Sunay asked 
Nihat Erim to form a 
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government of respected public figures (elite-government)4 which he did. Having 
received a vote of confidence, the government declared martial law in the major 
provinces. A reported 4,000 terrorists were caught, leftist newspapers were closed down 
and some civil liberties were suspended. In the next two years strict anti-terrorist 
measures were maintained. 
The military intervention increased the polarisation in Turkish political life and led to 
the disintegration of moderate political groups, both right and left. The radicals, 
Islamists, communists, ultra-nationalists and Kurdists argued that it was impossible to 
reach their aims in a democratic system because the regime under the army's leadership 
would never allow different ideas in political life. The first effect of this disillusionment 
was the resurgence of the Islamist NSP (National Salvation Party), the ultra-Turkist 
NAP (Nationalist Action Party), as well as the rise of the radical left in many small 
parties. The second effect was more dramatic - the rise of terrorism, particularly leftist 
and Kurdish. The moderate conservatives and the liberals felt unable to challenge the 
regime, but the radical nationalists and Islamists continued to criticise the regime, and 
dramatically increased their popularity among ordinary Turks. At first martial law 
succeeded in suppressing terrorism yet success proved temporary. In a short time an 
undeclared war was started by the extremist left and the radical nationalists. Between 
1978 and 1980 5,000 people were killed and over 14,000 people were injured in the 
clashes. S 
The military intervention underlined the army's undeniable position 
in Turkish politics, 
buying it the title of SKP, (Silahli Kuvvetler Partisi or Armed Forces Party) since 
it 
acted like a political party. 6 The competing parties at the time were the 
Justice Party 
(right wing), Republican People's Party (leftist Kemalist) and 
Kemalist SKP, namely 
the army; all three were secularist and Kemalist, 
but each had a different interpretation 
of Kemalism. Still it was the army which set the tone - through 
its monopoly over the 
means of violence. At times, the RPP, as Kemal's party co-operated with 
the army 
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against the liberal-conservatives, which in turn preferred it to the other two. ' But most 
of the time the army preferred to go it alone and hold power in its hands. The Army 
claimed that it was free of ideologies, except Kemalism, going so far as to argue that 
Kemalism was not an ideology but a unique idea that helped Turkey to adopt an 
advanced level of civilisation, muasir medeniyet sevryesi. 8 As demonstrated by the 
Inönü era and the first military coup, this was not true. In each era, the new Kemalists 
reproduced a different Kemalism from Mustafa Kemal's acts and policies. In order to 
maintain their position or justify their ideas not only the army but also all political 
parties invoked Kemalism because it was impossible to succeed in the Turkish political 
system as an anti-Kemalist body. 
RPP: From Kemalism to Radical Left? 
The military intervention not only led to the disintegration of the main political groups 
but also demolished the consensus inside the parties. In addition to the coalition 
governments, there were coalitions inside the coalition parties, like the Republican 
People's Party. With the natural death of Ismet Inönü the disagreement in the party 
increased, and Bülent Ecevit, the new leader, transformed the party from Kemalism's 
home-base to a more leftist party. Ecevit's ideas were a reaction to the existing regime 
though he claimed his ultimate aim was to implement `true Kemalism'. 9 His slogan was 
`This Order Must Change', and he argued that the existing economic and political order 
was exploitative and supported by the imperialist powers and their collaborators 
inside. 10 As a result, Kemalism was discarded to some extent as an ideology. 
Surprisingly, as Karpat pointed out, the new RPP took a position which was 
diametrically opposed to the basic tenets of the Republican regime, in that it tended to 
reject the concept of nation (ulus) and the nation-state idea. " The party identified itself 
as the representative of the true-left and the party of ideals of true-socialism. Thus, the 
For example the leaders of the 1960 and 1971 take-overs gave a clear preference to the RPP. For 1971 
coup see General Muhsin Bator's memoirs: Anilar ve Görüller: 
Üc Dönemin Perde Arkasi, (Memoirs 
and Ideas: The Hidden Side of the Three Periods), (Istanbul: Mill yet Yayinlan, 1985). 
8 Semih Vaner, `Ordu' (Army), in Irvin Cemil Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (eds. ), Geciý Sürecinde 
Türkiye (Turkey in Transformation Period), (Istanbul: Beige Yayinlan, 1990), pp. 255-284. 
9 Bülent Ecevit, Atatfirk ve Devrimcilik, (Ataturk and Revolutionism), (Istanbul: 
Tekin Yaymevi, 1969), 
pp. 2-14. 
lo Bülent Ecevit, Demokratik Solda Temel Sorunlar, (The Fundamental Problems in Democratic Left), 
(Ankara: Ajanstürk, 1975). 
11 Kemal H. Karpat, `The Military, the State, and Politics', in Metin Heiler and Ahmet Evin (eds. ). State, 
Democracy and the Military, Turkey in the 1980s, (Berlin and New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 
147. 
257 
RPP established by Atatürk, who was very sensitive about the minority issue and made 
efforts to lessen the differences among the Turks, Kurds and the other ethnic groups, 
described the Alevis and the Kurds as suppressed minorities and demanded their votes, 
offering itself as a home to all radical leftist and ethnic groups claiming to be a 
minority. The hegemony of the left in the party was certain, nevertheless, the RPP 
consisted of three different political groups: Ecevit's followers, who were leftist, etatist, 
elitist and secularist; then, there were the Marxist, radical etatist, anti-religious groups; 
finally there were `true Kemalists' early Republican and Inönü type Kemalists, anti- 
religious, elitist, against the liberal-conservatives but at the same time against socialism 
and Marxism. 12 In time, the Ecevit group would hold absolute power in the party. 
Although Ecevit and his friends named themselves Kemalists, as celik argued 
`Kemalism's political demise became prominent in the gradual alienation of the RPP 
from the state ideology', 13 and the new RPP produced a new type of Kemalism. Under 
this new Kemalism even the fundamental ideological tenets of Kemalism were 
questioned or changed, like populism; After 1972, the meaning of populism, one of the 
Kemalist six arrows, changed radically and became a reaction against the populism of 
the 1930s. Though Mustafa Kemal never accepted a classes-policy, neo-Kemalists 
underlined the class differences and attributed social injustice to class inequalities. ' 4 
The participation of the radicals in the party made RPP domestic and foreign policies 
more radical. Similarly, the deviation of the party from Kemalism alienated the army 
from the RPP. The worst effect of the disintegration in the RPP resulted in increasing 
tension in political and social life. Furthermore, the radical left's anti-Americanism and 
anti-capitalism led the RPP's leadership to believe that the West was against Turkey and 
undermining its welfare and social integrity. Therefore the RPP, under Ecevit, always 
blamed the West for Turkey's economic and political problems. As the RPP saw it, 
terrorism in particular was supported by Turkey's NATO allies and Ecevit constantly 
questioned the sincerity of the Europeans and the Americans. For the 
leftist radicals of 
the RPP, for example, the EC was a club of neo-imperialists seeking to exploit the 
Third 
12 For the rivalry between the different groups in the RPP see: 
Frank Tachau, `The Republican People's 
Party, 1945-1980', in Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (eds. ), Political Parties and 
Democracy in 
Turkey, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 108-109; Aye Günq-Ayata, `Class and 
Clientelism in the 
Republican People's Party', in Andrew Finkel and Nükhet Sirman (eds. ), Turkish 
States, Turkish 
Society, (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 160-161. 
13 Nur Betül celik, Kematist Hegemony from Its Constitution to Its Dissolution, unpublished 
PhD 
thesis, University of Essex, January 1996, p. 226. 
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World countries including Turkey. Most importantly, with the ideological shift in the 
RPP, Kemalist ideology lost its social and political ground in parliament. Thus 
politically Kemalism lost its popular support, although constitutional and other written 
power belonged to the Kemalist institutions and elite. All these developments made the 
Kemalist dilemma more obvious at home leading to another coup in 1980. 
Ecevit's leftist policies undermined the Kemalist establishment and radicalised its 
foreign policy as witnessed in the Cyprus case; paradoxically, the new ideology put an 
end to the RPP's decline in the elections: Under Kemalist Inönü the RPP dramatically 
lost votes to the right-wing parties, declining from 36.7 % (1961) to 28.7 % (1965) and 
finally to 27.4 % (1969). With Ecevit's leftist-Kemalism the RPP made a surprise 
comeback, becoming the largest party in the 1973 elections with 33.3 % of the votes 
and 185 seats - 41 seats short of an absolute majority. 15 Thus the RPP once more 
became the ruling party with its amended ideology. 
In foreign policy, as noted, the RPP with the increasing role of the leftist elements 
became more radical16 and more wary of the West; For instance, the leftist Ecevit defied 
the US in the poppy-growing crisis, he then made a military operation in Cyprus despite 
America's disapproval. Moreover, Ecevit blamed the EC and the US for Turkey's 
domestic problems and adopted an uncompromising posture vis-ä-vis the EC's attempts 
to improve relations with Turkey. It is certain that all these policies were not free of 
Ecevit's idealist radicalism and leftist ideology. As discussed, Ecevit had been deeply 
influenced by the 1960s leftist Yon movement and socialist ideas. For instance, he was 
against the close relationship between the West and Turkey. In his book, Bu Düzen 
Degi rnelidir'7 Ecevit advocated a lessening of foreign influence in Turkey, namely 
Turkey's alliance relation with the Western bloc. Ecevit also advocated greater 
independence and more friendly relations with the Third World and Soviet Union. For 
him, all these policies were Kemalist policies because Atatürk was a leftist and anti- 
imperialist. 18 In a later-day interview with the author, Ecevit went further and charged 
the conservatives and the liberals of acting as proxies of the West and therefore 
failing 
14 Güne-Ayata, `Class... ', p. 161. 
15 Dodd, The Crisis..., pp. 223-234. 
16 Dodd, The Crisis..., p. 35. 
17 Bülent Ecevit, Bu Duzen Degilmelidir (This Order Must Change), (Istanbul: Tekin, 
1969). 
18 Ecevit, Atatürk... 
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to realise Turkish foreign policy interests. 19 These words, as well as the differences 
between Ecevit and Demirel, show the impact of ideology in Turkish foreign policy. 
Neo-Democrats' Ottomanism and Westernism 
As noted earlier, the DP was closed down by the army which created many small parties 
who were presented as the real successors of the DP. The JP and NTP were relatively 
successful and the JP gained majority in all the elections between 1960-73. Yet it was 
clear that the political current, which was economically liberal, conservative in social 
issues, and partly Ottomanist in foreign policy was weakened by the Kemalist military 
and bureaucracy. This trend continued after the 1971 coup. When they saw that it was 
impossible to achieve their aims in such a political structure and with such moderate 
policies, the Islamists and the Turkists gradually left the JP. Contrary to the RPP and the 
left cases, the radicals crystallised the JP's ideological ground as the radical ultra- 
nationalists and the Islamists set up their own parties, NSP and NAP. Thus the JP 
without the extremes became the party of liberal democrats, free-market defenders, 
moderate Muslims, moderate Turkists and other liberals and conservatives. On the other 
hand, it was weakened and could not implement its long term policies. After the 
departure of the Islamists and the Turkists, the JP vote fell from 46.5 percent in 1969 to 
29.8 percent in the 1973 elections- 20 
In foreign policy, as will be discussed in the next sections, the JP was less radical, and 
more pragmatic than the RPP. Despite its conservative orientation, it 
insisted on 
Turkey's integration into the West, particularly the EEC. 21 While the RPP argued that 
full membership in the EEC would harm Turkey's economy, 
independence and 
Kemalist principles, for the JP the EEC was the only solution to economic problems, 
instability, terror and Turkey's foreign policy isolation. Moreover, the members of 
the 
Justice Party viewed the army and the Kemalist elite as a 
direct threat both to their party 
and to liberal-democracy in Turkey, while the West was perceived as 
the guarantor of 
the democratic system's existence. The JP's liberal orientation 
in economic issues 
provided suitable ground for good relations with the 
West. Furthermore, the JP 
advocated Ottomanist patterns in relations with the region, 
the Islamic world, the Third 
19 Author, s interview with Bülent Ecevit (Prime 
Minister at that time), 21 July 1996. Ankara. 
20 Dodd, The Crisis..., p. 223. 
21 Ercüment Yavuzalp, Iýiderlerimiz ve Did Politika, (Our 
Leaders and Foreign Policy). (Ankara: Bilgi 
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World and the outside Turks. However, Demirel understood that neither the Muslim 
world nor the Third World could be an alternative for Turkey's relation with the West. 
Similarly, improvement of relations with Eastern Europe was virtually impossible as it 
was under communist rule, which left Western Europe and the United States as the only 
foreign policy destination for Turkey. 
Return of the Islamists: Islam as Foreign Policy Ideology22 
Thanks to the military interventions and the failure of moderate policies, after the 
Ottomanists (DP, JP and others) Westernists (Kemalists) and the leftists, another 
Ottoman school of thought reappeared in Turkish political life: Islamism. The Islamists 
supported the DP and the JP until the 1970s, when they founded their own party, Milli 
Nizam Pacrtisi (the National Order Party, NOP). Necmettin Erbakan, the Party's leader, 
accused the JP of being an instrument of Zionists, freemasons, foreign capital and the 
rich classes. For Erbakan, the JP had turned its back on Islam, hence the Muslims could 
not give it their vote any more. When the NOP was outlawed in 1972 by the 
Constitutional Court for violating the secularism article of the Constitution the Islamists 
quickly established the Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, NSP). In a very 
short time, the NSP became the third major party with 11.8 percent of the total vote. 23 
The NSP called its ideology Milli Göri4 (National Outlook). This advocated a rapid 
industrialisation and Islamisation in politics and culture. For the NSP both were possible 
without foreign aid. From this perspective, Turkey was able to create a third economic 
model, and industrialise without following the capitalist model or receiving American 
economic aid. Similar to Ecevit's `This Order Must Change', Erbakan attacked the 
existing order and used `A Just Order will Come and People will be Happy' slogan. 
According to Milli Gorüq, the Ottoman Empire was a grand imperial power, and its 
success was due to a combination of military power and Islamic values. That is to say, 
contrary to Westernst secularists, Islam was not the cause of Ottoman collapse but the 
Empire's real source of power. Erbakan argued that not Islam but rather cultural 
westernisation had been responsible for economic and political collapse. 
As the 
Yayinlari, 1996), p. 126. 
22 For a detailed account on NSP see Jacob M. Landau, `National 
Salvation Party in Turkey', Asian and 
African Studies, Vol. 2,1976, pp. 1-57; Also Türker Alkan, `The National Salvation 
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successor of the Empire, Turkey was a natural candidate for a super power status. To do 
so, argued the NSP, Turkey had to abandon its reliance on the West in cultural, 
economic and political terms, turn to the Islamic world and build a national industry. 24 
As a modernised interpretation of Islam, Milli Göre argued that Turkey had to pursue 
world leadership in foreign policy. 25 The NSP's slogan in foreign policy was `a great 
Turkey once again'. Erbakan argued that Islam could offer the third way between 
communism and capitalism. For the NSP, the European Community was a Christian 
Club and its only aim was to destroy the Turks and Muslims. 26 In 1970, for example, 
Erbakan accused of EC of colonising Turkey: `Turkey ought not to be in the Common 
Market of the Western states but in the Common Market of the Eastern states. If Turkey 
enters the Common Market under today's conditions it will become a colony. '27 
According to Erbakan `Turkey's interest lies with the Muslim countries', 28 therefore the 
NSP defended Islamic solidarity in the Middle East and a co-operation against Israel 
and the American interests. 29 Erbakan argued that other Muslims had oil and financial 
power while Turkey had manpower. He further argued that if these sources of power 
could be united under the Turkish leadership the external powers, notably the US, 
would never enter the region. 30 In this context, the NSP criticised the government's 
Middle East policies and derided the other parties as followers of Satan, namely the 
Europeans and the Americans. For the NSP, Turkey's interest lay with the Muslim 
countries, instead of the Christians: 
`To enter into a common market arrangement with the Muslim countries can be 
profitable to us even if it is considered from a purely economic point of view, because 
they have financial resources and markets to buy Turkish goods. Unfortunately, some of 
our so called intelligentsia and political elite are unable to see these realities. They 
would like to reduce Turkey to a province of Christian Europe to be dictated to by the 
EC. They wish to reduce this nation with its glorious past and unique culture to a 
serfdom of Europe. God willing we shall not allow it. '31 
23 Dodd, The Crisis..., pp. 223-224. 
24,4 hrnad, The Making..., pp. 161-162. 
25 Mohammed Khan Kayani, Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey His Political Thoughts, (Istanbul: The 
Ummah, 1996), pp. 73-79. 
26 Kayani, Islamist..., pp. 65-70 (the sections of `Zionists Handmade-EEC' and `Why 
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Despite its imperial rhetoric, the NSP was a reactionary movement, limiting its 
activities to attacks against the regime rather than producing an alternative economic or 
political model. However, as will be seen, its radicalism and ideology would become 
very effective in foreign policy matters. As a result of the disintegration of Turkish 
politics, the NSP became a key party and a partner to three coalition governments (the 
RPP-NSP Coalition, January 1974-September 1974; JP-NSP-NAP Coalition, March 
1975-June 1977; JP-NSP-NAP Coalition, August 1977-January 1978). Thus it found the 
opportunities to influence Turkish foreign policy as seen in the Cyprus operation. 32 In 
addition to the Cyprus issue, the other coalition parties had to consider the NSP's ideas 
on certain issues, such as Turkey-EC relations and economic relations with the other 
states because the NSP was very sensitive on defending Turkey's economic 
independence and saw this principle as the corner-stone of the coalitions. 
Implementation: Realities vs. Ideologies 
The disintegration of Turkish political life continued in the post-coup years and the 
period 1973 to 1980 saw five different changes of government. 33 After the 1973 
elections the RPP formed a cabinet with the Islamist NSP. 34 The RPP-NSP coalition 
was ended with Ecevit's resignation on 18 September 1974. After Sadi Irmak's 
government, which could not get a vote of confidence from the Parliament, Süleyman 
Demirel formed another coalition with the Islamist NSP, ultra-Turkist NAP and the 
Reliance Party (RP) on 31 March 1975, which came to be known as the `First 
Nationalist Front'. 35 After the 1977 elections, although Ecevit won 41.4 percent of the 
votes and 213 seats, he was again 13 seats short of a majority in parliament. 36 As a 
result he formed a minority government which collapsed in short time. After Ecevit's 
falls Demirel's JP formed the `Second Nationalist Front' with the Islamists and the 
ultra-Turkists on 21 July 1977. This coalition too, did not last long and in a couple of 
months Ecevit was back in power with the support of the independents. In 1979 Ecevit 
32 Mehmet G6k, `Cumhuriyet D6nemi Turk Did Politikasimn 19 ve Did Kaynakian', in Atatürk 
Türkiyesi'nde (1923-1983) Did Politika Sempozyumu, Bildiriler. (Istanbul: Bogazici University 
Publications, 1984), pp. 49-66, p. 60; Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 43. 
33 Dodd, The Crisis..., p. 17. 
34 Dodd, The Crisis..., p. 17 and 141. 
35 Davison, Turkey..., p. 170. 
36 Dodd, The Crisis..., p. 19. 
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resigned and the coalition was re-shuffled under Demirel. 37 During these years, 
polarisation and tension increased dramatically. Thousands of people were killed and no 
party could win a majority for a long period of time. There was no consensus on any 
policy. As Ahmad pointed out, the post-1973 years were the worst period for Turkey to 
be led by weak and indecisive governments totally lacking in direction. While the weak 
coalitions could not solve the serious problems and the system became more dependant 
on the small-radical parties, the army, by exploiting the weakness of the system, 
increased its powers in these years. 38 
The domestic problems inevitably reflected on Turkish foreign policy. In he latter 
sphere, despite the existence of numerous schools of thought from Islamist 
Commonwealth, to Turkish Commonwealth to integration with the West to isolation, 
none was strong enough to be implemented. Therefore it is difficult to talk about a 
settled, coherent foreign policy framework. During this period, not only the ideologies 
but also the realities challenged the official foreign policy understanding. Turkey's 
inevitable reaction against the threats to' Turkish security determined its foreign policy. 
Thanks to traditional cultural biases in the West, Turkey's defensive polices were 
perceived as aggressive in the EEC and United States. At this point, the US arms 
embargo and the EEC's insensitivity towards Turkey, its military ally and associated 
member, disappointed Turkey's Westernsts and undermined the Kemalist regime and 
its foreign policy. As will be seen, Turkey solved its problems without any help from 
the West and despite the obstacles the West created. Therefore, the West was blamed 
for everything that went wrong in Turkey in the 1970s. All this inevitably affected 
Turkish foreign policy. In this framework, this chapter will deal with the changes in 
Turkish foreign policy by considering the ideological changes in Turkey and the 
changes in the international balance of power. 
The Cyprus Crisis and an Isolated Turkey39 
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As has been seen, the Cyprus Crisis put to the test Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy 
ideology in the 1960s which failed to provide solid grounds for Turkey's external 
relations. The impact of the second Cyprus Crisis was even worse than the first. 
While Turkey was preoccupied with internal violence, economic problems and military 
intervention, the problem in Cyprus was sustained and the West seemed indifferent to 
whether or not it was solved. The Western insensitivity encouraged the junta regime in 
Greece, headed by Colonel George Papadopoulos, which planned to unite the island 
with Greece. 40 The violence against Cypriot Turks living in the enclaves of the island 
was increasing dramatically. Also the Turkish Army was now ready for such an 
intervention, contrary to the 1960s. Apart from these factors, it can be said that the most 
important factor was domestic change. As noted, Ecevit had shifted Atatürk's 
Republican People's Party from the centre to the left, and a more sceptical view of the 
West, NATO and United States. Contrary to Inönü's character, Ecevit, as a poet, was an 
idealist. He believed in solidarity among the Third World and social democratic states. 
In the 1973 elections Ecevit campaigned by promising to create a welfare state model 
based on the Scandinavian example. He also focused on a more independent foreign 
policy with a limited role for NATO. In other words, with his third-worldism and leftist- 
Kemalism, Ecevit was not enthusiastic about co-operation with the United States. Not 
only the RPP but also the NSP did not approve of the American policy vis-a-vis Turkey 
and Greece. Thanks to the polarisation created by the coups, the Islamists had set their 
own party deserting the centre-right Justice Party. Similar to the leftists the Islamists 
were also against the capitalist-Western system. They severely criticised the EEC and 
the United States and blamed both of them for Turkey's economic an d poli tical failures. 
They were also opposed to the communist bloc and supported an Islamic regime for 
Turkey and an Islamic federation for the Muslim states. The election results forced 
Ecevit to form a cabinet with Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the NSP. This was the 
strangest government ever seen in Turkish politics, yet the similarities between these 
two parties cannot be ignored, particularly in foreign policy issues. There 
is no doubt 
that the RPP and the NSP's American scepticism, if not hostility, 
helped Turkey's tough 
reaction in Cyprus. To attract votes both parties competed for nationalist voters. 
40 This intention was supported by the Greek government and even the 
Greek leaders developed a scheme 
for assassinating the head of Cyprus: Sabahattin Egeli, 
How the 1960 Republic of Cyprus was 
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Before the Cyprus crisis, the poppy-growing crisis erupted. 41 The US had asked Turkey 
to cease poppy production entirely arguing that 80 percent of heroin illegally entering 
the United States had derived from poppies grown in Turkey. 42 The Demirel 
government had resisted the American pressure, however the above party Enm 
government, following the 1971 Coup, agreed to shut down its poppy cultivation. 43 
When Ecevit formed government in 1974, he with his Islamist partner Erbakan 
challenged the Americans' and in defiance of the threats from the United States, Ecevit 
lifted the ban on poppy-growing in the Aegean region of Turkey in March 1974. The 
problem was so serious that the United States recalled its ambassador to Washington 
and warned Turkey over its poppy-growing policy. 45 The US Seanto also frozen the 20 
million American credits to Turkey. 46 In response Ecevit declared that Turkey belonged 
to the Turks and only the Turks could decide what they grew - not the Americans. 47 One 
of Ecevit's aims was to strengthen his a nationalist credentials as defender of Turkey's 
right to manage its own affairs. 
Meanwhile the Greek soldiers made a coup in Cyprus against the Greek administration, 
which was seen in Ankara as Greece's direct intervention to the island. The coup 
leaders declared end of the Republic of Cyprus and proclaimed Cyprus Elen Republic. 48 
That proved a major mistake that sparked the Cyprus war. The coup leaders publicly 
declared that Cyprus would be annexed to Greece in a short time. Still, the Turkish 
intervention was far from automatic. In the words of Henze, `Ecevit was a very reluctant 
dragon'. 4s He first tried to persuade Britain to intervene5° since, together with Turkey 
and Greece, Britain was the guarantor of the Zurich and London agreements which set 
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the political status of Cyprus's independence. 51 British troops were already on the 
island, but the British government avoided any military action. 52 When Ecevit 
understood that no country would solve the problem, the Ecevit government ordered the 
Turkish General Staff to move forces across the island and the Turks landed the troops 
on 20 July 1974. After a short-lasting cease-fire, the Turkish troops launched a second 
offensive on 14 August which resulted in getting control over 40 percent of Cyprus 
island. 53 Turkey, as a result, set up a de facto administration in the North. Now the 
island was in effect partitioned and the north of the island was Turkish and the south 
was Greek. For Turkey it was victory for justice, and Ecevit became the second hero 
after Atatürk. 54 So much so that his supporters' slogan was Dün Atatürk, Bugün 
Ecevit'55 (Yesterday Atatürk, Today Ecevit). By way of capitalising in the public mood, 
Ecevit resigned on 19 September 1974, called new elections. However his plans did 
not work out as the parliament members refused to agree to new elections. As a result 
Demirel formed a new coalition, ironically searched Erbakan's support. 
The Cyprus operation was viewed as a victory in Turkey, yet the situation was 
fundamentally different in Europe, the United States and Greece. The Cyprus `victory' 
radically changed Turkey's position in the international arena. Moreover, as a result of 
the European and the American Cyprus policies Turkey's official Kemalist foreign 
policy understanding was also dramatically changed. Now the challenge did not come 
from a hostile ideology but from international realities, from external world. The next 
pages will focus on these changes. 
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The EC's `Partial' Cyprus Policy57 
It will be recalled that in the 1960s, the Demirel government had seen the EEC as the 
guarantor of Turkish democracy. Therefore, although the Turkish economy was far 
from being able compete with the EC economies, Demirel had demanded negotiations 
to start at the transition stage. The conservatives and the liberals were very enthusiastic 
over EC membership, but the EEC was reluctant to accept Turkey as full member and 
the first signs of this unwillingness appeared before the Cyprus operation. However, the 
most destructive factor was the European attitude to Turkey and Greece in the Cyprus 
crisis. Some of the EC countries, Britain and France in particular, were vehemently 
opposed to the Turkish position. The EC condemnation of Turkey peaked and deeply 
damaged Turkey-EC relations. For ordinary Turks, and Turkish politicians, the EC was 
giving unequivocal support to a military coup against the Turkish people's right to live 
in Cyprus, and backing `murderers' rather than `victims' in the name of Christian 
cultural values. 58 The EC's `partial' Cyprus policies convinced the Turkish government 
that it had turned a deaf ear to the Turkish course because the Turkish Cypriots were not 
Christian. Müftüler claims that the EC's Cyprus policy reminded Turkey of nineteenth 
century Euro-Christian discriminatory practices against the Muslim Turks. 59 Thus, the 
Community's attitude politically isolated Turkey from Europe in the 1970s. As a result, 
the EC's `anti'-Turkish policies were seen in Turkey as a scapegoat for the problems of 
the Turkish economy and Turkey's other problems. In this environment, the old 
European image was evoked and new prejudices were added. The perception that the 
EC was anti-Turkey was strengthened among virtually all-political groups. 
60 The 
smooth (Treece-EC relations and the generous European economic aid to Greece, 
61 were 
particularly galling to many Turkish people, confirming yet again the EC's unjust and 
partial attitude towards Turkey. 
With the double effect of Turkey's economic performance and the 
Cyprus problem, 
during the 1970s the EC rejected virtually all Turkish demands for economic aid, 
57 For Europe's role in the Cyprus problem see H. Gsangar, `The 
EEC and Cyprus and Turkey', in D. 
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agricultural concessions, free movement of Turkish workers and political support for 
Turkey's external problems, notably Cyprus. The deepening economic crisis and the 
EC's negative attitude forced Turkey to postpone its obligations to the EC in 1977. The 
Ecevit government referred its demand to Article 60 of the Additional Protocol, the self- 
protection clause. 62 It was obvious that Turkey needed fresh financial aid, however one 
of the problems was the RPP's anti-Western policies. For the RPP, like the Americans, 
the capitalist Europeans were also making efforts to undermine Turkish integrity. 63 For 
the leftists the European Community was the club of the rich capitalists whose aim was 
the establishment of a new kind of imperialism to exploit the third world. In other 
words, not only the European Turkish biases but also the leftist Ecevit's prejudices 
about the European Community negatively affected Turkey-Community relations. As a 
result, the Ecevit government requested a revision of the terms of the Association 
Agreement and asked for a five-year freeze in Turkey's commitments in 1979. 
Moreover, Ecevit requested a $8 billion aid package from the EC. " Obviously Ecevit's 
demands were not realistic because, thanks to the global economic crisis, the EC was 
also suffering from economic problems. As a result the EC offered Turkey only $600 
65 million under the Fourth Financial Protocol. 
When the liberal-conservative Demirel government came to power Turkey's attitude 
towards the EC changed dramatically. 66 True, the JP, too, was aware of the EC' 
negative Turkey policy and wary about the West; however it also thought that Turkey 
had no alternative to the West, which it needed for its economic and political 
development. 67 As a result of these ideological and pragmatic considerations, the 
Demirel government, on 30 June 1980, announced that Turkey would forward a formal 
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application for membership by the autumn. 68 Almost all academics agree that if Turkey 
had been able to apply for full membership, the EC would not have easily rejected this 
fait accompli because of security and political considerations. 69 But the EC was 'lucky', 
for as will be seen in the next chapter, the Turkish army made a new military coup on 
12 September 1980, and Demirel's initiative failed. 
Turkish - American Relations and the Cyprus Crisis 
Greece had withdrawn from military participation in NATO in the aftermath of the 
crisis while Turkey firmly committed to the alliance, however despite the Turkish trust 
in NATO, the Americans did not consider Turkey's loyalty to United States and NATO 
to be sufficient. Similar to the Europeans, the Americans viewed the operation as a clear 
occupation of a sovereign, independent state, and Turkey was the culprit. Worst of all, 
the American Congress imposed an arms embargo on 5 February 1975 against Turkey 
because of its use of American - supplied arms in the Cyprus operation. 70 As a matter of 
fact, both sides had used Americans-supplied arms, Greece having transferred the 
American arms before the operation. However, the Greek lobby in the Congress was so 
effective and the contextural problems in United States politics, like Vietnam issue and 
Watergate, helped to the Greek lobby's success. 71 President Nixon had resigned during 
the Cyprus crisis, and the presidential effect on the Congress was extremely limited in 
these years. Although the American executive branches (President, Defence and State 
secretaries) claimed that they lacked power over Congress, Turkey was deeply 
disappointed. Now Turkey's closest ally, the United States, was carrying out an arms 
embargo against one of its loyalist allies. As has been seen, the Johnson Letter had even 
shocked the Turkish by demanding closer relations in the 1960s; the arms embargo of 
1975-1978 was the final straw for Turkish-American relations. The embargo was an 
undeniable proof of the failure of Westernism for the Kemalists and the conservative- 
liberals. 
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As a response to the American embargo, the Turkish Federate State of Cyprus was 
established on 13 February 1975.72 Despite the embargo decision, Demirel waited for 
the results of the Executive Branch's efforts to change the mind of the Congress. For 
example, as Paul Henze pointed out, President Ford never conceded the validity of the 
embargo against Turkey or its relevance to the process of a Cyprus settlement. 73 Also 
the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense were against the embargo. 74 In July 
1975, Turkey, as a warning sign, declared that it abolished the Defense Co-operation 
Agreement of 1969.75 Three months later, Prime Minister Demirel, a leading 
Westernist, ordered several American bases in Turkey closed when he understood that 
the US decision would not change. 76 Turkey's decisive attitude softened the US policies 
and a new agreement was signed on the status of the American bases in Turkey. Also 
with this agreement the US undertook to make $1 billion-military aid to Turkey for 
four years. However the aid was conditional, and the agreement was still in force. Even 
the newly elected-President Jimmy Carter could not lift the embargo until 1978. " 
In 1977 the Süleyman Demirel government lost its majority in parliament and another 
Ecevit government came to power. 78 Although Demirel had taken some serious 
measures against the United States, he was a Westernist and had believed that Turkey's 
interest and future lay in good relations with United States. Also, similar to Menderes, 
Demirel shared the same values as the Americans, such as a free market economy, 
liberalism in politics and more religious freedom etc. 79 However, as has been seen, with 
the effect of the radicals, Ecevit identified its party as truly socialist and anti-capitalist. 
Hence, he, different from Demirel, chose to threaten the United States by sending 
friendly messages to the Soviet Union. In London, Ecevit said `the sources of imminent 
threat to Turkey changed considerably in recent years. '8° In his speech, Ecevit 
underlined the disadvantages of Turkey's dependency on the United States and argued 
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that the Soviet Union was no longer a threat to Turkey. He further argued that Turkey 
needed a more independent course in foreign policy instead of the Cold War's global 
considerations. In his visit to Moscow, in July 1978, Ecevit repeated his arguments by 
saying that Turkey did not see the Soviet Union as a threat. '"Likewise, Ecevit in RPP's 
Parliamentarian Group Meeting underlined the Turkish-Soviet fi iendship: 
`... with the new economic relations with the Soviet Union, we found opportunity to 
balance some of our economy's structural problems (... ) as you know the oil crisis has been increasing. Under the pressure of this crisis the Soviet Union provided 3 million 
ton oil to Turkey, and this is a clear sign of the Soviet friendship and enough to improve 
Turkish-Soviet relations in the recent years (... ) We also solved the territorial sea issue 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union and this is another proof for the friendship . 
'82 
It can be said that these pro-Soviet words were a certain deviation from Turkey's pro- 
Western policy. It was not only a deviation from Westernism but also from Kemalist 
foreign policy understanding, as for Kemal the primary threat to Turkish security came 
from communist Russia. Moreover, Ecevit signed a political document with the Soviet 
Union. 83 The context of the signed document was relatively not very important for the 
relations between two countries in terms of economics and politics, but its timing was 
critical as the relations with the United States was very problematic in these years. 
Moreover, in the 1970s Turkish-Soviet relations improved dramatically in economic 
and political areas. By 1978, the Soviet Union was aiding 44 different development 
projects in Turkey and by the end of the decade Turkey received more Soviet assistance 
than any country in the third world except Cuba. 84 Also in the Ecevit period, Turkish 
export to the Soviet Union increased over 30 per cent. 85 Ecevit was threatening United 
States with the Soviet Union. These developments annoyed not only the Americans but 
also all NATO members. Moreover, Zürcher86 claims that Ecevit's enthusiasm to re- 
orientate Turkish foreign policy towards the socialist and the Third World countries 
made him extremely unpopular in Washington. Zürcher further argues that 
`President 
Carter's influential security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, especially seems to 
have 
81 Ecevit explained the change as a part of a new defence understanding- 
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hated him. '87 However, Ecevit's tactics worked and on 1 August 1978 the US Congress 
abrogated the embargo. 88 Ironically, despite Ecevit's efforts to improve relations with 
the Soviet Union, the first country (apart from Greece) to oppose the lifting of the 
American embargo was the Soviet Union. One of the effects of the arm embargo was 
that Turkey was now more determined to build its own arms industry. As a result some 
projects were initiated to produce tanks, war ships and war planes. 
In spite of the lifting of the arms embargo, during the Ecevit period Turkish-American 
relations could not be restored. Ecevit claimed that the $1 billion American military 
aid, agreed on in the March 1976 Agreement, was not enough and Turkey avoided 
signing the Defense and Economic Co-operation Agreement (DECA). On the other 
hand he continued to make efforts to improve relations, not least in the light of clear 
evidence of Soviet support for leftist terrorist organisations in Turkey. 89 Against this 
background, it can be argued that in Ecevit's United States and Soviet Union policies, 
his leftist, anti-capitalist ideology played a crucial role. However, it can also be said that 
Ecevit's RPP was too extreme to have a sufficient foreign policy ideology. That is to 
say, during these years Turkey suffered both from an ideological foreign policy and at 
the same time from lack of a sufficient foreign policy ideology. Similar to their EC 
policies, the comparison between Ecevit and Demirel's foreign policy clearly shows 
differences and ideology's impact on their foreign policy. When Demirel came to power 
a year later, the DECA agreement with the United States was easily signed. 
Nevertheless, as argued earlier, in the 1970s, it was not only the clash of the ideologies 
but the challenge of realities, which determined Turkey's foreign policy. This was the 
case not only in Turkish - American relations, but also 
in Turkish - European and 
Turkish - Greek relations. 
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Turkish - Greek Relations 
Turkish - Greek relations are a good example of Turkey's increasing fears in foreign 
policy. Greece had grown four times with Ottoman territories until 1918. Between 
1918-1922 the Greek armies occupied almost half of Anatolia. Turkey gained its 
independent state after a bloody war against Greece. There is no doubt that the Turks 
were fighting a just war this time since their homeland was under occupation and they 
were struggling for independence. However the British and the French supported the 
Greeks, and Britain even encouraged them to occupy Turkish lands. Hence Mustafa 
Kemal's Turkey viewed the Greeks as the `Golden child' of the West. This perception 
was underscored in the 1960s and the 1970s. From the Turkish perspective, in Cyprus 
the Greeks were the guilty part since they had destroyed the constitutional system and 
the Republic. However the EEC and the United States could not strike a balanced policy 
vis-a-vis Turkey and Greece and for the Turks, they partially supported the Greeks and 
blamed Turkey for everything that went wrong in the problem. 90 For the Turkish press, 
politicians and the public at large the Western anti-Turkish biases were still there. Worst 
of all, the European support encouraged the Greeks and relations between Turkey and 
Greece worsened. Before the Cyprus operation, the only problems between the two 
states was to be solved were the minorities status and Cyprus Now the Greeks insisted 
on changing the status quo in the Aegean Sea, decided in the Lausanne. 91 According to 
the Lausanne Agreement, Greece had disarmed the Aegean islands. However, thanks to 
bilateral mistrust and European encouragement, Greece made enormous efforts to 
change the Lausanne status quo. Lausanne however was one of the foundations of 
Kemalist foreign policy. Hence Turkey perceived these attempts as an attack on 
Turkey's integrity. Last but not least, Turkey's past experience with Greece nourished 
Turkish suspicion about the reliability of the West. As the Turks saw it, the West did 
not preserve the agreements signed by Greece, Turkey and Britain in the first Cyprus 
Crisis and gave a clear support to the aggressive side; similarly, in the 1970s, the West 
was not making any efforts to maintain the Lausanne Order in the Aegean and gave tacit 
support to Greece. Whether Turkey was right is debatable. However, it quickly 
responded to the Greek initiative in the Aegean and to the Western 'unreliability': in 
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July 1975, a new army division, Fourth Aegean Army, was formed in the Aegean part 
of Turkey. Unlike the other three armies the Fourth Army was not directed against the 
Soviet Union but rather against a possible Greek attack. 92 Moreover, unlike the other 
armies it was not assigned to NATO. 
In this respect, Turkish - Greek relations can be considered as an exception to Turkey's 
foreign policy, because in the Ecevit or the Demirel years Turkey's Greece and Cyprus 
policies were not radically changed. No government could dare to shift Turkey's 
policies in this matter. However, the European and American support for Greece 
nourished mistrust among the Turks towards the West who viewed these actions as 
reaffirming Greece's privileged position as the golden child of the West. 93 
Turkey and the Muslim World: Greater Deviation from Kemalism 
Until 1973 Turkey's relations with the Muslim states and the Third World in general 
had been determined according to the government's ideological choices. While the 
right-wing governments were more enthusiastic for co-operation with the Muslim states, 
the Kemalists had doubts in terms of secularism. However as Turkey felt increasingly 
excluded from the West, it made efforts to gain the hearts of the Muslim states. With the 
rise of the Third World and with its disillusionment with the United States, Turkey 
sought better with the Arab, Muslim and Third World. Another factor was the oil crises 
and the rise of the pro-Islamist NSP in Turkish politics. 94 The economic crisis in 
Turkey" with the domestic factor and Turkey's isolation after the Cyprus Crisis forced 
Turkey to search for the friendship of the Arabs and other Third World countries. 
Although a few leftists, Kemalist-leftists and other hard-liner secularists opposed this 
shift by clanging that it ran counter to Kemalist principles, even the Inönü governments 
tried to develop the relations. Now both Ecevit and conservative Demirel saw relations 
with these countries as an important part of Turkish foreign policy. For the Demirel 
governments, Muslim states were brother states. Turkey and these countries shared a 
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common cultural and religious heritage and this heritage could set a suitable ground for 
improved relations. Even the leftist Ecevit struck a similar cause, in 1974 for instance, 
with his Islamist coalition partner recognised for the first time the Palestinians' right to 
establish an independent state. 96 This eventually would result in the opening of a PLO 
office in Ankara in 1979. Turkey's problems with the West and the government parties' 
anti-Western attitude further contributed to Turkish-Arab relations. As a result Turkey 
even opposed the Camp David agreements although they were signed under American 
sponsorship; 97 supported establishment an EEC-like common market among the Muslim 
countries, began to contribute the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference) budget 
(1974) and finally became a full member of the Islamic Bank (1975). In another word, 
Turkey's role in the OIC conferences shifted from a hitherto reserved stance toward 
more active participation. 98 Turkey sought to lessen its dependence on the West by 
developing ties with the Islamic world, however it never showed any intention to leave 
the Western alliance. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War Turkish support for the Arabs 
became evident. Although in the 1960s Turkey did not give an open support to the 
Palestinians, it now did not permit the US to use its military facilities to ship aid to 
Israel. In 1974 Foreign Minister Turan Günes was sent as Turkish representative to OIC 
and Turkey started to contribute to the OIC budget. Moreover, Turkish representatives 
were dispatched to the Jeddah Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministries and Rauf 
Denkta., head of the Turkish Cypriots, was invited to the conference as the leader of the 
Turkish people in Cyprus. Furthermore, the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers was held in Istanbul in 197699 and Rauf Denkta§ gave a speech as `the leader 
of the Turkish Muslim Community in Cyprus'. For its part the Conference mentioned 
its sympathy for Turkish Cypriot rights in Cyprus. 1976 Istanbul Conference was a 
historical turning point in Turkish foreign policy. In this conference, Prime Minister 
Süleyman Demirel and Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri caglayangil publicly underlined 
Turkey's Islamic character and called the Muslim world to support the Turkish 
Cypriots 
while Denktab likened the Cyprus problem to the Palestinian 
issue. 10° The conference 
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was favourable to the Turkish position and accepted Turkish Cypriot's participation in 
the next conference. "" As Aykan underscored `the support Turkey elicited from the 
OIC on its Cyprus cause was perhaps the most notable achievement of that country 
from its economic and political co-operation with the OIC in the 1970s. "02 Caglayangil, 
also, met with Faruk Kadduni, head of the PLO delegation, to negotiate establishment 
of a PLO office in Ankara. Moreover, Istanbul and Ankara became home for ICO's two 
permanent institutions, namely IRCICA (Islamic History, Art and Cultural Research 
Centre) and SESRTCIC (Islamic Countries Statistics, Economical and Social 
Researches and Education Centre) which would be recognised as diplomatic missions of 
the ICO by Turkey in 1982. Despite the government's enthusiasm, the leftist press 
viewed Turkey's participation as part of an anti-secular and anti-Kemalist attitude. With 
the effect of this campaign President Fahri Koruturk did not join the Istanbul 
conference. 103 
When Knesset (Israel's Parliament) declared Jerusalem as Israel's permanent capital on 
30 July 1980,104 Turkey blamed Israel and asked for cancellation of the relating act. '°5 
While Prime Minister Demirel accused Israel of not respecting international rules, his 
junior partner Islamist NSP increased the tension. As a result Turkey closed its 
consulate in Jerusalem as a part of its reaction to Israel. 106 
Conclusion 
The 1970s were years of crisis, political violence, terror, anarchy, instability and 
economic catastrophe for Turkey. An undeclared civil war was started and thousands 
lost their life. The military intervention and the terror fractured Turkish political life and 
radicalised party politics. In addition to the fragmented political structure, the old 
Ottoman schools of thought, like the Islamists and the ultra-nationalists, reappeared 
in 
the political arena, Another important political change was the RPP's deviation 
from 
Kemalism to leftism. Under Ecevit, Atatürk's party became the party of the radicals, 
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leftists, Kurdists and other minority groups. As Karpat put it, on the eve of the 1980 
take-over Kemalism as a state philosophy no longer had a formal, organised 
representation, only the army was left to secure Kemalism. 107 
In foreign policy, as an extension of domestic developments, the traditional Ottoman 
approaches took their place. Islamists, together with the leftist Ecevit, finely opposed 
United States and EC policies by accusing them of colonising Turkey. While the 
Islamists argued that Turkey could be a world leader if it would unite the Muslims 
against the Christians, the Turkists aimed to be the leader of the Turkish world. Though 
these groups were very small, the coalition system made them key factors in the 
formation of government. 
The fragmentation of domestic politics was mirrored in this foreign policy. Ecevit 
advocated a leftist version of third-worldism and opposed American hegemony and 
European capitalism. Demirel, in contrast, argued that Turkey had no alternative but the 
West. For its part the JP sought to improve relations with the Muslim world, while the 
NSP suggested an Islamic Commonwealth, and the NAC a Turkish Commonwealth. 
Finally, the leftist groups prescription was based on Turkey's good relations with the 
Communist bloc. In a short time Turkey experienced several contradictory foreign 
policy understandings. 
Another effect of the internal developments on foreign policy was the radicalisation of 
Turkey's foreign policy, as witnessed in Ecevit's foreign policy towards the EC and the 
United States. It can be said that Turkish foreign policy, for the first time in the 
Republican era, became idealist under the Ecevit rule. 
Moreover, the Kemalist impasse reappeared in the foreign policy arena as well. 
Kemalism could not provide a suitable ideological framework 
for Turkish foreign 
policy makers in a vastly changed world. The failure of the 
Kemalist civilisation 
understanding and Westernism was confirmed by the American and 
European anti- 
Turkish attitude in the Cyprus crisis. In the past this worldview 
had prevented Turkey 
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from developing good relations with the Third World and the Muslim states. But now 
an isolated Turkey was forced to improve relations with these actors despite Kemalist 
secularism. Mustafa Kemal had chosen isolationism, now the world forced Turkey to an 
isolated position. Now Turkey needed not only time but also friends and economic aid, 
and its participation into the Organisation of the Islamic Countries helped in this 
respect, albeit at the expense of the Kemalist tradition 
Another deviation was in the Kemalist school of thought itself Traditionally the 
political base of Kemalism, the Republican Party moved to a more leftist position. 
Gradually Kemalism was discarded from the RPP administration. The radical leftist 
RPP's foreign policies also can be considered as deviation from Kemalist foreign 
policy. At least it can be said that the Republican foreign policy was not inspired by the 
Kenialist principles but socialism and Ecevit's leftism. Contrary to Kenialist 
pragmatism, Ecevit, under the heavy influence of his ideology, underestimated the 
West's role in Turkish security. Another deviation from Kemalism was Ecevit's view 
that Russia, Turkey's traditional enemy since the 18th century, was no longer a threat to 
Turkey. In short, apart from the RPP no political party advocated a Kenialist foreign 
policy although all claimed that they were Kenialist parties in order to protect them 
from the army's wrath. Now Kemalism's home was the bureaucracy (e. g., the 
Organisation of State Planning) and constitutional institutions established by the 
military leaders in 1961 and 1971, such as the National Security Council, the 
Constitutional Court, and the army. 
Foreign policy came heavily under the influence of ideological considerations. As has 
been seen despite a few differences, the Democrat Party and the Republican People's 
Party were able to agree on the main foreign policy principles, like integration with 
West or Russia as the primary threat. In the 1970s, the main parties had opposite 
foreign 
policy aims, like RPP's third-worldism, NSP's Islamic Commonwealth, the 
JP's pro- 
Westernism, and NAC's Turkish Commonwealth ideas. 
Finally, although the 1970s can be considered the period 
in which ideology determined 
parties' foreign policies much more than ever, ironically 
Turkish foreign policy suffered 
and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988). 
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from an insufficient ideological framework for foreign policy. The rapid changes in 
power, the coalition system, the political violence and the economic crisis prevented the 
parties from carrying out their policies in an organised period. As a result, foreign 
policy orientation changed frequently and this weakened Turkey's position abroad. Just 
as third-woridist, leftist Ecevit aligned with the Islamist Erbakan, so the pro-Western 
Demirel aligned with Islamist Erbakan and ultra-Turkist Alparslan Turkes. In time 
Turkey saw many versions of shifting coalitions. 
In sum, after the Johnson Letter, there were attempts to lessen dependence on the United 
States. The Cyprus Crisis, the American arms embargo against Turkey and the 
Congress' anti-Turkish attitude worsened relations. Beside, the European Cyprus 
policies vis-a-vis Turkey and Greece were perceived as partial and anti-Turkish by the 
Turkish people. This in turn kindled anti-Western foreign policy understandings and led 
to reactionary policies, like Ecevit's third-world leftism and Erbakan's Islamism. 
Turkish policy makers wanted to counterbalance Turkey's dependence on the West by 
improving relations with the socialist states, the Third World and the Muslim world, yet 
these countries could not fill the vacuum created by the West. The Turks felt that they 
had no friends but themselves, which increased Kemalist scepticism. On the other hand, 
Atatürk's pragmatic, Westernist foreign policy understanding was abandoned. Although 
some groups, like Demirel's JP, argued that Turkey had no serious alternative in foreign 
policy to the West, the coalition system increased the effect of the marginal and radical 
groups. Consequently, during the 1970s ideology and idealism played a significant role 
in Turkish foreign policy and emotions sometimes left no room to realism and 
pragmatism. Not surprisingly, the social conflicts and the economic 
depression led to 
the third military intervention - 12 September 1980 coup. 
'°8 
log For the reasons of the 1980 breakdown: 
Dodd, The Crisis..., pp. 27-48. 
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CHAPTER X 
Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism) vs. Kemalism 
`Many things have changed in Turkey... In foreign policy the days of 
taking a cowardly and timid position are over. From now eve will 
pursue an active policy based on circumstances... ' My conviction is 
that Turkey should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and 
engage in an active foreign policy... The reason I made this call is 
because we are powerful country in the region. Let me also point out 
that there are conservatives who prefer that no change should be 
made to these passive policies. The reason these circles accuse me of 
dragging the country into an adventure is because I generally prefer to 
sue a more 2 pur dynamic policy for our country. ' 
Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey. 
The preceding chapters demonstrated that ideology played a crucial role in policy- 
making and implementation and many different approaches occurred until the 1980s: 
from Ecevit's leftism to Demirel's liberal-conservatism. Some of these alternative 
groups, like Menderes' and Demirel's, won majorities in elections, however the 
Kemalist civilian-military bureaucracy did not allow the elected governments to fully 
implement their program. That is to say there was a hidden cold-war between the 
Kemalists and others. With the rise of Turgut Özal, however, the balance of power 
changed dramatically against the Kemalists. As one of the greatest challenges to 
Kemalism, Özal fused the previous Turkism, Ottomanism and Islamism into a new kind 
of Ottomanism, or rather Özalism. Together with Kemalism, Özalism has become the 
most influential current in Turkish history, continuing on well after his demise. 
This chapter first examines the factors underlying the Ozalist approach, such as Ozal's 
personality, the 1980 coup and the isolation of Turkey, the economic boom, change in 
the socio-economic structure, globalisation of the Turkish economy and finally Kurdish 
separatism. A special emphasis will be laid on the ideological background of 
Özalist 
foreign policy, with a view to demonstrating the close relationship 
between Özal's 
Ottomanist foreign policy and his domestic approach and its translation to 
foreign 
policy. 
I Ahmad, The Making..., p. 201. 
2 Milliyet, 3 March 1991. 
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Return of Kemalism as Ideology and the Coup as Prelude of Özal Power 
The developments of the 1970s literally invited the third military coup. After the terror 
and years of instability, the army intervened yet again on 12 September 19803 with four 
distinct aims in mind: to suppress terrorism and radicalism; to restore economic growth 
and stability; to introduce a new constitution and legal arrangements that would stabilise 
the system and prevent anarchy; to re-establish civilian democracy on a Kemalist basis. 4 
In other words, in line with previous take-overs, the 1980 coup was not envisaged as a 
permanent military regime but aimed at the eventual restoration of civilian 
parliamentary rule once the army had put the government's house in order. 5 The Army 
was not against the democratic political system but its results. Were the political system 
to be truly Kemalist, the army would not intervene in its affairs any more. Indeed, the 
constitution and other laws defined the army as the `guardian of the regime'; however 
the rules had been re-written by the military leaders in 1960 and 1971. Similar to 
previous take-overs, General Kenan Evren, declared that the 1980 coup had been carried 
out in accordance with Article 34 of the military by-law, charging the army with the 
defence of the Republic, the Kemalist regime and unity. Hence it is arguable that the 
Turkish military intervention was fundamentally different from the Latin American and 
indeed most Third World coups since the Turkish Army has been legalist and based its 
acts on the 'law. 
Having suppressed the internal anarchy and tenor, one of the first acts of the military 
rulers was to revive the Kemalist doctrine. 
6 For the army, left and right-wing ideologies 
were alien to the Turkish people, responsible for the 1970s' catastrophe. 
Only 
Kemalism (Atatürkcülük)7 was a suitable ideology for Turkey that could foster national 
unity. Accordingly, a massive Kemalist campaign was launched: 
Kemalist books were 
3 For the coup see M. Ali Birand, 12 Eylül, Saat 04: 00, (12 
September, Hour: 04: 00 am. ), (Istanbul: 
Karacan Yaymlan, 1984); James Brown, `Military and Politics in Turkey', Armed 
Forces and Society, 
Vol. 13, No. 2, Winter 1987; Cüneyt Arcayurek, Demokrasi Dur, 12 EyIn11980, 
(Democracy, Stop! 12 
September 1980), (Ankara: Bilgi Yaymevi, 1990); William Hale, Turkish 
Politics and the Military, 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1994); Metin 
Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds. ), State, Democracy and 
the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, (Berlin and New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1988). 
t William Hale, 'Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military 
Perspective', in Metin 
Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds. ), State, Democracy and the 
Military, Turkey in the 1980s, (Berlin and 
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 166. 
5 Karpat, `Military', p. 149- 
6 For the military's Kemalism see: Kenan Evren, 
`Atatürk Yth Acih5 Konuýmasi'. (The Opening Speech 
of the Year ofAtatürk), in Kemalizm ve 
Tnrkiye, (Kemalism and Turkey), 6,52, January, 1981. pp. 
5-8. 
282 
published; 1981 was named the `Atatürk Year' and new institutions were established or 
financially supported to boost Kemalism in society. Streets, roads and buildings were 
re-named after Atatürk. The various institutions were consolidated in one central 
Supreme Atatürk Society. Kemalism had been restored as the state ideology while all 
others were swept away from power. Yet the 1980 Coup's Kemalism was very different 
from previous versions of Kemalism. It was a neutral and pragmatic ideology lacking 
unchangeable principles, instead arguing that what was good for the Turkish nation was 
good for Kemalism. Secondly, this new Kemalism, contrary to Inönü's autocracy, was 
loyal to democracy. Third, unlike Ecevit's Kemalism, it was pro-Western and pro- 
American. For Evren, the coup leader, the United States was the most important ally 
and the Soviet Union still posed the greatest threat to Turkish security. 8 Finally, this 
Kemalism was capitalist in orientation viewing Turkey's future in the capitalist rather 
than socialist world. 
The thing the generals understood least of all was the economy, and without economic 
success the coup could not be successful. Therefore, when Bülent Ulusu formed the first 
government, the Turkish National Security Council (NSC) announced that it would 
retain Turgut Özal, having been the spirit behind the last Demirel government's liberal 
economic reforms, as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs. In 1981 inflation 
dropped, exports increased rapidly, the GDP increased by 4.5 %. Tourism revenues and 
Turkish construction activities abroad increased dramatically. As a result the current 
account deficit was sharply reduced. 9 Özal's and the army's liberal policies showed 
them as closer to the capitalist world and more conservative than previous Kemalist 
military take-overs. In other words, the 1980 coup was a conservative-capitalist 
interpretation of Kemalism. Secondly, thanks to the government's success in the 
economy and the suppression of terrorism, the NSC gained credit before the people and 
continued its reforms. The military restored the regime's ideology of Kemalism; 
restored the economic system as a free capital market, yet the political structure 
remained unsettled. Some generals like Nurettin Ersin viewed this as proof that 
`Our 
social structure is not suitable for an advance and open democracy. We need an 
' 12 Eyl ul 1980 Coup leaders preferred to use `Atatürkcültik' term instead of Kemalism. 
8 Milliyet, 23 October 1984, Tercüman, (daily, Istanbul), 21 October 1984. 
9 Ahmet Kilicbay, Tnrk Ekonomisi, Modeller, Politikalar, Stratejiler, (Turkish Economy, 
Models, 
Policies, Strategies), (Ankara: Türkiye Iý Bankasi, 1991); Jeffry D. Lewis and Shujiro Urata, 
Turkery: 
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autocratic administration. ' 10 However, the dominant opinion among the generals was 
that the civilian rule should be restored. American and European pressure gave further 
impetus to this view. " The NSC was ready to do that, yet before handing over power it 
wanted to guarantee its favoured political structure. In the autumn of 1982 the 
constitution, written by the military and its favoured academics, was put to a national 
referendum. With the referendum, Kenan Evren became the President and the NSC 
gained extraordinary powers over government and parliament. As one of its first move, 
the NSC banned all political activities. It did not initially abolish the two major political 
parties (RPP and JP) or arrest deputies, but a few party leaders were temporarily 
detained and some deputies associated with radical groups and Kurdish separatists were 
taken into custody. 12 However in a short time the NSC understood that it could not 
reshape the Turkish political system with the old parties, abolished the two and banned 
all old political leaders from re-entering politics. Euren and his friends did not want to 
repeat the DP case, where the banned parties had re-established themselves under 
different names after the 1960s and 1970s coups against the DP. According to the new 
rules, the chairmen, general secretaries and all other senior office holders in the former 
political parties could not join or have `any kind of relations' with future political 
parties, or run for election (even as independent) for the next ten years. 13 Moreover, the 
new constitution forbade political organisations based on religion, a religious sect, 
regional considerations or Marxism. Having banned the old politicians and ideologies, 
the NSC encouraged new names. Before the elections the moderate right-wings 
Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party, NDP) and the moderate left 
Halkci Parti (Populist Party, PP) were established. The leader of the NDP was a former 
general and Evren had implied that this party was the army's choice. The NSC hoped 
that with these moderate and Kemalist right and a left party a permanent democratic 
system could be established, and it was sure for the victory of NDP. When 
Ozal, as a 
prestigious bureaucrat, formed a new party - Anavatan Partisi or ANAP (Motherland 
Party, MP) - the army's plans were spoiled. As the architect of 
the economic reforms 
Özal was a well-known person now, both inside and outside the country. 
Evren 
Recent Economic Performance and Medium term Prospects, 1978-1990, (Washington, 
D. C.: World 
Bank Working papers, No. 602), 1983). 
10 Arcayürek, Demokrasi..., p. 150. 
11 Ihsan D. Dag, `Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-1983: The Impact of European Diplomacy'. 
in 
Sylvia Kedourie (ed), Turkey, Identity, Democracy, Politics, (London: Frank Cass, 1996). pp. 
124-141. 
12 Karpat, `Military... ', p. 153. 
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indicated that the military did not favour Ozal's party, yet the NSC could not ban the 
party, and in the first elections Özal's Motherland Party won 45 % of the votes and 212 
of the 400 seats in parliament. 14 Thus the 1983 elections marked the beginning of the 
Özal era, which would last for some 10 years and would transform Turkey 
economically, technologically, educationally and politically. For the first seven years 
the military rulers provided the President with special authority to protect the system 
they had established, hence Özal could not carry out all his ideas, particularly in the 
field of social and human rights and foreign policy. However, when the military 
gradually lost its power over government, Özal started to implement his revolutionary 
ideas. 
During these years Özal also created a new foreign policy: Özalism or neo-Ottomanism, 
which in candar's words constituted the `funeral' of Kemalism. '5 It is true, as Özal 
accepted that he came from the same school as Bayar, Menderes and Demirel, and that 
Özalism can be viewed as a representative of the neo-Democrat or neo-JP current. 
However, as will be shown, despite the continuity of the democratic-liberal- 
conservative current since the Ottoman Empire, Özalism is distinguished from these 
currents in domestic and foreign policy term. 
The Army's Foreign Policy (1980-1983) 
Before moving to the Özal era, we need to explore the military's foreign policy, because 
it deeply affected Özalist foreign policy. As noted earlier, Turkey had been isolated 
from the EC, from the Third World and from the United States due to the Cyprus crisis 
the American arms embargo, and the Kemalist block on relations with the Muslim 
countries. In addition, the Kemalist legacy and Turkey's NATO membership prevented 
the improvement of relations with the communist bloc while internal problems (terror, 
economic collapse) and the oil crisis exacerbated Turkey's isolation so did the 1980 
13 Provisional Article 4, William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994), p. 260. 
14 Üstün Ergüder, `The Motherland Party, 1983-1989', in Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (eds. ). 
Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991), pp. 
151-153. 
15 Author's interview with Cengiz candar, 20 August 1999, Istanbul. Seufort and Weyland also analyse 
the social and political change in Turkey from Mustafa Kemal to 
Ozal by focusing on people's attitude in 
Özal's funeral, and claim that the funeral clearly showed what has changed 
in Turkey's social and 
political structures in the Oral period: Günter Seufort and Petra Weyland, 
`National Events and the 
Struggle for the Fixing of Meaning: A Comparison of the Symbolic Dimensions of the Funeral 
Services 
for Atatürk and Özal', New Perspectives on Turkey, Fall 1994. Vol. 11, pp. 
71-98. 
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military coup. The EC's reaction to the coup was very moderate in the first days 
because it stabilised the domestic situation. Yet when the military regime retarded the 
restoration of democracy, the EC toughened its policy towards Turkey. First the 
European Parliament suspended financial aid to Turkey on 22 January 1982. Then, the 
European wing of the Joint Turkish-European Parliamentary Committee was abolished. 
The Commission also froze the Fourth Protocol. 16 In addition, the Western leaders and 
the press were severely criticising the Turkish generals. Nevertheless Evren never 
abandoned Turkey's traditional Western aims and Westernism remained at the core of 
Turkish foreign policy and Turkey continued to seek all possible ways to improve its 
relations with the Western Europe and the US. However these effort, particularly those 
with Europe mostly failed. '7 The Us was the only major NATO ally not very critical of 
the coup leaders, yet the Americans could not help to break Turkey's isolated position 
in the world. 18 
Under these circumstances, the political isolation and Turkey's economic difficulties 
provided the basis for improved relations with the Arab world. 19 As a result, ironically, 
the Kemalist generals saw the Muslim world as the only way to get away from this 
economic and political isolation. Bülent Ulusu, the Prime Minister of the military 
government, for example, announced that Turkey would continue to develop and 
consolidate its relations with the Muslim world. In December 1980 the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry declared the new government's decision to reduce diplomatic representation 
with Israel to a minimum level (from charge d'affaires to the level of second secretary) 
in order to underscore Turkey's support of the Arabs, as a member of the Islamic 
Conference. 20 For Soysal and Dalacoura, this policy underscored Turkey's joining to the 
Islamic policy in international arena. 21 Turkey also argued that the main instability 
16 Meltem Müftüler, `Turkey and the European Community: An Uneasy Relationship', Turkish Review 
Quarterly Digest, Autumn 1993, Vol. 7, No. 33, p. 38; cayhan, Türkiye..., p. 256. 
17 Yavuzalp, Liderlerimiz...., p. 248. 
18 Uslu, Türk - Amerikan..., p. 260. 19 Birol A. Ye§ilada, `Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East', in Attila Eralp, Muharrem Tümay 
and Birol Yeoada (eds. ), The Political and Socio-economic Transformation of 
Turkey, (Westport: 
Praeger, 1993), p. 175. 
20 Aykan, Ideology..., pp. 231-232; George Green, `Turkey's Relations with 
Israel and Its Arab 
Neighbours', Middle East Review, Vol. 17, No. 3,1985, pp. 38-39. 
21 Ismail Soysal, `Islam Konferansi ve Ti rkiye', (The Islamic Conference and Turkey), 
Dij Politika. No. 
11,1984, pp. 16-30; Katerina Dalacoura, `Turkey and the Middle 
East in the 1980s'. Millennium, 
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2,1990, pp. 207-227. 
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reason in the Middle East was the problem of the Palestinians' political rights. 22 In 
particular, Turkey looked for ICO members' support on the Cyprus issue and succeed in 
some degree. 23 In the military period, Turkey joined almost all ICO meetings. Even 
Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu participated at the third ICO summit and made a speech 
underlining change in Turkish foreign policy towards detente. The coup 
administration's policy towards the Muslim world can be considered as an exception in 
the Kemalist tradition. 24 Apart from the right-wing governments, Turkey - Muslim 
world relations as a first time in the Republican history improved under a Kemalist and 
military government and it reached its peaked; Turkey's economic and commercial 
relations with these countries grew in an unprecedented way in the main fields of trade, 
capital, investments and contracting in 1980-1984 era. The share of the Muslim 
countries in Turkey's total exports rose from 22.51 per cent (1980) to 45.79 per cent in 
1983 paralleling notable decrease of the share of Western states. 25 The Iraq-Iran War in 
particular nourished Turkish export to these two countries: Thanks to the Iraqi-Turkish 
oil pipeline constructed in the 1970s, the trade between the two states increased and 
Turkey became a principal supply route for Iraq. Similarly Turkey also expanded its 
trade with Iran after 1980. By March 1982 the Turkish government had concluded aI 
billion dollar-commercial agreement with Iran and in the following years the trade grew 
larger. 26 Moreover, under the pressure of unemployment issue and the European 
reluctance towards Turkey, the coup government encouraged the businessmen and 
workers to work in the Arab states, like Libya and Saudi Arabia. So thousands of 
workers were sent to these countries. Turkey also saw these states as a fresh credit 
source when the Western financial centres limited credits to Turkey. 27 As a result, 
surprisingly Turkey-Muslim states relations were restored and improved under a 
Kemalist administration. These close relations confirm the argument of this thesis: 
Kemalism has also showed a dramatic internal evolution and there has been at least four 
different Kemalist approaches (Atatürk's, Inönü's, Ecevit's and 12 September Coup's). 
It is clear that 12 September's Kemalism differs from the previous Kemalists' 
22 Ali Karaosmanoglu, `Turkey's Security and the Middle East', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1, Fall 
1983, p. 163. 
23 Cigdem A. Kurt, `The Reception and Evolution of the Cyprus Issue in the United Nations, 1954-1984', 
Foreign Policy, Vol. 11, No. 1-2,1984, pp. 47-83. 
24 For a different view see Yavuzalp, Liderlerimiz..., p. 246 and p. 248. 
25 Mahmut Bali Aykan, `Turkey and the OIC, 1984-1992', Turkish Yearbook of International 
Relations, 1993, Vol. XXVII, pp. 106-107. 
26 Harrison, Turkey..., p. 197. 
27 Aykan, `Turkey and ... 
', p. 107. 
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understanding on secularism's role in foreign policy and in the relations with the 
Muslim world in particular. Even some leftist groups argued that the 12 September 
Coup Leaders were not true Kemalists, but undermined the real Kemalists principles. 28 
Ugur Mumcu for instance saw them as conservative and pro-American rather than 
Kemalist. 29 For Mumcu, Mustafa Kemal was against religious connections while 12 
September Coup leaders were in a very close co-operation with the Arab states on a 
religious understanding. 30 
Apart from the Cyprus problem, another motive behind the shift in Turkey's Middle 
East policy was economic. Turkey bought over 11 million ton oil from the Middle East 
states in 1980, however it had no sufficient source to pay its oil-debts. Thus credit from 
Iraq, Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia became essential for the Turkish economy. 31 
Turkey's strategy in these years was to increase its export to the Middle East and to 
develop political relations with the region. Despite this, Turkey rejected basing its 
relations on a Third World approach or Islamic values. Turkish Foreign Minister Ilter 
Turkmen, for example, refused to sign some decisions of the 1981 Mecca Declaration 
regarding on embargo on Afghanistan, Islamic principles and values, and Third World 
movement. 32 
Turkey - Israel relations can be considered a perfect reflection of Turkish-Western 
relations. Since the West had closed all doors down against Turkey, it needed new 
political support and economic markets. The Arabs offered money, markets and 
political support for Turkey, while Israel's effect on the West's Turkey policy was 
extremely limited. In these years Turkey's reputation among the European states was 
low. The only countries that the Turkish President could visit were Pakistan, the Arab 
world and the Balkans. In short, when Özal came to power he found a country isolated 
from both West and East. Turkey needed a radical shift in domestic and foreign policy 
in order to escape this political and economical isolation. 
28 Gerger, Türk Dye..., pp. 149-160. 
29 LTgur Mumcu, Rabita, (Istanbul: Tekin Yaymnevi, 1987). 
30 For his arguments Mumcu used the Rabita affair. For him, the 
Turkish religious officials outside 
Turkey were paid by the Rabitat Al-Islam, the Saudi Arabistan - 
based religious organisation, and the 
coup leader Kenan Evren had approved this connection. Mumcu, 
Rabita. 
31 Anthony McDermott, `Turkey's Search for Friends', Middle East International, No. 
148, pp. 12-13. 
32 Cumhuriyet (daily, Istanbul), 23 January 1981; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ba4bakam 
BWent Ulusu'nun 
Ügüncu Islam Zirvesi Konferansi'ndaki Beyanati' (Prime Minister Billent Ulusu's 
Speech and 
declarations in the Third Islamic Summit), Mekke and Taif, 25-28 January 
1981, Ankara Ba4bakanhk. 
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1980s as Prelude of Özalism and Factors Created özalism 
Özal's Personality 
Turgut Özal's personality played a crucial role in the formation and success of Özalism. 
In the words of Zürcher, `he had a foot in both camps: he had been a successful manager 
in the private industry in the 1970s and was very well connected in big business circles, 
which liked his liberalisation of the economy. On the other hand, he was an practising 
Muslim and was known to have connections with the Nat ibendi order of dervishes. '33 
In fact he had a foot in more than two camps. He was not only a successful 
businessman, and a religious person with good relations with religious sects: he was a 
successful bureaucrat and had very good relations with the IMF, the World Bank 
(between 1971-1973 Turgut Özal was adviser to the World Bank on special projects) 
and the US administration. He was a religious, nationalist, conservative, liberal 
politician, businessman, economist and bureaucrat. 34 Above all, Özal was a moderate 
who could do business with everyone regardless of their social or ideological 
background. For example, he was an Islamist NSP candidate for the Izmir province in 
1978,35 before becoming head of the economy under secular military rule. 36 Özal's other 
key feature was his Americanism. Having graduated from Istanbul Technical University 
in 1950 as an electrical engineer, Özal studied in the United States, and during these 
years became an admirer of the United States. In his view, the United States owed its 
success to its liberalism. Özal further argued that the United States and the Ottoman 
Empire were similar political structures: Both allowed different cultures and gave 
people freedom to exercise their religion, nationality and economic preferences. 
From 
this perspective, Turkey had to desert its authoritarian official understanding, namely 
the Kemalist state ideology. 
33 Heath Lowry, 'Challenges to Turkish Democracy in the Decade of the Nineties', 
Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. V, Fall 1996, p. 
95; Yqilada, `Turkish Foreign... ', p. 178; 
Zürcher, Turkey..., p. 297. 
34 Ozal was a member of the technical Advisory Board of the 
Turkish Prime Ministry, and from 1967 to 
1971 was under-secretary of the State Planning Organisation; also after 
returning from United States to 
Turkey he was appointed under-secretary to the Prime 
Minister in 1979. On 12 September 1980 he was 
made Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs. 
35 Lowry, `Challenges... ', p. 95. Islamist while the Islamists 36 Thanks to his NSP membership, the radical leftists accused 
him of being 
labelled him as a traitor because of his departure from the 
NSP. Milliyet, 20 March 1994. 
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Coup, Isolation and Thirst for Economic Success 
The military coups had put an end to the Menderes and Demirel governments. 
Ironically, the 1980 military coup provided a suitable political base for Özalist foreign, 
economic and domestic politics, though he was from the same school of thought as 
Demirel and Menderes. First, the coup eliminated Özal's political rivals by banning old 
politicians like Demirel, Ecevit, Türkes and Erbakan. Secondly, Özal's co-operation 
with the Kemalist army legitimising his ideology in the system. Thus Özal gradually 
banished the military elements from politics. Third, the lack of political rivals granted 
Turgut Özal a respite to concentrate on the country's problems. Thus, Özal became one 
of the most creative and productive political figures in Turkish politics. Until the 1990s 
Özal won the election with new projects. Finally, the unique environment of the 1980s 
provided enormous public support for Özal's governments. For example, in the 1983 
elections his Motherland Party (MP) scored an overwhelming victory, with 45 per 
cent. 37 Thus, MP received an absolute majority in the new assembly. 
Economic Boom and Re-gaining of Confidence 
In the 1980s, Turkey's political agenda was dominated by a high economic growth rate, 
and a revolutionary structural change towards an industrialised country. Thanks to 
Özal's liberal economic policies, the Turkish economy grew at an annual rate of over 5 
%, the highest among the OECD countries. 38 The volume of Turkish exports rose from 
$ 2,910 million in 1980 to over $ 20 billion in the 1990s, with an annual increase of 
15,6 %; a staggering 350 % increase in 10 years. 39 Moreover, the share of industrial 
products in Turkish exports rose from 41,1 % to 84 % in 1990. Now only 14 % of the 
exports were agricultural. Likewise, imports rose from $ 7,909 million in 1980 to $ 22.5 
billion in 1990 (a 182% increase) while tourism leaped from a marginal industry to a 
major earner of foreign currency with a increase from $212 million in 1980 to about $3 
billion in 1990.4° For its part the Turkish construction sector dramatically increased its 
projects in the Middle East, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
37 Dodd, The Crisis..., p. 95. 
38 R. Hine, `Turkey and the European Community: Regional Integration and Economic Convergence. 
in 
S. Togan and V. N. Balasubramanyam, The Economy of Turkey since Liberalization, 
(London: 
Macmillan Press, Ltd, 1996), p. 146; Dodd, The Crisis..., p. 102. 
39 `General Outlook of Turkish Economy', via internet, http: // www. foreigntrade. gov. tr/ENGLISH? 
ECONOMYYECONO. htm, visited May 1997, p. 2. 
40 Anne O. Kruger and Okan H. Aktan, Swimming Against the Tide: Turkish 
Trade Reform in the 
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Despite this remarkable record, the real figures were even higher than the official 
statistics due to the underground economy. That is to say, Turkey in the 1980s was a 
miracle economy, or in the words of Mango `a young tiger'. 41 Moreover, the Turkish 
economy had by now been liberalised and globalised. The Turkish government adopted 
the EC's nomenclature for commodity classification and in 1988 initiated legislative 
adjustments for adopting EC legislation. The main aim was integration of the Turkish 
economy with the world economy. For some scholars, all these developments were `the 
Özal revolution. 
The first effect of the economic success was the regaining of national confidence lost in 
the 1970s. Özal's slogan was `again a great Turkey'. This also affected the conduct of 
Özalist foreign policy. With economic power, Turkey's foreign policy horizons were 
widened, as Turkey gradually became a regional power. 
Change in Social and Economic Structures 
Another effect of the economic boom was the radical change in economic and social 
structures. As noted earlier, economic power had been in the hands of the Kemalist 
bureaucracy and state-sponsored businessmen. Although the Menderes and Demirel 
governments supported the conservative Anatolian capital, their success was limited. 
Thanks to Özal's policies, the periphery, villagers, workers and traditional religious 
groups entered the economy, and as a result, strengthened their autonomy against the 
core, namely the bureaucracy, the military and the state-created industry. During these 
years, industrialisation of many towns increased immigration from the rural areas, and 
the portion of those who lived in urban areas rose to 75 %. These developments, 
together with the high economic growth, urbanisation and 
Özal's liberal reforms 
accelerated the restoration of democracy. Many non-democratic rules were abolished, 
and the masses gained legal rights to resist pressure from the establishment. When 
ordinary Turks and minority ethnic groups gained power they insisted on good relations 
1980s, (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992), pp. 148-149. 
41 Andrew Mango, `Unfriendly Neighbour°s', The World Today, Vol. 50, No. 3, March 1994, pp. 
60-61. 
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42 Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled, Atatfirk and After, 
(London: John Murray Publishers Ltd. 
1997), pp. 158-179. 
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with those with whom they shared common values, namely the Muslim and the Turkish 
worlds. 43 
Re-emergence of Ethnic Pluralism and Its Impact on Foreign Policy Pressure 
Groups 
Indeed, the restoration of democracy and a growing income enabled the political and 
ethnic minorities to join the democratic system fully. Bosnians, Albanians, 
Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Chechens and Turkmens in particular brought their problems 
to the foreign policy agenda. ' No government could any longer ignore these groups 
because they sponsored or supported the main political parties both through financial 
assistance and voter power. 
Already during the Ottoman epoch Turkey had been a migrant-country. 45 With the 
collapse of the Empire millions of the Ottoman subjects, particularly Muslims and 
Turks poured into Anatolia from Russia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece. 46 
This trend continued throughout the Republican era. In addition to the Turkish and 
Kurdish population the number of Caucasian, Balkan and Russian immigrants was very 
high. However these people were not allowed to use their ethnic identity in politics, and 
were seriously warned not to interfere in the affairs of the country of their origin. 47 The 
early Republican policy was based on the Turkification of these people, and this policy 
continued until the end of the Cold War. In the 1980s the leftist and Kemalist groups 
perceived the outside Turks and the problems of the ethnic groups in Turkey as 
endangering Turkish independence. For them, any connection between Turkish citizens 
and any other country was unacceptable. However there were millions of them. 
43 For a comprehensive analysis of the internal social and economic factors' role in shaping dzalism see 
Hakan Yavuz, `DegiWn Turk Kimligi ve Ihr Politika: Neo-Osmanhcih m Yükseliýi', (The Rise of the 
Neo-Ottomanism, The Changing Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy), Liberal Dü#ünce, Vol. 4No. 13, 
Winter 1999, pp. 25-38. 
44 Lowry, `Challenges... ', p. 103. 
45 For the ethnic minorities in the Ottoman and Turkish period see: Peter Alford Andrews (ed), Ethnic 
Groups in the Republic of Turkey, (Weisbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989); Server Mutlu, 
`Population of Turkey by Ethnic Groups and Provinces', New Perspectives on Turkey, Spring 1995,12, 
pp. 33-60. 
46 yule Kut, `Yugoslavya Bunalimi ve Türkiye'nin Bosna - Hersek ve Makedonya Politikasi, 1990-1993', 
(Turkey's Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia Policy), in Sdylemezoglu, Türk..., pp. 159-179. 
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292 
By now their numbers had grown substantially. " According to Edward Shvardnadze, 
the President of Georgia, the number of the Georgians in Turkey was about 2 million, 49 
while the number of the Bosnian Turks is estimated about 3-4 million and the number of 
the Albanian Turks is about 4 million. 50 There are similar number of Azerbaijanis and 
Chechens. Though most of these people had been Islamised and Turkified, they still 
spoke their language and had a different identity awareness. 51 As a result, thanks to the 
democratisation and economic growth, each of these minorities came to its own 
lobbying organisations, publishing houses and established links with political parties. 
Particularly active were the Azerbaijanis and the Chechens. Another large migrant 
group, Balkan migrants, settled down in the Bursa, Adapazan, Izmir and Istanbul 
provinces. Millions of them had come during the Ottoman years, like Albanians, 
Bosnians, Pomaks, Bulgarian and Macedonian Muslims. With the exchange of 
populations between Turkey and Greece in the 1920s and in subsequent years, their 
numbers dramatically increased and they became an important pressure group. 52 In the 
1980s, the ethnic cleansing campaign in Bulgaria forced about 300,000 Bulgarian Turks 
and Muslims to move to Turkey which made the Balkan community as one of the 
biggest lobbies in Turkey. 53 As a result the Balkan migrants became one of the largest 
pressure group in Turkey. Though the Bulgarian Turks caused a great problem in 
Turkish-Bulgarian relations in the 1980s, they would become an important actor in 
improving the economic and political relations in the 1990s. 54 Apart from the Balkan 
and Caucasia migrants, there were Central Asian migrants as well, like the Kazaks and 
48 Bells Kdrnbetog)u, `Gemmen ve Siginmaci Gruplardan Bir Kesit: Bulgaristan Göcmenleri ve Bosnali 
Siginmacilar', (A Small Portrait og the Asylum Seekers and the Migrants: The Bulgarian and the Bosnian 
Migrants), in Kemali Saybasili and Gencer Özcan (eds. ), Yeni Balkanlar, Eski Sorunlar, (The New 
Balkans, The Old Problems), (Istanbul: Baglam Yayincihk, 1997), p. 229-230 and 255. 
49 Milliyet, 26 June 1996. 
50 Kut, `Yugoslavya... ', p. 178; Sezer cited in Stephanos Constantinides, `Turkey: The Emergence of a 
New Foreign Policy The Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model', Journal of Political and Military Sociology. 
1996, Vol. 24, Winter, p. 328. 
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The 
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Uygurs Turks, who came to Turkey after the communist revolution in China, and the 
Kyrgyzs and Afghanis, who came after the Soviet occupation. 
The effect of all these ethnic groups on foreign policy was dramatic. With the increasing 
role of ethnic groups, Turkey's relations with the region intensified. 55 These ethnic 
pressure groups forced Turkish policy makers into a more sensitive foreign policy 
towards these countries. As a result, the problems in these countries became Turkey's 
own problems, as witnessed by the Bosnian War and the Nagorna-Karabagh problem 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Similarly, as will be seen, one of the most important 
factors would shape Turkey's Bosnia policy was the Bosnian Turks in Turkey. 56 In 
other words, the ethnic groups created their own foreign policy aims, which were 
different from the state's Kemalist foreign policy. Turgut Özal saw this change and 
sought to develop a foreign policy covering all these sector demands. 
Globalisation of the Turkish Economy 
Apart from the structural change and the rapid development of the Turkish economy, 
the share of exports in the economy was dramatically increased. In the first years, when 
the difficulties with the EC markets increased, Turkish businessmen focused on the 
Middle East countries, notably Iran, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Thus, for the first 
time in Republican history, the Turkish economy became dependent on economic 
conditions in the Muslim world. In addition to the oil trade, Turkey attached great 
importance to export, tourism and the construction sectors. Moreover, in time, the 
European Community, became the first and most important export area for Turkish 
goods, with over a 50% share. In addition to the EC and the Middle East, trade with the 
US, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Russian Federation markets became vital for 
Turkish businessmen, and the dependant classes. 57 Thanks to the 
Özalist economic 
measures of the early 1980s, by abandoning its inward-oriented economic policies 
Turkey succeeded not only in diversifying its exports but also in becoming an 
important 
market for direct foreign investment. 58 The Istanbul exchange was now considered one 
of the most important financial markets in south-eastern Europe, together with 
that of 
55 Constantinides, `Turkey... ', pp. 328-330; Lowry, `Challenges... ', PP- 102-104; 
Yavuz, `Degisen... ', pp 
36-38. 
56 Sezer cited in Constantinides, `Turkey:... ', p. 328. 
s' Dodd, The Crisis..., p. 105; Ahmad, The Making..., pp. 206-207. 
58 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question, 
(New York: Rowman. 1998), p. 
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Athens. That is to say, contrary to the small Turkish market in the 1920s-30s, Turkey 
was now one of the most rapidly developing international markets, with billions-dollars 
of foreign investments. Hence, an isolationist policy, like Kenialist foreign policy of the 
early Republican years, was virtually impossible. Turkey became the third biggest 
market among the non-EC European countries, after Switzerland and Russia. All these 
factors affected and sometimes forced the Özal administration to improve Turkey's 
economic and political relations with the EC and other economic partners. Thus, for 
example, Turkey was very careful not to annoy Germany, its biggest economic partner. 
Similarly, contrary to the early Republican indifference towards the region Turkey's 
growing economic interests in the region and new export-oriented policies inevitably 
raised Turkish consciousness toward the Middle East. 59 
In short, with the internationalisation of the economy, Turkish businessmen imposed 
their agenda on the state or manipulated the official foreign policy 
Kurdish Separatism and the Need for a New Identity60 
Kemalist nationalism let many Kurdish nationalists down after the Independence War. 
As a Turkist, Kemal sought to establish a homogeneous country and eliminated other 
ethnic and cultural differences from the state machinery. Kurdish was banned and 
Kurdish names of towns were changed into Turkish names. In the Seyh Sait Revolt 
(1925) and in the Dersim (Tunceli) Revolts (1937-1938), the Kemalist state suppressed 
the Kurdish-Islamist separatists by using violence. 61 Many were hanged. The main 
factor that united the Kurds and Turks was Islam. The secular and nationalist 
Republicans undermined that, hence, the unrest in the region continued. Yet the 
separatists were too weak to launch a general riot. However, thanks to the anarchic 
environment of the 1970s, the separatist Kurds united groups and claimed an 
independence or autonomy for the Kurdish people. In 1980s the separatist Kurdish 
became a significant armed movement under the PKK's leadership. In a 
decade the 
PKK gathered about 10,000 armed men and thousands more sympathisers. 
By the late 
164. 
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1980s, the Kurdish question dominated the political agenda, and all political parties 
searched for a solution. Kemalist Turkish identity, thus, was no longer satisfying for 
some parts of Turkish society, and the Kurdish problem underscored this problem. 
Kurds and other ethnic and political groups (Islamists, socialists etc. ) demanded a new 
identity and citizenship definition that would include ethnicity, cultures, religion, 
political ideas and minority languages. Özal claimed that the main pillars of the 
Republic needed to be re-considered, notably Turkish citizenship, unity, individual 
rights and the state's rights and responsibilities. 62 This policy created a Second 
Republican current in domestic politics. 63 In foreign policy matters it created neo- 
Ottomanism or Özalist Foreign Policy understanding. 64This manifested itself in a wider 
identity abroad, Ottoman rather than Turkish covering all neighbouring Muslim peoples 
(like the Kurds in the northern Iraq) and all minorities in Turkey. For example, after the 
Gulf War Özal claimed that Turkey was the protector of the Iraqi Kurds and Turkmens 
in its capacity as the `big brother' of these peoples, arguing that a federation between 
these peoples was possible under Turkish sponsorship. 65 Özal underlined his plans for 
the outside Kurds in his speech in Diyarbakir, a predominantly Kurdish region: 
`The people in the south east region are our brothers. The people in the Northern Iraq 
are their brothers and should to be our brothers too. Turkey just neglected the events 
happened in Northern Iraq in the past.. For example, the Halabje incident. We said 
"that's outside our frontiers, it's nothing to do with us. " This policy must be changed. 
Turkey's new policy should be as: if Baghdad commits another barbarity there, it will 
find us opposing it. '66 
This speech clearly underscores the huge differences between the traditional pacific 
policies and Özal's activist Kurdish policy. Moreover, the Özalist policy challenged the 
principle of non-involvement in the regional inter-state conflicts and domestic politics 
of the other countries. As Menderes did in the Iraqi Crisis of 195867, 
Özal threatened the 
neighbour countries with military intervention. 
68 In sum, the Kurdish problem not only 
increased the political liberalism of Özalism but also nourished its Ottomanist elements. 
61 Bat, Preventing..., pp. 142-148. 
62 Turgut Özal, MAI Özal Aqivi, Ankara, TÖ / 91456B-2. 
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ical Background of Özalist Foreign Policy: Democrat, Western_ mimen 
and Turkish 
A New Civilisation Understanding and Özalist Westernism 
As mentioned Mustafa Kemal had aimed at creating a religious-free, European Turkey 
by changing the civilisational mode of the country, as he viewed Islam and Ottoman 
tradition as responsible for poverty, political corruption and economic collapse. 69 For 
Ozal there was no compulsory relationship between progress and Western civilisation. 
Contrary to the positivist Ittihatcilar and Kemalists, Özal argued that Western 
civilisation was not the only civilisation on earth, and that Turkey did not have to 
choose between either the European, Turkish or Islamic civilisations. For Özal, the 
Turks were European Muslims; therefore Turkey did not need to change its mentality or 
civilisational mode to be European. In his book `Turkey in Europe, Europe in Turkey-'0, 
he argued that Turkey had always been, still was, and would be a part of Europe. In 
brief, the main difference between Kemal and Özal's European vocation was that the 
former internationalised the European values while the latter did not see any problem 
with Turkish civilisation. For Özal, responsibility for Turkish backwardness lay in the 
lack of liberalism and scientific thinking. He formulated his understanding as `cag 
atlamak' (skipping an age), whereby Turkey did not have to re-experience the 
ghtenment enlightenment process undergone by the West because the fruits of the enli 
could easily be adopted by today's Turkey. These, in his view, were liberalism, human 
rights, democracy, technological and scientific developments and Turkish culture was 
not an obstacle to receive all of them. Özal even claimed that if Turkey tried to re- 
experience the European positivist, autocratic past, it would never reach these aims. In 
other words, Özal's Western vocation, contrary to Atatürk's, was based on the 
assumption that the Europeans must accept the Turks as they were. Undoubtedly, the 
reason for this confidence was Özal's ideological background and dramatic economic 
performance, which let to the stability and co-existence between Islamic values and 
modernity witnessed in the 1980s. 
For the issue see Türkkaya Ataöv, The Inquisition of the 1980s: The 
Turks of Bulgaria, (Washington, 
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According to Turgut Özal, the Islamic awakening was also on advantage in integrating 
Turkey with the rest of Europe and the Western system because the Turkish version of 
Islam was different from the Iranian or the Arab Islam. He claimed that the Turkish 
Islamic outlook could provide peace between Muslims and the others, since religion and 
progress could go hand in hand. 71 As a Westernist and a pious Muslim, Özal 
accommodated his Islamic understanding to Westernism: 
`I have demonstrated that Turkey has never abandoned secularism. In this context one 
can refer to Ghazali's distinction between faith and reason. The Turks are aware that faith in itself does not affect secularism, nor does prevent him from being rational, 
provided that their respective realms are not encroached. In life today there is no 
difference in this respect between the Christian European and the Muslim Turk. Thus a 
synthesis has been achieved between the West and Islam, a synthesis which has put an 
end to the identity crisis of the Turks... the universal humanism created by secularised 
Islam, together with the concept of the brotherhood of mankind, a product of Turkish 
Sufism. ''2 
For Özal, Turks do not need to be shamed of their civilisation, because Turkish 
civilisation was not a lower civilisation, but one of the many advanced civilisations in 
the world: 
`The Turks living in this territory for a thousand years, have inherited some part of 
culture of every civilisation which flourished here since prehistory. They have evolved 
a synthesis derived from the cultural legacy of Anatolia, from the culture they brought 
with them from Central Asia, and from the Muslim religion. Their talent for synthesis 
and their ecumenical character have enabled them to blend these three strands 
together. '73 
Apart from his different civilisation understanding, Turgut Özal, contrary to Kemalist 
Western scepticism, believed that Turkey could solve its security problem only through 
integration with the West, because Turkey and the Western countries were opposed to 
any possible conflict or instability. If Turkey managed to enter the EC, it would 
be far 
away from any war risk: `Like the founding members of the EC, we 
favour integration 
primarily in order to eliminate any possibility of war between the constituent nation- 
states. Turkey like all European countries, has suffered enormously 
from wars. '74 
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In line with this view, Özal made efforts to convince the Europeans to accept the Turks 
as Muslim Europeans into the European political system. On the other hand he tried to 
demolish the Turkish Western scepticism, were Turkey to be integrated with the West, 
it would be advanced in terms of democracy and economy: 
`Political integration with Europe will further ease the institutionalisation of democracy 
in the Turkish political system. A secular and pluralist culture has been gradually taking 
root in Turkey. Integration with the EC will only enhance its ability to persist into the 
twenty-first century. '75 
A New Look at the Ottoman Past and the Region 
Kemal had sought to eradicate anything reminiscent of the Ottoman-Islamic past. For 
Ozal, Turkey's past was its most important advantage in entering the Western club. 
Moreover, while Kemal saw the Ottoman heritage as the source of problems in the 
region, Özal claimed that Turkey could solve the regional problems due to the Ottoman 
past. He even argued that the Ottoman heritage granted Turkey great power to control 
the region, saying that `Turkey cannot be prisoner of the Misak-i Milli (National Pact) 
borders'. He further implied that the only solution to the Kurdish problem and other 
matters in the Middle East was a federation between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, which was 
considered as the resurgence of the Ottoman Empire by the leftist groups in Turkey. For 
Özal, Ottoman political and cultural systems could be a perfect model for 20th century 
Turkey. For example, his eyalet sistemi (state system), the localisation of the 
administration, and the presidential system suggestions were all inspired by the 
Ottoman past. 
Turkish Islam and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
In spite of Kemalism's anti-religion stance, Özal was known as a pious Muslim, if not 
an Islamist. As noted earlier, he was one of the candidates of Islamist NSP in the 1979 
elections. However, his Islam was different from either the Kemalist or the NSP Islam. 
His friend and follower Cengiz Landar spelled out the difference: 
`Republican secularism was inspired by French and Soviet atheism. 
Therefore, in the 
1920s Republican secularism became atheism. In time, Kemalist secularism 
became an 
anti-religion and anti-Islam concept. When Turkish Islam, rooted 
in the Ottoman and 
Seljuki Islamic cultures was suppressed by the State, Arabic 
Islam, which is a less 
moderate, more radical version, became the leader in the world. 
Now when Ozal and 
me visited the Turkish communities in the Balkans, 
in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Central 
Asia, in Azerbaijan, in Kazakhstan, we saw a completely different Islam 
from the Arab 
version: a Turkified Islam. A more moderate 
Islam. An Islam which is suitable for 
75 Ö? zal, Turkey..., pp. 330-331. 
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liberalism and democracy. I mean Turkish Islam is so different. Kemalists cannot accept that a country needs religion as well, because their ideology was an imported ideology 
and not suitable for Turkish cultural structure. We have to accept that Turkey is a Muslim country. 76 
In other words, Özal was against the Kemalist interpretation of secularism and Arab 
Islamism. He argued that Turkey needed an Anglo-Saxon secularism and a Turkish 
version of Islam, which was much more tolerant of other religious groups and more 
moderate than French and Soviet secularism, or rather atheism. " He searched for a 
middle-way between Islamism and Turkism, his aim being to formulate a religious 
understanding which was suitable for democracy, liberalism and capitalism. 78 The 
answer was Turk Islam Sentezi (Turkish-Islamic synthesis). 79 Originally developed by 
the Turkist Aydinlar Ocagz (Hearts of the Enlightened Society), this synthesis was seen 
by Özal as the answer for 1980s Turkey, hence it became the guiding principle of his 
policies. 80 According to this approach, Islam held a special attraction for the Turks 
owing to a number of striking similarities between their pre-Islamic and Islamic 
cultures. `They shared a deep sense of justice, monotheism and a belief in the immortal 
soul, and a strong emphasis on family life and morality. '81 However, despite these 
similarities, Turkish culture was not merely based on Islamic or pre-Islamic culture but 
on both of them. Therefore, Turkish Islam is more tolerant, more liberal and democratic 
than the other interpretation of Islam. Özal claimed that Turkish Islam could provide a 
peace between the Muslims and the others saying `we learned that religion and progress 
could go together. '82 Özal was implying that Islam is montageable into the modern 
political system. In the light of this information, in Özal's foreign policy understanding 
Turkish Islamic mentality had an important role in Turkey's external relations. 
Özalist Nationalism 
Turkism constituted one of the main elements of 
Ozalism. However, his Turkism was 
neither irredentist, like Enver Pasha's Turkism, nor isolationist, 
like Kemal's. 83 For 
76 Author's interview with Cengiz candar, 20 August 1999, Istanbul. 
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Ottoman Turkists, the ultimate aim was a Turkish Empire covering all Turkish tribes 
who were under Russian, Chinese and Iranian rules. On the other hand, as a reaction to 
adventurist Turkism, Atatürk developed an isolationist Turkism, viewing the outside a 
danger for the Anatolian Turks. Hence Atatürk's Turkey had no interest in the outside 
Turks, and gave no support for Turkish resistance against any power, like the 
Azerbaijanis against the communist attacks in the 1920s. Conversely, for Özal Turkism 
was an important element in Turkish citizens' identity and in Turkish foreign policy 
particularly after the Cold War, when the new world order was based on economic 
alignment and solidarity among kin states. As a result Özal saw Turkism as one of the 
cornerstones of Turkish modernisation inside and of the transformation of Turkish 
foreign policy. However, territorial nationalism or an irredentism did not match his 
Turkism. Özalist Turkism was a cultural concept aimed at economic and cultural 
domination of the Turks rather than territorial expansionism. The Turkish states were 
relatively poor and weak countries, therefore possible co-operation among them would 
be useful to overcome their problems. Özal saw Turkey at the heart of a possible 
Turkish bloc and he predicted that it would benefit from the leadership of a Turkish 
alignment. 
Moreover, unlike Kemalist Turkism, Özalist Turkism was not a reactionary movement 
in domestic politics. As noted earlier, Atatürk's nationalism was a reaction to minority 
separatism, Western antagonism and Ottoman Islamism. However Özal's Turkism was 
not against the West or any minority group in Turkey. On the contrary, it was a search 
to accommodate all different ethnic and political groups under a wide Turkish concept. 
Özal's Turkism can be likened to Americanism in United States. 
Liberalism and Americanism84 
As mentioned, during his studies in the United States Özal became an admirer of the 
American political, cultural and economic system. His dream was to make Turkey 
another America - his role model. It can be argued that 
Özal's ideology consisted of 
American secularism, American democracy, American capitalism and 
American 
liberalism. Therefore, Turkish-American relations were vital for Özal's domestic and 
84 For the ideology's role in Özal's policies and his Americanism also see 
Uslu, Türk - Amerikan.... pp. 
269-270. 
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external policies. 85 When comparing the American and the Turkish system, Özal argued 
that Turkey had a communist system in bureaucracy and economy. For him the 
Kemalist etatist principle was one of the culprits for the failure of the Turkish economy. 
He further argued that protectionism had made the Turkish industry inefficient, un- 
competitive and expensive. Moreover, from the Özalist perspective there was a very 
close relationship between economic liberalism and democratisation. He gave special 
importance to individual rights in contrast to the Kemalist approach which gave the 
state the first priority. In 1979 Ozal said: 
`A strong state does not mean a patriarchal state. The aim is not richness of the state but 
richness of the nation. If people are rich, it means that the state is rich. In economy or 
political spheres the state should not compete with the people, but support them. The 
people are not the servants of the state, but the state must be servant of the people. 786 
It can be said that one of the main pillars of Özalism, with its Turkism and Islamism, 
was liberalism and American-type democracy- For Özal, all these principles were 
compatible, not contradictory. 
Ozalism vs. Kemalism? 
Against this backdrop it is hardly surprising that Özal was not happy with the Kemalist 
establishment and its principles. candar argues that although he was Prime Minister, 
then President of the Turkish State, Özal was an anti-state person: 
`He was opposed to almost all the principles of the regime dominating the state. While 
he was the President he opposed the state, and when he died he was buried not in a state 
cemetery. He now lies near by those who were hanged by the state, like Menderes. 'a' 
candar claims that Özal represented the people's anti-Kemalist and anti-regime 
feelings, having attacked virtually all Kemalist principles, like secularism, etatism, 
nationalism and populism. His civilisational understanding was completely different 
from the Kemalist Western-centred civilisation understanding. Mustafa Kemal had 
dreamed of a Turkified, secular, Western society in Europe. 
Özal's dream was of a 
Muslim, democratic, liberal, capitalist society with multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi- 
as mal pursued an EC-type relation with United States in economics and politics. 
86 Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar, 2. Cumhuriyet Tarti malaf 
(Second Republic Debates), (Ankara: 
Ba$ak, 1993), 17. 
87 Personal interview with Cengiz candar. 20 August 1999, 
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religion aspects and with a secular state which respected its subjects' cultural and 
religious differences. 88 
Ozalism in Foreign Policy: Implementation" 
Having provided the ideological and political background of Özal's foreign policy, his 
actual policies can now be examined. The Özal era in foreign policy can be divided into 
two separate periods: during the early years (1983-1989) the Özal government had to 
focus on the domestic problems, notably the economy, competition between the civilian 
politicians and the coup leaders and political stability, while in the second period (1989- 
1992) Özal concentrated on foreign policy and democratisation. 
Prelude to Neo-Ottomanism (1983 - 89) 
It is difficult to talk about Özalist foreign policy understanding in most of the 1980s 
because, thanks to the effect of the military coup, Turkey had been isolated from the 
democratic world, and the internal economic and political transformation prevented it 
from opening to the world. Therefore, Özal's firs task in foreign policy was to restore 
Turkey's external relations. 
In the first years of the Özal government, Turkey was under heavy European and 
American pressure on human rights and democratisation issues. Despite Özal's efforts, 
the European Community in particular refused to normalise relations. This raised 
formidable obstacles in addition to the traditional and structural problems. The most 
important barrier during these years was the lack of communication, as the institutions 
gg Ozal's critics for Kemalism produced two theoretical prescriptions: inside, Second Republicanism and 
in foreign policy issues neo-Ottomanism and Second Republicanists formulated 
Dial's ideology as re- 
establish the main pillars of the Republic on democracy, liberalism, a moderate secularism, a pluralist 
nationalism and free market economy instead of the Kemalist Jacobeanism, absolute positivism, 
revolutionarism, laicism, etatism and Turkism. Since the details of the Second 
Republicanism fall outside 
of the limits of this study, we will just note its impact on foreign policy. 
89 For analysis of Ozal's foreign policy see: Özal, Turkey...; Hakan 
M. Yavuz, `Turkish Identity and 
Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism', Critique, Spring 1998, pp. 
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and instruments for communication were removed by the EC. Also, the negative 
propaganda of Turkish deportees and exiles in Western Europe, who escaped after the 
coup, fortified the historical image of the Turks in European mind. Meanwhile, anti- 
European feelings in Turkey were dramatically increasing. Turkey was overcoming its 
problems despite the EC, and now the EC did not even want to listen to it. The second 
barrier to improved relations was the Greek factor. While Turkey had been isolated 
from Europe, Greece had become the tenth member of the Community. Greece, which 
had always viewed Turkey as a hostile country, used the EC as a weapon against 
Turkey. 9o 
The United States was more understanding than the EC. They even said that the Turkish 
military coup was no ordinary coup but a necessary intervention in politics. During 
Ronald Reagan's first administration, relations between Turkey and the United States 
improved significantly. However, in the second Reagan term, the international balance 
of power began to change. The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, the gradual thaw in 
the US - Soviet Union relations, the impending Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, all 
this made Turkey's defence needs less urgent from the American standpoint. Under 
economic and social pressures, Congress cut the defence budget- The decreased 
American aid to Turkey worsened relations. In addition, the Greek and Armenian efforts 
in Congress harmed US-Turkish relations. Nevertheless, Özal continued his efforts to 
develop a special relationship with the United States. 
Although, Özal continued to see integration with the West as a prime foreign policy 
goal due to its isolation from the West, he had to make efforts to develop relations with 
the region. 91 Also, the growing Turkish exports forced Turkish policy makers to look at 
the neglected regions such as the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East. Despite 
the crisis with Bulgaria and Greece in the late 1980s, Turkey's relations with these 
regions were improved, particularly in the economic sphere. In the pre-1989 era, 
Özal 
further attached great importance to the Middle Easter Muslim countries, particularly 
in 
the economic matters. Turkey established very close economic relations with 
Iran, Iraq, 
90 Mehmet All Birand, Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerasi: 1959-1985, (Turkey's 
Common Market 
Adventure), (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1986). p. 412. 
91 Turgut Oval, ANAP Ozal Arrivi, Ankara, TÖ/Konqmalar/84312,84314-C. 
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Libya and Pakistan which had been neglected for a long time. 92 These relations 
underlined Ozal's ideological orientation and how he gave importance on economic 
relations. For Özal economy should be at the core of Turkey's relations with the Muslim 
states rather than politics or the military issue. He never visited any of these countries 
without a crowded businessmen group and made effort personally to improve the trade 
with the region. 93 In the first years of the Özal era, the 1984 Casablanca Islamic Summit 
constituted a turning point. Turkey as the first time in the Republican history, 
participated the conference at the presidential level. In the conference Kenan Evren was 
appointed president to the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Economic and 
Commercial Co-operation (COMCEC), one of the six specialised OIC committees. 94 
Turkey thus in practice assumed a leading role in efforts to achieve co-operation among 
the Muslim countries challenging the Kenialist secularism and non-involvement 
religious meetings principles. 
The last Turkish initiative in foreign policy, in the first Özal period, was its application 
for full EC membership. 95 According to Özal, there were three requirements for such 
membership: being European, democracy and a developed liberal economy. As he saw 
it, Turkey had met these criteria. Özal's enthusiasm for membership was not shared by 
the EC, notably by Germany. 96 As a result, the Community warned Turkey unofficially 
that the timing for membership application was not right. 97 Ignoring these warnings, 
Turkey applied for full-membership in 1987, being confident of the acceptance of its 
application. 98 Özal asserted that `according to the written agreements, there is no other 
way, they can delay it, but they cannot refuse it. '9 The Commission's response took 
92 For the details of ()zal's diplomatic visits to these countries see Yavuzaip, Liderlerimiz..., pp. 269- 
303. 
93 Yavuzalp, Liderlerimiz..., p. 269. 
94 Aykan, `Turkey and... '. 
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Alan M. Williams (eds. ), Turkey 
and Europe, (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd, 1996); Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey's Relations with a 
Changing Europe, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997); A Evin and 
G. 
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& Budrich, 1990); 
Werner Gumpel, Turkey and the European Community, (München: LDV, 1992); Erol 
Manisali (ed). 
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PPomfret, The Mediterranean Policy of the European Community. (London: Macmillan: 1986). 
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Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 5. 
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cayhan, Turkey..., p. 292. 98 
99 'Turkey's EEC Full Membership Can Be Delayed But Not Refused', Interview With 
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thirty months, which was more longer than that taken for the Greeks, Spanish and 
Portuguese applications. The EC Commission finally issued its opinion on 20 December 
1989. The reluctance of the EC was clear though the Commission tried not to spell out 
its negative opinion. 100 For the EC the obstacles were economic gap, free movement of 
Turkish workers (paragraph 82)101, and the political problems, notably human rights 
issues (paragraph 9) and Turkey's problems with Greece. 102 Hale argues that 
democratisation after the coup had partly been motivated by foreign policy 
considerations and thanks to the European refusal both the military and the government 
accepted that further liberalisation would be necessary condition for a better relations 
and eventual acceptation of Turkey into the Community. 103 However disappointed Özal, 
in contrast, argued that the real reason was neither liberalisation nor the political 
problems but cultural differences and European biases about the Turks. 104 
Apart from bilateral relations, another significant development of the first Özal era was 
Turkey's enormous efforts to establish its own defence industry. There is no doubt that 
the main reason for this was the traumatic experience of the American arms embargo of 
the 1970s. Though the first coup leaders had attached great importance to a national 
defence industry, it was Özal who devoted huge budgets to defence development 
projects and encouraged Turkish businessmen to invest in the security industry. The 
humble efforts resulted in a sophisticated national defence industry in the late 1980s and 
Turkey became a supplier of anti-craft weapons, small arms, communication equipment, 
military vehicles and other equipment to NATO members and some other friendly 
countries, like Egypt and Pakistan. On 10 June 1987, in co-operation with an American 
consortium, an F-16 project was started and Turkey entered the aircraft industry as a 
producer. Some of the Turkish F-16s were exported to other countries, 
like Egypt. That 
is to say, despite Özal's Americanism, Turkey had learned the 
lessons of the arms 
embargo and realised importance of being independence on 
defence industry. As a 
100 Eralp, `Turkey... ', p. 36. 
'0' European Commission: opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the 
Community, SEC, 89, 
2290 final, Brussels, pp. 6-7. 
102 Opinion. 
103 William Hale, 'Generals and Politicians in Turkey: 1983-1990'. 
Turkish Yearbook of International 
Relations, 1995, Vol. XXV, p. 18- 
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result, unlike Menderes and Demirel, Özal did not rely solely on the West in the 
security matters. 
As has been seen, thanks to internal problems and the international environment Ozal 
could not apply his principles to foreign policy as much as he wanted during this period. 
Nevertheless, with the growing exports, Turkey became much more directly connected 
with the world during the 1980s. Also the international developments in the 1980s 
prepared Turkey for the radical changes of the 1990s. In these years Turkey for the first 
time in Republican history turned its face towards its region, in contrast to Kemal's 
`escape from the region policy' and Menderes' Cold-War-obsessed policies. Moreover, 
unlike previous policies, with the growing economic ties with the region, Turkey set 
permanent relations with its neighbours. 
Post - Cold War and Neo-Ottomanist Foreign Policy After 1989105 
In the second period of his rule two important factors emerged. First, Özal felt 
increasingly free to focus on foreign policy issues, as the military's effect on politics 
decreased. Second, with the end of the Cold War, Turkey found itself facing a new 
environment -alone philosophically, politically, and militarily and uncomfortable in 
such an isolated position. 106 Thus Turkish leaders sought ways to extricate Turkey from 
its predicament. 107 As has been seen throughout this thesis, despite some differences, 
the path all Turkish governments have chosen was integration with the West. The axis 
of the Kemalists' (Atatürk, Inönü and the leftist-Kemalists) and liberal-conservative 
right-wing parties' (Democrat Party, Justice Party, Motherland Party etc. ) foreign policy 
was a fully integration with the West. That is to say, except for the Islamists, the radical 
left and the ultra-nationalists, all political groups in Turkey solved Turkey's historically 
isolated position with integration with the West. Even these radical groups were arguing 
los For post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy see: Kemal Kirici, The End of 
Cold War and Changes in 
Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour, (Istanbul: Bogazici Üniversitesi, 1992); Andrew Mango, Turkey: 
The Challenge of a New Role, (Washington: The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 1992): 
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1992); Yavuz, `Turkish_.. ', pp. 19-41. 
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partly Westernism. Particularly for the Kemalists, integration with the Western world 
was a matter of life and death. It was not only base of Turkish security and foreign 
policy but also a security for the secular regime. Therefore the end of the Cold War 
made most Turks panic. The simplest explanation was that: `Now the West does not 
need us. Hereafter they will not give any financial, political and military aid. Similarly, 
the EEC, which had implied cultural biases in its Turkey policy, will close down its 
doors to Turkey. Turkey separated from the `civilised world' (the West), will be alone 
with the traditional enemy, Russia, and the regional conflicts, poverty, instability. 
Regional instability will undermine Turkish economy and integrity and all the foreign 
powers will work to disunite Turkey. ' log 
Kemalists, who believed that the end of the Cold War threatened the Turkish economy, 
security and democracy, suggested returning to the early Republican policy of isolation. 
They further argued that after the Cold War the West's aim was to disintegrate Turkey 
as witnessed in Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. For the Kemalists and other isolationists, 
Kurdish problem and the European refusal of the Turkish application were clear signs 
for the Western intention. Kemalists (leftist and traditional) argued that separatist Kurds 
were encouraged by the EU countries. 
Islamists, on the other hand, were happy with the developments, because for them the 
end of the Cold War confirmed their ideas. They, as a result, re-suggested a common 
market between the Muslim countries. 
However, Turgut Ozal's prescription was very different from the Kenialist and 
Islamist 
prescriptions. Özal saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity 
for Turkey. From his 
perspective, the collapse of the communist block 
freed the Turkish Republics and 
dissolved the system in neighbouring regions, which 
had prevented Turkey from 
developing good relations with these regions. In other words, now not only 
the Turks 
turned to these regions, but also the peoples of Bosnia, 
Azerbaijan, Albania, Kosova, 
Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan turned 
towards 
Ankara. In the words of Sezer, 
`new geopolitical developments mobilised mutual awareness 
and sympathy 
alaAoag and 
Turks of Turkey, their ethnic and linguistic 
kin in the Caucasus and C, 
108 Cumhuriyet (daily, Istanbul), 27 December 1989; Hürriyet 
(daily, Istanbul), 2 January 1990. 
308 
the Balkan peoples of Muslim heritage who look to Turkey as a source of moral and material support in the formidable task of transition to post-communist soc1ies' 109 
One of the reasons for this mutual awareness was the eruption of regional conflicts, like 
Karabagh and the Bosnia crisis which motivated these countries to look for Turkey's 
support. Now there was no communist-capitalist competition, and therefore they could 
not get support from the superpowers. Thus, the cultural and ethnic similarities became 
important to get political and military support. Fuller argued `neo-geopolitics' activated 
psychological and cultural dynamics among nations. llo Thus group identity of a cross- 
national and cross-cultural became very important in international relations. Especially 
in the Balkans and Caucasia these factors were more important due to these regions' 
multi-cultural structures. Apart from Fuller's neo-geopolitical formulation, Huntington 
argued that the end of the Cold War implied a clash of civilisations and cultures. "' 
According to this approach, a cultural polarisation was inevitable and Turkey's region 
was the most dangerous in the world. Whether these theories are right or wrong falls out 
of the scope of this study, yet it is obvious that Turkey became an attraction centre for 
the Turks, Muslims and former Ottoman Empire's peoples. For example, while the 
Serbs took the Greek and Russian support Turkey appealed as a natural ally for the 
Muslim population of the former Yugoslavia. Likewise, in Caucasia in the face of 
Russian-Armenian co-operation the Azerbaijanis looked to their `Muslim, Turkish 
brothers' for support. While in the wake of the Cold War, almost all leaders of the 
Turkic world, Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia rushed to Ankara for support over their 
economic and political problems. 
Moreover, the strategic withdrawal of the Soviets changed the balance of power in the 
region. The centuries-old Turkish-Russian border ceased to exist. This was a 
development of historic significance for Turkey, because now the primary threat 
f 
Russia was relatively distant from Turkish borders, and the Russians were 
busy with 
their own domestic problems, and even they invited Turkish businessmen to their 
territories to contribute to Russian economic reconstruction. Furthermore, as the 
109 Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, `Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and 
Black Sea 
Region', in Mastny and Nation, Turkey between East and 
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monolithic power of Russia on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea was 
gone, now the littoral was divided among Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey and Russia. 1' 
Particularly the emergence of an independent Ukraine balanced the Russian power in 
the Black Sea and Turkey felt itself more comfortable on the straits question. Likewise, 
in Caucasia Soviet sovereignty was replaced by three different states: Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. This new arrangement destroyed Russian domination in the region. 
Now in Caucasia Russia, Iran and Turkey became the dominant powers. Apart from the 
Black Sea and Caucasia, in the Balkans Soviet Union lost its previous strong position. 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia granted new friends to Turkey. Also, the ideological 
changes in Bulgaria, Romania and Albania changed these countries' attitude towards 
Turkey. Turkey and Bulgaria, for example, looked to increase co-operation. 
Apart from security concerns newly established republics (like Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan) and the former communist states (such as Romania and Bulgaria) with 
limited economic and political resources looked to Turkey viewing it as economic and 
political model (Turkish model). Also they made efforts to lure Turkish investment to 
their countries because they could not finance all needs for structural changes in lack of 
Russian and Western aid. Under these circumstances, Turkey had a great opportunity to 
increase its investments and export to these states. 113 
The most important development for Turkey in the post-Cold War was the emergence 
of the Turkic world. When Turkish peoples in the Soviet Union were 
freed from 150 
years of Russian rule, Turkey saw these Republics as a solution to 
its isolation. As the 
most advanced of them, Turkey dreamed of being the leading 
Turkish republic and to 
benefit from this position. The Turkish economy and ethnic structure were very suited 
to close co-operation with these regions and the West's 
indifferent policy towards 
Turkey also forced Turkish policy-makers to develop closer relations 
with its kin 
countries. 114 Thanks to the West's attitude, even 
Turkish Westernsts realised that 
cultural and religious differences were a crucial 
factor in Turkey's neglect by Europe 
and this weakened resistance to Özal's policies. 
1 12 Sezer, `Turkey... ', p. 72. 
113 Author's interview with Fehmi Koru, 12 February 
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310 
Given this situation, for Turgut Özal despite its disadvantages the end of the Cold War 
offered Turkey many regional opportunities. Although the West was questioning 
Turkey's value, for Özal, the West could not neglect such an important country. 
Therefore, Özal made efforts to persuade the West of Turkey's post-Cold War 
importance locally and within the Islamic and Turkic world. Secondly, because Turkish 
businessmen played a crucial role in his foreign policy concept, Özal argued that the 
state had a duty to prepare the legal and political ground for Turkish economic 
enterprises in these regions. As such the Özal government took the initiative to set up 
EC-like regional co-operation institutions in the area surrounding Turkey, with an aim 
of stabilising Turkey's region for co-operation. Then he intensified his efforts to 
establish bilateral and multilateral links between Turkey, neighbouring countries, 
Turkey's kin states and the Muslim world. In Özal's plans, as will be seen in the Black 
Sea, Russia and the Central Asia cases, Eurasia in particular played a significant role, 
and he focused on to make Turkey an important actor in the region. One of the initiative 
to realise these aims was Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC). 
Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC)115 
The BSEC was a Turkish initiative and Özal's personal idea. Its main objectives were to 
stabilise the region by using economic means and to open new export destinations for 
Turkish enterprises. 116 This 1990 proposal was greeted with enthusiasm by the Black 
Sea, Caucasia and the Balkan states and after a preparatory meeting in Ankara in 1990, 
working meetings were made in Bucharest (Romania), Sofia (Bulgaria) and Moscow 
(the Soviet Union) followed between December 1990 and July 1991.117 After the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, apart from Turkey, Russia, Greece and 
Ukraine 
almost all-regional countries participated in the organisation: Romania, 
Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Albania, Georgia, Moldavia, Bulgaria and Armenia. The BSEC Agreement 
was signed in Istanbul on 25 June 1992 by all parties. 
118 The agreement declared all 
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members' support for the democratic values, basic freedoms, individual rights, social 
justice, economic freedom, security and stability in the region. ' 19 
The BSEC had a political as well as economic dimension but Özal hesitated from 
focusing on political matters because most of the countries in the region had serious 
political problems with each other (for example Azerbaijan and Armenia; Russia and 
Ukraine; Turkey and Greece). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia many regional countries faced economic catastrophe, and Özal also wanted 
Turkey, which lost its Arab market after the Iran-Iraq and the second Gulf War, to fill 
the economic vacuum. Özal also emphasised the cultural dimension of the BSEC. In 
almost all his trips to these countries Ozal signed cultural protocols or agreements 
which covered education, language, science and art. As a result of these efforts, some 
countries sent their military and civil servants to Istanbul or Ankara to study, often 
funded by Turkey. Turkey also gave credits to poorer regional states, like Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Macedonia. Contribution of these policies to BSEC was limited yet, 
thanks to Özalist policies, Turkey became a regional power-centre for many countries, 
like Ukraine and Bulgaria. Further, some countries saw Turkey as a balancing power 
against their traditional enemies. For example for Albania, Turkey became a fresh credit 
source and a balancing political support against Greece. Despite Russian scepticism 
over the B SEC, the economic needs of newly-emerging states and other former 
communist states nourished the organisation and a joint Black Sea Bank and a data bank 
were established; and even political and economic committees were formed in order to 
discuss the regional problems. All member in these discussions also agreed to improve 
transportation, communication in the region and trade between the members. 
For some academics like Genckaya, BSEC was a Turkish-led challenge to 
European 
integration. '20 However, as the Turkish under-secretary for Foreign affairs clearly 
stated, B SEC was not an alternative to the EC, but it was thought as an assistance 
factor 
for Turkey's integration with Europe. 121 Furthermore, the EC member 
Greece's 
119 Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism, From Irredentism to Cooperation, (London: 
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of the pan-European integration project 
another Turkish diplomat, also stated that the BSEC was a part 
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application to the BSEC emphasised the BSEC's this character. 122 In this context it can 
be said that the organisation's main character was complementing the regional 
integration projects like the European Community, rather than competing. 123 Also, 
contrary to the 1930s' Balkan Pact and 1950s' second Balkan Pact, BSEC was an 
economy-culture oriented organisation, rather than a security block. 124 Another 
characteristic of Özal's B SEC, initiative was that, contrary to Atatürk's, Inönü's and 
Menderes' security-oriented regional policies, Ozal formed such a policy for peaceful 
aims, like economic and cultural co-operation. Fourth, in establishing the BSEC Turkey 
played a leading role as a regional power, and as Uslu pointed out the BSCE can be 
considered as one of the most vivid proof for Turkey's new activist foreign policy. 125 
Fifth, before Özal, Turkey had never perceived the Black Sea as a co-operation region. 
With Turkey's new Black Sea policy, apart from the Balkans and the Caucasia the 
Black Sea rim was perceived as a whole political entity by the Turkish policy makers. 
Finally, after the BSEC the trade between Turkey and the other members significantly 
increased, and Turkey hugely benefited from the emergence of the Black Sea as a new 
political and economic entity. 
The Balkans and Turkey: The Resurgence of the Ottoman Empire? 126 
Apart from the BSEC, the Balkans was a very important area for Özalist foreign policy 
as the former Ottoman territories and a place where millions of Muslim and Turkish 
minorities lived. Also apart from Turkey, there were four Muslim countries in the 
region: Kosova, Macedonia, Bosnia and Albania. That is to say historical and cultural 
similarities provided a suitable ground for co-operation, and this co-operation was 
viewed as an opportunity to end Turkey's aloneness in Europe. Moreover, after the 
saying `this is not a new compartmentalisation of Europe' : Oktay Ozdye, The Independent, 26 June 
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disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the great Slavic block, which 
destroyed Ottoman predominance in the 19th century, now vanished. As a result, 
Muslim peoples and those states that had problems with Serbia and Greece, such as 
Macedonia and Albania, turned their faces to Ankara. Under the effect of these factors 
Turkey evinced a new interest and activism in the Balkans after the Cold War. Turkey, 
similar to its policies in other regions, first of all, tried to develop economic and cultural 
relations instead of the military or political groupings. For example Özal's first priority 
was to unite these countries with Turkey by using telecommunication and transportation 
systems. In this context an Albania-Bulgaria-Turkey highway project (the Balkan 
Highway Project) was significant. For Yinanc, this highway would connect all Balkan 
states into Turkey and lessen Turkey and the regional countries' dependence on 
Greece. 127 Turkey made efforts not to be seen as over-enthusiastic. As candar128 has 
noted Turkey did not want to antagonise regional opponents, like Greece, however, 
perceived the growing friendship between Bulgaria, Albania, former Yugoslavia, 
Romania and Turkey as a direct threat to its security and Greek academics and 
politicians referred Turkey's Balkan policy as `containment policy. ' 129 For the Greeks 
Turkey was surrounding Greece by using Muslims and former Ottoman subjects. 
According to the Greek perception Turkey's efforts created a Muslim-Orthodox 
competition in the Balkans. 13° Ironically Greece accused Bulgaria and Macedonia of 
being in a Muslim conspiracy. As a result Greece sought Serb and Russian friendship to 
balance Turkey. In spite of the Greek unrest, it can be said that the Ozalist Balkan 
policy put an end to Turkey's isolated position in the Balkans, and in a short time even 
Greece understood that Turkey was not a new Ottoman Empire and its new Balkan 
policy was not based on a Muslim conspiracy against Greece, but a cultural and 
economic co-operation. 
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The Bosnian crisis demonstrated the Özalist policies' differences from the previous 
foreign policy understandings; when the crisis erupted, Turkey, with the pressure from 
Islamic and ethnic circles, 131 felt that it had to follow a more active foreign policy. ' 32 
Özal arguing the arms embargo on Bosnia must be lifted immediately, even publicly 
stated Turkey's intention to intervene militarily in the Bosnian conflict in order to help 
the Muslims. 133 Furthermore, Turkey was the most enthusiastic supporter of the 
Bosnians in the diplomatic arenas. For instance, the Turkish delegation made great 
efforts to form a pro-Bosnian group organising Azerbaijan and the Central Asian 
republics in the 1992 ECSC Helsinki Summit. In the summit, the Turkish Prime 
Minister also made negotiations with the Western leaders to get their support for 
Bosnia, 134 and argued that the NATO had to intervene to the conflicts in Yugoslavia in 
order to protect the Bosnians. 135 Turkey also sent $ 22 million official aid to the 
Bosnians in 1992 and 1993.136 In addition, Turkey, in the name of the Bosnians, was 
very active in the United Nations too. 137 Despite these efforts, the massacres in Bosnia 
could not be prevented. In this environment Turkey severely criticised the West and 
even many Turkish politicians, like Kamuran Iran, Ekrem Pakdemirli and Bülent 
Akarcali, accused the European states of being racist and anti-Muslim because they did 
not stop the Serbs. 138 As a result Turkey felt fiustrated at the reluctance of the West 
attempted to use Organisation of Islamic Countries as a platform to support the 
Bosnians and to attract the Western attention to the problem. 139 President Turgut Özal, 
in his Balkan tour between 15-22 February 1993, tried to make the Croatians and 
Bosnians ally against the Serbs, and made efforts to persuade the Bulgarians, Albanians 
and Macedonians to use their air zones for Turkish military air planes. 
140 
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salis argues that Ozal's Balkan policy was in conformity with Turkey's traditional 
foreign policy. 141 It is true Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet cetin declared President 
Özal's announcements did not reflect Turkey's official policy, 142 yet cetin's words did 
not mean Turkey followed a traditional Kemalist policy in the Balkans but underscored 
the great competition and differences between the Kemalist approach and Özal's 
Ottomanist Balkan policy. Turkey had never set its foreign policy on a common 
religious and cultural values neither in the Balkans nor in the Middle East since 
Atatürk, 143 and the Kemalist elite were still reluctant to see Turkey involved in the 
Balkans. " However now, in addition to the defensive considerations, Turkey's Bosnia 
policy was based on religious and cultural solidarity and Özal was very enthusiastic for 
an active Balkan policy to make Turkey economically and politically a regional power. 
Turgut Özal, for instance, stated `Turkey is responsible for looking after the well-being 
of the Muslims in the Balkans. ' 145 Finally, all Turkish initiatives in the region Turkey 
had been defensive'46 and has never followed an active foreign policy in the Balkans 
except Özal's Ottomanist policies. 147 Thus Özal attempted to change another column of 
tradition Turkish foreign policy. 
From the Adriatic to the `Chinese Wall': Turkey as a Development Model for the 
`Turkic World' 148 
Turkey had no official relations with the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union 
and other Turkic peoples prior to 1989, despite common cultural, linguistic, and 
141 cahý, The Role... 
142 Sabah, 28 February 1993. 
143 Constantinides, `Turkey:... ', p. 328. 
144 J. F. Brown, `Back to the Balkans? ', in Graham E. Full er and Ian O. Lesser, Turkey's New 
Geopolitics, (Boulder: Westview, RAND, 1993), p. 153. 
145 Quoted in S. J. Blank, S. C. Pelletiere and W. T. Johnsen, Turkey's position at the 
Crossroads of 
World Affairs, internet edition, (Washington: Department of Defense, 3 
December 1993), Part 111, p. 3. 
iah Bilnien, `The Regional... ', pp. 76-77. Balkan 147 For a comprehensive account on Turkey's previous Balkan policies see 
Oral Sander, 
Gelilmeleri ve Türkiye, 1945-65, (The Developments in the Balkans and 
Turkey, 1945-65). (Ankara: 
Sevinc Matbaasi). 
'4' For Turkey's policies on Central Asia and the Caucasus see: 
Bülent Gökay and Richard Langhorne. 
Turkey and the New States of the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, (London: Wilton Park, 1996); Bülent 
Aras, `Turkey's Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options', 
Turkish Studies, Vol., 1, NO. 
1, Spring 2000, pp. 36-58; Stephen J. Blank, `Turkey's 
Strategic Engagement in the Former USSR and 
US Interests', in Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere, and 
William T. Johnsen (eds. ). Turkey's 
Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs, 
(Charlisle, PA Strategic Studies Insitute, 1993). 
Gareth M. Winrow, Turkey in Post - Soviet Central 
Asia, (Brookings Institute, 1995); Reimani 
Hooman, Rivalry in Central Asia: Iran, Turkey and Russia 
in Comparison, PhD thesis, Queen's 
University of Kingston (Canada), 1996; Bilal 
Simsir. `Turkey's Relations with Central Asian 
Turkic 
Republics', Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Vol. 6,1992. 
316 
religious ties to these peoples. 149 The causes for this were mainly Kemalist nationalism 
and isolationism understanding"' and the Cold War circumstances. As Rouleau put it 
`Mustafa Kemal distanced Turkey from Turkish-speaking populations, abroad, arguing 
that Ankara should not meddle in the internal affairs of foreign states, just as he had 
dissociated the young republic from the Islamic world. '151 Apart from Kemalism, 
Turkey as a small country could not challenge the Soviet Union for the Turkish diaspora 
in this country. The end of the Soviet Union freed the Turkic peoples under communist 
rule and five of them established their own independent states. Now there were seven 
Turkish states: Turkey, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Kemalism had clearly warned 
against any kind of Pan-Turkist foreign policy. Though Turkey was the first country to 
recognise these states and relations developed at a feverish face. 152 
Despite the discussion among pan-Turkists about the creation of a Union of the 
Turks, 153 Turkey chose not to establish a Turkish Commonwealth between these 
countries. The reason is debatable yet it can be said that the primary reason was not to 
provoke the Russians and other regional powers, like Iran. Özal concentrating on the 
relations with the outside Turks were economy, education and culture, hoped secular 
Turkey would provide a development model for these new emerging republics-' 14 
Indeed, Özal argued that the `Turkish model' was much more suited to the region than 
the Iranian, Russian or Saudi models. He further argued that the Turkish model was 
better for Turkey, Turkic states, the West, even for Russia because it would stimulate 
development, secularism, democracy and stability in the region, and it would down play 
fundamentalism and conflict. To realise the Turkish model Özal needed to persuade the 
Turkic states, the Turkish public, the West and the Russians. As a first step, 
Özal added 
a new section to the Foreign Ministry and established new institutions with large 
budgets ($406 million) to deal with relations with the Turkic world, like TIKKA 
(Turkish Development Assistance Agency), which is the first official institute in the 
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republican history to regulate the relations with the Central Asia and Caucasus. 155 
Moreover, he frequently visited the Turkic republics and by 1993 had signed several 
agreements with these countries on areas ranging from health to education. Bilateral 
committees and organisations were also established. Moreover, Turkey granted about 
ten thousand scholarships to university students from the Turkic world, and sent some 
Turkish students to these countries. 156 TRT, Turkish national television, started to 
broadcast in the region under the name of Avrasya (Eurasia) and other private television 
stations followed the TRT move. 157 State-owned Turkish Airlines established regular 
flights to Baku, Alma Ati, Taskent, Ashkabad and Bishkek. While Turkish Eximbank 
and other Turkish banks gave about $7 billion in credits to Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Krgyzstan. 158 Some former Soviet Republics, like 
Georgia and some Turkic autonomies in the Russian Federation also benefited from 
Turkish aid. Apart from state aid, Özal encouraged Turkish businessmen, religious 
groups, Turkists and media to invest in these countries. As a result, many Turkish 
businessmen and idealists poured into these countries and established their own 
businesses in these countries. Private aid programmes were inaugurated, particularly in 
the education, media, telecommunication and textile sectors, and private Turkish 
companies opened branches and increased their investment in these countries, especially 
in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. 159 In particular the ultra-Turkist and 
Nurcu religious groups, led by Fethullah Gillen, established their own business and 
media in Central Asia and Azerbaijan and Gillen group's daily newspaper Zaman 
became the second or third biggest newspaper in these countries. 
160 As a result of these 
efforts Turkish people and media as a first time in the Republican history named some 
other countries as `brother Republics'. 161 This was a turning point in Turkey's sceptic 
world perception and underlined the effects of the new Turkist policies. Despite the 
welcome of the masses, Özal's Turkic policies confronted a weak 
leftist-Kemalist 
resistance in the first years of the post-Cold War era. Particularly Turkist, 
Islamist and 
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Westernsts features of Özalist policies disturbed the left and the leftist-Kemalists who 
opposed any support or privileged position for Turkic republics. The left viewed Ozal as 
a `servant' of American interests in Central Asia, and claimed his aim was to demolish 
socialist solidarity in the region. They also argued that Turkey's policies would provoke 
Russian anger and risk Turkey's independence and security. In spite of the opposition 
the resistance was so weak and their effect on the public was so limited. 
Ozal's efforts to revive the Turkic world were warmly welcomed by other Turkic 
peoples, and in his latest visit to Central Asia and Azerbaijan Özal was received by 
enthusiastic crowds and these states decided to meet annually under the banner of 
`Turkic Summits', with the first held in Ankara. 162 
Turkey's interest extended beyond the independent Turkic Republics and covered other 
Turkic tribes in the Russian Federation, China and the Balkans. In particular Crimean 
Tartars, Bashkir, Kazan Turks, Turks of Yakutistan (Russia), Uygurs of China, Gagavuz 
Turks of Moldavia and Volga Turks attracted interest from Turkey and Turkey made 
extreme efforts not to provoke the mainland countries by using economic and cultural 
investments. 163 As Landau pointed out `Turkey's grand policy was to strive to 
institutionalise its relations with the "Turkic Brethren", 164 both in conjunction with 
other states and on Turkish-Turkic basis'. 165 Under this strategy, Turkey encouraged the 
Turkic republics to participate The Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) 
166 to 
improve the regional economic co-operation and with Turkey's encouragement and 
efforts the ECO was enlarged in 1992 by the admission of the Turkic-Muslim republics 
of the Soviet Union with Afghanistan. 167 The inclusion of the Central Asian republics 
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increased the ECO's importance in terms of politics and international trade, and the year 
1992 became the busiest year of the organisation, which showed no real progress for a 
long time because of the Iraq-Iran War during the 1980s. 168 Iran in particular saw the 
ECO as an instrument to materialise its political-religious aims in the region, yet for 
Turkey the was not a religious or a political organisation, but an economic cooperation 
initiative. Isin celebi, Turkish State Minister for the Economic Affairs, for example, 
clearly declared how Turkey perceive the organisation: 
`The ECO is not going to be an Islamic Common Market. It is a regional economic 
cooperation organisation. ' 169 
In this context, Eco provided Turkey another economic instrument in order to 
implement its economy-oriented activist regional foreign policy. 
In light of all this, Özal saw Central Asian republics as an opportunity, which had been 
ignored by the traditional foreign policy approaches, to strengthen Turkey's influence in 
international arena. 170 He was so optimistic and claimed that the 21" century would be a 
`Turkish century' and adopted the slogan `Adriyatik'ten cin Seddi'ne' (From Adriatic to 
the Chinese Wall). This slogan was defining Turkey's new interest areas. Contrary to 
Kemalist isolationism, Özal argued that Turkey had vital interests in the Balkans, 
Middle East, Caucasia, Black Sean rim, Central Asia, even in Western China where a 
Turkish tribe, Uygurs, lives under the Chinese rule. In doing so Özal brought about a 
historical change in Turkey's relation with Turkic states. Moreover, the emergence of 
the Turkic world can also be viewed as a historical turning point for Turkish 
foreign 
policy, because Turkic World put an end to Turkey's isolated position in the world. 
It 
also helped Turkey to overcome its cultural isolation and identity crisis. Turks now 
did 
not have to be just European or Arab-styled Muslim. They had their own world, a 
Turkish world to which they can relate culturally, politically and economically without 
any dilemma. All this inevitably created a more active `Turkist' 
foreign policy towards 
the East, and Turkey left its Kemalist isolationism. As 
has been witnessed in the 
Azerbaijan-Armenia conflicts, Turkey's support to Azerbaijan on 
the basis of 
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`brotherhood' underscored the dramatic change. Özal in this crisis threatened the 
Armenians with sending troops to the region saying `if we frighten the Armenians what 
can they do? ' 
171 
Turkey and Russia: From Potential Threat to Market 
As has been shown throughout this study, historically not only Atatürk but almost all 
Turkish and Ottoman policy-makers, except the socialists, perceived the Russians as the 
greatest threat to Turkish security. The relations were often dominated by rivalry and 
war. 172 The age of imperial competition ended with the First World War and the mutual 
enemies created mutual empathy and co-operation between Lenin and Mustafa Kemal 
in the post-war era. However Turkish-Russian co-operation was short-lived and Turkey 
turned its face towards the West. The Second World War and Stalin's territorial claims 
over Turkey increased the mistrust, and finally Turkey's participation to the NATO 
worsened the relations. Despite some efforts, as seen under the Ecevit governments in 
the 1970s, the relations could not be improved and the main priorities had been security 
issues. 173 As such, the end of the Cold War had significant security implications. A 
former American Ambassador to Ankara pointed out: 
`The threat of the past 400 years - Russia - has been virtually eliminated. Turkey is 
now more secure than it has been since the birth as a republic after the First World 
War'. 174 
In reality, Russia was still a great potential threat to Turkey and was unhappy with 
Turkey's activities among the Turkish, Turkic and Muslim peoples in Central Asia and 
Russian Federation. Yet the Turks were considered a lesser menace compared with the 
Iranian and Saudi efforts in the region. Moreover, Turkey went to great efforts not to 
antagonise Russia, and Özal was much more interested in the economic potential of the 
Russian Federation as an export and investment destination more than political issues. 
For Özal, Russia had more opportunity than the small Turkic Republics had. Therefore, 
Turkey could benefit from these two different markets by not provoking them. In 
another word, Turkey's orientation was mainly in the economic realm towards the 
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former Soviet Union countries in the Özal era. "S Similarly, the former Soviet republics 
under the great economic depressions and the political problems caused by the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union sought friendship and economic cooperation with the 
regional countries, including Turkey, rather than rivalry. As Ataöv noted, `having a new 
and a different perception of each other, the Soviet Union and Turkey exhibited a desire 
to augment trade and investment possibilities. ' 176 
On 11 March of 1991 Özal paid an official visit to Russia with a delegation of 
businessmen and officials, which was the first presidential level visit to Russia for 
twenty-two years. 177 In this visit a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourness and Co- 
operation and some other agreements and protocols were signed. 178 This 1991 Treaty 
can be considered as the high point in Turkish-Russian relations. Moreover, unlike 
previous agreements the focus of these agreements was financial and economic, rather 
than political and security ones. After Özal's visit, Turkish Eximbank increased Turkish 
credits to Russia from $300 million to $400 million, and also gave a $200 million credit 
to finance Russia's imports from Turkey. As a result, Turkish-Russian trade tripled in 
1990 and by 1991 had reached $2.5 billion. 179 The trend continued in the following 
years and Russia became the second biggest economic partner of Turkey with about $5 
billion trade. Özal hoped that the trade volume might reach $ 10-15 billion by the end of 
the century. In addition to the official export-import figures, millions of Russians 
poured into Istanbul and other Turkish cities to make unofficial trade (especially bavul 
ticareti - `suitcase-trade'). According to the state figures, in a short time, the unofficial 
trade climbed to the billions of dollars. Moreover, the Russia-Turkey natural gas 
pipeline increased economic dependency between these two traditional enemies. 
Turkish credits to Russia, which reached $1.5 billion in 1993, and the bilateral 
agreements made more trade and Turkish investment in Russia possible. As a result of 
these policies Turkish construction and consumption sectors boomed in Russia. 
By 
1993 the value of the Turkish construction sector in Russia was more than 
$2 billion. 
Many Russian prestigious buildings, like hospitals, hotels later even parliament 
building 
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and other cities were build by the Turkish firms, like ENKA and GAMA. The 
increasing dependency between Turkey and Russia decreased the tension in the 
relations and forced both sides to search friendship and co-operation. As a result 
Turkey's biggest fear became one of the biggest markets for Turkish exporters. 18' 
The Gulf War: Return of Activism and Özalism vs. Kemalist Bureaucracy's' 
By developing close relations with the Turkic world and Turkey's region, Özal did not 
challenge the United States or Europe. On the contrary, he made efforts to unite Turkish 
and Western interests. In other words, having provided legal and political frameworks at 
home and in the region for the Turkish economy, Turkey tried to persuade the West that 
Turkey was a regional power in the Balkans, the Middle East, Caucasia, Black Sea and 
in the Central Asia; and with its democratic, secular and pro-Western system Turkey 
could be a good partner for the West. Özal meant that the West needed Turkey as a 
partner to defend its interests against instability, Islamic fundamentalism, unpredictable 
states (like Iraq, Iran), ethnic conflicts (like Yugoslavian crisis) and against Russia's 
unpredictable policies (as witnessed in Chechnya). In the first years the West ignored 
Turkey's arguments. However, the Gulf War provided the opportunity to show Turkey's 
importance. 182 Also the Gulf War revealed the Kemalist bureaucracy's and army's 
unrest about Özalist foreign policy. Finally, the Gulf War showed the clear difference 
between Kemalist foreign policy and Ozalist foreign policy. Therefore we now examine 
Özal's Gulf War diplomacy and his Middle East policy. 
As has been seen, relations with the Islamic world and the Middle East had been an 
important indicator in the regime's Kemalist character. Even the neo-democrat 
Menderes and Demirel governments could not change its essence. Turkey's relations 
i so Cjdkay and Langhorne similarly argue that the essence of the relations 
between Turkey and the Soviet 
Union unlike their past rivalry shifted towards a more co-operative point. 
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with this region were based on these Kemalist principles: 183 Non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of Middle Eastern states; non-interference in disputes between the 
states in the area; non-interference in inter-Arab relations; non-interference in religious 
groupings. In another word, Turkish foreign policy became characterised by non- 
involvement and non-interference in the regional politics. 184 However, as he implied in 
the 1980s, Özal saw an active role in the Middle East and on many occasions he stated 
that Turkey would have to increase its involvement in the Middle eastern politics: `It is 
impossible for us to refrain from playing a role in the Middle East. ' 185 Despite his desire 
for activism, Turkey's relations with the Middle East were mainly economy-oriented 
until the Gulf War, except the relations with Syria. 186 Turgut Özal in these years 
personally played a significant role in mobilising Turkish business interests in the 
Middle East and also attracted Arab capital to Turkey. '87 Thanks to his efforts, Turkey's 
trade with the region grew dramatically and Turkey became an important exporter in the 
Middle East. '88 
When the Gulf Crisis erupted, Turkey's initial reaction was within the traditional 
approach - Turkey did not approve of the invasion, 189 but saw it as merely a problem 
between two Arab states190 and the principle of maintaining the status quo became the 
dominant consideration. lsl However, as mentioned, Özal saw the crisis as an 
opportunity to show Turkey's value to the Western security system especially to the 
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United States. In the words of Ahmad `Özal took matters into his own hands and placed 
the country squarely behind President Bush's policy. ' 192 Also, for Özal, the US-led anti- 
Iraq grouping was morally and legally right, and Turkey had to give clear support for 
the Alliance. In addition to the legal considerations, from the Özalist perspective, 
Turkish support for the Alliance was very important in order to show Turkey's strategic 
importance for the West. Moreover, Özal believed that Turkey would benefit from the 
post-war situation. `The Middle East was in the midst of irreversible change and it was, 
therefore vital for Turkey to be in a position to take full benefit from future 
opportunities. ' 193 For some, this benefit might be annexation of the northern oil-rich 
regions of Iraq. For Özal, for the first time in 100 years, Turkey might have backed the 
winning side in a war. 194 According to Özal, Inönü by not to supporting the Allies in the 
Second World War risked Turkish security and prosperity, 195 now Turkey had to use 
this chance and support the winning side. 
Özal was so determined and when he perceived parliament and the government as timid 
in taking initiative he bypassed both and carried out a secret telephone-diplomacy with 
the White House. Moreover by manipulating the public he created pressure on 
parliament in favour of the Western position. 16 Kemalist and leftist groups argued that 
such a policy might draw Turkey into a war and turn Turkey into an agent of American 
policy. On 8 August Turkey rushed to cut the oil pipelines, which carried 1.52 million 
barrels of oil a day between Turkey and Iraq and under Özal's influence parliament 
approved the government's request to send troops to the Gulf Özal's personal role in 
cutting off the oil pipelines was viewed as a sign of deviation from Kemalism and his 
activism in foreign policy resulted in three important resignations from the government 
and bureaucracy. First Foreign Minister All Bozer resigned on 12 October 1990.197 
Defence Minister Sefa Giray followed Bozer on 18 December. 198 Not only the 
isolationist and cautious liberals and leftists but also the Kemalist 
Army was upset. 
Chief of the Staff Necip Torumtay criticised Özal's foreign policy as 
`adventurist' and 
implied that the army was against such a foreign policy. Torumtay 
implied that Özal 
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endangered Turkish security for Western 199 But now the balance of power was 
different than in previous years, and the Chief of Staff had to resign when he understood 
that he could not persuade civilians. For the Turkish press the resignation was a shock 
and underlined the civilian character of the regime and Özal's overwhelming influence 
on foreign policy matters. 20° According to Özal, the generals were resisting the change: 
`some generals are not keeping in step and are acting to preserve the status quo. While we are taking brave steps forward, they are trying to put brakes on. '201 
As Robins pointed out, on the other hand the opponents' considerations were different 
than Özal's; 
`the Kemalist traditionalists were concerned that the end of the crisis would see a rapid 
closing of Arab ranks, leaving a legacy of deep suspicion towards Turkey, whose involvement in the crisis would be feared and resented as a resurgent neo- Ottomanism. 'm 
Considered Özalist activism as a threat for Turkish security, leftist Bülent Ecevit, for 
example, visited Baghdad to dampen the tension between Iraq and Turkey. Ecevit was 
followed by Islamist Necmettin Erbakan and the leftist-Kemalist Social democratic 
Populist Party's (SHP) leader Erdal Inönü. 203 Despite these leftist, Kemalist and Islamist 
attempts, Özal managed to keep Turkey with the US-led alliance against Iraq and 
blamed the opponents of being Inönist and of not understanding the new circumstances 
in international politics. 204 President Özal declared Turkey's new foreign policy position 
as: 
`Many things have changed in Turkey... In foreign policy the days of taking a cowardly 
and timid position are over. From now we will pursue an active policy based on 
circumstances ... 
205My conviction is that Turkey should leave its former passive and 
hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy... The reason I made this call is 
because we are powerful country in the region. Let me also point out that there are 
conservatives who prefer that no change should be made to these passive policies. The 
reason these circles accuse me of dragging the country into an adventure is because I 
generally prefer to pursue a more dynamic policy for our country. i206 
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Compared with Menderes and Demirel's timid attitude in the face of army opposition, 
Özal's self-confidence was significant. No doubt the main reason behind this confidence 
was the internal changes. 207 As Özal expressed, his foreign policy was a result of his 
internal policies. Also, his opponents were in an ideological dilemma with the end of 
the Cold War bankrupting most of the leftist and Kemalist values. They were attacking 
Özal yet they had no prescription for the problems. For instance in the Iraqi Crisis they 
condemned Iraq for its invasion, yet they could not provide any policy towards Iraq and 
United States. 208 Thus this ideological dilemma helped Özal. 
Özal claimed that entering the Gulf War was a `profitable move' saying `this is the most 
profitable deal of my life. We are betting one getting three. -)209 When the war begun on 
17 January, Ozal was able to get the extra powers from the Turkish Parliament: The 
parliament gave permit to deployment of Turkish forces in foreign countries, the 
deployment of foreign forces in Turkey and the utilisation of these forces . 
2'0 Despite 
Özal's enthusiasm, due to public pressure, Turkey did not join the war actively, but 
gave a clear support to the alliance forces. It also allowed the American forces to use 
joint air bases (like Incirlik in Adana) in Turkey to bomb Iraqi forces . 
211 Turkey's 
importance was underlined by the war, and particularly the Americans understood that 
Turkey was a vital country for American interests in the Middle East as Robins noted: 
`the action of President Özal in helping to isolate and confront the Iraqi regime greatly 
endeared him to the US administration and the White House. This in turn brought 
benefits on a wide front - from greater access to American markets 
for Turkish textiles 
to help in improving the quality of military hardware possessed by the armed forces. 
The US now appears to place greater value on the importance of Turkey than 
before. '212 
207 For the impact of Turkey's domestic changes on its foreign policy 
in the Ozal period also see Fuller, 
`Turkey's New... ', pp. 38-40. the UN-led 208 Except Bülent Ecevit and Mumtaz Soysal, who argued that Turkey should oppose 
campaign, almost all opponents of Ozal were in favour of implementing 
the UN decisions, including 
Erdal Inönu, President of the leftist-Kemalist Social Democrat Populist 
Party, SWeyman Deimre1, leader 
of the right-wing The True path party an d the former coup 
leader and former president Kenan Eý ren 
Milliyet, 6-7-8- August 1990; Hürriyet, 8-9 August 1990. Inönü further suggested an 
international army 
against Saddam (Hürriyet, 7 August 1990) while Ecevit opposed any 
military action against Iraq: 
Milliyet, 26 December 1990. viewed thcA-ar 209 Hürriyet, 16-17 January 1991. For some profit was Northern Iraq while 
Turkish press 
as an opportunity for Turkey's EC membership: HürriY 
14 August 1990- 
210 Robins, `Turkish Policy... ', p. 79. 
2' 1 Hü rriyet, 18 January 1991- 
212 Robins, `Turkish', pp. 85-86. 
327 
Moreover, after the Gulf War Turkey's importance as a regional power rose. 213 On the 
negative side, however, new troubles appeared, like the Kurdish problem. When the 
Kurdish rebellion against Saddam failed, some 700,000 people poured into the Turkish 
territories. Also the war created a power vacuum in Northern Iraq, which was filled by 
the PKK. Thus, the PKK gained a strategic base to attack Turkey and increased its 
authority in this region and south-eastern Turkey. On top of all this, the war caused an 
economic and political crisis in Turkey as Turkey lost an important market. Though 
Turkey asked for compensation from the West, the aid was limited. In conclusion it is 
hardly possible to argue Özal's strategy in Iraq worked perfectly and Turkey could not 
get most of the benefits Özal had expected while it was exposed to the bad effects of the 
Gulf War. 214 On the other hand, Özal's Gulf War policy vividly showed the differences 
between Özal's foreign policy and the previous approaches. Turkey, under Özal, 
abandoned its traditional pacific Middle Eastern foreign policy. Özal himself publicly 
declared that the main responsible the shift was his own foreign policy understanding 
and he accused the previous Turkish Middle Eastern policies of being pacifist and 
timid. 215 
Post-war Developments 
In June 1991, in a defeat for conservative-nationalists, the leading secular liberal Mesut 
Yilmaz was elected as the leader of MP. The October elections indicated the end of the 
Özal era as Demirel's Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, TPP) emerged the winner 
with 27 per cent of the vote. Yilmaz's MP came second with 24 per cent. Surprisingly 
the leftist-Kemalist Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Part (The Social Democrat Populist Party, 
SDPP), that carried out an anti-war and anti-Özal campaign during the Gulf War 
fell to 
third place with 20.8 per cent. Özal continued to challenge the traditional 
foreign policy 
position and blamed the official understanding of being timid, 
isolationist, bureaucratic 
and useless, but the domestic changes limited his influence over the government and 
parliament. According to his close circle216, 
Özal thought that he could not affect 
Turkish politics from the Presidential Palace, therefore 
he was making plans to return to 
politics as party leader in order to implement his radical policies 
including a new 
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215 Milliyet 3 March 1991 and G6zen, `Türldye'nin. ". 
', p. 189" 
suggesting a 216 yusuf Bozkurt Qzal, Turgut Özal's brother told me that 
Özal prepared a party Program 
15 December 1997. 
more active foreign policy. Author's interview with 
Yusuf Bozkurt Özal, Ankara 
328 
foreign policy understanding, and a new human rights and nation-state concept, which 
was more tolerant to the Kurdish groups. However, in the spring of 1993 Turgut Özal 
died and never found an opportunity to carry out his ideas. His death increased the 
dilemma of Turkish foreign and internal politics. As candar pointed out Özalism 
continued its effect after Öza1's death217 and many parties including the MP, TPP and 
Islamist WP (Welfare Party) claimed Özal's heritage. 
Conclusion: Neo-Ottomanism: An Alternative to Kemalist Foreign Policy? 
The left and Kemalist groups218 have accused neo-Ottomanism of being aggressive219 
while some European and Greek academics have called it an irredentist movement, 220 
and some in the Western press saw the Özalist policies as pan-Ottomanist, pan-Turkist, 
even pan-Islamist march of the Turks. 221 Yet despite its name, neo-Ottomanism is not 
an aggressive foreign policy and is not aimed only at the former Ottoman territories. It 
looks to the imperial Ottoman past but it is a product of a very different economic and 
social structure and is a reaction to a Kemalist isolationist foreign policy, not an 
irredentist, expansionist or aggressive foreign policy. In fact, neo-Ottomanism does not 
suggest a renewed interest in the former territories and people of the Ottoman Empire. 
But it aimed at a certain organic geopolitical, cultural, and economic relationship that 
had been absent during the Cold War and the early Republican years could re-emerge in 
the new suitable international and regional environment. In the words of Fuller, `It 
suggests that the Turks may now come to see themselves once again at the centre of a 
world re-emerging around them rather than at the tail-end of a European world that is 
increasingly uncertain about whether or not sees Turkey as part of itself. 
' 
Moreover, because of Özal's obsession with the economy, his foreign policy focused on 
the economic aspects of external relations. For example for 
Özal, Turkey's export- 
21' Interview with Cengiz candar. 
218 Like Mumtaz Soysal, Erdal Inönü and Emin col4an. 
219 Emin cöla$an, Hürriyet (daily, Istanbul), 26 June 1992. 
220 Stavrau views Ottomanist orientation as abandonment of the Kemalist philosophical 
basis of foreign 
policy arguing Turkish Balkan policy was based on common religion 
instead of secular considerations. 
Stavrau, `The Dismantling', pp. 45-46. Also for 4ttomanist irredentism see: 
Constantinides, `Turkey', pp. 
323-334; 
221 A. Zaman, `Ottoman Heirs Seek New Balkan Role', Sunday Telegraph, 29 
November 1992; D. 
Sneider, `Turkey and Iran Play Out New "Great Game" in Asia', The 
Christian Science Monitor. 15-21 
May 1992; R Marthner, Horizon Shift to Central Asia', Financial Times. 24 
May 1992. 
222 Graham E. Fuller, `Turkey's New Eastern Orientation', in Graham E. Fuller and 
Ian 0. Lesser (eds. ), 
Turkey's New Geopolitics, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 48. 
329 
import capacity was far more important than military capacity. 223 For Özal Turkey 
needed time to develop its economy. Having developed its economy Turkey would have 
to follow an active foreign policy in order to protect its economic interests in the world. 
However this protectionism was not aggressive or isolationist. On the contrary 
economic interests played a crucial role in Ozalist activism and Özal's compromise 
policy in Cyprus and in relations with Greece. 224 
For candar, Ozal was against the militarist character of Turkish-Western relations 
`Turkey, until Özal, saw its relations as political or security relations. The West needed Turkey, and Turkey used the West's need to enter the Western society. For Özal, the 
only way to join the Western club was economy. He emphasised that the West has to 
accept Turkey as an equal partner if Turkey become a developed state. Further, Turkey 
will not need anybody if it success this. '225 
Similarly, Özal's solution to Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Russian problems was to 
develop economic ties. As a result, Turkey, in the Özal period, searched for good 
relations with the promising foreign markets and focused on the economic matters more 
than political ones. Contrary to the independence-obsessed Kenialist foreign policy, 
with increasing economic power, Özal's Turkey re-gained its confidence in the world 
and pursued an internationalist foreign policy, because with rapid economic change not 
only the independence concept but also the national interest concept was changed. Now 
Turkey's interest was not in isolationism but in a close relationship with the world. In 
other words, Turkey's new economic interests had a crucial role in Özalist activism. 
In addition to the economic aspects, neo-Ottomanism placed great importance in the 
cultural similarities of Turkey to the Middle East, the Balkans and the Central Asia. In 
this context, Islam, Turkism, and Ottomanism were three key concepts. 
Neo- 
Ottomanists argued that Turkey was a natural part of the Islamic, Turkish and 
Ottoman 
world and this provides a suitable ground for economic and political co-operation. 
226 
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Özalist neo-Ottomanism was very keen to improve relations with these regions. While 
Kemal had strictly avoided from setting out relations based on the Ottoman and Islamic 
past, Özal particularly emphasised the importance of these values. For instance, Kemal 
had seen the outside Turks as a dangerous issue, although for the neo-Ottomanists the 
outside Turks with the Turkish diaspora in Europe were crucial to improve Turkey's 
relations with Germany, Russia and other states 
Integration with the West was another main pillar of neo-Ottomanism, and for Özal, 
neither the Islamic nor Turkish world was a viable alternative to the West. Özal argued 
that Turkey with its good relations with these regions would be integrated into the 
West 
. 
227 In other words, Turkist, Islamist and Ottomanist elements in Turkish foreign 
policy were part of Turkey's European integration aim, and Özal never gave up the 
European Turkey dream. 
Moreover, as a result of his Americanism and ideological considerations, Özal attached 
a great importance to relations with United States. For him, the Americans could 
understand Turkey more than the Europeans. Also he argued that the American political 
model was more suitable for Turkey because of Turkey's unique social structure. In 
addition, for Özal, the American realist foreign policy suited Turkey's foreign policy 
priorities. In particular in the Middle East and Caucasia, he saw the United States as a 
natural ally for Turkey. 
The Third World was not a very important issue for Özalist foreign policy. Unlike the 
socialists and leftist-Kemalists, Özal did not have an ideological framework 
for these 
countries. Muslim Third World states, however, had a special place in the 
Özalist 
policies. As noted earlier he restored relations with Iran, Iraq and other 
Muslim states in 
his early years. He also tried to demolish the historical mistrust 
between the Turks and 
Arabs, created partly by the Ottoman experiences, partly by Kemalist 
isolationism and 
Westernism. For example, Özal apologised to the Algerians 
for Turkey's pro-French 
policies during the Algerian Independence War. 
228 Özal saw the Third World countries 
as export destinations. In particular, the difficulties 
in the European and American 
227 Turgut Özal ANAP Ozal Ar*ivi, T. Ö. /90222 
228 Fikret Ertan, `Menderes'in ve Türkrye'nin Cesareti' (Menderes' and 
Turkey's Courage). Zaman 
(daily, Istanbul), 26 January 1999. 
331 
markets forced neo-Ottomanists to turn these countries, and in the Ozal era, as has been 
seen, Turkey's trade with the African and Asian countries in particular dramatically 
increased. 
In conclusion, unlike the Kemalist and leftist foreign policy approaches Özalism added 
new dimensions to Turkish foreign policy, like cultural and economic areas. National 
interest, independence and many more concepts of foreign policy were re-defined by 
Özalism. All these caused a multi-dimensional and internationalist foreign policy 
understanding. Özal did not see Islam, Turkism and Ottomanism as an obstacle to 
Turkey's integration into the West, but an important contribution to that. In brief, 
Özalist foreign policy was a clear deviation from Kemalism, however it was not an 
absolute rejection of the Kemalist approach. In the words of Fuller, `it does not 
represent a wholesale rejection of Atatürk, but rather a recognition that not every idea 
and value of Atatürk has to be forever valid in Turkish consideration of the future. '229 In 
the light of this information it can be said that Özalism was a new approach and 
provided a new way in foreign policy. However Qzal did not directly attack Kemalism. 
On the contrary Özal attacked Kemalist policies, but on the other hand he said that 
Atatürk was the greatest Turkish hero. 230 Özal, instead of attacking Atatürk, attacked 
Inönü's Kemalism. He, in one of his speeches divided Turkish foreign policy history 
into two different periods: Atatürk and Inönü period. 231 According to this analysis, 
Atatürk symbolised a more pragmatic, active and brave period, while Inönü closed 
Turkey to the world with his extremely isolationist, pacific, bureaucratic and etatist 
policies. Despite the words, as discussed, Özal's critics were for Kemalist foreign 
policy, and 4zal clearly declared that he was against the previous foreign policy 
understandings, 232 and, as discussed above, he proved these words with his own 
foreign 
policy implementations. 
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CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the impact of Turkey's unique geopolitical location and past 
experience on its foreign policy, domestic politics, ideas and ideologies played a crucial 
role in this process. As shown by this study, Turkish foreign policy has not been 
constant but rather has changed virtually in every decade. These shifts can be explained 
in part by the vicissitudes of the international arena, notably the Second World War and 
the Cold War. However, an examination of the differences between the Atatürk, Inönü, 
Menderes, Ecevit, Demirel and Özal's eras reveals that these dramatic changes cannot 
be explained without referring to the role of ideas, ideologies and the impact of the 
domestic politics on Turkish foreign policy because, contrary to the traditional Kemalist 
explanations, Turkish foreign policy has been heavily influenced by domestic 
developments in Turkey. Moreover, Kemalism has not been the only ideology affecting 
Turkish foreign policy, but rather a multitude of ideas and ideologies like leftism, 
conservatism, Islamism, Ottomanism and Özalism. All these were discussed by this 
study and the main findings may be summarised as follows: 
First of all, as discussed in Chapter II, III5IV and V, Kemalism did not constitute a 
separate foreign policy ideology. As a pragmatist leader, for Atatürk foreign policy 
issues were secondary to his main aim of transforming Turkish politics and society 
from 
an empire to a nation-state. To do so, he needed time, and foreign policy was one of the 
useful instruments to this end. This combined with Turkey's weaknesses 
led to a highly 
pragmatic foreign policy. Therefore, it can be said that Atatürk 
did not establish an 
unalterable foreign policy understanding in a rigid mould, but only ultimate aims. 
These 
aims, as discussed in detailed in Chapter IV, were mainly a 
homogeneous, secular, 
industrialised and developed nation-state on a defendable territory. 
Naturally his ideas 
regarding the domestic politics reflected on his 
foreign policy understanding. For 
instance in the Lausanne negotiations Mustafa Kemal's republican 
ideas mainly 
determined Turkey's position in the conference rather than the 
imperial considerations. 
The sole exception of Kemalist pragmatism was 
its Western-Eastern perception, 
Kemalist foreign policy has seen the Islamic and Eastern world 
in general as a source of 
333 
conflict and backwardness and viewed the West as the final destination for Turkey. ' 
Hence ideology alienated Turkey-East relations while Turkey has been exposed to the 
negative consequences of naive Kemalist Westernism. In summary, despite these 
exceptions, in the words of Harris, `Atatürk's legacy in foreign affairs was not specific 
enough to answer all of the questions and needs of his successors. -32 However his 
followers perceived Kemal's ideas as an ideology, which provides all the prescriptions 
Turkey need, including Turkish foreign policy issues. Thus Kemal's main principles 
became taboo and a guide-book for the Kemalists. In the Inönü period in particular with 
Inönü's own interpretation of Kemalism, the Second World War and the Russian threats 
to Turkey's territorial integrity after the Second World War increased Turkey's and the 
Kemalist regime's insecurity feelings. As a result, as discussed in Chapter VI, Kemal's 
and his friends' scepticism about the Western great powers, minorities and the 
opposition groups (Islamists, Ottomanists, socialists etc. ) became one of the main 
characteristic of Kemalism. At the end of the one-party era, the Kemalists were 
considering any opposition to Kemal's ideas as an act of national treachery while the 
Kemalist elite and the army saw themselves as the guardians of the Kemalist republic. ' 
As Shaw and Shaw put it, RPP, which had been established by a pragmatic leader, 
Atatürk, was more than a political organisation, `for many Kemalists it was a religion, 
way of life. '4 Similarly Agaoglu says `the republic was a religion, a faith, not just a 
state regime'. 5 In other words, pragmatic Kemalist understanding evolved into a more 
ideological approach and Kemal's domestic aims and fears deeply affected Kemalist 
foreign policy understanding after Mustafa Kemal. Between 1923 and 1945 this 
understanding confronted no serious challenge because the Kemalist elite enjoyed a 
monopoly under a single party tutelary regime. In this framework, this thesis further 
reached these conclusions for ideologies and ideas' effect on Turkish foreign policy 
in 
Atatürk and Inönü eras: First of all, as mentioned Turkey's foreign policy in these years 
was mainly a survival policy. Kemal's and Inönü's Westernism helped good relations 
with the West and Turkey always sought the West's friendship yet 
ideology played a 
limited role in Turkey's external relations with the European great powers, the 
Balkans 
and the Soviet Union_ On the other hand, as Chapter V showed 
ideological 
259-269; G61e, Modern..., pp. 48-51; Rustow, Turkey..., p. 
14. 1 Gökay, 'From Western... ', PP- 
2 Harris, Turkey..., p. 180. 
3 Robinson, The First..., p. 88; Lerner and Robinson, `Swords... ', pp. 
19-44. 
4 Shaw and Shaw, History of..., p. 403. (daily, 'Vicdan Azabi Duymayanlara', Son Posta, , 
Istanbul), 12 January 193 1. 5 
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considerations deeply determined Turkey's relations with the Middle East and the 
Muslim countries in general. Kemal and Inönü's hard-line secularism and their 
Westernism (or West-East perception) prevented from establishing closer relations 
between Turkey and the Islamic countries. Except the defensive Sadabat Pact, Turkey 
opposed any meeting or integration based on the common Ottoman or Islamic past or 
cultural values, and as witnessed in the Fez Affair, Turkey's ideological attitude made a 
close co-operation difficult. Another example which showed the Kemalist ideology's 
impact on the relations was Turkish policy vis-ä-vis Israel and the Arabs. Turkey 
became one of the first countries to recognise Israel in the Inönü period, and as Kihc put 
it, Inönü government took the decision to emphasise Turkey's Western identity. 6 
When Soviet Union directly threatened Turkey after the Second World War, Turkey 
was forced to abandon its neutrality in foreign policy and to change its one-party regime 
to multi-party regime inside mainly to get the American support. 7 These two factors, 
namely Turkey's western alignment and democratisation, opened a more pluralistic era 
in Turkey's foreign policy and many other ideological approaches, from Islamism to 
socialism, found opportunity to challenge the traditional Kemalist foreign policy 
understanding. The right-wing Democrat Party in particular represented the first serious 
challenge to Kemalism in foreign policy area and the DP era marked the end of absolute 
Kenialist hegemony. The Democrats, unlike Kemal, idealised democracy, liberalism 
and the people's traditional values such as Islam and the Ottoman past. The DP 
effectively continued Inönü's Western alignment policy and Turkey was accepted as a 
NATO member, however, the Democrat's ideological roots in time reflected on their 
foreign policy methods and aims, and at the end the DP deviated from the traditional 
foreign policy understanding in many cases. 8 The first effect of the Democrats' ideology 
was seen in relations with the West. Contrary to the RPP's scepticism about the Western 
countries, as Köprülü declared, the DP identified Turkish national interests with the 
Western block's. 9 The DP's naive Americanism not only determined Turkey's relations 
with the West but at the same time badly affected Turkey's relations with the newly- 
emerged Third World block. Turkey, thanks to the DP's Americanism acted as a 
6 Kilic, Turkey and..., p. 189 and Mango, `Turkish... ', p. 59. 
Hale, `Foreign Policy... ', p. 94. 
8 As discussed in Chapter VII in the literature it is frequently claimed that there was no change 
in foreign 
policy in the Menderes era. For an example see Hale, `Foreign Policy... 
', p. 94. 
Köprülü cited in Cumhuriyet, 25 December 1955 and Toker, DP'nin 
Attie..., pp. 160-175. 
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spokesman for the developed Western countries, although it was an underdeveloped 
country. }° Obviously Turkey's this attitude towards the Third World cannot be 
explained by the geographical or historical factors, because neither its location nor its 
history and economic power forced Turkey for such a policy, but the government 
party's ideas and perceptions about the world order and Turkey's interests. In other 
words, it can be argued that if another party, which had a different world view, was in 
power, like RPP Turkey's Third World policy would have been very different than the 
DP's policy towards the underdeveloped states. As a matter of fact that our claim would 
be proved after the 27 May Coup; the leftist Inönü and the Urgüplü governments 
immediately abandoned Menderes' Third World policy and saw these countries as an 
important alternative to balance Turkey's Western connections. As it was detailed in 
Chapter VIII, naturally ideology was not the only reason and there were other reasons 
like the external factorsi l for this shift, yet it was certain that ideology had played an 
undeniable role in this change. 
As witnessed in his Third World policy, Menderes' world order perception also affected 
his Middle Eastern policies and caused a great deviation from the Kemalist non- 
alignment and pacific Middle Eastern polices. As a result Menderes and his Foreign 
Minister Köprülü argued that Turkey could play a `big brother' role in the Middle East 
in the name of the United States. 12 In this concern Turkey's Baghdad Pact initiative with 
the United Kingdom and the United States cannot be likened to Mustafa Kemal's 
defensive Sadabat Pact, because the Baghdad Pact was a part of an activist anti-Soviet 
plan while the Sadabat Pact was peaceful defensive measure against a possible attack. 
As Chapter VII argued the Baghdad Pact separated the regional countries into two 
different groups and contrary to Kemal's pacifism, Turkey played a significant role in 
this great power game. Apart from the Baghdad Pact, Menderes followed an activist, 
and even a militarist foreign policy approach in the Syrian and the Iraqi Crises. For 
example, when the pro-Western Iraqi government was overthrown, Menderes 
decided 
on a military intervention in 1958,13 and he repeated his activist, pro-Westernist attitude 
when the American troops landed in Lebanon and the British entered Jordan 
in 1958. 
Again, the DP's ideological considerations and perceptions played a significant role 
in 
10 Gönlübol, `A Short... ', p. 7. 
" Such as the Johnson Letter, the US' Turkish policy etc. 
12 Bagrl, `Demokrat Parti'nin... ', p. 93. 
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making DP's activist and even militarist foreign policy understanding. Inönü's criticises 
about Menderes's Middle East policy support this claim: For Inönü, Menderes' Middle 
East policy with its aggressiveness and adventuristic character was a certain deviation 
from Kemalism. 14 The 27 May Coup was a reaction to the DP policies and the coup 
leaders aimed to restore Kemalist understanding in foreign policy as well. However the 
leftist elements increased their influence on Turkish politics in the 1960s, and with the 
Yön movement leftist-Kemalism emerged as a new foreign policy school of thought. 
The leftist-Kemalists advocated new security strategies for Turkey outside of NATO 
and propagated rapprochement with the Soviet Union. 15 Similarly other leftist groups, 
like the TIP, publicly criticised Turkey's alliance with the US and accused Turkey's 
Western allies of occupying Turkey economically and politically. 16 These ideas affected 
the official policy, and the Inönü and Urgüplü governments followed a more sceptical 
foreign policy towards the West while they sought partnership with the Third World 
countries. In these years Turkey abandoned its indifferent Third World policy and sent 
many delegations to improve Turkey's relations with the Latin American, African and 
Asian states. Furthermore Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan I§ik visited Moscow and 
Peking and sought close co-operation with the communist Soviet Union and China. All 
this radical shift can be considered as the impact of the ideologies. However it was not 
only ideology and the ideas which caused the shift, but the real changes also forced 
Turkey for a new foreign policy orientation. The Cyprus problem and the United States' 
disappointing Turkey policy was one of the most important reasons. The Johnson letter 
in particular increased anti-Americanism in Turkey and forced the Turkish policy- 
makers to find new friends. However, under these circumstances while the leftist and 
Kemalist Inönü and Ürgüplü governments turned their face to the Third World countries 
and the Soviet Union, the right-wing Justice Party choose to improve Turkey's relations 
with the Muslim countries and focused on the religious solidarity. This 
difference 
vividly underscored the ideology's effect on Turkish foreign policy. 
Mustafa Kemal and 
Inönü had refused to join any religious meeting or organisation 
in the Middle East yet 
now Prime Minister Demirel was calling the Muslim countries as 
`Turkey's brothers' 
and Turkey became an active member of the Islamic Conference 
Organisation (ICO) in 
these years. The Demirel government also for the 
first time in the republican history 
13 Cumhuriyet, 29 July 1958. 
14 Inönü, TBMM Meclis Zabitlan, 1958, pp. 844-845. 
15 Soysal, `Yalmzlik', Yön, No. 143. 
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changed Turkey's policy vis-a-vis Israel and Arabs and actively supported the 
Palestinians. 17 This thesis argues that this dramatic shift in Turkey's Middle East policy 
cannot be explained by only the international developments or Turkey's location 
because under the similar circumstances Inönü and Ürguplü governments did not see 
religious solidarity as a foreign policy card. They even attempted to improve Turkey's 
relations with the Latin American countries, but they never abandoned Turkey's secular 
and indifferent position in the Middle Eastern problems. In a short time, however, 
Demirel and his Foreign Minister caglayangil, as discussed in Chapter VIII, set their 
Middle Policy on religious solidarity with the Muslim states of the region claiming `the 
Muslim countries are Turkey's brothers. '18 It can be claimed that the main reason for 
these differences between the neo-Democrat Demirel and the Kemalists and the leftists 
are rooted in the ideological considerations. 
As the Chapter IX discussed, the 1970s were economic depression and social turmoil 
years for Turkey, and these increased radicalism and the role of ideologies in Turkish 
politics, and as a natural result of this in Turkish foreign policy. In the first years of the 
1970s the Orthodox Kemalist RPP's transformation from the centre to the left was 
completed by Bülent Ecevit, and the RPP became a home for many radical political 
groups like radical leftists and the Kurdists. Moreover when their parties (The NSP and 
the NAP) became the government partner, the radical Islamists and the ultra-Turkists 
increased their role in Turkish politics. Turkish Foreign policy was not immune from 
the changes in the domestic politics and different political groups affected Turkey's 
foreign policy in different degrees throughout the 1970s. Of course not all the aspects of 
Turkish foreign policy were changed, and a limited continuity was also observed. 
Turkey's location, historical factors, Turkey's social and economic structures and 
Kemalism, as a dominant ideology played a significant role in making Turkish 
foreign 
policy as witnessed in the previous decades. However the other ideologies also affected 
Turkey's external relations in an undeniable way. In the Cyprus problem and 
the poppy- 
growing crisis Ecevit publicly challenged the United States, which resulted 
in an arms 
1 
17 
6 Milliyet, 27 May 1967.168-169. Also see Chapter VIII of TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Birleim 115, Oturum 1,18,1967, pp. 
t8For 
the examples see Chapter VIII of this study. As this chapter 
detailed, Turkey's activist policy in 
the OIC in particular provides vivid examples of Turkey's 
`Islamist' policy in the region. Also see 
TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Birlesim 115, Session 1,18,1967, pp. 168-169 and 
The Bulletin of the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 33,1967. pp. 55-56. 
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embargo. Anti-Americanism became an important feature of Ecevit's R PP and the 
Turkish politics in these years while Turkey made attempts to improve its relations with 
the Soviet Union, the Third World countries and the regional states. Thanks to Ecevit's 
policies, different from Kemal's and Inönü's policies between 1920s and the 1940s, 
Turkey followed a more radical and activist foreign policy vis-ä-vis the East and its 
region. It is true not only Ecevit's or the other groups' ideological backgrounds shaped 
Turkey's foreign policy, but the international developments, like the oil crises and the 
disappointing Western attitude to Cyprus problem in particular forced Turkey for a 
radical shift in its foreign policy. However, as detailed in Chapter IX, Ecevit with his 
Islamist partner Erbakan responded all these changes more radically compared to the 
previous Inönü and Demirel governments. In addition, the certain differences between 
the Ecevit and Demirel governments' policies in the 1970s showed the ideologies' 
impact on the policies. While Ecevit reacted to the West's `anti-Turkish' policies by 
improving Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union and the Third World countries, the 
Demirel governments concentrated on the Islamic world. Under the Demirel 
governments Turkey's role in the Organisation of Islamic Conference shifted from a 
hitherto reserved position toward a more active participation while the Kemalist groups 
opposed Turkey's membership to the OIC claiming it contradicted with the secularism 
principle of Kemalism. '9 Another example was Demirel's and Ecevit's attitudes towards 
the European Economic Community (EEC). Ecevit, who was very sceptical towards the 
EEC, freeze Turkey's commitments to the EEC in 1979. When the government, 
however, was changed and Demirel came to power Turkey in a couple of months 
announced that it would formally apply for full membership. Turkey was the same 
country and the EEC was the same organisation but the change of the power 
in Turkey 
had changed Turkey's EEC policy, and even solely this example proves that 
the 
ideological orientations of the Turkish governments deeply affected 
Turkish foreign 
policy. 
Thanks to the 12 September 1980 military coup Turkey was 
isolated by the West. 
Turkey concentrated on the domestic problems and 
it was forced to make cooperation 
with its region. Ironically Turkey's relations with the 
Islamic world became closer 
under a Kemalist administration, because the generals saw 
the Muslim world as a way 
19 Aykan, Turkey's Role..., p. 75. 
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to get away from the economic and political isolation. 20 As a result Turkey became an 
active IOC member in the 1980s. In addition, in the 1980s Turkish economy showed a 
miracle-like development and Turkey became the biggest exporter of its region, except 
the Soviet Union. 21 The increasing trade with the regional states helped to increase 
Turkey's relations with the Middle East and the Balkans. Furthermore, the 
democratisation and the fast economic development changed the social structure of 
Turkey and the ethnic groups, like the Kurds, Bosnians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, 
Chechens and Turkmens, became one of the important factors in Turkish politics, and as 
a result of this Turkey's relations with its region intensified. However the most 
important factor caused a radical change in Turkish foreign policy was the end of the 
Cold War. In the new international environment Turkey relatively lost its geo-strategic 
importance for the West compared with the Cold War years. The European Community 
(EC) furthermore refused Turkey's membership application and Turkey felt frustrated 
and humiliated at the reluctance of the Europeans to accept Turkey as an equal 
member. 22 Under these circumstances Turkey lost the theoretical framework of its 
foreign policy and all these factors mentioned above provided a suitable ground for the 
Özalist foreign policy understanding. Özal publicly challenged the existed foreign 
policy understanding saying in foreign policy the days of taking a cowardly and timid 
position are over. From now we will pursue an active policy based on circumstances. '23 
Ozal claimed that Turkey was now a strong country in terms of military, economy and 
politics and it had to play its role in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus. 
24 As 
Turkish and Muslim country, he further argued that, Turkey must use the religious and 
kinship solidarity as an instrument of its foreign policy. 
25 In this framework, while the 
Kemalists and the leftist groups saw the end of the Cold War as a great threat to 
Turkish 
security, Özal, as Chapter X showed, perceived all these 
developments as an 
opportunity to make Turkey a regional power. It can be argued that 
his activism and 
new foreign policy were rooted in his ideas while the secular 
Kenialist groups avoided 
to see the newly emerged Turkic and Muslim states as an alternative. 
As a result, it can 
be said that Özal abandoned the traditional foreign policies: 
First Turkey concentrated 
in the economic issues and made efforts to increase regional 
integration as witnessed in 
20 Aykan, `Turkey... ', pp. 106-107.148-1 9. 2' General Outlook of..., p. 2; Krueger and Aktan, Swimming 
Against..., pp- 
2z Landau, Pan-Turkism..., p. 202. 
23 Ahmad, The Making..., p. 201. 
24 Milliyet, 3 March 1991. 
340 
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation experience, which is mainly an economic 
organisation and different from the previous regional Turkish initiatives, such as the 
Sadabat Pact or the Baghdad Pact. Turkey in these years used the economic instruments 
to restore its relations with the Greeks and the Russians. Second Ozal abandoned 
Kemalist pacifism and non-involvement principles as witnessed in the Balkans, 
Caucasus and in the Gulf War. In the Bosnian Crisis Turkey gave a clear support to the 
Muslim Bosnians, and Turkey's support for the Azerbaijanians in the Azerbaijan- 
Armenia conflicts was based on `Turkish brotherhood'. 26 Similarly according to Ozal 
all the Turkic republics with Turkey were `brother republics. 727 As shown in Chapter X, 
Özal with his style and policies represented a clear deviation from the traditional 
Turkish foreign policy understanding. The international developments, like the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the domestic structural changes forced Turkey 
for a shift in its foreign policy, however Özal and his ideas cannot be ignored in this 
change. Finally this study has argued that Özalist foreign policy is one of the most vivid 
examples for the role of the ideas in Turkish foreign policy. 
In conclusion, this study has explored the role of ideas and ideologies in Turkish foreign 
policy since the beginning of the republic to the end of the Özal years, comparing the 
different Turkish foreign policy approaches. This study accepts that Turkey's unique 
location, its history and international developments have deeply determined Turkey's 
foreign policy and left no manoeuvre area in many areas for the Turkish policy makers, 
as sometimes seen in the Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Greek relations. Also Kemalism, 
as the founding ideology of the modern Turkey has determined Turkey's external 
relations in many cases, as witnessed in Turkey's relations with the Muslim countries 
in 
the Kemal and Inönu periods. Thanks to these factors Turkish foreign policy 
has 
showed a limited continuity in regard to some issues and principles. For example, the 
Westernisation ideal has been the guiding principle of the Turkish Republic 
from its 
inception in 1923 to the present time, and the West has been seen as the 
final destination 
by the Turkish policy makers. Likewise, Turkey has remained true to 
the non-revisionist 
norms of Kernalism. However this is not enough to claim an unbroken 
ideological 
continuity. Rather, this continuity as mentioned stemmed 
from international 
25 See Chapter X of this study and Fuller, `Turkey's New... 
', pp. 45-48. 
26 Milliyet, 3-6 March 1992. 
27 Milliyet, 15 March 1993. 
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developments and Turkey's geographical and historical features. Furthermore, even 
when the principles and aims remained unchanged the perception of these aims and 
principles by the governments changed, and this reflected on the implementation. 
This study has also argued that the changes occurred in Turkish foreign policy since the 
1920s could not be explained by only using the variables other than ideology and 
domestic factors mentioned above. This thesis has claimed that one of the most 
important factors has shaped Turkey's foreign relations is ideology and ideas. To prove 
this the thesis compared Mustafa Kemal's, Inönü's, Menderes', Ecevit's, Demirel's and 
finally Özal's foreign policy implementations and found that ideas, in addition to the 
other variables, has played an important role in Turkish foreign policy. The thesis also 
found that it is difficult to claim that Kemalism has been the only dominant ideology in 
foreign policy matters because Kemalism has faced many serious challenges, and anti- 
Kemalist and non-Kemalist approaches have not been only marginal or radical as seen 
in the Menderes, Demirel and Özal cases. It is also difficult to talk about a distinctive 
single Kemalist foreign policy ideology because Mustafa Kemal's, Inönü's, Ecevit's, 
and the 12 September Coup's Kemalisms showed certain differences as discussed in the 
relevant chapters, and the lack of consensus on the main principles of Kemalism 
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